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Glossary of Terms Used in the Thesis 
ajlaf 
Arya Samaj 
ash:raf 
at raE 
a zan 
---
bhadrolok 
bus tee 
dust uri 
dhabi 
dhoti 
durbar 
durwan 
fa twa 
Bhat 
gharri (gharry) 
goonda 
gurdwara 
hartal 
--
Hindu Mahasabha 
imambara 
jamadar 
Common body of Muslims, see atrap and 
ashraf. 
Hindu sect founded by Dayanand in the 
Punjab whence it spread into the United 
Provinces in particular; opposes caste 
restrictions, aggressively proselytising, 
especially vis-a-vis Muslims. 
'Honourable', Muslims of highest status 
who traced their descent to homelands 
outside India. 
Bengali corruption of ajlaf. 
Muslim call to prayer. 
'Respectable' people. 
class Bengali Hindus. 
Middle and upper 
Mud and thatch slum dwellings. 
Bribe. 
Washerman. 
Sarong worn by men. 
Viceregal or gubernatbrial levee~ 
Watchman. 
Religious opinion issued by a convocation 
of Muslim divines ( ulema). Not binding 
upon Muslims. 
water steps, quay. 
Horse-drawn carriage. 
Petty gangster, hooligan. 
Sikh religious building. 
Closing of shops and businesses as a sign 
of mourning and/or political discontent. 
The oldest Hindu communalist party, 
founded 1915, especially active from 
mid-1920s. 
Shia Muslim religious/educational 
institution. 
Porter, watchman. 
jihad 
khut"ba 
korbani 
kutcha 
lascar 
lathi 
loongi 
makhtab 
~aulana 
mq.ulvi 
mel a 
-
~ofussil 
Muezzin 
Mutwalli 
panchayat 
pandal 
pukkah 
Qu'ran 
Sanga than and 
Suddhi 
Shia/Sunni 
sirdar 
Religious war. 
'Successor', the religious and temporal 
head of Islam (as acknowledged_ by Sunni 
Muslims). 
Formal Friday prayer in mosques. 
Cow sacrifice. 
Temporary building. 
Indian seaman. 
Steel tipped wooden truncheon. 
Sarong worn by men in different fashion 
from dhoti. 
Qu'ranic school. 
Title of learned Muslim. 
Title of learned Muslim. 
Measure of 82.286 lbs. 
Public festival 
The rural localities of a district (or 
region) as distinguished from the chief 
station (or capital). 
Person who calls Muslims to prayer. 
Mosque manager. 
Betel nut mixture. 
Village or group council. 
Temporary pavilion. 
Muslim saint. 
Permanent, correct. 
Main Muslim religious text. 
v 
Hindu religious movements active in 1920s 
to counteract Muslim proselytising, 
connected with Hindu Mahasabha. 
Female dress in India. 
Two main Muslim sects. 
the largest sect. 
Foreman. 
Sunnis are by far 
Swaraj 
Swadeshi 
Tamasha 
Tanzim and 
Tabligh 
vakil 
zamindar 
vi 
Independence. 
Indigenous industry and products. 
A not-particularly violent brawl. 
Muslim religious movements founded in the 
1920s to counteract activities of the 
Hindu Sangathan and Suddhi movements. 
Pleader. 
'A possessor of land', formerly a revenue 
farmer, in Bengal, eastern United Provinces 
and parts of Madras they were accorded 
proprietary rights by the British. 
Preface and Acknowledgements 
Th:is thesis is a study of an urban minority group 
within India. In particular it examines the social and 
political history of the Muslim community in Calcutta 
between 1918 and 1935. 
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My initial interest in the topic was provoked by 
previous research work on the Muslims of Tamil Nad and a 
thesis written by Dr Donald Ferrell on the political history 
1 
of Delhi in the early decades of this century. The idea 
of an urban study was of immediate interest as it represented 
a hitherto largely unexplored area of modern Indian history; 
whilst my own preoccupation with the Muslims of the sub-
continent gave birth to the idea of combining both 
interests in a single studyo 
Calcutta appeared an ideal centre of interest for 
several reasons. Principally because it was the main urban 
centre of a province intimately affected by the development 
of Muslim separatism; also it was a non-traditional city 
being the product of British penetration into the sub-
continent, and as such was more typical of the urban centres 
which are now developing in India than the majority of 
older cities. 
In addition John Broomfield had published a pioneer 
work on modern Bengali political history which provoked 
much controversy, and indicated the need for further 
research into other aspects of Bengali history - particularly 
communal relations. 2 
Broomfield's work was a deliberate study of elitist 
politics and was mainly concerned with the history of the 
nationalist movement and the Bengal Legislative Council 
in the first half of the twentieth century. By its very 
1Ferrell, D.W., 'Delhi 1911-22: Society and Politics in 
the new Imperial capital of India' (unpublished Ph.D. 
t:p.esis, A.N.U., 1969) • 
.?Broomfield, J .H., Elite Confl.ict on a Plural Society 
(Berkeley, U.C.L.A. Press, 1968). 
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nature it concentrated more upon the history of the various 
communal leadership groups rather than upon the relationship 
between the leaders and the communities they led. 
My intention was therefore to write a thesis on social 
pnd political change amongst the Muslims of Calcutta with 
particular emphasis upon the relationship between the 
leaders and the masses of the community, and more generally 
u,poti the role which the Muslims of Calcutta played in the 
history of modern Bengal. Instead of concentrating upon 
the elitist leadership, which emerged during the 
nationalist struggle, both inside and outside the 
institutions of government, I sought to trace the growth 
of political and communal self-consciousness amongst the 
largely anonymous mass of Muslims who comprised nearly a 
quarter of Calcutta's population between the two World 
Wars. 
In doing so I attempted to fathom the basic levels 
of Muslim c"5:mmunal organisation within Calcutta, and the 
-~-;,.-
processes whereby increasing numbers of Muslims were 
introduced into the political arena. This in turn led to 
an examination of the changing role of the community's 
leadership from a largely traditional and homogeneous 
group, which was dependant upon British support, to a 
rnol;'e diverse group- which of necessity gained power and 
influence only by the deliberate cultivation of politically 
conscious groups within the urban community, 
The time span of the thesis had unfortunately to be 
strictly limited. I would have preferred to have taken 
the study up to Partition, but the limited time I had 
available in India, and the difficulty of obtaining 
material for the years afJ:;er 1935 imposed restrictions upon 
the period I could investigate. 
1918 seemed a logical year in which to begin; mainly 
because it was a time when communal relations in the city 
were in an extremely fluid condition, and in which the 
Muslims were faced with a severe leadership crisis. Also 
in 1918 Calcutta experienced the first of a series of 
massive communal riots in which previously quiescent groups 
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within the community began to express their first crude 
political and communal sentiments under the leadership of 
men who were antagonistic towards both the British and the 
traditional leaders of Islam in the city. 
1935 was chosen as the end date for reasons already 
discussed, but there were several other factors why it 
seemed a convenient point to end the study. At the 
beginning of the year Calcutta gained its first Muslim 
mayor who, along with the entire bloc of Muslim councillors, 
resigned from the Corporation in December 1935. These 
resignations heralded a new era of Muslim politics in 
Calcutta and Bengal as by 1936 the reformed constitution 
of 1919 had been abandoned; whilst Jinnah,·who had recently 
risen to prominence within the all-India Muslim community, 
;had begun to lead the Muslims of the province along the road 
to political separatism and Pakistan. 
One of the major difficulties I faced in my research 
concerned government material. The records of the Imperial 
Government, held at New Delhi, were freely available, but 
the same cannot be said of the West Bengal State Archives • 
.A.t the time of Partition a random division of the provincial 
archives was made roughly along the lines of the odd years 
after 1920 to East Pakistan and the even years to West 
Bengal. In addition to this the bulk of the files which 
belonged to the Police and Political Departments remained 
in West Bengal and were transferred to the C.I.D. where 
they remain closed to scrutiny. 
The official documentary material I obtained in West 
Bengal was therefore very piecemeal and was even worse in 
East Pakistan where many government records seem to have 
vanished at the time of transfer from Calcutta. 
Similar difficulties were experienced at the offices 
of the Calcutta Corporation where I was given free access 
to the 'Minutes' but was otherwise barred from the 
departmental records of the municipality. Newspaper 
material helped fill many of the missing details I was 
searching for, but even here there were serious gaps in the 
available volumes of such important newspapers as the 
X 
Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Statesman~ In turn the 
'Native Newspaper Reports', compiled weekly by the C.I.D., 
provided further background information but after 1930. the 
quality of the reports declined and they were of decreasing 
value. 
The dispersion of families at the time of Partition 
seems also to have led to the loss of many importcnt 
collections of personal papers. For example the papers of 
Abul Kasem were reputedly destroyed at this time and during 
communal riots in Burdwan in 1950, whilst the remaining 
papers of Fazl-ul. Huq were likewise claimed to have been 
destroyed by his descendants in Calcutta and Dacca. The 
sp.rviving members of the Ispahani and Suhrawardy families, 
who now live in Karachi, indicated that their family papers 
remained largely intact but they were not prepared to 
release them. 
My main thanks go to the Australian National University 
wno provided me with a scholarship and travel grant which 
made this study possible. Among others in Australia my 
sincere thanks are also due to Professor Ravinder Kumar, 
my original supervisor, Dr Johannes Voigt, Professor J.A. 
La Nauze and Dr Richard Newman all of whom provided 
invaluable supervision and encouragement. 
The staffs of the Menzies Library at the A.N.U., the 
Australian National Library in Canberra and of the 
Victorian State Library in Melbourne were also of great 
help; whilst Mrs May Richardson, Mrs Beverly Gallina and 
~ud Jackson typed drafts and compiled maps with unflagging 
zeal! 
In London the staff of the India Office guided me with 
a gentle hand through the invaluable material at their 
disposal; whilst various people at the universities of 
Sussex and Heidelberg helped sustain my belief in the 
possibility of such a study. 
In India I had the assistance of many people including 
the staffs of the National Archives of India, New Delhi 
(particularly Miss Dhan Keswani); the West Bengal State 
Archives. Calcutta; the Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi 
xi 
and the National Library, Calcutta. To individuals such 
as Dr Ajita Ranjan Mukherjea, formerly secretary to the 
Bengal Legislative Assembly, Dr Hossainur Rahman, 
Mr Ragat Ray, Dr Barun De, Drs Ashin and Uma Das Gupta 1 
Pr Soumeyer Mukherjea and many others who enabled me to 
gain valuable insights into the work I had undertaken, and 
who made life in Calcutta so rewarding, my gratitude and 
affection. 
The same thanks I also owe to various people in 
Bangla Desh. In particular Alhaj Shamsuddin Ahmed, Keeper 
of Records to the former state of East Pakistan, 
Mrs Humaira Momen at the University of Dacca, and the 
staffs of the Bengali Academy and the Australian High 
Commission (particularly Mr Allen and Mr Abdul Matin) who 
made possible the interviews I held in Dacca .. 
Last but not least my thanks to Joan, Nick, Jenny 
and David whose support during these last three years has 
made so much possible. 
. . . 
I 0. ! 'll 
. 
. 
l.t li"Q. ~ Q 
11-''"---------'..:~:::.'_' ____ •, I 
i 
CALCUTTA AND SUBURBS f 
Scale 1 = 1 Mile I r 
_..._ 
v 
- _... 
"""' 
--"' 
~-:':!<'_., 
-+-
00 
IBJENCGAIL 
AND 
§ITOCJKifM 
1921 
A y OF 
! 
I 
.,~ .... :.~-=~ -=-=-~~~~---~--:----*~ ~~~~~·- --==-=-
CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL WARDS 
1921 
SOUTH SUBURBAN 
MUNICIPAl-ITY 
COSSIPOitE 
CHIT PUR 
CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL 
1924 
SUBURBAt-l 
MUNICIPALITY 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MUSLIMS OF CALCUTTA, 1918. 
1 
At the end of the Great War in 1918, Calcutta ranked 
second only to London amongst the great cities of the British 
Empire. Built on the muddy deltaic plain of riverine Bengal 
i;;he city was bounded to the west by the sluggish, silt-laden 
Hooghly and on the east by the saline marshes of the 24 
Parganas district. Across the Hooghly and for 20 miles 
north and south stretched a variegated panorama of 
dockyards, ghats, industrial plants, temples, gardens of 
country houses and densely populated industrial townships 
centred upon the processing of jute, the mainstay of 
Bengal's economy. Contiguous to Calcutta city were the 
'dormitory' and industrial municipalities of Cossipore-
((hitpur, Manicktolla, Tollygunge, South Suburban, Garden 
1 Reach and Howrah. Administratively distinct from Calcutta 
these townships were nevertheless an organic part of the 
city. 2 
Founded in the seventeenth century by a band of Scots 
and English traders Calcutta remained a foreign enclave in 
Bengal. Its population was predominantly migrant with 
nearly 50 per cent coming from areas outside Bengal3 in 
composition the population ranged from the wealthy 
E1.1ropean business community with their splendid Victorian 
office buildings in the area of Clive Row under the shadow 
of the domed Corinthian General Post Office, to the 
1 See map of city. The best geographical and demographic 
description of Calcutta in the early years of the twentieth 
century can be found on pages 1-4 of John Broomfield's book 
Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (1968). 
2
'How far the suburbs of a great city should be held to 
extend, it is always a matter of some difficulty to determine. 
Suburban conditions in the case of Calcutta however abruptly 
terminate in the east with the limits of Maniktolla and 
Tollygunge, for the level of the land falls at once to the 
marshes. To the south and west the outlying parts of the 
South Suburban and Howrah municipalities include certain areas 
of agricultural land and suburban conditions do not extend 
'Qeyond municipal limits. To the north, however, the land on 
both banks of the Hooghly is parcelled out among a series of 
municipalities extending almost without a break for 20 miles.' 
Govt of India, Census of India, 1 921 , vol. VI, part 1 , p. 1, 
hereafter referred to as Census, 1921. 
3Ibid., p.18. 
2 
1 impoverished Hindi- and Urdu-speaking 'up country' Hindus 
and Muslims who lived in the teeming Indian city which 
stretched northwards from Dharumtala. Riverine, romantic 
Bengal of the poets and novelists was not in evidence in 
the streets of Calcutta. In the bazaars and lanes of the 
city, Hindi, Oriya, Urdu, Bihari, Tamil and many other 
languages often echoed louder than Bengali. 2 Certainly 
Bengali was the language of the predominantly Bengali 
Bindu professional and clerical middle classes, the wealthy 
Hindu landowners who had townhouses in the city, and of 
many of the fine educational establishments scattered 
throughout the city - but Bengali was the mother tongue of 
little more than half the city's population. 3 Rural 
pro~perity, the disinclination of industrial employers to 
recruit Bengali labourers and the penchant of Bengali 
lfindus for education and employment commensurate with their 
soholastic achievements militated against the formation of a 
Bengali-speaking working class in the city with the result 
that the vacuum was filled by non-Bengalis. 4 
The trade and industry of the city was controlled by 
Europeans and non-Bengali 'latter-day nabobs' , 5 mainly 
Marwaris from Rajasthan, who from Burra Bazar held virtual 
IllOnopoly over the trade of north and east India. 6 Minor 
partners to the Marwaris were merchants from the Gangetic 
1
'up country': current term used to describe Indians 1 both 
Hindu and Muslims, from the provinces stretching from Bihar 
to the North West Frontier Province. 
2 Census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, p.79. 
3Ibid., p.79, 53.3 per cent spoke Bengali as their mother 
tongue. 
4
o'Malley, L.SoS·~ Hooghly District Gazetteer (1912), p.172; 
O'Malley. L.S.S., Howrah District Gazetteer (1909), pp.32-3, 
94 .... 5; Chaudhuri, M.K. (ed.), Trends of Socio-Economic Change 
in India ( 1969), Pradip:_Sinha, 'Urbanisation and the Bengali 
Middle Class', p~319o Publication details for these and 
subsequent publications referred to can be located in the 
bibliography. 
5Broomfield, J., Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (1968),p.1. 
6 ' 
Chaudhuri, M.K. ( ed.) ~ op. cit., p. 320. 
3 
provinces, the Punjab, Bombay, Sind, Gujerat and southern 
. 1 
lndia. Below these magnates were the great mass of the 
city's population comprising mainly 'up country' Hindus 
and Muslims who, in preceding years had flooded the city 
in search 1of wealth and distinction, education, or more 
simply employment 1 • 2 The tide of migration was on the wane 
by 1918? but even so the city's population was still fluid 
insofar as few of its inhabitants regarded it as their 
permanent home, and it was very much a city of isolated 
males rather than family units with a ratio of a little 
4 less than ten men to four women. Petty merchants, 
s4opkeepers, industrialists, domestic servants, labourers, 
artisans, beggars and the ubiquitous goonda - men of all 
occupations ranging from 'Kabuli' money-lenders to 
nerveless Sikh taxi-drivers - were rarely Bengali. By 1918 
a certain number of mill operatives, petty merchants, 
lascars, boatmen and dock labourers were Bengali-speakers, 
but religion and caste fractionalised the numerically small 
and nascent Bengali working class while differences in 
wealth, occupations and life-style set it apart from the 
Bengali professional and clerical classes of the city. 5 
Physically Calcutta presented an equally diversified 
picture. To the south were the European and upper-class 
westernised Indian suburbs of Alipore and Ballygunge, 
while to the west of these areas lay the dock district of 
Kid.derpore with its comparatively large Bengali labouring 
class population. To the east of Fort William and the 
:Maidan lay the modern Bengali Hindu suburb of Bhawanipur, 
1Ray, P.c., Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemi§.! (1932), 
pp.il.47 et seg. 
2Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.1. 
3census, 1921, op.cito, p.81. 
4Ibid., pp.12, 105. 
5Chaudhuri, M.K. (ed.), op.cit., pp.316-7, 319; O'Malley, 
L.S.S., Howrah District Gazetteer (1909); Census, 1921, 
op. cit. , pp. 2 7; 36, 82, 111 • 
4 
popular with middle class families~ and the Europeanised 
shopping and commercial districts around Park Street. It 
was also an area of European and Anglo-Indian enclaves; 
of 'chummeries' where European bachelors lived and created 
innumerable scandals; of imposing villas and of the new 
colony at Park Circus - an area settled mainly by 
successful Muslim professional men~ urban and rural 
property owners and government officialso 1 Throughout the 
·entire district were large settlements of Hindu and Muslim 
tradesmen~ artisans and domestic servants who catered to 
the needs of the European and westernised Indian 
communities. 
Further to the north were the variegated Indian 
commercial and business areas which stretched in a crescent 
from Burra Bazar to the vicinity of the Municipal Market 
south of Dharumtala Street. Wedged between this crescent, 
the Hooghly and the Maidan, in the area behind the General 
Post Office was a monsoon-stained replica of the City of 
London containing the office buildings of European companies, 
the residence of the Governor of Bengal and a High Court 
modelled after the Cloth Hall at Ypres. The bazaars of the 
'crescent' were less spectacular architecturally and 
comprised a multitude of small business premises~ workshops 
and stalls which overflowed into the crowded streets and 
lanes of the area~ Living quarters reared up over business 
premises~ and mercantile buildings vied for space with 
temples, churches~ mosquess gurdwaras~ banks 9 restaurants~ 
schools~ workshops, apartment houses and the fortress-like 
homes of the large and wealthy Marwari joint families. Yet 
again to the north beyond Harrison Road were large areas 
0f slum and tenement dwellings~ inhabited by the labouring 
classes of the city~ and an occasional oasis of more 
respectable settlement which served as a reminder that this 
had once been a garden suburb for the wealthier Indian 
1The Park Circus colony represented a move away from the old 
centre of Muslim middle- and upper-class settlement in Ward 
XIV: Bengal Govt, Education Dept, April 1919, File No. 1E-2, 
Frogs 1-10. 
inhabitants of eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Calcutta. Pukkah tenements now rubbed shoulders with 
5 
1 kutcha bustees and decaying villas vacated by their owners 
as the quarter lost its earlier respectability. Small 
shops, religious institutions and atelier abounded 
though the residential nature of the area predominated. 
In the period immediately after 1916 the Calcutta 
Corporation implemented several slum improvement campaigns 
involving bustee clearance but most of the dispossessed 
population merely shifted site to the less congested 
municipality of Manicktolla across the Circular Canal where 
2 
new slum conglomerations rapidly sprang up. 
Such was Calcutta in 1918. A city of diverse peoples 
and religions: Bengalis~ Armenians, Punjabi.s, Tami~s, 
Afghans, Chinese 9 Pathans 9 Biharis, Englishmen, Italians, 
Persians, Hindus, Muslims, Jews 9 Christians, Jains and 
Buddhists to name but a few. It was a city of foul slums, 
a multitvde of shops and extraordinary palaces - inhabited 
by the Bengali Hindu landowning elite and modelled after 
Highland castles and French chateaux; of sometimes 
beautiful but more often astonishing British colonial 
a;rchi tecture and of medieval bazaars jammed with people, 
taxis, bullock carts, animals and the lumbering green 
trams which plied the city from Baghbazar in the far north 
to Kalighat in the south. 
II 
Granted mu~icipal status in 1727,Calcutta is the 
qldest corporation in India. At that date a Council which 
consisted of a Mayor and nine Aldermen had been createdJ -
a Council which by 1918 had developed into an institution 
1Ali, Ashraf, The City Government of Calcutta: A Study in 
Inertia (1966), pp.9-12; Goode, S.W., Municipal Calcutta 
(1916), pp.167-71. 
2o1 Malley, L.S.S., 24- Parganas District Gazetteer (1914), 
p.227c 
3Goodev S~W. 9 op.cit., pp.9-40 for a detailed history of the 
constitutional development of the Calcutta Corporation. 
6 
1 
with 50 members who administered an area of 11,954 acres 
2 divided into 25 wards with a population of nearly 885,000. 
Each of the wards elected one Councillor; 15 were nominated 
by the provincial Government; four each by the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce 1 which represented European business 
interests, and the Calcutta Trades Association, which 
represented Indian business interests and finally two were 
nominated by the Port Commissioners who controlled the 
important dockyards and canals of the city. 3 In 1915 the 
25 elected Councillors represented 38,415 voters, a little 
less than 5 per cent of the city's population. 4 This 
small number of voters comprised only the more affluent 
businessmen, householders, property owners and professional 
men who fulfilled the high financial qualifications 
necessary to be enrolled as a voter. 5 In all these men 
held 95,492 votes 6 under a system which permitted plural 
voting and which consequently favoured the mercantile and 
property owning classes in the city with property scattered 
tb.roughout the 25 wards. 
A summary of the incowplete electoral returns between 
1876, when the electoral principle was introduced, and 1918 
gives some clues as to the composition of the business and 
property owning classes in the city - insofar as the 
religion and race of the elected Councillors can be 
considered to represent the comparative voting strength of 
various interests in the city in the absence of more 
detailed statistics. Between 1876 and 1918 more than 
1 Goode, S. W. , op. cit. 1 p. 7. 
2 Census, 1921, op.cit., p.4. 
3There were 15 Port Commissioners: 5 were elected by the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 1 by the Calcutta Trades 
Association, 1 by the Calcutta Corporation and 8 wev:-e 
nominated by the provincial Government. 
4 Goode, S.W., op.cit., p.J7L 
5 Goode, S.W., op.cit., p.371. 
6 Goode, S.W., op~cit., P•37L 
7 
75 per cent of the elected Councillors were 'Hindus' - a 
loose definition comprising members of a wide variety of 
caste and linguistic groups - the rest being made up of 
Jews, Europeans, Parsis and Muslims~ 1 Following the 
reconstitution of the Corporation in 1899 at the hands of 
the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, however, when the number of 
2 
elected Councillors per ward was reduced from two to one, 
the proportion of 1 Hindu 1 Councillors to those of other 
communities rose. Jews and Europeans still gained election 
but the numerically small Parsi communiw was eliminated 
from direct representation as was the much larger but 
materially less prosperous Muslim community. In the 1900 
Corporation elections three Muslims were elected but from 
1903 onwards the 3,523 Muslim voters with 7,365 votes 
proved unable to get one of their number elected and Muslim 
representation was limited to the four Councillors nominated· 
triennially by the Government. 3 Prior to 1899 the 
percentage of Muslim municipal voters appears to have been 
greater but in later years while their numbers did not 
decline the number of non-Muslim voters increased at a far 
greater pace which was, in part at least, an indication of 
the slow rate of Muslim economic progress in the city with 
the result that by 1911 the Muslims held little more than 
8 per cent. of the municipal votes although they formed 
nearly a quarter of the city's population. 4 
In 1918 the Corporation Council.was composed of 
representatives of the following racial and religious groups: 
1 Goode, Su'Wo, op.cit., p.372. 
2Goode, s.w., op.cit., p.38; Broomfieid, J., op.cit., p.26. 
For details of the 1899 Bill see Christine Roche, 1 The 
Calcutta Municipal Bill~ 1896-1900 1 , (1965). 
3Goode, s.w., op.cit.J p.372; Raheem, Abdur, Mahommedan 
Representation On the Calcutta Corporation (1919), pp.1-4. 
4Raheem, Abdur,op.cit., p.3; Roche, C., op.cit., p.3: in 
1895 the Muslims had comprised 10.5 per cent of the 
registered votersw 
25 Hindus (20 elected) 
17 Europeans (2 elected) 
4 Muslims 
J Jews (J elected) 
1 Parsi. 1 
The result was that Hindu interests loomed large in the 
debates of the Council to the relative exclusion of all 
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but European interests. Not until the reconstitution of 
the Corporation in 1923, when the principle of separate 
communal electorates was introduced, did Muslim grievances 
and aspirations become of greater importance in the daily 
business of the Corporation. Until then the body retained 
its overwhelming Hindu bias both in the Council chamber 
and amongst the ranks of Corporation employees of whom 
only 12 per cent were Muslim in 1915. 2 
The Corporation was not, however, the sole agency of 
civic administration" The Indian Army maintained Fort 
William and the Maidan independently of the municipal 
authorities, and the provincial government kept tight rein 
on law and order by means of the Calcutta Police Force, 
the Bengal Judicial Service - whose officers staffed the 
regular courts - and the system of Honorary Magistrates. 
The latter group were appointed from the ranks of the 
socially more distinguished members of the city's population 
and comprised members of all the major communal groups. 
Social status, influence withi.n their respective communities 
and loyalty to the Crown were factors important in the 
choice of these men by the provincial administration. 
That such considerations were paramount in the mind of the 
authorities can be confirmed by looking at the background 
of the eight Muslim Honorary Magistrates and four nominated 
Muslim Corporation Councillors who held office in 1918. 
Socially the most prominent of these men was Prince 
Afsar-ul"-Mulk Mirza Muhammed Akram Hussain Bahadur, the 
youngest son of the late King of Oudh who had been exiled 
1 Goode, S.W., op.cit., p.371. 
2 Goode, s.w., op.cit., p.J72~ 
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to Calcutta after the Mutiny in 1857. The Prince was both 
a nominated Corporation councillor and an Honorary Magistrate 
as well as Sheriff of Calcutta in 1918. A pensioner of the 
Britisht plagued by financial and family difficulties 1 the 
Prince nevertheless had a long pedigree which seems to have 
impressed the British more than the local Muslims. They 
held the Prince and his family in some esteem but his 
influence was circumscribed by a considerable amount of 
intellectual and financial poverty and a natural penchant 
to live a restricted social life. Safe in a cocoon 
compounded of his historical prestige and the patronage of 
the British, the Prince, and men of similar background, 
regarded themselves as the natural leaders of the Calcutta 
Muslim community. 'Educated' Muslims he dismissed as 'too 
busy to provideo •• leaders' and believed that 'the gentry and 
nobility' were likely to provide the best leaders of the 
2 
conununuty. Merchants and trad.'esmen he regarded with 
particular disapproval and considered them social parvenus 
despite the fact that such men shared his rank as Corporation 
councillor and Honorary Magistrate. Oblivious to their 
sentiments and the realities of the changing world he stated 
in 1913 that 
Members of this community from the very nature of 
their calling are daily brought into contact with 
all sorts and conditions of men and have therefore 
no doubt unique opportunities of gaining knowledge and 
experience •••• They are not only influential with the 
people, but also rich. But, as a class, they are by 
no means more advanced than either [the gentry, 
nobility or educated Muslims]. They may be less so~ 
They are no doubt, men of experience and business 
instincts, but barring a few who are self-made, they 
have come into prosperous lines of business bequeathed 
1 Bengal Govt, Political Dept, December 1918, File no.10-26, 
Progs 122-3; ibid., February 1920, File no .. 10-12 of 1919, 
Progs 20-4. 
2ca~cutta Corporation, 'Minutes~, October 1913-March 1914, 
5.11.1913, pp.1233-4. (In 1895, however, of the 13 nominated 
and elected Muslim municipal councillors none were represen-
tatives of the old aristocratic families: 4 were lawyers, 
2 were doctors, 5 were public servants and 2 were property 
owners, Roche, Co, opocit~, p.5)~ 
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to them by their ancestors and they are prospering 
now almost automatically. I know~ •• that great 
apprehension is entertained in some quarters that a 
handfu.l of men of this class ••• will have more or less 1 the monopoly of representing the Mahommedan community. 
Of the other Honorary Magistrates and Corporation councillors 
three were merchants, one a zamindar, two members of the 
legal profession and two were government pensioners. One 
of the merchants was G.H.C. Ariff, a wealthy Gujerati silk 
merchant, one-time member of the Imperial Legislative 
Council, member of the Muhammedan Literary Society2 and in 
1917 a member of the dissident Presidency Muslim League 
faction which attempted to take over the Central National 
Muhammed.an Association as a rival organisation to the League. 
Originally a prominent member of the pro-Congress Muslim 
grpup in Calcutta,Ariff had broken with the group over the 
terms of the Lucknow Pact in 1916 but had lost his seat 
in the Imperial Legislative Council as a result of his 
earlier association with the group and it was not until 
he aligned himself with Nawab Syed Ali Nawab Chowdhury, a 
wealthy zamindar who led the dissident League faction, 
that his standing within the elite circles of the Calcutta 
community and the eyes of the British was restored.J In 
1916 Ariff had been defeated by Abdur Raheem a Corporation 
councilJ_or since 1913, Honorary Magistrate since 1915, doyen 
of the Muslim merchants of Ward VIII4 and a property owner 
of some note in the city. Like Ariff,Raheem was a non-
Bengali being an Urdu-speaker originally from Delhi., The 
third merchant was Mirza Muhammed Bakar Shirazi, a wealthy 
Persian and member of the Muhammedan Literary Society5 whose 
family had a long tradition of Persian scholarship and were 
intimately connected with the Hooghly Inambara and the 
1Ibid. 
2 See page 41o 
3see pp.56f< 57 9 62, 71: 
~NR, 1918, JO March, Jamhur. 
5see page 4 1 ;, 
1 1 
Persian Department of Calcutta University. The zamindar 
was Moulvi Syed Altaf Ali, son of Nawab Syed Ali Nawab 
Chowdhury, Honorary Magistrate and 'wealthy young man 
about town' who lived in Calcutta on the rents from family 
property in Rajshahi. The two lawyers were Nawab A.F.M. 
Abdur Rahman, son of Nawab Abdul Latif, barrister, retired 
Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, President of the 
Muhammedan Literary Society, Secretary of the Central 
National Mahommedan Association and a member of the 
Corporation since 1899, and Nawab Serajul Islam. Originally 
from Delhi Serajul Islam had settled as a child in 
Calcutta, practiced law and had first been appointed to the 
Corporation in 1877 and was made an Honorary Magistrate in 
1 913. The two remaining Honorary Magistrates were 
Nawabzada Saiyid Hussain Ali and Nadir Jung Mirza Ahmed 
Ali, both government pensioners and members respectively 
of the ex-ruling houses of Mysore and Oudh. Neither were 
men of public note but the social background and family 
connections of both were impeccable. 
Apart from Ariff who eventually reformed and was 
appointed an Honorary Magistrate in 1918, these men had 
avoided involvement in all but the most loyal and 
respectable political, social and occupational activities. 
All were men of wealth and education whose life-style and 
fortunes were closely bound to the maintenance of British 
rule in India insofar as it apparently maintained the 
status quo amongst communal groups and social classes in 
the Indian Empire. 1 
III 
The Muslims of Calcutta city numberoo.approximately 
205,000 out of a total population of nearly 885,000 in 
1918. 2 The greater Calcutta region- an area which 
----·-
1I have avoided biographical footnotes and references in 
this section for the reason that they are far too numerous 
to detail and the information provided represents the piecing 
together of a large number of petty and disparate oddments 
of information. The more important references are included 
later in the text if, and when, the individual concerned is 
of prominence at a particular time between 1918 and 1935. 
2census, 1921, op.cit., pp.4, 34. 
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included the city and contiguous muni.cipalities 1 -had a 
populati.on of over 1,300,000 which included some 325,000 
Muslims. 2 The greater proportion of these Muslims were 
Hindi - and Urdu-speaking migrants from the Gangetic 
provinces who had flooded into the city in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. In the census of 1911 435,927 
inhabitants of the greater Calcutta area, including 70,588 
Urdu-speakers, returned Hindi or Urdu as their mother 
tongue as did 40.3 per cent of the city's population.3 
In that census no breakdown was given for the linguistic 
affiliations of the Muslim population but the tendency 
was noted of Bengali-, Hindi- and Bihari-speaking Muslims 
to return Urdu as their mother tongue, 4 and it can be 
safely assumed that the greater proportion of Muslims in 
the city were not Bengalis. 
Prior to the great flood of migrants in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century the Muslim population of 
the city had been mainly Bengali-speaking with the 1837 
census of the city returning 45,000 Bengali-speaking 
Muslims to approximately 20,000 non-Bengali Muslims. 5 The 
Bengali-speakers had migrated from districts near to 
Calcutta such as 24 - Parganas~ Howrah and Hooghly into a 
city which was till the 1850s primarily a mercantile rather 
than industrial centre. They were mainly illiterate 
peasants who found work as day-labourers, market-gardeners, 
hawkers, fish sellers, domestic servants and. in various 
other occupations associated with their traditional caste 
1 See Map. 
2 Census, 1921, op~cit., p.71. 
3census, 1911, volcVI, part 1, p.47. 
4Ibid.; Govt of Bengal, Report on the Census of Calcu'tta, 
J.§21, Po25. 
5Mukherjea, S.N .. & Leach,. E. (eds), Elites in South Asia 
(1970), Mukherjea, S"N., 'Class, Caste and Politics in 
Calcutta, 1815-38', p.37. 
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or group occupations. The non-Bengali Muslims, however, 
were a very different group. They were not a homogeneous 
community but made up of a variety of sectarian, linguistic 
and regional groups hailing from many parts of India. One 
of the earliest groups to settle in the city were the 
Cutchi Memons, a trading group from the Kathiawar region 
in western India who arrived in 1770~ 1 Other groups 
included traders from Delhi, Oudh, Persia, Dawoodi Bohras 
and Ismailis, the last two being heterodox sects, Arabs 
and.- 1 Meg-hul:s-1 - who were the descendants of the socially 
elite Ashraf families of foreign descent whose political 
dominance in Bengal had been usurped by the British~ 
All these groups were, for the most part, merchants 
and traders with a sprinkling of government servants and 
academics who were culturally and linguistically distinct 
from their Bengali-speaking co-religionists. Few took 
an interest in public affairs having neither the 'inclination 
nor skill required for the type of administrative posts 
open to the Indians' • 2 Their interests in the mercantile 
field were mainly traditional being largely restricted to 
th.e hide and skin trade, which they virtually controlled, 3 
d th t f . . d. t b d . 4 an. e expor o gums, sp1ces, 1n 1go, o acco an. r1ce -
rarely did they take an interest in 1 the areas of economic 
activity which received a new impetus under the British 
and opened up opportunities for men to move up in the new 
world' • 5 
The 1 Moghul' Muslims were, however, a very distinct 
sub-community 'isolated from the vast majority of the 
Bengali Muslim masses and from other non-Bengali Musli~ 
groups in Calcutta 1 ~ 6 They were the Ashraf, the 
1
statesman, 1929, 9 May$ p.10o 
2Mukherjea, S.N. & Leach~ E. (eds)~ op.cit., p~49~ 
3Ray, P.C., op.cit .. , p.447. 
4Ibid., p.459 fn. 
5Mukherjea, SoN. & Leach, Eo (eds), op.cit., pJ+9. 
6Ibid. 
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aristocrats and traditional social elite of Bengal and 
included those of highest social ranking such as Saiyid, 
Pathan and Moghul as opposed to the anonymous mass of 
1 Atrap or commoners. The respect and prestige accorded 
them was based on several factors the most important of 
which was their claim to foreign descent - a claim which 
intimated a closer family connection with the glorious 
past of Islam than could ever be possessed by the larger 
2 body of Atrap. During the pre-British period in Bengal 
when various Islamic dynasties had held sway from the 
thirteenth century, the ancestors of these Ashraf families 
had settled in the province as administrators, soldiers 
and missionaries. Maintained by land grants these 
migrant families from northern India, Persia;, Iraq and 
central Asia had formed an exotic ruling class which was 
culturally and linguistically foreign to Bengal. Their 
culture aped that of the Moghul court and their language 
was Persian and to some extent Urdu, Instead of waning 
over the centuries the cultural distinction between the 
Ashraf and the largely indigenous Atrap became more rigid~ 4 
Knowledge of Bengali permeated the ranks of the Ashraf, 
but it was the despised language of the uncultured masses5 
and. as far as the Ashraf were concerned it had no place 
in their religious, intellectual or social life that was 
of any consequenceo 6 
1
o 1 Malley, L.s.s., 24-Par anas District Gazetteer (1914), 
p.8J: Atrap is the Bengali corruption of A,ilaf Lower classes) 
and is a generic designation for converts and functional 
groups, e.g~ Dhunia (cotton cleaner), Kulu (oil_presser), 
~ajjam (barber). 
2Roy, Asim, 'Islam in the environment of Medieval Bengal' 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1970), p.J2. 
3one major theme of Bengali Muslim historical writings, 
especially in the late nineteenth century when Islamic 
revivalist movement swept the mofussil has been the attempt 
to prove that the Atrap, like the Ashraf, are in fact of 
foreign origin, evg. Fazli Rubbee's, The Origin of the 
Mussalmans of Bengal (1895), a_~claim not supported-by 
anthropological surveys. 
4Roy, Asim, op.cit., pp.J6-45. 
5Sinha, Pradip, Nineteenth-Century Bengal (1965), p.55. 
6Roy, Asim, op.cit~, p.41u 
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In no way did. the Bengali language or culture 
impinge upon the circumscribed. life of the Ashraf. The 
result was the emergence of a Muslim social, economic, 
religious and. administrative elite centred. upon the Moghul 
provincial capitals such as Dacca and. Murshid.abad. which 
was bound. to the body of its co-religionists by little 
more than a common religious belief. 
The advent of British rule in the eighteenth century 
had. far-ranging effects upon the position of the Ashraf. 
The socio-economic changes wrought by the British in the 
mofussil caused. a certain amount of dispossession amongst 
1 Musli:rn landowners, but more important still was the 
administrative and. cultural impact of British rule. At 
first the British retained. the decayed. Moghul administra-
tive system but in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, however, the administrative machinery was 
overhauled. as the process of government expanded. and. became 
more sophisticated.. The skills required. of Indian 
employees became more diverse and essentially entailed. the 
absorption of western techniques and. education, a process 
the majority of Ashraf families proved. incapable of 
undergoing. The effect on many Ashraf families was severe 
an overweening pride in non-Bengali cultural values had. 
prevented. any widespread. integration of these families 
with the indigenous society of Bengal and. now militated. 
against their acceptance, or at least utilisation, of 
western techniques and. culture. An archaic education system 
2 looked. backwards to the days of Moghul glory, and left 
them ill-prepared. to accept the new administrative and. 
economic opportunities which opened. up under the new regime. 
The luckier amongst them found. refuge on their estates in 
the mofussil or in the fading pensionary courts of the 
Nawabs of Dacca and. Murshidabad., but for many the changes 
spelled. ruin. The more enterprising took to trade in 
1Mukherjea, S.N. & Leach, E. (ed.s), op.cit., p.J9; Mukherjea 
seriously questions Hunter's thesis of Muslim material 
d.isposses~;~ion. 
2 Roy, As~m, op.cit., pp.15-16. 
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Calcutta or sold off land to provide their children with 
a western education 1 but most simpl.y retreated behind 
their garden walls where in increasing poverty and in a 
cultural and emotional cocoon they clung to a rapidly 
fading life-cycle. Of those that did settle in Calcutta, 
and this included other non-Bengali Muslims, only a few 
rich landowners and merchants took any interest in public 
affairs. 1 The majority were simply not interested in 
acquiring the skills required by the new administration 
and even when provided with their own institute of higher 
education, the Calcutta Madrassa, by Hasting in 17802 
tliey ~ither ignored it or allowed it to languish for lack 
of moral and financial support and under the impact of 
internecine squabbling over the curriculum.J 
By the mid-nineteenth century the Ashraf were a 
relatively impoverished social elite compared to those of 
other communities. In the mofussil some of them, such as 
the Nawab of Dacca, survived as great landowners and were 
the social and economic leaders of the community but the 
position of the Ashraf in Calcutta was somewhat different. 
As far as status was concerned they were still socially 
pre-eminent in their community and the few Muslims with a 
western education and who had entered the professions and 
higher ranks of government service were from this group. 
But, the wealth of the Calcutta Muslim community was in 
the hands of migrant merchant families who, although they 
may have claimed Ashraf status were rarely accorded it by 
the long-established Ashraf families of the province. The 
latter took pride in their historical role in Bengal and bad 
imbibed enough of the bhadrolok~ ethos to associate status 
1Mukherjea, S.N.& Leach, E. (eds), op.cit., p.J8u 
2Huque, M. Azizul, History and Problems of Moslem Education 
in Bengal (1917), pp.S-6, 18, 29. 
Jibid., p.18; Sinha Pradip, op.cit., p.54, quotes the Calcutta 
University Commission of 1917-19 which stated that: 'while the 
Bengali Muhammadan is generally anxious that his community 
should reap the full. benefit of secular education, he is not 
prepared to take the benefits at the price of any real 
sacrifice of the Islamic tradition or culture'. 
4Roy, Asim, op.cit., p.JJ; Broomfield, J., op.cit., pp.S-6. 
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also with landownership to the extent that mercantile 
activities of the Calcutta Muslims were somewhat beyond the 
bounds of respectability. 
This does not mean, however, that the Calcutta Muslim 
community was socially immobile. In Muslim society throughout 
India descent and language were the basic criteria for 
status ranking but pragmatically wealth also counted. 
Wealth plus the adoption of Ashraf cultural and linguistic 
1 -
values, and also the purchase of an agricultural estate 
eased the path to higher status. With prosperity non-Ashraf 
groups did not form rival social elites but by marriage and 
changes in life-s~tyle they were gradually absorbed into the 
ranks of the traditional elite. The difference was that in 
Calcutta by the twentieth century the pre-requisites for 
Ashraf status were subtly different from those current in 
the mofussil. In Calcutta imitation of this status group 
implied subscription to time-honoured cultural traditions, 
but in the urban environment it also entailed the pursuit 
of occupations other than the ownership of land and the 
disbursement of patronage granted by the British to prominent 
communal leaders such as the Nawab of Dacca. The more 
success;ful Ashraf in the city had taken to weste:rn education 
and entered the professions and government service with the 
result that such pursuits gained respectability amongst the 
economically dominant but socially inferior Muslim mercantile 
groups in Calcutta adding a hitherto unknown degree of 
modernity to an ancient pattern of social mobility. In 
addition this growing differentiation of interests between 
the western-oriented aspirations of many Calcutta Ashraf 
families and the traditionalist outlook of leading Ashraf 
families in the mofussil sowed the seeds for a divergence 
of interests within Ashraf ranks when in later years members 
of this group_entered the political arena -Ashraf families 
from Calcutta vied with those from the mofussil for leadership 
of the Bengal Muslim community, one using the modern political 
techniques of the age, the other appealing to the romantic 
1 ~us, 1921, voloV, pp.160, 349, vol.VI, p.71. 
cause of traditionalism as applied to religious beliefs 
and the structuring of Islamic society. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the 
composition of the Muslim population of Calcutta changed 
radically. In this era Calcutta developed rapidly as a 
18 
great industrial city based on the processing of jute, cotton 
and associated industrial concerns which sprang up in and 
around the city. 1 Vast numbers of labourers and operatives 
were needed to- staff the milliS' and 1 up country' Hindus 
and Muslims from outside Bengal were recruited. Poor 
comm~nications with the Bengal mof~ssil, relatively 
prospero~s r~ral conditions which red~ced the rate of inteT'nal 
migration, caste prohibitiops, a strong belief amongst 
employers that the Bengali was constit~tionally nnfit for 
factory labo~r and not lea1st the penchant of Bengalis for 
more respectable non-manual pursuits were all factors which 
militated against the formation of a large Bengali working 
class in Calcutta during'thi~ period. 2 The system of 
recruitment organised during this period was found convenient 
by the mill-owners and directly helped maintain the non-
Bengali character of the Calcutta working class. Workers 
were recruited by sirdars, or foremen, who generally signed 
on men from their own villages or districts either out of 
a sense of group loyalty, simple convenience or for the sake 
of the welcome dasturi or bribe. 3 In 1918 the mill 
population's communal ratio was roughly five Hindus to 
threeMuslims- the figures for 1921 were 47,694 Hindus and 
10 1 Malley, L.S.S., Howrah District Gazetteer (1909), pp.38-9, 
110-11; Gadgil, D.R., The Industrial Evolution of India in 
Recent Times ( 1948 ed.), pp.54, 55, 74, 78, 103. 
2 See footnotes no. 4, p.2 and no.-:;., p.3; Govt of India, 
~I~n~d~~.:;;;.;.;s...;t;..;;:r;,;;i;;.;a;:-;;;;l~C...;o;;.;mm~;.;;:i;.;;s:;..;s;;;.;l=. . .;;o~n~R~e~p.;;;o.;;;r;....;t;,z.., ~1~9:-1.;..6-=---~1...::;,8 , p. 11 ; Chat to padhya y, 
K.P., A Socio-Economic S~rvey of Jute Labour (1952), pp.5-9. 
3census, 1921,. vol.V, part 1, p.143; Chattopadhyay, K.P., 
op.cit., p.8; Kelman, J.H., Labour in India (1923), p.102; 
Mukerjee, R., The Indian Working Class (19p1), p.39; Govt of 
India, Ind~strial Commission Report, 1916-18, pp.11, 13; 
Anstey, V., The Economic Development of India ( 1952 ed.), 
pp.120, 125. 
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30,182 Muslims. 1 The majority of mill workers were from 
Bihar and the United Provinces 2 andmost lived either singly 
or with dependents outside the municipal limits of Calcutta 
which contained only 17.3 per cent of the mill labourers 
and families.J Most lived either in mill housing or in 
squalid bustees which were ramshackle straw and mud huts 
crowded onto vacant blocks of unsewered land that was 
invariably flooded by the annual monsoon. The labourers 
were in the area for one reason only - to make money, which, 
despite'the temptations and ravages of prostitutes, money 
lenders, V.D. and grog shops, they sent to their native 
villages in large quantities. 4 Few labourers spent more 
than eight months in the area5 and the mills had an 
exceedingly high labour turnover. 6 Most labourers arrived 
without dependents, particularly, for some unknown reason, 
the Muslims,7 and the male-female ratio for the greater 
Calcutta area was the lowest in Bengal; for the city itself 
it was 1,000:470 a factor which no doubt contributed to 
the turbulent social life of the mill labourers in and 
around the city. 8 
The majority of the Muslim inhabitants of the city 
were not mill labourerso Calcutta city was not an industrial 
area but rather a business and mercantile centre which 
1 Census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, p.107. 
2Ibid., p.111. 
3Ibid., p.104. 
4Mukerjea, R., op.cit., p.291; Govt of India, Industrial 
Commission Report, 1916-18, pp.11-12; O'Malley, L.s.s., 
Howrah District Gazetteer (1909), pp.94-5. 
5census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, pp.12-13; O'Malley, L.s.s., 
24-Par anas District Gazetteer (1914), p.226; O'Malley, L.S.S., 
Howrah District Gazetteer 1909), p.JO. 
6Mukherjea, R., op.cit., p.41. 
7Kelman, J.H., op.cit., p.98; Chattopadhyay, K.P., op.cit., 
p.19; Census, 1921, vol.V, part 1, p.J64. 
8
census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, p.12; Ali, Ashraf, The City 
Government of Calcutta: A Study in Inertia (1966), p.6. 
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provided occupations different to those offered by the 
mills. The Muslims of the city tended to follow particular 
occupq.tions because they were traditional and also because 
some such as butchering and the skin and hide trade were 
avoided by many caste Hindus. 
In particular the Muslims dominated trades such as 
Qutchering, leatherwork, cigarette manufacturing, building, 
carpentry, baking, cabinet-making, tailoring, cart 
transport - as drivers and entrepreneurs, river transport 
and various sections of the maritime services, particularly 
1 
as lascarso Large numbers were also found in the lower 
ranks of the police force where the tough Bihari Muslims 
were valued as constables, domestic service, the drug 
industry, book-binding, animal care, the fresh and dried 
2 fruit trade, shoemaking, printing and as dock labourerse 
In other fields, however, the Muslims were poorly 
representedQ As merchants, moneylenders and traders they 
were outnl.Ullb~red 3:1 by Hindus 3 and were mainly, apart from 
a few wealthy families, petty merchants such as the 
'Feshwari' fruitsellers, Bihari butchers, Hooghly Muslim 
general-goods merchants, 'Kabuli' moneylenders and Pathan 
shoemakers who had small stalls and shops in Wards VIII, 
X and XIII, the main centres of Muslim business activity. 4 
A similar =\atio of Muslim employment existed in the public 
force and administrative agencies of the city where they 
were found mostly in the lower ranks as labourers and petty 
clerkse In the 'professions and liberal arts' Muslim 
representation reached its lowest ebb and for every Muslim 
employed there were six Hindus, not to mention the members 
1
see Appendix I: Census, 1921, voloV, part 1, p.414, vol.VI, 
part 1, p.J6, 'they are almost the only Indians who go to 
sea and. form a majority of the crews of lighters, launches, 
river steamers and boats which are in use in the port', 
pp.104, 105, 107. 
2Ibid.; Ray, P.C., op.cit., p.456e 
3census, 1921, vol.V, part 1, p.414. 
4
see Map, "Calcutta Municipal Wards, 1921 11 • 
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of other communities. 1 Overall one third of the city's 
Muslims were employed in industry, one sixth in transport, 
one seventh in trade, one eleventh in domestic service and 
a mere one in twenty in the public administration, 
2 professions and liberal arts. 
An interesting feature of'Muslim employment in the 
city, particularly as recorded in the 1901 Census 3 is the 
indication it gives of the social organisation of the 
community below the elite level of Ashraf families who 
provided the Muslim membership of the professions and 
liberal arts, 4 and the more prosperous merchant families. 
The 1901 Census revealed that Muslims following certain 
trades and occupations lived in particular areas of the 
city, or at least in groups scattered amongst a limited 
number of wards. For example the greatest concentration 
of Muslim animal food and vegetable sellers was to be found 
in Ward VIII whilst the largest number of Muslims engaged 
in water transport and storage plus those engaged in the 
professions was to be found in Ward XX.5 
Obviously this pattern of settlement was more than 
fortuitous. The pattern of Muslim and non-Muslim settlement 
in Calcutta was such that the maintenance of identity of 
communities and sub-communities was relatively easy. The 
4 
..:;..;;;.:;.;;;::..::;;.=..z.~l:...9~2~.1 , . :V.o l. . VI , . part 1 , p • 1 0 7 • 
Census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, p.123: 
Occupations/income of Saiyid's of Calcutta 
Income from rent of land 4.0~ 
Cultivators 1.1% 
Industry 25.4% 
Transport 10.5% 
Trade 14.4% 
1:3.5% Domestic service 
Contractors etc .. 
Beggars etc., 
Others (includes 
those employed 
academics,clerks, 
8. J% 
2. J% 
in professions etc.)2o.5% 
5census, 1901, vol.VII, part 1, pp.200-491. 
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very rapid growth of Calcutta in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century affected the social organisation of the 
various communal groups similarly, in at least one basic 
way. Insofar as it occurred over a relatively short period 
this rapid urbanisation resulted in the members of various 
groups clinging together socially in geographic units, as 
a conscious, or perhaps subconscious, means of protection 
and maintenance of social identity in what was essentially 
a foreign environment. Calcutta was, and still is, more a 
conglomeration of vill,ages than a western metropolis with 
a major division between the areas inhabited by the larger 
communal groups and yet further sub-divisions based on 
regional, linguistic, sectarian and occupational 
affiliations. 1 Amongst the Muslims the only groups not to 
be so confined were the Ashraf and wealthier mercantile 
families who were scattered throughout the areas of 
greatest Muslim population~ but even they had begun by 1918 
to congregate at the Park Circus area in Ward XX where a 
modern, predominantly Muslim upper class suburb developed. 
Throughout the city there was a noticeable tendency for 
Hindus and Muslims to move to separate areas - the Hindus 
to the north of the city and the Muslims to Wards VIII, 
X, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX partly for the reasons explained 
above and partly for the more pragmatic reason that Hindu 
2 landlords were loath,to have Muslim tenants~ 
1rcalcutta does not enjoy that easy and widespread social 
communication necessary to foster the organisation of a well-
knit society of people having a civic consciousness. The lack 
of assimilation makes Calcutta not a melting pot but a tossed 
salad, and the city's life seethes with tensions between non-
communicating groups, which flare up into riots and disorder 
at the slightest provocation', in Ali, Ashraf, The City 
Government of Calcutta: A Study in Inertia (1966),p.18. 
~Sse Table I, page 23J Census, 1921, vol.VI, part 1, p.J6, 'in 
spite of the fact that Calcutta's population is so remarkably 
a shifting population, the proportion between Hindus and 
Muliammedans in each locality has been remarkably constant •••• 
Much of the explanation for this~-~lies in the fact that a 
Hindu landlord will not have a Muhammedan tenant if he can 
help it, and a Hindu ve:ry much prefers not to live in a house 
whose previous occupant has been a Muhammedan •••• Muhammedans 
may not have the same prejudice ••• but they prefer to keep 
their houses for their co-religionists if only in retaliation 
for the attitude of the Hindus in the matter', p~J7, 'there 
is undoubtedly a tendency towards segregation [which] has 
been decidedly more marked in the last decade than previously 
and that its working is most easily apparent in a drawing 
apart of ,the Hindu majority from the rest of the community and. 
the reduction of small minorities of Muhammedan [sic] in the 
northern end of town$ in Bhowanipore and in the Southern 
suburbs where Hindus are most numerous'. 
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TABLE 1 : 
Ward Population 1921 
Percentage Migrant Muslim 
Ward speak:i,;ng ·H:iridi Percentage of Percentage of 
or Urdu Ward Population Ward Population 
1 15.3 4L5 7.69 
2 15.5 65. 1 2.77 
3 2L8 54.0 1J. 22 
4 JO.J 56.8 19.34 
5 56.0 79-3 2.86 
6 25.7 50.2 9c22 
7 70.0 96.4 13.46 
8 54.5 81.7 42.77 
9 22.2 78.8 25.69 
10 48.5 67.9 33.34 
1 1 15.4 58.2 4.03 
12 66.8 91.0 11 .. 60 
1 3 46 .. 5 83 .. 2 36.50 
14 40.7 60.5 44 .. 51 
15 48.2 70~9 37.16 
16 52 .. 5 82.2 13.85 
17 53.0 86.7 18.62 
18 78QO 62.8 26.80 
19 4L4 46.7 33.28 
20 46 v 7 46.4 53. 12 
21 39.8 56 .. 6 34.83 
22 32.6 76.0 6.89 
23 J8.J 88.8 19.83 
24 42.6 6o.6 38 .. 84 
25 45.3 69.0 28.59 
TOTAL J6.8 66.4 23.03 
Cossipore- 45.1 68.6 27. 13 Chitpur 
Manicktolla 40.J 70.7 36.40 
Garden Reach 35·9 51.3 45.95 
rr'ollygunge 24.6 37-9 29.92 
South 
9·5 17.5 17.19 Suburban I Howrah 41.4 55·9 22.04 
Calcutta + 37.2 62.9 24.48 Suburbs I I I 
References: Govt of India, Census of India, 1921, vol.VI, 
part 1, pp.27-8, 40,82~ 
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None of the census reports of the period ever attempted 
to differentiate the Muslims on caste or group grounds 
beyond enumeration of Saiyid, Pathan, Moghul and Sheikh1 
with an occasional nod in the direction of a few occupational 
2 groups. A report from as late as 1970, however, listed 
more than 65 'ethnic groups' (including several sectarian 
groups) among the Muslim population of the city. 3 They 
ranged from the 'groups claiming foreign descent [and] 
having no traditional occupation and not organised on the 
basis of caste panchayat ' 4 such as Saiyid, Pathan, Moghul 
and Sheikh, to 'occupational groups that continue to pursue 
traditional occupations, besides adopting other occupations, 
[and] have generally strong caste organisatio~s' ,5 for 
example the Bengali and non-Bengali Darzi (tailors), the 
Meo dairymen and dealers in milk who originally migrated 
from the region north of Delhi and the Qureshi, butchers 
from the Punjab. 6 
1Saiyid, Pathan and Moghul are the three Ashraf titles which 
denote descent from the Prophet and foreign origin; Sheikh 
is a much looser title generally assumed by converts and 
members of functional groups in an attempt to achieve 
greater respectability. 
2~sus, 1921, vol.V, part 1, p.349: 'There is no caste 
recognised by.the Muhammadan religion.~.and although there 
are certain divisions among the Muhammadan community, they 
are by no means the clear divisions of the Hindu caste system. 
The several sections are not to be called castes in the same 
sense as the word is used for Hindus, and yet some certainly 
are not distinguished by race. There are functional sections, 
such as Jolahas and Kulus, and there are what purport to be 
separate races, the Pathans and the Moghuls, though the 
fashion nowadays is to deny the existence of rigid partitions 
on the lines of the functional sections, and the distinctions 
of race have been almost obliterated. Yet the fact remains. 
that a Sheikh will not marry a Kulu and in some parts one 
class of Muhammadans will not even feed with another.'; ibid., 
vol.VI, part 1, p.71: 'there is no doubt thati'many Muhammadans 
avoided being returned as Jolaha, Kulu, etc., who should have 
been so returned, and called themselves Sheikh', p.76: in 
1921,3,302 Muslims retumed themselves as Jolaha in Calcutta 
city, 10,857 as Pathan, 3,981 as Saiyid and 180,632 as 
Sheikh; see Appendix II. 
3see Appendix II. 
4siddiqui, M.K.A., 1 Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta' 
(unpubl.seminar paper given at the Indian Anthropological 
Society, January 1970), p.6. 
5Ib:j_d., P• 7. 
6Ibid. 
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The economically more dominant groups were those from 
Gujerat, 'sectarian-cum-ethnic groups' such as the Dawoodi 
Bohras, the Cutchi (Kachi) Memons and others, as well as 
the Qaum-e-Punjabian from Delhi and the Ranki who 'virtually 
monopolise the hide and skin trade' and claim to have been 
originally Kalal, or distillers, from Iraq. All these groups 
maintain some sort of voluntary group association, particularly 
in the case of the Cutchi Memons who were responsible for the 
re-building of the Nakhoda Mosque, Calcutta's largest, in 
the 1920s, and who also controlled consi-derable funds for 
1 the benefit of impoverished group members. 
Certain groups, however, are not accounted for in the 
survey, particularly occupational 'castes' such as the 
Dhuma (cotton cleaners), Kulu (oil pressers) and Kunja 
(vegetable sellers). 2 In part the explanation of this is 
the fact that they were Bengali Muslim groups, amongst whom 
the tendency was to abandon caste names in favour of the 
more general and respectable title of Sheikh, especially 
after settling in Calcutta where they hoped to merge into 
the greater body of the community. 3 This is particularly 
apparent amongst members of the Joloha, or weaving caste, 
whose numbers showed a marked decline between 1911 and 1921 
as the more prosperous members took to petty trade and 
adopted the title Sheikh. 4 The tendency amongst the Bengali 
Muslim migrants, the least respected group within the 
community, was to seek higher status by change of name and 
if possible of language and occupation. Within the Calcutta 
Muslim community the first two deeds were relatively easily 
1Ibid., pp.5-6; Statesman, 1929, 9 May, p.10; The Muslim Year 
Book of India and Who's Who, 1948-49, p.44o; Bengal Govt, 
Political Dept, September 1918, File no.2N-J1, Frogs 
B1075-96. 
2
o'Malley, L.S.S., 24-Parganas District Gazetteer (1914), 
p.8J. 
30 1 Malley, L.S.S •. , Hooghly District Gazetteer (1912), p.98. 
4
o 1 Malley, L.S.S., Howrah District Gazetteer (1909), p.J8; 
Census, 1921, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 76, the Jolahas declined 
from 7,145 in 1911 to 3,302 in 1921. 
accomplished especially as the common form of Urdu had 
become debased into a conglomerate patois known in the 
mofussil as Dobhasi 1 and in Calcutta as Gulabi Urdu 1 a 
Hindustani dialect ••• that contains Bengali as well as 
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2 English vocabulary and syntactical elements•. Change of 
occupation was another matter. For the most part poor and 
illiterate the Bengali Muslim was mainly confined to manual 
labour andf hailing from the riverine and maritime 
districts of the province, naturally gravitated towards 
occupations such as river transport, dock labour, fishing 
and maritime pursuits with the result that they formed the 
majority of seamen recruited from Calcutta - the lascars.J 
Maintenance of group identity was therefore facilitated 
by several factors: the geographic pattern of settlement in 
the city, occupation, language, historical tradition and 
the survival of endogamy in a communal society where social 
status was inextricably related to religious status and to 
a large extent material prosperity. 
Sectarian differences never loomed large amongst the 
Muslims of Calcutta. The Census of 1921 enumerated only 
816 Shias, 4 the rest of the population apparently being 
accounted Sunni. The previously mentioned 1970 survey 
lists five heterodox sects - namely three Shia groups which 
maintain strong social exclusiveness and are numerically 
small, e.g. the Imam Ismaili Shia numbered only 50 families 
in 1970, and two sects which fall outside the Sunni-Shia 
spectrum, the Ahl-e-Hadith or Wahabi and the Ahmadia both 
of which are numerically insignificant and developed only 
in the twentieth century in Calcutta.5 Not mentioned in 
either the Census or report is the Persian Shia community 
1Roy, Asim, op.cit., pp.2J-4. 
2s. dd. . M K A . t 4 1 .. 1qu1, ••• , op.cl ., p •• 
JCensus, 1921, Vol.V, part 1, p.J64; ibid., pp.J6,105,27. 
4 Census • 1921, Vol. V, part 1 , p. 161 • 
5Siddiqui, M.K.A., op.cit., pp.S-9. 
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which although apparentl.y small in numbers included such 
wealthy families as the Ispahanis, and Shustarys, and. had 
been long established in the city as a merchant group with 
its own association, the Anjuman-i-Murtazavim founded in 
1 the 1890s, and a controlling interest in_the Hooghly 
Imambara an imposing but much troubled Shia educational 
institution in the Hooghly district. Disputes over the 
curriculum and finances of this institution spread over 
the latter half of the nineteenth and earlier part of the 
twentieth centuries and resulted in innumerable family 
feuds within the Persian community which somewhat weakened 
their influence as a united body. In part the official 
and academic neglect of the Persian community can probably 
be explained by their wealth and long connection with 
Calcutta city. Time and wealth tended to obscure their 
sectarian exclusiveness with the result that they were to 
the public eye an integral part of the social and economic 
Muslim elite of the city - they pvacticed endogamy but 
so did the older Muslim Ashraf families in Bengal and as 
far as the Muslim inhabitants of Calcutta were concerned 
the Persians were Ashraf in terms of status, wealth, 
language and life-style. 
IV 
Leadership of the Muslim community in Calcutta 
obviously existed at several levelsG At the apex of the 
social pyramid were the Ashraf families who formed the 
social, political, religious and professional elite of 
the community at large. The Nawab of Dacca, the premier 
Muslim nobleman of Bengal and British-inspired leader of 
the province's Muslims,was the head of the principal Ashraf 
family and in status only approached by the Nawab of 
Murshidabad, head of the Nizamat family, and the impoverished, 
1 Statesman, 1921, 10 November, p,5. 
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exiled royal. houses of Oudh and Mysore gently decaying in 
the Garden Reach and Tollygunge suburbs of Calcutta,. Both 
Dacca and Murshidabad were great zamindars with widespread 
influence in the mofussil and with considerable theoretical 
but little actual influence in the day to day events of 
the life of the Calcutta Muslim community~ The leaders 
of the Calcutta community were drawn from the Ashraf, and 
mercantile families of the city. The Ashraf families 
settled in Calcutta were closely tied by background, 
marriage and descent to the Ashraf of the mofussil. Many 
had settled in the city, been educated and gained 
employment as a result of the patronage held by men like 
the Nawab of Dacca, 1 but this process contain,ed the seeds 
of ultimate differentiation for once settled in the city 
the ties of these families with the mofussil weakened and 
they developed aspirations and grievances different to 
those held by the Ashraf in the mofussil. Few appear to 
have retained land outside Calcutta and once their dependence 
upon mofussil patronage had waned there was a tendency 
amongst them to form a socially elite group from their own 
members in the city, and to develop their own powers of 
patronage which inevitably cut across those held by Dacca 
and Murshidabad. This can be best illustrated by e~amining 
the history of two families: those of Nawab Abdul Latif and 
Obaidullah Al-Obaidi Suhrawardy. Latif's father had settled 
in Calcutta early in the nineteenth century under the 
patronage of the Dacca family. Eldest son of an impoverished 
zamindari family which claimed descent from the Prophet 
through related noble families in Delhi and Baghdad, Latif's 
father achieved some success as a Persian historian and as 
a vakil at the Cal.cutta High Court. Latif was educated at 
1Ikramullah, Begums., From Purdah to Parliament (1963): 
written by the daughter of Sir Hasan Suhrawardy this book 
provides an exce.llent background to Muslim society and culture 
in Calcutta amongst Ashraf families from east Bengal, 
especially pp.3-13, 22-4; I am indebted to Mr Ragat K. Ray 
of Calcutta and Oxford for references relating to this period 
from works such as Sufia Ahmad's Some Aspects of the Muslim 
Community in Calcutta, 1884-1912 (n.d.) which I was unable 
to locate and also to a number of Bengali language 
publications. 
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the Calcutta Madrassah and in 1849 entered the provincial 
judicial service as a deputy magistrate. After a 
successful career in the service, a term in the provincial 
legislative council and as a Prime Minister of Bhopal 
Latif retired in 1887. Not only had he completed an 
eminent public career but he had also taken a lead in the 
social and political life of his community in Calcutta. 
In 1863 he established the Muhammedan Literary Society and 
in 1877 joined Ameer Ali in founding the Central National 
Muahmmedan Association. Of his children three sons joined 
the judicial service, the most noteworthy being Nawab 
A.F.M. Abdur Rahman who took a leading role in the 
activi tie$ of the Calcutta Corporation and who finally 
1 
retired in 1913 as Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court. 
A daughter married Nawab Syed Mohammed, member of an 
impoverished east Bengal zamindar family who had entered 
2 Government service as Latif's protege and two of whose 
daughters in turn married into the Suhrawardy and Huq 
families both of which had formerly been petty zamindar 
families in east Bengal. 
The Suhrawardy family were of similar background to 
that of Latif .. 3 Obaidullah Suhrawardy was a petty zamindar, 
who claimed Persian descent, from east Bengal. Steeped in 
Moghul culture he nevertheless possessed sufficient 
acumen to gauge the need for coming,.j;o terms with the 
British regime and sold off his land to provide his four 
sons with an English language education at the Dacca 
Madrassah. Fortuitously his sons, including one who died 
tragically at 19, proved brilliant and won scholarships to 
study in Eng 1 and. Returning from their studies the two 
1I have avoided giving references for the life of Nawab 
Abdul Latif and his family as they are many and varied with 
no comprehensive works available, except Enamul Haque's 
Nawab Bahadur Abdul Latif ( 1970), which is rather piecemeal. 
2 Ikramullah, Begums., op.cit., pp.6-8~ 
3Ibid., pp.14-16. 
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eldest, Abdullah and Hasan, settled in Calcutta, the first 
as a lawyer and later politican and the second as a doctor 
and later Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University. They 
were joined by their elder sister Khyista Akhter Begum, 
a prominent female educationalist married to a judge and 
by their cousin Zahid Suhrawardy who entered upon an 
eminently successful career which culminated in his 
appointment as a High Court Judgeo All three men were 
eventually knighted and played an important role in the 
social and political life of their community, first in 
Calcutta and later throughout Bengal. Initially reliant 
upon the goodwill of the prominent Ashraf families in the 
mofussil such men proved to be the political and social 
technocrats of the new age and. equipped with the skills 
demanded in a rapidly changing society they eventually 
superseded the role of the mofussil Muslim elite. In 
Calcutta their influence was bolstered by their powers 
of patronage, superficial emulation of the life of Anglo-
India and close personal identification with the intellectual 
and cultural traditions of the Ashraf life-style which were 
not in open contradiction with their chosen careers. 1 
In close association with such families were the 
pre-eminent Muslim mercantile families of the city, such 
as the Shirazis, Ispahanis, Shustarys, Sallehjis and Ariffs 
all of whom were non-Bengalis. Supported by business 
investments and the rents of urban property the members of 
such families had little need to seek alternative 
occupations, but nevertheless on account of their wealth 
and influence amongst other Muslim merchants and business-
men they took an active and vital part in community social 
lifeo Their role is perhaps best illustrated in relation 
to the activities of Nawab Abdul Latif. 
A disciple of Saiyid Ahmed Khan, both in the 
intellectual and political spheres, Latif established the 
Muhammedan Literary Society in Calcutta in 1863 with the 
1 See footnote 1, page 28; also Table: Geaneological 
Table, p.31. 
? Nawab Abdul Latif 
- - - - - - - - - - -· 
I 
Obaidullah Al-Obaidi Suhrawardy Nawab Syed Mohammed = dgt ? 
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X X X X X X X X X 
>< 
>< 
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XIX X X 
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>< 
>< 
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Nawab A.F.M.Abdur Rahman 
Khiyista Akhter Banu Abdullah Hassan = dgt 2s dgt = Zahid dgt = A.K.Fazl-ul Huq Abul Kasem 
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Jabbar and 
Mujibur 
4s Begum Ikramullah Shahid Huseyn Shaheed 
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object to 
impart useful information to the higher and educated 
classes of the Mahommedan community.".on various subjects 
in Literature, Science and Society, which are delivered, 
at the monthly meetings, in the Oordu, Persian, Arabic 
and English languageso1 
The first committee was elected in October 1863 after a 
visit by Saiyid Ahmed Khan and apart from Latif, his son 
A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, close associate Nawab Abdul Jabbar,son 
of a Burdwan zamindar family,and representatives of the 
Oudh, Mysore and Nizamat families,it also included Shirazis, 
Ariffs, Shustaris and members of other mercantile familieso 2 
In 1877 Latif was closely associated with Syed Ameer 
Ali, whose family were of Persian descent and had been 
administrators under the Moghuls, in the establishment of 
the Central National Mahommedan Association, a social and 
educational organisation3 planned on more grandiose terms 
than the Literary Society and initially of more widespread 
influence. 4 The Calcutta branch was dominated by Ashraf 
members of the professions and, like the Literary Society, 
by members of mercantile families, particularly the Gujerati 
Ariffs. 5 As with the Literary Society, however, the C.N.M.A. 
achieved little lasting importance. Both were attuned to 
the grievances and aspirations of small, socially-exclusive 
groups. They were concerned with the interests of the 
non-Bengali 'higher and educated classes' and made no 
contact with the mass of Bengali-speaking Muslims or, indeed, 
the mass of lower class Muslims in Calcutta city. The 
only positive role they played was to provide the first forum 
1Haque, Enamul, Nawab Bahadur Abdul Latif (1970), p.195. 
2The Mahommedan''Literary Society of Calcutta, Abstract of 
Proceedings (1901), pci; Haque, Enamul, op.cit., pp.43-53, 
78-111,139-243. 
3Bengal Govt, Political Dept, October 1917, File no.8A-8, 
Progs B584-85, 1 C.N.M.A. File' containing correspondence 
and Government confidential notes. 
4Aziz, K.K., Ameer Ali (1968), p.8. 
5See footnote 3· 
for concerted public activity by the socially and 
economically dominant Muslim elites of Calcutta. 
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Various other institutions rose to prominence within 
the Calcutta community in the wake of the Muhammedan 
Literary Society. All were Urdu- or Persian-·oriented and 
restricted to particular groups within the community. The 
most important were the Anjuman-i-Waizeen, 1 a socio-
religious organisation dominated by merchants in Wart! VIII; 
the Anjuman-i-Mufidal-i-Islam, established in 1905, which 
ran a free Muslim cemetery in Entally, a free school for 
orphans and the children of poor Muslims and a free 
library; 2 the Anjum@n-i-Murtazavim of the Persian community, 
established in the 1890s, and various smaller, localised 
associations such as the Anjuman-i-Talim-o-Taraqgi and 
Beniapukur Moslem Association both of which ran free schools 
3 in Ward XX. 
One feature common to all these organisations, apart 
from their organisational dominance by Ashraf and mercantile 
families, was their non-Bengali cultural outlooko In the 
late nineteenth century the Muslims of Calcutta remained 
convinced that their Bengali co-religionists were, apart 
from the Ashraf families, little more than neo-Muslims. 4 
Little cognisance was taken of the revivalist and puritanical 
religious movement which swept rural Bengal in this period 
and produced a mass of Bengali language literature aimed at 
purifying Islam in the mofussil. 5 Scant interest in the lot 
1 Statesman, 1919, 9 May, p.11. 
2Thackers Directory, 1918, py67; Calcutta Corporation, 
'Minutes', April 1915-March 1916, 29.3.1916, p.1443-45, April 
1919-March 1920, 20.3.1920, p.2000. 
3Ibid.; Thackers Directory, 1918, p.50. 
4Roy, Asim, op.cit., p.38. 
5Ibid., pp.23-4; also notes provided by Mr Ragat K.Ray relating 
to this mofussil movement and the publications Meherullar 
Jibani (1909) by Mohammed A.Pradhan, Meher Chant by Sheikh 
Mohammed Jaminuddin (1909) and various references in the 
'Native Newspaper Reports' which indicated the growing tension 
between mofussil Bengali-speaking Muslims and the Urdu-speaking 
Muslims of' Calcutta city e.g. NNR, 1895, 17 January, Mihir, 
Jamany and Damussultanat. 'Native Newspaper Reports' are 
hereafter referred to as NNR. 
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of their Bengali co-religionists was displayed by the Muslims 
of Calcutta until 1899 when the Bengal Provincial Muhammedan 
Educational Conference was formed at Dacca after a session 
1 
of the all-India parent body. Calcutta Muslim representa-
tion on the subsequent committees of the Conference was 
2 disproportionately large and mofussil representation was 
Ashraf dominated, but increasingly the exponents of the 
Bengali language as a means of reaching and educating the 
masses gained ground in the councils of the Conference.3 
This was largely due to the activities of men such as 
Moulvi Abdul Karim, a member of the Dacca family, one-time 
teacher at the Calcutta Madrassah and officer in the 
provincial education department, and also Moulana Abu Bakr 
a prominent divine from Hooghly with great influence amongst 
4 the Muslim peasant masses of Bengal. Both men came from 
eminently respectable Ashraf families but the administrative 
experience of one, and the religious activities of the 
other had made .them aware of the importance of social 
uplift in the mofussil if the overall position of Muslims 
in Bengal was to be improved. Respected by all sections of 
the community both men had considerable influence upon the 
deliberations and resolutions of the Conference but at the 
best it was little more than a consultative body, limited 
by lack of finance and concrete plans for action. Nevertheless 
it was the first Muslim association in Bengal to look beyond 
the immediate interests of the dominant Ashraf and mercantile 
families. 
1NNR, 1900, 2 January, Chani Mihir. 
2 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Bengal Government 
to consider uestions connected with Muhammedan Education 
1915 , pp.iv-vi; Bengal Govt, Education Dept, July 19171 
File no.10C-3, Progs 37-42, report on the Bengal Provincial 
Muhammedan Education Conference; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 
1 January, p.9. 
3Bengal Govt, Education Dept, July 1917, File no.10C-3, Progs 
37-42; Azam, M.A., Life of Maulavi Abdul Karim (1939), 
part II, p.95. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Depo), December 1920, no.74. 
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Not nntil 1911, however, did the sl.owly burgeoning 
Bengali Muslim awakening make any impact. In that year in 
Ward IX an area of light Muslim settlement but with a 
comparatively large Bengali Muslim population, the Bangiya 
Mussalman Sahitya Samiti was established with the help of 
a prosperous Bengali Muslim merchant and sympathetic Hindu 
intellectuals from the Bangiya Sahitya Samiti. 1 Slow to 
flourish the association nevertheless survived under the 
youthful management of young men such as Mujibur Rahman 
from Burdwan and Moulana Akram Khan both of whom were 
members of petty zamindar families from west Bengal which 
had, as occasionally occurred through the history of Bengal 
from the middle ages, a long tradition of Bengali as well 
as Persian scholarship. 2 By 1918 they had established a 
fr'ee library of 450 books with 1, 000 subscribers and a vibrant 
debating society which proved the intellectual creche for 
many of Bengal's later prominent Muslim communist and 
3 socialist political leaders. 
In general the total effect of the Samiti was marginaf.o 
The Muslim culture of Calcutta was Urdu-oriented and this 
is nowhere better illustrated than in the Muslim educational 
system of the city. The Calcutta Madrassah had approximately 
1,0004 students in 1917 most of whom were in the Arabic and 
Persian departments with a handful of students pursuing 
English language studies, whilst el.sewhere in the city there 
were fewer than 500 Muslim students out of a tertiary student 
population of over 5,000 in the various colleges of the city.5 
1 Ahmad, Muzaffar, Myself and the Communist Party of India, 
1920-29 (1970), pp.23-4. 
2 Roy, Asim, op.cit., passim. 
3Ahmad, Muzaffar, op.cit; Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', 
April 1919-March 1920, 20.3.1920, p.2000. 
4Huque, M. Azizul, History and Problems of Moslem Education 
~Bengal (1917), p.147. 
5Ibid., p. 147. 
The bulk of Muslim students briefly attended the 206 
government- and muncipal-aided makhtabs which had 7,642 
male and 1,638 female pupils in 1918. 1 Low as these figures 
are they are even worse when the curriculum of the makhtabs 
is considered - all they provided was a poorly supervised 
rote education which concentrated on Urdu, Arabic, 
memorising the Qu'ran and simple arithmetic with the main 
emphasis on religious instruction. 2 
Small wonder that the Muslim population of the city 
was one of the least literate communal groups in 1921 wtth 
an overall literacy rate of 25.3 per cent compared with 
48.7 per cent for the Hindu population. Amongst the 
Ashraf, particularly the Saiyids, the rate was much higher 
with 51.9 per cent of males and 19.1 per cent of females 
over five years of age literate, but amongst the larger body 
of Atrap it was much lower being 24.3 per cent for males and 
4~6 per cent for females. 3 The medium of instruction in 
1
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1917-March 1918, 
6~3.1918, pp.1187-206; Bengal Govt Education Dept, April 
1919, File no.1E-2, Progs~1-10o 
2 Census, 1921, Vol.V, part 1, p.291, 'before he is taught 
anything else the Muhammedan child is usually taught to say 
his prayers by rote and perhaps to repeat some parts of the 
Korano This delays his secular education at the start, as 
further on in the progress of school education the necessity 
for him to take up another language~ Arabic, as well, gives 
the Hindu boy an opportunity of getting ahead of him in 
English'. Bengal Govt, Education Dept, November 1929, File 
no.7M-1, Frogs no.B429-92/, 'the progress in primary education 
is more apparent than real, for many pupils never pass beyond 
the lowest class and the wast age is enormous •• o .The 
Muhammedans of Bengal are educationally backward in comparison 
with other communities [and] in spite of special facilities 
provided for [them] the fact remains that the proportion of 
Mussalman pupils remains low. The well-known effect is that 
Mussalmans cannot take their proper place in the economic and 
political life of the country [because] Mussalmans are much 
poorer than other communities and can less afford to pay for 
education and because of the intensity of their desire for 
r.eligious instruction which causes them to demand special 
institutions which are completely inefficient'. 
3..census, 1921, VoL VI, part 1, PPo 83-94; in Calcutta and 
suburbs 38.9 per cent of the Hindu population was literate 
compared with only 19o3 per cent of the Muslim population. 
In the case of those literate in English 19~68 of the Saiyids 
were compared with 5.33 per cent of the Sheikhs and 0.79 per 
cent of the Jolahas. 
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the makhtabs was Urdu and. by the time the principles of this 
language had. been absorbed. and. large sections of the Qu'ran 
memorised. few pupils had. the time, inclination or finance 
to enter either the Calcutta Mad.rassah or the Sakhawat 
Memorial School for Girls, the only reputable institutions 
which provided. the Muslim youth of Calcutta with a secondary 
education. The more prosperous families employed private 
tutors for Urdu, Arabic and Qu'ranic studies and educated 
their children at English-medium schools and colleges such 
as the Loreto Convent, St Xavier's and. La Martinierre. 
Communal relations in the city prior to 1918 were 
generally good. Muslims had precipitated localised riots 
in the central wards of the city in 1891 and 1897 over 
possession of mosques but those involved had been 'up-country' 
Muslims and. the police - Bengali Hindus and Muslims were not 
involved,a pattern which repeated. itself in the riots of 
1910, 1918, 1926 and. to an extent in 1946., 1 The 1910 riot, 
however, did involve Hindus and Muslims., The immediate 
cause was not, as Broomfield. has suggested., the tension 
created. by the partition agitation, 2 but rather Marwari 
agitation over the prospect of cow-slaughter at a mosque 
in a predominantly Marwari area on the occasion of Bakr-Id. 
Marwari appeals to the Police Commissioner to halt the 
korbani enraged. the local Muslims population who joined by 
tough Pathans and Punjabis from the Bowbazar area set upon 
the Marwaris. 'Up-country' Hindus from Bihar and the U.P. 
came to the support of the Marwaris and. Bengalis of both 
religions quickly vacated the area. Once the riot had been 
suppressed the Bengalee attempted to identify the groups 
involved and classified them as: 1) low class Urdu-speaking 
migrant Muslins, 'loongiwallas', 2) Pathan money-lenders 
from the North West Frontier Province, 'Kabulis', 
3) 'up-country' Hindus, 4) Marwaris and. 5) goond.as of all 
races - indicating that at the later stage of the riot the 
1 Bengalee, 1910, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18 March: this reference 
and. subsequent references to the Bengalee are by courtesy 
of Mr Ragat K. Ray. 
2Broomfield, Jo 1 op.cit.s p.32. 
goonda element came to the fore with the prospect of loot 
overwhelming religious fanatacism. 1 
While the agitation over the partition of Bengal appears 
to have made little impact on the non-Bengali Muslim 
population its impact upon the Ashraf families of the city 
and mofussil was considerable. For the majority the creation 
of the Muslim majority province in east Bengal was a 
God-send. A new world of economic opportunity was opened to 
them and for a while the old Moghul capital at Dacca regained 
some of its lost importance. The agitation of Hindu 
politicians against the partition enraged the Muslim leaders 
of the new province and partly as a result of this and the 
prospect of India-wide constitutional reforms the All-India 
Muslim League and a provincial branch were established under 
the aegis of the Nawab of Dacca, at Dacca, in 1906. But the 
League was not the only Muslim political association formed 
in Bengal that year and it was rivalled as a focus for 
Muslim political activity by the Bengal Presidency Mahommedan 
Association. 2 Politically, however, the two institutions 
were poles apart - the League was communalistic, Urdu-
oriented and the forum for mofussil Ashraf interests whereas 
the Association was pro-Indian National Congress in outlook, 
anti-partition and inimical to the social, political and 
economic dominance exerted by the conservative Ashraf 
families. Organised by men such as Abdul Halim Ghuznavi, 
Abdul Rasul, Mujibur Rahman, Moulana Akram Khan and Mazharul 
Huq, all of whom came from Ashraf families, had received a 
western education, and were young, the Association set about 
welding closer contacts with Congress. Under the able 
leadership of Abul Kasem, a kinsman of Mujibur Rahman and 
Nawab Abdul Jabbar of nineteenth century prominence in 
Calcutta, the Association sent a regular stream of delegates 
to Congress sessions in the years before the First World War. 3 
1 See footnote 1, page 37. 
2 Bengalee, 1907, 9 January; ibid., 20 December; ibid., 1910, 
10 October. 
3 Ibid., 1910, 10 October; Ahmad, Muzzafar, op.cit., p.S; 
Hayat, Abul, The Mussalmans of Bengal (1966), pp.l9-20. 
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The members of the Association represented a new current 
of political thought within the Muslim community of Bengal. 
They rejected the conservative social and political, i.e. 
loyalist, outlook of the Ashraf families from the mofussil 
and had, in the cosmopolitan hot-house of Calcutta, imbibed 
fresh ideas for the social, educational, economic and 
political uplift of their community - ideas which stretched 
beyond the interests of both the majority of Calcutta's 
Muslim elite and the Ashraf families ensconcErl.on their 
estates in the mofussil. Politically, however, they were out 
of tune with the articulate sections of their community at 
this period. Their efforts to stir up support in the mofussil 1 
2 
and Calcutta met with little success and their immediate 
influence was drowned in the wave of bitterness which swept 
Muslim Bengal when the partition was annulled in 1911. 3 
Conversely it was this event which although it temporarily 
discredited the pro-Congress Muslims laid the foundation for 
their future success in the years after 1918 when they 
usurped the older Ashraf leaders as representatives of the 
Muslims of Bengal. 
The immediate effect of the annullment was not to: increase 
Hindu-Muslim tension but rather to direct Muslim frustration 
and anger against the British who had betrayed ·their trust. 
The younger and more volatile members of the Dacca coterie 
men such as Abdullah Suhrawardy and Fazl~ul Huq - began to 
talk of emulating the eminently successful Hindu pattern of 
agitation, and at a meeting in Calcutta in January 1912 
Suhrawardy preached the cause of Hindu-Muslim political 
co-operation - a sentiment which echoed that of the members 
of the Bengal Presidency Mahommedan Association. Indeed, in 
succeeding years the members of both groups co-operated to 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), September '1912, no.7, 
pp.179-82. 
2Bengalee, 1905, 9 August; ibid., 1907, 6, 9 January. 
3NNR, 1912, 8 March, Mussalman. 
4NNR, 1912, 6 January, Bihar Bandhu. 
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such an extent ~hat they became members of a single faction. 
They issued no direct challenge to their elders whose 
influence was still considerable but helped by events between 
1911 and 1918 this faction of 'younger Muslim leaders' who 
'headed by Dr Suhrawardy and ••• G.H.C. Ariff [came] into 
prominence and adopted an attitude of independence towards 
the accepted leaders of their communi ty 1 1 were able to 
expose the bankruptcy of the pro-British policy of conciliation 
followed by the Nawab of Dacca and other splendid courtiers 
at the Viceroy's durbar. 
The younger leaders joined the Presidency Muslim League 
and with the assistance of Mahomed Ali they slowly turned 
its face towards developments within the All-India Muslim 
League at the centre of the national scene, and began 
capitalising on the increas·ing sense of Muslim grievance 
2 
against the British in Bengal. 
The Balkan Wars came hard on the heels of the partition 
furore and stirred the Calcutta Mtrslims to a pitch of 
agitation: never before achieved. The leading Ashraf families 
in the city remained aloof from active ·agi ta tion3 but a 
'keen interest in the progress of the war had extended to 
classes which [were] ·ordinarily unmoved by political events 1 • 4 
A widespread feeling of further British betrayals, concern 
for Turkey and the description of the wars as a crusade of 
the Cross against the Crescent particularly disturbed the 
Muslims of Calcutta who with their romantic historical 
outlook viewed Turkey as the last bastion of Islam's usurped 
glories.5 The Comrade6 and its successor Al-Hilal edited by 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (A), May 1913, no.111. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (B), November 1913, no.149, 
'History Sheet of Mohamed Ali'. 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (A), May 1913, no.111. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6For a history of the Comrade see Govt of India, Home Poll (B), 
November 1913, no.111. 
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the.young Abul Kalam Azad took a JW.omi.nent part i.n the 
agi. ta ti.on. 1 Azad 1 s name a:p.d family connections added 
considerable weight to the agitatio~ in the city. His father 
had been a prominent divine with a considerable following 
in the city particularly amongst the small but wealthy 
Cutchi Memon community. The Memons who were the traditional 
managers of the Nakhoda. Mosque, the city's largest,had been 
responsible for attracting Azad's father to the city from 
Bombay, and upon his death they had transferred some of 
their veneration to his son whose newspaper, Al-Hilal, they 
initially financed. 2 Ashraf leaders from the mofussil such 
as the Nawab of Dacca attempted to dampen the surge of 
Pan-Islamic sentiment, as did the Aga Khan, but their efforts 
were rejected, by the younger leaders who though unable to 
stir many of their more venerable peers had gained considerable 
support from the ranks of petty merchants and artisans who 
on the occasion of Bakr-ld donated the skins from slaughtered 
animals to the Red Crescent Fund. 3 The authorities, however, 
were not so much concerned with this stirring of previously 
quiescent Muslim groups but with more immediate and 
disturbing development of the 'younger Muhammedan party ••• 
the ·more advanced section of the community' seeking a 
rapprochement with Hindu nationalist politicians. 4 Abdullah 
Suhrawardy, G.H.C. Ariff, merchant and younger son of a 
prominent mercantile family, and Abul Kasem all sought 
support from the Hindu political leaders who led by B.C. Pal 
were to be found preaching Hindu-Muslim unity in the working 
class are as of north Calcutta. 5 
2Govt of India,Home Poll, 1921, no.45, Azad's sister married 
a prominent Maulvi, Irshad Qadri of Midnapore who had thousands 
of followers and the British considered that 'the marriage has 
been of great political value to Abul Kalam in Bengal'. 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (A), May 1913, no.111. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
Another outcome of this agitation was the growth in 
influence and circulation of the Calcutta Muslim press. 1 
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The Urdu daily Al-Hilal was pre-eminent but was rivalled by 
the Habul Matin, a Persian daily established during the 
midst of the agitation which had an estimated circulation 
throughout India, Persia and Central Asia of 25,000 in 1914. 2 
Originally it had an English language edition edited by 
Abdullah Suhrawardy, and a Bengali-language edition .edited by 
Maniruzzaman Islamabadi a foundation member of the Bengal 
Presidency Mahommedan Association3 -but neither of these 
editions appear to have lasted long. In addi ti·on there was 
the Muhammadi, a Bengali daily edited by Moulana Akram Khan, 
and the Mussalman, an English daily edited by Mujibur 
Rahman; both were establi{Shed in 1906 and had been organs 
of the anti-partition campaign. 4 
As if blessed by the gods the young Muslim party was 
presented with further causes for agitation once the Balkan 
Wars had begun to pale as a focus of Muslim interests. The 
Calcutta University affair and the Cawnpore Mosque incident 
were grist to their mill. The first affair was of limited 
interest but served to alienate active members of the young 
Muslim group further from the British and bound them more 
closely to their Hindu compatriots. In May 1913 Sir Asutosh 
Mookerjea submitted the names of Abdul Rasul, Abdullah 
Suhrawardy and a Hindu K.P. Jayaswal to the provincial 
Gov:ernment for confirmation of their appointment as staff 
to the Law College of Calcutta University. But Governor 
Carmichael rejected the submissions on the grounds of the 
political activities of the three and set off a storm of 
protest which further undermined Muslim and Hindu faith in 
1Ibid. 
2 Statesman, 1924, 31 August, p.S. 
3Ahmad, Muzaffar, op.cit., p.S; Hayat, Abul, op.cit., p.20; 
..;:;T;,:;;h:;.;e;;__,;M:..;:;::::U:.::S:.:l::.:l::.:. m~..::Y~e::.:a=r--=B~o;;.:o::.;k=....::O:.:f;......;I=n:.::d:.:.i:;.:a;;._.::;a:.:;n;.;d:.,_W::.:.::.:h:.::o;...'...:s::._Wh.:.:.=;:;.:O~, _...:1 .... 9:...4.:..;8:::.--...:4~9 , p • 4 1 3. 
4 Ibid., pp.412-3. 
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British intentions~ The second incident was of greater 
importance and roused perhaps more widespread concern within 
the Calcutta Muslim community than the Balkan Wars~ The 
supposed mosque demolition drove Mahomed Ali into a paroxysm 
of pro-Turkish and anti-British utterances at a meeting in 
Calcutta2 and caused the Al-Hilal to advocate, with the 
support of various Hindu newspapers, the boycott of European 
goods and the support of Swadeshi industries. 3 The Bengal 
Presidency Muslim Leag1.1.e under the signatures of its 
secretaries Zahid Suhrawardy, a cautious Calcutta lawyer, 
and Nawab Syed Ali Nawab Chowdhury,a socially conservative 
and weal thy .zaminO.ar from Rajshahi, sent a telegram to 
the Viceroy in July protesting against the demolition and 
again in August to protest against the riot. 4 
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought a temporary halt 
to all political agitation and for the last time the Muslims 
of India rallied en masse to support the Empire. But the 
lull was deceptive. The young Muslim party quietly forged 
ahead on their path of Hindu-Muslim conciliation and in 
1915 supported. the pro-Congress activities of Jinnah in 
the councils of the All India Muslim League at Bombay. 5 
Pan-Islamists were also active in the city and late in 1915 
they established the Igd.am, Tarjuman and Risalet ~· Urdu 
dailies edited by fanatical agitators from the Punjab. 6 
1Broomfield, J., op.cit., pp.78-9. 
2 Govt of India, Home Poll (B), November 1913, no.149, 'History 
Sheet of Mahomed Ali' o 
3Govt of India, C.I,D., 'Histories of the Non-Cooperation and. 
Khilafat Movement' by P.C .. Bamford, Delhi, 1925, Partii, 
Chapter I, 'Pre-War Pan-Islamic Agitation in India, 1911-14', 
p.6. Hereafter referred to as the 'Bamford Report'. 
4Govt of India" Home Poll (B), November 1913, nos.1-36, 
1 Cawnpore Mosque File', pp.10,16. 
5,Bamford Report', op.cit., pp.20-1; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), January 1916, no.36, reference by courtesy of Dr 
D. Ferrell. 
6Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), March 1916, no.50,reference 
by courtesy of Dr D. Ferrell; NNR, 1916, 22 Jun;e, Sadagat; 
ibid.., 1918, 6 March~ Naggashy 
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The prohibition of these newspapers in the Punjab and later 
of the Igdam and Risalet in Bengal convinced many Muslims 
that despite their loyalty to the British they were more 
suspect than the Hindus 1 , a feeling that many felt confirmed 
when it was revealed that the British had instigated a 
supposedly spontaneous fatwa signed by several Calcutta 
divines in support of the war early in 1915c 2 
The internment of the Ali brothers - Mahomed and 
Shaukat - in May 1915 further exacerbated Muslim feelings 
of confusion and discontent engendered by the entry of 
Turkey into the war on the side of Britain's enemd.esc Not 
only had Turkey long been a source of emotional pride as 
the last major Islamic power but it was also the home of 
the Caliph, the spiritual head of Islam. The subtleties 
of Allied propaganda which aimed at convincing the Muslims 
that war was being waged against the Caliph as temporal 
rather than spiritual ruler was lost upon most Indian 
Muslims who failed to fathom the semantic differentiation, 
as from experience they realised the value of temporal 
power for the protection of religious and social values. 
Hardly had agitation over the Ali brothers reached 
fever p;itch in Calcutta 3 when Abul Kalam Azad,described by 
the British as 'one of the most mischievous Muhammedan 
agitators in India' 4 and regarded by the Bengalee as 'an 
idol of both the male and female members of the Moslem 
community in Calcutta' 5,was externed from the province in 
April 1916. Fifty thousand Muslims in Calcutta signed a 
petition for his release 6 and the Muslim press launched an 
1Govt of India~ Home Poll (Dep.), March 1916, no.50c 
2 1 Bamford Report', op.cit., p.20. 
JGovt of India 9 Home Poll (Dep.)~ March 1916~ no.48. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (B), April 1916, nos.475-78. 
5Beggalee, 1916, JO July. 
6Ibid. 
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impressive campaign against his exile. 1 
Agitation on the issue of Muslim detenus continued 
2 throughout the war years" By 1916, however, the activities 
of the younger Muslim leaders in collaboration with their 
Hindu supporters had begun to worry the older leaders of 
the Calcutta community, but they moved too late. The 
Nawab of Dacca had died late in 1915 and the Bengal Muslims 
nad lost their major spokesman 'at court' .3 Sir Shamsul 
Huda, member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, who 
succeeded the leadership role of Dacca, attempted to curb 
the activities of the younger Muslims who in July 1916 
convened a meeting of the Presidency Muslim League to 
express their condemnation of the Sherif's revolt in Arabia, 
and indirectly of the British who supported him. 4 Huda 
persuaded some of the members led by G.H.C. Ariff to cancel 
the meeting but Abdul Rasul led an ad hoc meeting which 
carried the original proposals. 5 
The final break between the younger faction and those 
who held back from the pell mell rush into conciliation with 
Congress and the Hindus came in 1917 in the wake of the 
communal rapprochement reached during the Christmas week of 
1916 in Lucknow. Prior to this, however, the controversy 
over the Sherif's revolt had revealed dissensions within the 
community., and it would definitely seem that despite the 
surface success of much of their agitation the younger Muslim 
leaders had failed even by then to carry the socially and 
economically dominant Muslim groups with them.. In June 1916 
one of their party, Abul Kasem, had stood against Zahid 
Suhrawardy for election to the Imperial Legislative Council. 
Kasem had carried all the mofussil votes but in the final 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), May 1916, no.S. 
2
'Bamford Report', op.cit., p.J6; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 
6 February, p~9, 26 February, p.6, 5 April, p.4, 24 June, p.4. 
JBroomfield, J., op.cit., p.118. 
4
'Bamford Report', op.cit., pp.29-JO. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), August 1916, no.24. 
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counting was defeated by two Calcutta votes a fact which 
caused the Muhammadi to comment that Calcutta would always 
be a hindrance to the election of a true Bengali Muslim 
representative. 1 The temper of the Calcutta Muslim elite 
was further revealed when in 1917 following the resignation 
of Suhrawardy, Abdur Raheem, a 1 Delhiwallah', property owner, 
Corporation councillor, and prosperous tobacco merchant 
defeated G.H.C. Ariff for the seat. 2 In part the election 
results were but a reflection of the old Calcutta Muslim 
feelings of disdain towards the mofussil and its inhabitants 
but it was also a rejection of the younger Muslim party and, 
in the case of Ariff, of those who had been associated with 
them. 
The mass agitation whipped up amongst the lower classes 
no doubt disturbed the Muslim elite of the city but the 
rapprochement achieyed at Lucknow infuriated them as did 
Hindu intransigence· regarding any modification of the Pact, 
and the subsequent violent communal riots in Bihar and the 
U.P. late in 1917 and early in 1918. 
The Lucknow Pact settled the proposed Muslim representa-
tion in the Bengal Legislative Council at 4o per cent, which 
when the Muslim population stood at 52.6 per cent failed to 
please all but the most ardent exponents of the communal· 
rappr~chement.3 The inability of the young Muslim party 
to modify this provision caused a sharp drop in their 
popularity while the image of conciliatory Hindus was 
drastically tarnished by the severe communal riots which 
rocked Bihar and the U.P. in September 1917 and January 1918. 4 
The young Muslim party attempted to retain support by 
concentrating upon the is'sue of the Ali brothers5, and by 
1 NNR, . 1916, 23 June, Muhammadi. 
2Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, March 1917, File no.18L-23, 
Progs 3-14; see page 10 for further details of Raheem. 
3Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.114. 
4
•Bamford Report', op.cit., pp.34-6; Broomfield, J •. , op.cit., 
p.119; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), March 1918, noAa. 
5,Bamford Report', op.cit., p.35. 
attempting to build a basis for mass·· support as was the 
case with Fazl·-~ul Huq' s Calcutta Agriculturalists Association 
established in December 1917 1 -but th~ir activities were 
futile. 
The British proposals of eventual constitutional 
reforms and the impending visit of Edwin Montagu, the 
Secretary of State for India~ to gauge public opinion 
provoked the more articulate members of the younger Muslim 
party to action. Their more communalist opponents, mainly 
conservative merchants from the city and wealthy zamindars 
from the mofussil, attempted to revitalise the near-defunct 
Central National Mahommedan Association as a rival organisation 
2 to the Presidency Muslim League, but finding this impractical 
they established a new body, the Indian Muslim Association 
under the guidance of .Nawab Chowdhury! Nawab A.F.M. Abdur 
Rahman and G.H.C. Ariff late in 1917.3 The Association soon 
established links with similar organisations elsewhere in 
India, particularly with Shafi': s dissident Muslim League in 
the Punjab and the Prince of Arcot's Islamia League in Madras. 4 
But after petitioning Montagu it, like its associated bodies, 
soon faded into oblivion, although it was temporarily 
revived in 1921. 
Other opponents of the young Muslim party included such 
former stalwarts as Abdullah Suhrawardy and members of 
merchant families as Ismail Salehji and Y"C. Ariff, brother 
of G.H.C. Ariff~ however~ their sympathies were not with the 
more communalist and socially conservative group. led by 
1Broomfieldv J.~ op.cit.~ pp.157-8. 
2Ibid. 1 p.116; Bengal Govt, Political Dept, October 1917, 
File no.8A~8, Progs BS84-85~ 1 C.N.M.A. File'. 
3Bengal Govt~ Political Dept, August 1919, File no.1W-229, 
Progs 48-62; Statesman, 1918, 17 April, p.8; Broomfield, J., 
op.cit., p.116; Govt of India, Report of the Franchise 
Committee, 1918-19 (1919), p.39y 
4McPherson, Kenneth~ 1 The Political Development of the Urdu-
and Tamil-speaking Muslims of the Madras Presiden9y,1901 to 
1937', pp.77-9 (unpublished M.A.thesis, University of West. 
Australia, 1968). 
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Nawab Chowdhury and they rather unsuccessfully attempted to 
tread a path between the two extremes - first through a 
futile attempt to form a moderate organisation1 and then 
throug-h the agency of the Society of Moulvis and Ulema, 
established in September 1917 to find employment for Muslim 
2 graduates and 'also to counteract anti-Government propaganda'. 
At the same time fanatical 'up-country' Pan Islamists in the 
city were; through the agency of the Urdu dailies, the Naggash 
and Sadagat3,active in conducting an intensive propaganda 
campaign against the British and Hindus alike and championed 
the cause of Islam in danger. 
In essence by the beginning of 1918 the Muslims of 
Calcutta were without a unified leadership. The death of 
Dacca in 1915 and the replaceptent of Huda by S.P. Sinha 
on the Viceroy's Executive C~·uncil in June 19174 had left 
the community bereft o'f direct contact with the administration, 
, 
while the leaders of the Calcutta community were divided 
into inimical factions none of which threw up a leader of 
sufficient calibre to capture the supp~rt of a decisive 
proportion of the population. The mass of Muslims were 
confused by a multitude of conflicting emotions which had 
destroyed their faith in the British, roused their ire 
against- the Hindus and undermined their own self-confidence. 
The Balkan Wars and the Cawnpore Mosque affair had involved 
large numbers of them in a crude form of sporadic and 
disorganised political agitation without evolving a satisfac-
tory mode of ieadership. The influence of Ashraf families 
from the mofussil had been weakened, that of the merchant and 
urban Ashraf professional families was shaken and divided, 
and the mass of Muslims in Calcutta were prey to the influence 
of fanatical Pan-Islamist agitators and the variegated 
pressures and tensions occasioned by the war. 
1 
'Bamford Report', op.cit., p.J5. 
2Bengal Govt, Political Dept, May 1918, File no.8A-7, Progs 
B645-47. 
JThe Sadagat was established to replace the Tar,iuman which 
went bankrupt late in 1916. 
4Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.118. 
CHAPTER TWO 
RIOTS AND RAPPROCHEMENT, 1918 TO 1919 
By the beginningof 1918 the mass of Calcutta's 
suburban and. metropolitan population0 both Hindu and. Muslim, 
were beginning to feel the full economic effects of the 
Great Ware The larger proportion of the factory workers 
found.. employment in the jute mills 5 1 but whether mill 
labourer of Howrah or cart driver in the city the economic 
implications of the war were the same~ Drought~ poor 
harvests, shortage of railway rolling stock, and. a sharp 
reduction in shipping tonnage due to the submarine campaign 
eff'ectively imposed. a supply blockade on Calcutta and. Bengal. 
The result was a sharp rise in prices of basic commodities 
2 
such as rice, wheat, salt, cooking oil and. cloth~ Throughout 
1918 and. 1919 the price of these and. other staple household. 
goods in Calcutta rose rapidly as the following figures 
indicate: 
~t/maund.3 rice/maund. wheat/maund. 
1914 Rs 2.118 Rs 6~483 Rs 4.10.0 
1918 3-929 5. 181 6c5e10 
1919 4.012 7.519 7.13~8 4 
Tl;le rise in the price of cotton cloth was equally dramatic. 
Best quality cotton cloth rose from Rs 7.10.0 in 1917 to 
Rs 16 .. 8~0 in 1918 for a standard. 9 lb bundle, whilethe 
cheaper qua.J:ities of cotton cloth which usually found. a 
ready market amongst the poorer classes of the city were 
similarly affected. by the price rise.,5 Thus between 
November 
6' lengths-
Rs 3o4o6 
1918 and. July 1919 the cheapest ~ and. d.hoti 
rose from Rs 3.6.0 toRs 4.12.6 and. Rs 2.15G0 to 
respectivelyo7 
1Royal Commission on Labour in India, Report of the Royal 
Commission on Labour in India, 1929 (1931), pp.8-9. Hereafter 
referred. to as Labour Commission, 1929. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), May 1918, no.21; ibid.., May 
1918, no.64;. ibid.., August 1919, noG50. 
3Maund. = 82.286 pounds. 
412 paise = 1 anna, 16 annas = 1rupee; Govt of India, Statisti-
cal Abstracts for India, 1911-12 to 1920-21, pp.602-5,614; 
the format of figures quoted. is inconsistent. Hereafter referred. 
to as Statistical Abstracts, 1911 to 1921. 
5 Ibid.. , p. 6o 1 • 
6stand.ard. sari and. d.hoti lengths were nine yards. 
7Bengal Govt, Commerce Dept, July 1919, File no.1Q-22, Progs 
20-21; ibid.., March 1919, File no.1Q-7, Progs 11-12. 
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The effect of these price rises was disastrous for all 
sections of the labouring population of the city at a period 
when wages were static and the industrial and mercantile 
concerns of the area were reaping large profits. Bolstered 
by government orders (hiring the war the jute- mills declared 
lavish dividends and experienced their most prosperous 
period~ 1 whilst the great mercantile concerns of the city 5 
particularly those controlled by the Marwaris~ experienced 
a similar rich harvest of profits~ Inevitably such a 
situation gave rise to increasing un:r:-est .. am:ongst,.. the werking 
classes who noted the large mill profits,and who were rightly 
convinced that Marwari speculators were hoarding rice and 
cloth in an attempt to force up pricesw 2 Rumour also 
encouraged the belief that the Government was turning a 
blind eye to Marwari profiteering in the hope that the proceeds 
would be invested in the War Loan.,J Indeed, there is no 
doubt that Marwari pressure was in part responsible for the 
defeat of an attempt in the Calcutta Corporation to appoint 
a committee to investigate the rise in cloth prices. 4 
One of the hardest hit sections of the labouring 
population of the Calcutta area was that of the jute mill 
workers. In 1918 the area had some 300,000 operatives and 
dependents$ a third more than that of its nearest rival in 
India, Bombay.5 Also unlike Bombay,where the majority of 
workers came from contiguous Marathi-speaking areas and more 
frequently brought their families with them, the factory 
population of greater Calcutta contained a smaller proportion 
of family units~ and comprised a labouring class whose 
6 
language and culture were foreign to Bengalo 
1 cotton~ C. W .E.~ Handbook of Commercial Information for India 
(1924)~ p.117; Anstey~ V. ~.The Economic Development of India 
( 1952), p. 282 and fn. 
2Govt of India~ Home l'oll (Dep")~ March 1918~ no .. J8; ibid., 
September 1918~ no.20a 
3Ibid. ~ September 1918, no.20. 
4statesman, 1918~ 29 August, p.8. 
5Laoour Commission,, 1929 ~ pp. 8~9. 
6Gadgil, D.R., The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times 
(1948), pp.82-3,120._ As Dr R."Ntlwman has pointed out, however, 
in recent note to the writer 'don't imagine that because the 
Konkanis and Deccanis in Bombay both spoke Marathi they 
necessarily had much love for one another'~ 
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Social alienation and dislocation were therefore greater 
problems in Ca.lcutta than in Bombay where the majority of 
workers were recruited from the same province" In the Calcutta 
region the majority of workers were Hindi- and Urdu-speakers 
from the United Provinces and Bihar whose basic loyalties 
and attachments were not to Bengal but to their native 
villages, religion and, in the factory or miLl, to the sirdar 
who had recruited themo 1 
Most jute mill labourers were in the city and its 
suburbs on a temporary basis in order to enhance their 
earnings from agriculture in their native villages to which 
they invariably returned for harvest and sowing. The 
majority regularly remitted money home, but to do so often 
involved increasing indebtedness to money-lenders and 
shopkeepers in the mill areas with the result that many had 
2 to return to the mills to pay off locally incurred debts. 
The fact that each mill operated on different wage 
rates has made an accurate assessment of wages for this period 
difficult,3 but in general it would appear that in 1918, 
as in 1914 9
4 the average weekly wage for an unskilled mill 
labourer was approximately two rupees, for a five day week, 
and that of a ski.lled operative between three and five 
rupees for the same period"5 Overtime during the war years 
no doubt boosted average earnings, but few workers responded 
to the incentive of bonus rates despite their aggravated 
economic position. 6 In part the explanation was psychological: 
the mills and life in the company lines and bustees 
surrounding them were far from congenial. As the Industrial 
1Labour'Commission, 1929, p.041; Royal Commission on Labour in 
India, Evidence~ Vol o V,; part 1.> p. 6: in 1921 of the population 
of greater Calcutta 495~474 were bornin Bihar and 328,398 in 
the U.P. Hereafter referred to as Labour Commissions 1929; 
(Evidence). · 
2Labour Commission< 1929 ~ p. 255; ibid,, (Evidence) 1 Vol. V, part 1 ,p.,49~ 
3Ibidor, p.216o 
4Buchanan~DoH., The Development of Capital.,:bst Enterprise in 
Indi~ (1934), p.355. 
5~our Commission. 1922. (Evidenc~), Vol. V, part 1, p~ 299; O'Malley~L.S.S.~ 24-Parganas District Gazetteer (1914),p.141; 
British Govt~Report of' the Indian Industrial Commission 2 1916-18 (1919),p.15: monthly wages in rupees for various types of jute 
mill operatives 
carders 9 
shifters 11 
rovers 12 
coolies 
spinners 
winders 
133 
144 
18 
beamers 
weavers 
mistries 
22 
27 
30 
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Commission of 1916-18 reported both the work and environment 
were unattractive to men accustomed to rural life and who, 
rather than spend extra hours in the millsg would prefer to 
1 
crowd into the grog shops and brothels of the area. No 
detailed studies of personal expenditure by mill labourers 
exist for this period, but the Labour Commission of 1929 
presented a study of the expenditure of two skilled operatives, 
a Hindu and a Muslim, at one mill in 1928. 2 In the case of 
both workers over 65 per cent of their weekly income was 
spent on foods at a time when the price of wheat~ rice and 
flour was lower than in 1918~ while the remaining portion of 
their income went on basic essentials such as rent~ cloth~ 
soap, firewood and kerosene~ tobacco,, matches, pan, the barber 
and the dhobi~J 
Given that the items of expenditure were essentially the 
same in 1918 the position of the mill workers must have been 
difficult, if not desperate,when one considers that amongst 
the items of expenditure not accounted for were postal 
remittances, festivals, religious activities, alcohol and 
4 
women. Indeed, in Calcutta by early 1918 although wages had 
not risen since 1914 wholesale prices in general bad increased 
by 78 per cento5 
1Ibid., pp .. 1·1-12. 
2No such figures or data are available for either unskilled 
factory or non-factory labour. 
3Labour Commission, 1929 (Evidence), Vol.V, pa.rt 1, p.268: 
distribution of weekly expenditure: 
Hindu skilled operative Muslim skilled operative 
(vegetarian) food (rice, food (vegetablesp meat, 
vegetables, flour): 65.5% rice 5 ghee): 71.5% 
firewood, tobacco 
matches; __ 
soap: 
cloth: 
rent: 
4Ibid~, p.268. 
18.0% 
L5% 
1 o. o% 
s.o'fo 
firewood, kerosene, 
tobaccotmatches: 
soap, dhabi, barber~ 
perfume: 
cloth: 
rent: 
12.5% 
5Buchanan, D.H.s op.cit., p.J55: 
Index of jute mill wages 
1914 100 
1915 II 
19io II 
1917 - II 
1918 110 
1919 120 
Index of wholesale prices i"nCalcutta 
1914 100 
1915 112 
1910 128 
1917 145 
1918 178 
1919 196 
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Despite their difficult economic position~ both during 
the period 1918-19 and before• there is little evidence of 
agitation amongst the workers to improve their position. The 
reasons for this are not hard to find. Concerted action 
needed leadership~ finance and unity, and the multi-lingual 9 
multi-religious factory population of Calcutta had none of 
these. Mostly drawn from the ranks of illiterate peasants, 
the basic loyalties of the industrial worker in the region 
of Calcutta were to his native village and religion~ The 
world of the factory employee was restricted to the immediate 
area of the mill where his fellow workers were generally of 
the same village and district. 1 Within this environment 
his social world was further restricted to intercourse with 
members of the same caste or religion and was dominated by 
the sirdar. The sirdar recruited the worker, maintained him 
in his job for a financial consideration, passed on the 
orders of the management and, more often than not,owned the 
bustee i.n which the industrial worker lived., 2 To a lesser 
degree, however~ the sirdar was also subject to the same 
restricted life and consequently his leadership rarely 
extended over a group which did not comprise men of one 
religion and drawn from a particular village or group of 
villages. 
Bengali politicians and political agitators prior to the 
period beginning in 1920 were largely ignorant or wary of the 
potential of mass agitation as they were, in politics and 
life-style, a socially exclusive group which was oriented 
more towards region and class rather than the nation. They 
had few interests in common with the predominantly non-Be~gali 
factory population and were separated from them by barriers of 
language, culture, religion and economic interests. It was 
not until the advent of Gandhi, when new approaches to 
political agitation were evolved which necessitated mass 
participation, that local politicians began to take a serious 
1 Labour Commission, 1929 (Evidence), Vol. V, part 1, p. 11. 
2Ibid., VoLV~ part 2, p.121; Labour Commission,1929, p.J41. 
interest in the industrial lapouring population of Calcutta, 
and provided the finance for a labour movement which the 
workers themselves were unable to supply., 
To a certain extent the questions of group unity and 
leadership were somewhat different when applied to the Muslim 
factory population~ Despite remnants of caste and occupational 
differences within the Muslim community, religion provided a 
more unifying force than it did amongst the multi-caste 
Hindu community; the same can be said of language where 
Urdu, no matter how debased the dialect, was the lingua franca 
of the Muslim factory population and the bulk of the 
perrnanently-s et,tled Muslim inhabitants of Calcutta city. 
Education, wealth and status may have provided some effective 
social barriers within the cornrnunity,but in the mosque on 
Friday Muslims of all backgrounds spoke the same prayers 
and listened to exhortations of religious and social leaders 
who ideally differentiated between none of their co-religion-
ists .. 
This is not to claim, however, that the economic 
strictures of 1918-19 did not precipitate some form of labour 
unrest. Throughout 1918 and 1919 the Calcutta area witnessed 
a series of strikes which not only gained the jute mill 
workers a wage increase of 20 per cent but which also proved 
to be a mild foretaste of the massive industrial disturbances 
of 1920 and 1921.. 1 
The first reported strike of 1918 carne from the Kankinarah 
jute mills north of Calcutta where crowds of workers agitating 
for a wage increase, 'to meet the increased cost of living', 
2 
were forcibly dispersed by troops. Throughout the remainder 
of the year and during the course of 1919 the spate of minor 
strikes continued: coachmen and gharri drivers in the city 
itself in Septernber,3 jute balers at the Sealdah mills in 
1 Buchanan~ D.H.? op.cit. ~ p.J55; Labour Commission, 1929 
(EvidenctJ., Vol~V? part 1s Po299· 
2 Statesman, 1918, 13 April, p.5. 
3Ibid., 9 May, p.5. 
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1 October, dockworkers at Ki.dderpore and railway workers at 
Kharagpur in December 1918, 2 and in May, July and August of 
1919 postal peons in the city and workers at the Lilloah 
workshops of the East Indian Railway" 3 None of the strikes 
were of any great duration and except for the railway strike 
at Lilloah rarely involved more than 500-1,000 workers: 
a fact which would seem to indicate that in the mills at 
least, where the labour force was usually several thousand 
strongQ only certain groups of workers were involved in the 
strikes. None of these incidents of industrial unrest 
appear to have been politically motivated, for as far as the 
demands of the workers were concerned they were of a purely 
economic nature., No evidence is available that would indicate 
the involvement of political agitators or local politicians, 
The one exception was during the strike at Kharagpur in 
December 1918 when CoR. Das, the rising luminary of nationalist 
politics in Bengal, stepped in and eventually persuaded the 
predominantly Bengali labouring force to return to work. 4 
The intervention of Das at Kharagpur was an incident, 
which although isolated, helps throw further light on the 
composition of the groups ifivolved in the strikes. At 
Kharagpur the workers involved were high caste Bengalis 
who fillBd specialist positions such as signalmen and clerks.5 
As such they were a cohesive and well-defined group and typical 
of the class from whom Das gained the majority of his 
followers in urban Bengal. In the jute mil.ls a similar 
pattern of group involvement seems to have occurred8 Initially 
those involved were skilled operatives who formed a distinct 
regional~ linguistic and religious group in the mill concernedD 
1 Ib lid u , 1 0 October,, p, 5 • 
2Ibid.~ 6 December, p.5; ibid., 18 December, p.5; Govt of 
India, Home Poll (Dep.~ ~ December 1918, noc-22~ 
3statesman, 1919, 24 May~ po8; ibid.,, 31 July, p.7; ibid!, 
9 August, p" 6. 
4 Govt of India, Home Poll (Depo), January 1919, no.41. 
5 Ibid. 
Group consciousness was strong, and once the sirdars had 
decided upon strike action the removal of even a small group 
of skilled operatives from the mill could effectively cripple 
its operationsc 
There is little evidence to indicate the existence of 
any form of trade unionism during this periodo The 
inability of l.abourers to pay dues, lack of interest of 
local politicians and social leaders and the diverse social, 
linguistic and religious backgrounds of the factory population 
were all factors which militated against the formation of a 
trade union movement. 1 There were, however, two exceptions 
to this rule, the Indian Seamen's Anjuman and the Carters 1 
Union. The former had be.en established in 1908 by Nawab 
2 Chowdhury, the wealthy Muslim zamindar and politician from 
east Bengal, to cater for the predominantly east Bengali 
Muslim seamen population of Calcutta, and the latter in 1917 
by Y.C. Ariff, younger brother of G.H.C. Ariff,J amongst the 
carters of Calcutta the majority of whom were Muslimso 4 Both 
men were communalists and conservative in political outlook, 5 
and as such were not interested in using the organisations 
they had created for anything more than rallying points for 
a more widespread support of the communalist cause and also 
for personal aggrandisement. Indeed, the organisation of 
the Carters' Union was almost certainly a half-hearted attempt 
on the part of the dissident faction of the Presidency Muslim 
6 League to rally support amongst a section of the Muslim 
population of the city, especially as Y.C. Ariff was at this 
1 Kelman: J.H_, Labour in India (1923), p.15. 
2 Saksena, R.N., Seamen in India (1951), pp.92-4~ See also pages 
59~ 62)ar.:d:71f:· for Nawab Chowdhury. 
JSee pages 10,41 ~46 and 48 for Ariff brothers. 
4
aovt of India, Home Poll, 1924, nov66/124 and KW. 
5 see pages 10~ 41, 46, 47. 
6 See page 47 ., 
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time the Secretary of the Central National Mahommedan 
Associationo 1 However 1 the Indian Se'amen' s Anjuman was 
virtually moribund by 1914 and it was not until March 1918 
that Mahomed Daud and R. Braunfield, two socially conscious 
but politically wary lawyers, revived ito By the end of 
1919 the Anjuman, had gained sufficient strength to hold a 
successful strike for increased wages,and. in 1920 was renamed 
the Indian Seamen's Union~ 2 
But economic hardships were not the sole affliction 
which affected the lives of the working classes of the 
Calcutta area during the years 1918 and 1919. Like their 
counterparts elsewhere in India, they felt the full brunt 
of the great influenza epidemic which swept the world in 
this period. Admittedly the effects of the epidemic were 
less severe in Calcutta than in most other urban centres in 
India,J but even so deaths from all causes had increased 
during 1918 by nearly 50 per cent from the 1917 total, and 
4 by another 20 per cent by December 1919. Influenza was 
the main killer but the debilitating effect of it, a poor 
diet and insanitary living conditions precipitated an 
increase in the number of deaths from dysentery, diarrhoea, 
cholera, smallpox and other causes.5 
The epidemic first assumed notable proportions in June 
1918 and spread with 'lightning like rapidity' so that by 
J l •t . "d. d 6 p l l ll d u y 1 was caus1ng w1 esprea . concern.. opu ar y ca e . 
'war fever' it upset and dislocated all facets of life in the 
city and suburbs and spread through every quarter of the 
metropolis.7 The worse affected areas, however, were those 
1
see page 47 .. 
2 Saksena~ R.N.,op.cit., pp.92-4. 
3statistical Abstracts< 1911 to 1921, p.J74. 
4 Census, 1921, Vol.VI, part 1~ po63~ 
5Ibid..~ p.6J. 
6
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes'~ October 1918 to March 1919, 
12.2e1919, pp.1J4J-46. 
7Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.)c September 1918, no.19~ 
:inhabited by the poorer citizens of the city. , The 
epidEmicrs toll was heaviest in the Kidderpore dock area 
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1 
where it was reported that there was a case in every bustee. 
The northern wards of the city were also severely affected, 
and the rapid rise in mortality rates was particularly marked. 
amongst children under five years and amongst males in the 
20-JO year age group, the largest group in the male working 
population. 2 The epidemic declined during the early months 
of 1919 but experienced a sudden and final resurgence 
between the months of September and December. 3 
II 
Against this background of material and physical distress 
relations between the two major communities in Calcutta 
underwent a piecemeal disintegration during 1918. By 1917 
the Lucknow Pact had precipitated divisions within the ranks 
of the elite Muslim leadership of the city, 4 whilst severe 
communal riots in the United Provinces and Bihar had. 
exacerbated tensions between the many thousands of natives 
from these provinces, both Hindu and Muslim, who were resident 
in and around the city. The Muslims were confused by the 
conflicting appeals of a divided leadership and by the 
incompatible pull on loyalties engendered by the war. Within 
the city perennial questions involving korbani, or cow 
slaughter,continued. to bedevil relations between Muslims and 
1Calcutta Corporation, op.cit., p.1J46; 
25 October, p.6. 
Statesman, 19~8, 
2
calcutta Corporation, op.cit., 30.10.1918, p.812; 
Statistical Abstracts, 1911 to 1921, pp.JS0-84. 
3Ibid., pp.J94-5. 
4
see page 47. 
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Marwaris 1 especially when a newspaper such as the Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, with its proclaimed policy of' Hindu-Muslim 
conciliation, came out in support of Marwari sentiment. 2 
Petty quarrels regarding Corporation policy towards the 
clearance of Hindu and Muslim bustees, and the alleged 
penchant of 'lawless Muhammedan ruffians' for idol breaking 
and the nubile charms of Hindu maidens did little to further 
the cause of communal goodwill.J 
Such incidents provided ideal ammunition for the more 
communally minded Muslim leaders in the city; but the 
decline in communal relations was not a simple process of 
inevitable or final alienation. but was compounded of a variety 
of complicated factors. Feeling amongst the Muslims of the 
city was certainly directed against Hindu groups such as the 
Marwaris whose wartime profiteering and religious parochial-
ism offended them, but it was also directed against the 
British who were engaged in a war with Turkey from which they 
were to emerge as the victors later in 1918. A prominent 
Calcutta Bengali-language newspaper, the Moslem Hitaisha -
owned by Mulla Enamul Huq, one of the few wealthy Bengali 
Muslims in the city and reputed to be 'the richest hide 
merchant in Calcutta 14 - may have followed a strictly communal 
line under the patronage of Nawab Chowdhury and Moulana Abu 
Bakr;5 but its scorn of the non-Bengali mercantile population 
of the 'city, which was the legacy of the sense of rivalry 
felt by the Ashraf families of the mofussil towards the 
rising Muslim leadership of Calcutta 1 no doubt lost it much 
6 
sympathy there. Many Muslims may have sympathised with its 
1 Statesman, 1918 1 29 May 1918,p.7. 
2Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918: various articles between January 
4 and 8 .. 
3Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 22 July, p.7; ibid., 21 August, 
p.J; ibid., 2 May, p.18; ibid., 15 June; p .. 7 .. 
4Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File No .. 472/19. 
5 Ibid. 
6NNR, 1918, 26 April, Moslem Hitaishi. 
6o 
frequent criticisms of Congress as a Hindu-dominated 
organisation, 1but its policy of abject loyalty lost it still 
further support. Increasing n~bers of Muslims were~ despite 
their preoccupation with communal grievances, becoming 
emotionally involved in the mounting furore over the question 
of the Muslim detenus and the fate of Turkey. More frequently 
their anger was directed against the British - their 
political masters. 
The question of the Muslim detenus aroused particular 
feeling in Calcutta. The most prominent Muslims amongst 
those-interned, namely Mahomed and Shaukat Ali and Abul 
Kalam Azad, were well known figures in the city. They had 
taken a leading role in local agitation at the time of the 
Balkan Wars and had established popular Pan-Islamic news-
papers in the city which had helped sow the seeds of the 
2 present discontent over Turkeyo Hindu and Muslim supporters 
of the communal ~pprochement in the city were quick to make 
use of the popular feeling aroused by this issue. Younger 
Muslim leaders such as Fazl-ul Huq and Abul Kasem united 
with Congress agitators to stir Muslim sentiment. With the 
help of Hindus such as C.R. Das, the leader of the provincial 
Congress organisation, and Byomkesh Chakravarti, Annie 
Besant's lieutenant for the Home Rule movement in Bengal, 
they were active throughout 1918 and 1919 organising meetings 
and de--putations in support of the detenus .. 3 
The position of men such as Huq and Kasem was, however; 
complex., Huq was born of a family of Barisal vakils, had 
completed a brilliant law degree under the great Hindu High 
Court lawyer Asutosh Mookherjea, and in 1906 had emerged as 
a protege of the Nawab of Dacca in the administration of the 
1
-Ibid., 10 May. 
2 See pages 41-4J. 
JGovt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), March 1918, no.40; e~g. 
Amrita Bazar Patrika-, 1918, 1 January, p.6; ibid., 6 February, 
p.9; ibid.., 26 February, p.6; ibid~, 5April, p.4; ibid., 
19 June, p.4; ibid., 24 June, p.4. 
new province of East Bengal and Assam. Following the 
reunification of Bengal in 1911 Huq had become one of the 
major critics of the older Muslim leadership 9 especially 
after he entered the Bengal Legislative Council. 1 Wary of 
Congress he had nevertheless moved towards the position of 
the more extreme nationalist Hindu politicians in a bid to 
wrest leadership from men such as the Nawab of Dacca and 
Nawab Chowdhury. Huq championed the Lucknow Pact in Bengal 
a:p.d as a result lost much popular support 9 but in the 
agitation concerning the Muslim detenus he did much to 
refurbish his image in Calcutta at least. 
Huq represented a new kind of leader within the Muslim 
community. Although his background was Ashraf and in his 
first and second marriages his wives were members of notable 
Ashraf families, 2 his influence was not locally based on 
land ownership and patronage but rather on personal ability 
and his realisation of the value of mass agitation and 
involvement. Unlike the older Ashraf leaders Huq realised 
the value of rousing widespread popular support and found 
in the Muslims of Calcutta the ideal material. Admittedly 
Huq 1 s hometown of Barisal provided him with a life-long 
base of hard core support due to his own and his family's 
prestige 9 but during the years between 1918 and partition 
in 1947 Huq's centre of activity was Calcutta:the modern 
social, political and economic capital of Bengal - for 
Hindus and Muslims alike. 
Kasem 1 s background was in many ways different. Born of 
a land-owning Ashraf family from the Burdwan district in 
west Bengal Kasem had been one of the foundation members of 
the Bengal Presidency Mahommedan Association and its first 
secretary in 1906. 3 An earlier convert than Huq to the 
1Low, D.A. (ed.), Soundings in Modern South Asian History 
(1968), Broomfield, J., 1 The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal 
Muslims and September 1918 1 , pp.202-J. 
2His first marriage was to a granddaughter of Nawab Abdul 
Latif and his second to a daughter of Maulana Abu Bakr his 
political opponent during this period! 
3see page 40. 
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cause of nationalism he had long opposed the influence 
exerted by the Dacca faction over the fortunes of his 
connnunity, and following Huq's emergence as a critic of the 
old leadership the two came into increasing contact. For a 
while Kasem allied himself with the moderate Hindu politician 
Surendranath Banerjea in the provincial Legislative Council, 1 
but by 1918 Kasem, Huq and Mujibur Ralnnan, the editor of 
the Calcutta English-language newspaper the Mussalman, were 
members of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee led by 
2 C.R. Das. Until 1917 they had received support in Calcutta 
city from the prominent lawyer Dr Abdullah Suhrawardy and 
the brothers Ariff - Yacoob and Ghulam Hussain Cassim - both 
of whom were wealthy silk merchants. Disillusionment with 
the terms of the Hindu-Muslim pact at Lucknow and the rapid 
conciliation with more extreme Hindu politicians, however, 
alienated Suhrawardy and the Ariff brothers. By 1918 the 
Ariffs had shifted loyalties to Nawab Chowdhury, and 
Suhrawardy was following a fine path between the two camps. 
Unlike Huq and his followers Suhrawardy was prepared 
to accept the reforms proposals submitted by the British in 
1918. They were.in fact based largely on the terms of the 
Lucknow Pact but were rejected by the nationalist Muslims 
on the grounds that they left too much power in the hands 
of the bureaucracy, and by the communalists because they 
gave the Hindu minority in Bengal a majority of seats in 
the proposed Legislative Council.J In part too Suhrawardy 1 s 
differences with Huq were, like so many of the instances of 
dispute between leading members of the Muslim community in 
Calcutta, personal. In March 1918 for instance they were 
at loggerheads in the Legislative Council over the question 
of the siting of a proposed Muslim Arts College in Calcutta; 
1Broomfield, J., opncit., p.57. 
2All India Congress Committee Papers, General Secretary's 
Correspondence, File no.J. Hereafter referred to as AICC 
Papers. 
3statesman; 1918, 11 July, p.4; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 
28 August, p.4 .. 
64 
was prohibited, a new crop of Urdu-language newspapers 
soon rose to replace them. By mid 1918 in addition to the 
Muhammadi, Mussalman, Moslem Hitaishi and Habul Matin the 
Muslim press in Calcutta consisted of the Naggash, established 
early in 1918,the Jamhur 1 established in December 1917, a 
re-vived Risalet and the Sadagat, which had been established 
to replace the bankrupt Tarjuman in 1916. 
The editors and leading staff of all these newspapers 
were no:r:--Bengali Muslims and they frequently swapped from 
one new.spaper to another as in format and content there was 
little to differentiate the journals. The most prominent 
of these journalists were Syed Mahomed Fazlur Rahman, a 
native of Bihar and a former student who had been expelled 
from his Patna college in 1916 for leading a strike, 1 and 
who first worked on the .§adag_at and finaJ.ly on the Jamhur; 
Kazi Abdul Ghaffur, son of a petty landowner in the United 
Provinces,who had originally worked on Mahomed Ali's Hamdard 
in Delhi and who later came to Calcutta to work first on 
the Tarjuman and its successor the Sadagat, and then as 
editor of the Jamhur .. In addition there was Saiyid Muhammed 
Habib Shah a 'native of the Punjab, former sepoy in Hong 
Kong and later detenu who in 1916 joined the Risalet, moved 
to the Sadaga:£ and finally started the Naggash; and Jaffar 
Hussain Kalami, a Madrasi from the south Indian Urdu 
stronghold of Nellore,who worked as subCeditor on the 
Sadagat~ 
All these men, and others such as the Punjabi Ghulam 
Hussain of the Risalet,had several things in common - they 
were Urdu speakers, migrants and fanatically Pan-Islamic 
and anti-British~ Their inspiration was Mahomed Ali with 
2 
whom at least one, Kalami, was in touch , and as such they 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (A), November 1918, noso 164-201: 
all the biographical details of the Pan-Islamic journalists 
are contained inthis file. 
2NNR, 1918~ 3 September, Millat. 
were hostile to the war being waged against the Ottoman 
Empire, the temporal domain of the spiritual head of Islam 
the Caliph. But the Pan-Islamism of Mahomed Ali had 
developed from its earlier form of Islamic parochialism and 
pragmatically Ali, his brother Shaukat and other leading 
exponents of the movement such as Maulana Abdul Bari, had 
turned to Congress for moral support in their anti-British 
stand. 1 
The Great War had brought Britain into direct conflict 
with Turkey and the Pan-Islamists in India who saw the war 
not in its European context but as the final episode of a 
long history of Christian and Muslim conflict which dated 
from the fall of Constantinop~e. Thus in the pages of 
newspapers such as the Jamhur, Risalet and Sadagat articles 
critical of British attitudes towards Turkey were juxta-
posed with articles in support of the detenus, Congress, 
2 the Lucknow Pact, and Annie Besant's Home Rule movement. 
As if to illustrate the basic conflict in the Muslim 
mind of the time, however, when extra-Indian loyalties 
gained new strength and traditional loyalties and animosities 
were alternately weakened and strengthened, the same 
newspapers contained articles of a distinctly anti-Hindu 
nature. Thus the Jamhur of 6 January 1918 wrote bitterly 
of Hindu involvement in the recent Bihar riots and on the 
9th lavished praise on the stand of Anni:e Besant and Congress 
against the British.J Such was also the case with the 
4 Sadagat, the Millat - which replaced the Risalet when it 
was banned in April 19185 - and even the avowedly pro-
Congress Muhammadi, which in an issue of 29 March 1918 went 
1 
'Bamford Report 1 ~, p. 58" 
2NNR~ 1918~ January-September, passim. 
3NNR, 1918, 6 and 9 January~ Jamhur. 
4NNR 9 1918~ JO December 1917, 16-19 January, SadagatQ 
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as far as to support the British recruiting drive on the 
grounds that it would provide the Muslims of Bihar and the 
United Provinces with a military training which would enable 
them to fight the Hindus in a recurrence of commun'al strife. 1 
Such conflicting emotions were typical not only of the 
confused state of Muslim opinion in Calcutta but of Muslim 
opinion throughout India.. The pro-British policies of the 
traditional leadership had been steadily discredited since 
the early years of the century, and with it any widespread 
loyalty to the British, but the vacuum had only been partly 
filled by the rising group of more pro-nationalist younger 
leaders. 
For the Urdu-speaking Muslims of Calcutta, whether 
up-country mill labourer or petty merchant in the city, 
increasing bitterness towards the British combined with 
outraged religious sentiments and renewed suspicions of 
the Hindus to produce a confusing stream of rumour and. 
counter rumour, and to undermine the influence of all but 
the most fanatically religious leaders:for religion was 
the one unchanging factor of which all Muslims were sure. 
Huq, Abdullah Suhraward.y and Nawab Chowdhury may have exerted. 
some measure of control over the social, professional and 
economic elites of the Muslim community in the city but 
it was the Pan-Islamic journalists with their ill-defined. 
creed compounded of religion, hatred of the British and 
Hindus, and opportunistic outlook towards Congress who 
held the most immediate and. powerful sway over the Muslim 
masses of the Calcutta area. They owned no master 9 least 
of all Huq or any. other Muslim poli tici.an except perhaps 
the interned. Mahomed. Ali, 2 who was more of a spiritual 
rather than practical mentor, and. were scornful of Bengal 
and all things Bengali~J In sentiment they were completely 
1NNR, 1918, 29 March, Muhammadi. 
2NNR 
' 
1918, 3 September, Millat. \ 
JNNR 
' 
1918, 26 March, Risalet~ 
oriented to the Urdu heartland of India in the central 
Gangetic valley and to Turkey, the last great symbol of 
Islamic temporal and spiritual power, 
. III 
The confusion of Muslim political ideals, the material 
havoc wrought by rising prices, static wages and the 
various epidemics that plagued the city in 1918 all combined 
to create a volatile situation amongst the Muslims of 
Calcutta. The Risalet was subject to censorship in April 
1918 for articles regarding the Bihar riots, 1 and was banned 
in the following month for flouting censorship rules. 2 It 
was succeeded by the Millat which declared in its first 
issue that India was the home of the Muslims and Hindus 
had no rights in it 9 although shortly afterwards it lavished 
praise on Gandhi for his conciliatory utteranc.es about 
Muslim grievances against the British.J In March the 
?adaqat has been banned in the Punjab and with the loss of 
its main market was forced into bankruptcy in the following 
month. 4 
In March also Gandhii fast rising to prominence within 
Congress, came to an agreement with Maulana Abdul Bari of 
Lucknow~ a leading Pan-Islamist, that the Hindus would 
espouse the cause of Turkey in return for a ban on cow-
slaughter. But this had little effect in Calcutta where the 
mercantile Marwaris, the most fervent supporters of cow-
protection,had recourse to the law in May to stop the 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), March 1918, no.J8; ibid., 
March 1918, no.41; ibid., Home Poll (A), November 1918, 
nos 1 6 4-2 0 1 • 
2 Ibid. 
JNNR, 1918, 6 April and 4 June, Millat. 
4 Govt of IndiaQ Home Poll (Dep,), May 1918, no.64; NNR, 
1918, 2 March, Sadaqat. 
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construction of a Muslim slaughterhouse in Alipore. 1 Huq, 
Kasem and their followers in the Presidency Muslim League 
continued to press the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity 'for 
the cause of the nation' , 2 and Hindu extremist politicians 
such as B.C. Pal praised the anti-British spirit of the 
Pan-Islamic movement at meetings in north Calcutta~J In 
September 1918, however, Muslim resentment in the city 
finally exploded into an orgy of violence and looting. 
The immediate cause of the outbreak was an article 
which appeared in the English language Calcutta newspaper, 
the Indian Daily News, in July 1918. During the course of 
a description of Paris one of the newspaper's journalists 
unfortunately wrote that an Alg~rian street sweeper gazed 
into a gutter with the reverence usually reserved for the 
tomb of the Prophet. Innocent in itself the remark was 
construed as a libellous attack on Islam and was seized 
upon by the Pan-Islamic journalists of Calcutta as another 
instance of the scornful attitude of the British towards 
Islam. That such a seemingly insignificant incident could 
have assumed its later proportions can only be understood 
if the full emotional impact of the British involvement 
against Turkey is grasped. Indian Muslims at this period 
struggled to preserve the remaining glories of the past 
in the face of an uncertain future. As the Governor of 
Bengal, Lord Ronaldshay wrote to the Viceroy: 
The root cause of the trouble •• ois not a local 
one. It is deC?p-seated and widespread; and so 
far as I can judge, the present display of feeling 
in Bengal is merely a symptom of the di~turbed 
state of the whole Moslem body politic. 
1Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 29 May, p.7. 
2Ibid., 26 April, p.12. 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), August 1918, no.JO. 
4Details of the riots, characters involved and associated 
events a:r:'e drawn from the following sources: Govt of India, 
Home Poli (A), November 1918, nos 164-201; ibid., Home Poll 
(Dep.), 1921, no.45; ibid., September 1918, no.41; Bengal 
Govt, Political Dept, September 1918, File no.2N-31, Frogs 
B1075-96; ibid., File no.12c-63, Frogs P57-58; Statesman,1918, 
10 September, pp.5-9; ibid., 11 Septemner, p.6; Amrita Bazar 
Patrika, 1918, 10 September, p.4; ibid., 11 September, p.4; 
Zetland, Marquis of, Essaye~ (1956), pp.109-16. 
The Pan-Islamic press immediately made capital of 
the article as a deliberate attack by the British authorities~ 
and launched a virulent campaign against the editor of the 
newspaper and the British in general. The immediate 
reaction of the authorities was to censor and then ban 
the Naggash later in August when they seized its security 
'on account of its wild and indiscreet articles' • 2 But 
it was immediately replaced by the Rahbar under the 
continuing editorship of Saiyid Muhammed Habib Shah"J The 
Millat 9 successor to the Risalet, was subject to censorship 
also, but proceeded to flaunt the rules much to the chagrin 
of the British" 4 The tone of their articles certainly 
supported Ronaldshay 's thesis that the cause of Mus lim 
unrest was not purely local as did the utterances of Ahmed 
Musa Misri, the Egyptian Imam of the Nakhoda mosque in Ward 
VIII, who was noted for his anti-British sentiments and who 
daily offered prayers for the safety of the Caliph. But 
the pressures of local influences, both economic and communal, 
were also responsible for the violence of the Muslim 
reaction to the newspaper articles as is evinced by the 
pattern of unrest which developed during the month of 
September, 
On 11 August the Presidency Muslim League organised a 
protest meeting against the article in the Indian Daily News. 
Chaired by Abdur Raheem, the prominent Colootolla St 
merchant and member of the Imperial Legislative Council, 5 
the meeting was marked by wild anti-British speeches. 
Horrified, Raheem immediately visited the Gov~:,rnor to protest 
his loyalty to the Empire, and to state his inability to 
persuade the members at the meeting not to organise a 
1NNR, 1918, 1 August, Naqgash" 
2 Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep"), September 1918, no.20o 
3Ibid9, no.41. 
4Ibid. 
5see page 1 0_, 
massive all-India protest meeting for Calcutta in early 
September. An ad hoc committee comprising mostly up-
country merchants from Ward VIII, and particularly from 
the area immediate.ly around the Nakhoda mosque, was 
established to arrange the September protest. 
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The committee consisted of eight Urdu-speaking Muslims, 
five of whom were petty merchants, one - Habib Ghulam 
Rasul - a fo·rmer railway clerk turned journalist, one -
Moulvi Najimuddin Ahmed - a retired deputy collector, and 
one of unknown origin. The committee proceeded to print 
invitations and leaflets in Urdu which were distributed 
throughout north India and the mill areas of Bengal which 
urged all Mus1.ims to attend the proposed protest meeting. 
The organisers claimed that the purpose of the meeting was 
to discuss the newspaper article and the reforms proposals 
of the British, but translation of the leaflets does not 
bear this claim out. The leaflets distributed to the 
mill-hands in the Calcutta area were both anti-Hindu and 
anti-British in expression and urged the participation of 
the Muslim masses in a jihad against all non-believers. 
Throughout the remainder of the month enthusiasm and 
support for the September meeting was assiduously cultivated 
in Calcutta by the Pan-Islamic journa.lists 1 especially 
Kalami and Ghulam Hussain of the Millat, Habib Shan of the 
Rahbar and Fazlur Rahman of the Jamhur, who organised a 
variety of meetings at which they hurled wild accusations 
at the British and blatantly defied the authorities to 
silence them. 
Few other prominent Mus1.ims in Calcutta, however, 
appear to have been involved in the mounting agitation. 
The Sunni Bohra Association of Bohra merchants sent a letter 
of protest regarding the offending article to the Governor, 
and Mahomed Daud, a leading Calcutta lawyer and President 
of the Indian Seamen's Anjuman, organised a protest meeting 
at the Shia imambara in Garden Reach presided over by an 
obscure prince of the Mysore household and attended by some 
2,000 millhands. This meeting in particular was indicative 
of the growing communal consciousness in the area, at least 
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as far as the Muslim sirdars in the mi .. lls were concerned. 
Obviously Daud, an Urdu-speaker, had caught the attei:\-tion 
of these group leaders and provided the link between them 
and the mainstream of Muslim sentiment in the city. In 
general, however, the direction of the agitation was in the 
hands of Pan-Islamic agitators. 
Fazl-ul Huq was bitterly offended by the article and 
was in contact with the organisers of the proposed meeting 
but his role is obscure. If anything it appeared that he 
favoured negotiations .with the local government on the 
issue. However, two of his major supporters in the 
Presidency Muslim League were on the organising committee, 
namely Moulvi Najimuddin Ahmed, a retired deputy collecto:r, 
and Moulana Abdul Rauf, a Bihari merchant and long-time 
friend of Azad who had taken an active role in the Pan-
Islamic movement since the period of the Balkan Wars. 
Both were fully aware of the anti-Hindu overtones of the 
agitation and were largely responsible for the collection 
of Rs 8,000 from 'well-to-do people' in Calcutta to finance 
their activities. 
Other Muslim leaders such as Abdur Raheem, Dr Abdullah 
Suhrawardy, the Ariff brothers and Nawab Chowdhury appear 
to have been cowed by the strength of Muslim sentiment on 
the issue and powerless to control it. Indeed, men such 
as Nawab Chowdhury had been in a large part responsible 
for the inflaming of Muslim antipathy towards the Hindus, 
an:lthe communalist newspaper patronised by Chowdhury, the 
Moslem Hitaishi, had long been more consistently anti-Hindu 
than any of the Pan-Islamic journals. 
The Governor was not s1ow tu realise the direction the 
agitation was taking and on 3 September called a. meeting of 
the organisers to discuss events and to suggest that the 
conference should be cancelled. But under the leadership of 
Najimuddin the committee members declined the Governor's 
advice and on the following day delegates from all parts of 
Urdu-speaking India began to arrive in the city. The 
authorities persuaded many to return home voluntarily and 
served externment notices on the more recalcitrant. 
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Tension rapidly mounted and the speeches of agitators 
to crowds of several thousand in the central areas of the 
city, particularly around the Nakhoda mosque, became more 
virulent and defiant. On the evening of the 6th Kalami 
made a particularly strong speech which earned him expulsion 
to his native Madras the following day when similar orders 
were served on Habib Shah and Fazlur Rahman who had likewise 
ignored orders prohibiting them from speaking in public. 
The removal of these journalists effectively curtailed the 
spirited writings of the Rahbar, Millat and Jumhur, but by 
now the agitation had gained sufficient momentum to survive 
the loss of its progenitors. 
The British were thoroughly alarmed by this time and 
troop reinforcements were rushed into the city to be 
stationed at strategic points such as the Howrah bridge 
and the Kidderpore docks to defend the city against an 
influx of turbulent millhands at the time of the meeting 
on the 9th. On that morning the Governor made a final bid 
to dissuade the organisers of the meeting. A group of 50 
leading Muslims including Huq, Dr A. Suhrawardy, G.H.C. 
Ariff, Nawab Chowdhury,• Najimuddin and several prominent 
journalists, who had survived the purge of the 7th, were 
invited to Government House and received a lecture and 
order from Ronaldshay which banned the meeting. 
Meanwhile crowds of Muslims had gathered in the streets 
and alleyways surrounding the Nakhoda mosque wher;e they 
were harangued in Urdu by a series of anti-Marwari and 
anti-British speakers. The hot humid weather frayed tempers 
and by mid-day lack of news from Government House gave rise 
to a renewed d,etermination to confront the authorities. A 
large crowd marched down Chitpur Road from the Nakhoda 
mosque shortly after 1 p.m. and met a police picket near 
the junction with Bowbazar Street at 1.15 P:om. Shoes, 
brickbats and offal were hurled in a rather desultory fashion 
at the police but Huq arrived from Government House and 
peace was temporarily restored when he persuaded the crowd 
to return to the mosque. Unfortunately, however, Huq was 
the bearer of bad news: the Government remained firm in 
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their resolve to ban the meeting and once informed of this 
all control over the ~ense Muslim mobs in the centre of the 
city was lost. 
The alleged shooting of a Muslim by guards at the house 
of a nervous Marwari precipitated the next stage of the 
riot and by early evening Wards VII, VIII and IX of the city 
were completely in the hands of rampaging mobs of Muslims 
who were busy attacking the Marwari merchants and looting 
food and cloth shops. The police and troops eventually 
restored order by force the next day but only after killing 
and wounding several rioters. The storm centres of the 
riots proved not to be at the Howrah bri.dge, as there was 
no attempted invasion by the millhands of Howrah, but 
around the Nakhoda mosque, on the borders of Calcutta city 
and the municipalities of Garden Reach and Manicktolla. 
Order was restored around the Nakhoda mosque late on 
the evening of the 9th when it was cleared of rioters and 
the Muslim petty merchants, artisans and labourers of the 
area had been cowed. The following day, however, Muslim. 
millhands in Garden Reach and from municipalities to the 
north of Calcutta attempted to enter the city. 10,000 
millhands at mills in Garden Reach went on strike and a 
group of 2,000 labourers and 1 Chittagong Muslims of the 
seafaring class who [were J known to be a turbulent lot 1 , 1 
preceded by whirling, screaming fanatics, attacked a line 
of troops on the main road leading to the Kidderpore docks 
and llret'e only driven back after 12 were killed and 20 
wounded. Meanwhile a resurgence of violence occurred at the 
Nakhoda mosque where two rioters were shot and several were 
wounded before order was restored 1 and a mob of several 
thousand began a rampage of looting in the Manicktolla 
markets where two were eventually shot to death. 
By the afternoon of the 1Oth the disturbances began 
to subside and peace was finally restored once a thoroughly 
1 Statesman, 1918, 11 September, p.6. 
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frightened Najimuddin Ahmed and the Imam of the Nakhoda mosque 
had agreed to issue a leaflet in Urdu calling for a cessation 
of ho-stilities. 
In retrospect an analysis of the riots and rioters 
reveals several interesting features about the nature of 
Muslim society and communal relations in Calcutta. The 
victims of the riots were mainly up-country Muslims and 
Marwaris; Bengali Hindus and Muslims were only marginally 
involved - for instance in the final stage when the prospect 
of loot attracted men of varied backgrounds - and within the 
city itself the riot spread only in those areas where a 
heavily populated Muslim ward bordered on a centre of 
Marwari settlement, as was the case in Wards V-VIII - the 
commerical centre of the city. Indeed, in the latter stages 
of the riot up-country Hindu and Muslim goondas appear to 
have been equally responsible for attacks on Marwari shops, 
and what does emerge from the whole incident is the general 
lack -of violent anti-Hindu activity compared with the strength 
of anti-Marwari and anti-British sentiment. 
Despite the fears of the British the mass of millhands 
remained quiescent. Admittedly the Muslim millhands of 
Garden Reach, where the Muslim percentage of inill employees 
was higher than in other areas, 1 attempted to enter the city 
but their confrontation was with the police and troops, and 
there are no reports of any clash with their Hindu co-workers. 
This might be construed as an indication of the absence of 
any marked degree of communal tension in the mill areas; 
perhaps, however, it was more an example of the influence 
exerted by the sirdars who were undoubtedly responsible for 
organising the incursions. The Muslim millhands from Garden 
Reach seem to have been particularly well organised and 
marched from their mills in orderly groups under the direction 
of sirdars until they were confronted by British troops at 
Kidderpore. Similarly in central Calcutta and Manicktolla 
the British troops were the enemy and the rioters were more 
1Labour Commission, 1929 (Evidence), VoLV, part 1, pp.1J4-5. 
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intent on loot than anything else. 
The main body of rioters in fact comprised the Muslim 
and noh-Muslim up-country inhabitants of Wards V-VIII. 
Those involved were the middle-class and lower middle-class 
traders, artisans and clerks of the area and they were 
joined by the petty hawkers, cart drivers and labourers 
who lived on the streets and in the bustees of central 
Calcutta. It was these groups rather than the inarticulate 
factory workers who were able to air their economic and 
religious grievances at such a level. Of course, the 
factory workers were affected by similar grievances but 
their methods of protest were less well-defined and took 
the form of hapahzard strikes or looting of grain shops. 
At no stage in the riots were attacks on temples or 
images reported, and neither do the Bengali or up-country 
Hindu population of the area appear to have been the object 
of organised mob attacks. In Howrah for instance all was 
quiet despite the circulation of virulently anti-Hindu 
leaflets and the feeling engendered by the communal riots 
in Bihar and the United Provinces. Certainly the Marwaris 
came under attack in the city, especially in their stronghold 
at Burra Bazar, but in many ways they were the obvious target 
being.suspected ofcommodity profiteePing andthe foremost 
exponents of agitation against cow-slaughter. As Ronaldshay 
reported to the Viceroy: 
The theory that hatred of the Marwaris was the 
cause of the outbreak in Calcutta is only partially 
true. Hatred of the Marwaris was undoubtedly a. 
contributory cause, but it was not the root cause. 
Indeed all disturbances in Calcutta whatever their 
origin tend to become anti-Marwari before they 
finish. 1 
And in the final count it was the Muslims of the area who 
bore the full human toll of the riots with 36 dead compared· 
with seven Hindus (including Marwaris) killed. 
1 Zetland, Marquis of, op.cit. 
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IV 
The British reaction to the riots was a final burst of 
activity against the Pan-Islamic press in Calcutta. On 14 
September Ghulam Hussain, :former editor of the Millat, and 
Kazi Abdul Ghaffur, former editor of the Jamhur, were 
externed from Bengal, and censorship regulations were applied 
to the Muhammadi and Mussalman which temporarily ceased 
publication. 1 The Hindu press and extremist leaders, 
however, appear to have reacted in a surprisingly 
conciliatory manner towards the Muslims. Like the Presidency 
Muslim League~Hindu Congressmen were quick to blame the 
British ban on the protest meeting for the riots. 2 
The mild reaction of the Hindu nationalist press and 
leaders is perhaps best understood in the light of events 
outside Bengal, the validity of which were underscored by 
the troubles in Calcutta. At the centre of the nationalist 
movement Gandhi was active building up an edifice of Hindu-
Muslim unity based on Hindu support of Muslim grievances, 
particularly those relating to Turkey and the Caliph, He 
soon realised the tactical and propaganda value of mass 
involvement in the nationalist movement, and his early 
experiments in this field won him many supporters throughout 
India and in Bengal where attempts to evolve mass agitation 
had originated independently during the course of the anti-
partition movement. To the more perceptive Hindu leaders 
in Bengal and Calcutta the riots provided an immediate 
example of the strength and feeling of mass agitation thus 
underscoring Gandhi 1 s arguments, and at the same time brought 
home the realisation of the catastrophic effects of Muslim 
alienation. In particular it awakened in the minds of the 
political leaders of Bengal, both Hindu and Muslim, the 
spectre of uncontrolled mob activity and the realisation of 
1 Govt of India, Home Poll (A), November 1 918, nos. 164-201. 
2Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1918, 12 September, p.2; NNR, 1918, 
September, passim. 
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the forgotten fact that Muslims, and not Hindus, formed the 
majority of the provinces' population, 
Local Hindu nationalist leaders were not slow to realise 
the value of Gandhi's style of politics,particularly in 
relation to the Muslims of Calcutta,and following the riots 
they pursued a policy of Hindu-Muslim conciliation in the 
city. The riots had revealed the fact that the British 
now loomed larger than the Hindus as the object of Muslim 
fears and hatred and .the basis of the new communal 
rapprochement in the city rested upon this fact. Increasing 
numbers of Hindu extremist politicians became involved in 
the agitation concerning the detenus and the Khilafat 1 
while the older Muslim leader ship~ which had proved 
ineffective during the riots, continued to act as if the 
political scene was unchangedQ They made no attempt to test 
the strength of their influence within the Calcutta community, 
and in the columns of the Moslem Hitaishd_ and in the 
Corporation they wrote and spoke as if the Hindus and not 
the British were still the object of their community's 
bitternesso 2 Hindu zamindars and money lenders were the 
object of much vilification by the Moslem Hitaishi, while 
in the Corporation throughout the last months of 1918 and 
the early months of 1919 Muslim and Hindu councillors were 
involved in acrimonious debates cone erning the format of the 
propos.ed new Corporation constitution. The Muslims demanded 
separate electorates but at least in this period their 
efforts were countered by a Hindu determination that the 
maximum concession they would be granted was a reservation 
of a limited number of seats that in fact was less than their 
percentage of the city's population. 3 Thus the bitterness 
1Khilafat denotes the office of the Caliph as spiritual 
head of Islam. 
2 NNR, 1918$ October-December, Moslem Hitaishi; Calcutta .. 
Corporation~ 'Minutest, October 1918-March 1919, 7~1.1919, 
p.1027. 
3Ibid.~ 8.3o1919, pp.1422-26; the question of separate 
electorates had been raised first in 1913, see Calcutta 
Corporation, JMinutes' October 1913 to March 1914, 22c10.1913, 
p.1171. 
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of the older Muslim leaders in the city mounted against 
the Hindu majority.and those of their co-religionists who 
advocated the cause of a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. 
v 
Events in Calcutta city and beyond the borders of 
Bengal, however, soon exposed the fading importance of 
the interests and influence of the older leadershipo Within 
the city the Muhammadi and Mussalman were revived and 
energetically proceeded to preach the cause of communal 
under standing. In addition Moulana Akram Khan, the editor 
of the Bengali-language Muhammadi, established an Urdu 
language edition, the Zamana, in December 1918,to broaden 
the basis of Congress-League propaganda amongst the Muslim 
masses of the city. 1 
Their cause was aided by another newspaper incident 
which this time involved the Epiphany which was published 
by the Oxford Mission. The incident never assumed the 
proportions of the previous affair but throughout January 
and February 1919 it was the object of' much agitation by 
the Muhammadi and Huq 1 s friend Abul,Kasem, and was reported 
by the British to have 'created a great impression' amongst 
the Muslim petty merchants~ artisans and labourers of the 
city: the same groups which had been involved in the outburst 
of September 1918. 2 The Epiphany incident occurred at the 
same time as the Sherif of Mecca received recognition from 
the British of his claim to be the Guardian of the Holy 
Places - a declaration which caused considerable disapproval 
and which was considered a further denigration of the powers 
of the Caliph.J Thus the scene was set for a new phase of 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), December 1918, no.2J. 
2Ibid., February 1919, no.42; ibid., March 1919, no.16. 
3Ibid., March 1919, no.17. 
agitation over the question of the fate of the Caliph and 
the Ottoman Empire. 
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The defeat of Turkey and the subsequent delay of the 
victorious allies in deciding the fate of her empire and its 
ruler, the Caliph, had serious repercussions in India. The 
uncertainty engendered by the precarious situtation of the 
spiritual head of Islam provided fertile ground for the spread 
of rwnours, and it was generally believed that the allies were 
determined to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, divide its 
Turkish heartland amongst themselves and depose the Caliph. 
For the Indian.Muslims, and particularly for those steeped 
in the Urdu language and culture, the Turkish empire and the 
Caliph were the last symbols of the glorious past of Islam. 
They saw the Ottoman regime as the ideal Islamic state and 
could not conceive of a Caliph shorn of his protective 
temporal powers. The issues involved stirred not only the 
fanatical and superstitious but Muslims of all classes and 
backgrounds from the most loyal to the most seditious. 1 
In Calcutta both 'extremists and moderates', and 
included amongst the latter was Nawab Chowdhury, were disturbed 
by the question and temporarily set aside their differel).ces 
in a fruitless bid to achieve a common platform on the,~ssue 2 
but as the British commented 'possibly owing to jealousies 
among the leaders, there are no signs of any cooperation in 
this movement' • 3 Disagreement there may have been between 
extremists and moderates but the extremists nevertheless 
pushed ahead with their agitation, and. in cooperation with 
local Hindu Congressmen they rapidly undermined the remaining 
influence that the older Muslim leaders held over the masses 
in the city. The Muhammadi actively campaigned in support of 
Turkey, 4 and on 9 February 1919 Calcutta witnessed its first 
1For a description of the emotional impact on a highly 
westernised Muslim professional family in Calcutta see Begum 
Ikramullah 1 s From Purdah to Parliament (1963), pp.40-4J. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep .. ), March 1919, no.16. 
3Ibid., August 1919, no.54. 
4Ibid., April 1919, noo48; NNR,1919, January-December, Muhammadi. 
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ove.rt Khilafat meeting under the leadership of Fazl-ul Huq, 
Abul Kasem, Najimuddin and the newspaper editors Akram Khan 
and Mujibur Rahman. 1 Several weeks later at Mymensingh a 
joint meeting of the Bengal Congress and the Presidency 
Muslim League under Huq, who had recently been President of 
the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi, 
overwhelmingly gave its support to the Caliph, 2 and shortly 
afterwards the burgeoning spirit of Hindu-Muslim unity was 
tested in Calcutta city. 
On Sunday 6 April Calcutta observed, at the instance of 
Gandhi~ a hartal in protest against the Rowlatt Act which 
was proposed by the Imperial authorities to curb nationalist 
activity in India. Gandhi used the Act as th:e occasioh to 
test his new tactics of nation-wide mass agitation and the 
hartal was observed in all parts of India. Indeed, Gandhi 
could not have chosen a better cause as the Act pot entia.lly. 
affected Indians of all creeds and classes., They were 
considered highly offensive by Indians of every political 
persuasion from the constitutionally-minded Liberals to the 
revolutionary terrorists of Bengal. 
In Calcutta the hartal passed quietly. 3 Most shops in 
the northern and central areas of the city closed as did the 
stalls in the Municipal Market with the exception of the 
Muslim owned fruit and meat kiosks. A good humoured meeting 
attended by approximately 10,000 was held at the Ochterlony 
Monument on the Maidan under the chairmanship of C.R. Das 
and Byomkesh Chakravarti.. A police reporter in the crowd 
later noted that : 
1 Mussalman, 1919, 7 February, p.4. 
2Govt -~:t·India, Home Poll (Dep.) '· July 1919, no.47 .. 
3Details of the Rowlatt hartal and riots in Calcutta are drawn 
from the following sources: Govt of India, Home Poll (B), May 
1919v nos 514-15; ibid., Home Poll ~ep.), April 1919~ no.49; 
ibid., July 1919~ noo46; ibid., July 1919, no-,47; Amrita Baza_r 
Patrika, 1919, 8 1 14 April, various a~ticle~; Statesman, 1919, 
.17 April, . p" 8; Bengal Govt, Political Dept, May 19 19, File no" 
145-1, Frogs B241-44. 
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The greater part of the crowd assembled at the 
Maidan consisted of durwans, low class Muhammedans 
etc (sic), who were evidently out to enjoy a 
tamasha; they took little or no interest in the 
actual proceedings and in fact very few of those 
present could have heard what was said. The 
programme of speeches at the main meeting was not 
completed owing to the inability of the speakers to 
make themselves heard over the noise of the crowd. 
However despite official cynicism and the trepidations 
of the police reporter that trouble was brewing the day 
passed off quietly and by Monday the city was back to normal" 
Further meetings punctured by the cries of 'Mahatma Gandhi 
ki-jai' and 1 Hindu-Mussalman-ki-jai 1 were held on Tuesday the 
8th in various parts of the city, but in general Calcutta 
remained calm until news of Gandhi's alleged arrest in the 
Punjab reached Bengal on the 1.0th. 
By the morning of Friday the 11 tlr an apparently 
spontaneous hartal gripped Calcutta. Indian-owned shops and 
stalls throughout the city closed and Sikh taxi drivers 
immediately went on strike in support of the hartal. Crowds 
in the northern wards were exhibiting less good hwnour than 
on the previous Sunday, and in Bun:'@. Bazar mobs of Marwaris 
and Muslims fraternised to the extent of cooperating in the 
ejection of passengers from trams and carriages. A mass 
meeting was held at the Nakhoda mosque at which Hindus and 
Jains were invited into the central courtyard where they were 
served refreshments without regard to caste or creed. Various 
speakers~both Hindu and Muslim,mounted the pulpit of the 
mosque amongst whom were Byomkesh Chakravarti and Gandhi's 
son Haro Lal Gandhi who delivered a speech on Hindu-Muslim 
unity to the multi-religious congregation. 
The next day saw the continuation of the hartal and the 
complete absence of all traffic in the centre and north of 
the city~ Crowds of Marwari and Muslim youths gathered in 
BurraBazar and by noon were engaged in a full scale affray 
with police pickets in Harrison Road and troops guarding the 
vital Howrah bridge. At the same time a crowd of some 800 
assembled at the Nakhoda mosque. Made up of about .500 Marwaris, 
Jains, Bhatias and up-country Hindus, and the remainder of 
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'~ll~terate' Musl~ms they exc~tedly l~stened to speeches ~n 
Urdu by a Musl~m, a Marwar~ and a Bengal~ wh~ch called for 
H~ndu-Musl~m un~ty and a boycott of Br~t~sh goods~ Throughout 
the rema~nder of the day repeated attacks were made on the 
pol~ce, troops and f~re br~gades, but by late even~ng w~th 
s~x dead and troop re~nforcements pour~ng ~nto the c~ty the 
r~oters were spent and by the 13th the c~ty was s~lent. 
One of the ma~n features of the r~ot was the ~ns~gn~f~­
cant role played by the Bengal~ element and the ~ntens~ve 
part~c~pat~on of up-country Musl~m, Marwar~, Ja~n and Bhat~a 
mercant~le groups. The decl~ne ~n real ~ncome dur~ng the 
war years affected the var~ous groups of petty merchants and 
art~sans ~n the c~ty as badly as the manual labourer as 
they were faced w~th a sharp decl~ne ~n·consumer demand~ 
They were a.lso no doubt further subj~9t to the econom~c 
repercuss~ons of the depress~on wh~ch h~t the jute m~lls ~n 
1919 when government orders ceased as a consequence of wh~ch 
m~ll hours were cut. In add~t~on just as the Musl~m 
mercant~le groups were h~ghly sens~t~ve to the rel~g~ous 
~ssues of the per~od so was the case w~th certa~n non-Musl~m 
groups. Marwar~s and Ja~ns ~n part~cular were strongly 
drawn to the H~ndu and Ja~n trad~t~ons w~th wh~ch Ghand~ 
surrounded h~s pol~t~cal and soc~al act~v~t~es, espec~ally 
w~th regard to h~s attempts to prevent the slaughter of 
'mother cow' and h~s advocacy of Swadesh~ ~ndustr~es. Such 
was also the case w~th the Bhat~as, a trad~ng group from 
Gandh~'s home area of Gujerat, who were numerous ~n both 
Bombay and Calcutta. Equally remarkable was the absence of 
any act~ve part~c~pat~on by Musl~m leaders~ Certa~nly ~n 
February Huq, Kasem and Muj~bur Rahman had jo~ned ~n protest 
meet~ngs, 1 but Kasem at least apparently st~ll had reservat~ons 
about the w~sdom of st~rr~ng the masses ~n v~ew of events the 
prev~ous September~ On the 6th the Statesman had publ~shed a 
letter from Kasem whlch stated that: 
1 Mussalman, 1919, 7 February, p.6. 
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Although I yield to none in my condemnation of the 
Rowlatt Bills ••• I am not one of those who think 
that this method of protest would be productive of 
any good result, especially as the political 
leaders of the present day in Bengal are hopelessly 
divided" 1 
Apparently doubts still lingered in the minds of the younger 
Muslim leaders,but nevertheless tb,is did not prevent them 
from utilising the new spirit of Hindu-Muslim concilia.tion 
which had been confirmed by the Row'J.att agitation in 
Calcutta. 
The hartal and riots of April made little impact on the 
mofussil where the rule of the conservative Ashraf families 
was still strong amongst the Muslim masses. The Calcutta 
affair was oriented towards the sensibilities of Urdu Muslims 
and the dominant Hindu economic groups, and not towards the 
inarticulate Bengali Muslim peasant masses who had yet to 
be awakened to the plight of the Caliphu The language and 
culture of the Calcutta Muslims facilitated the transmission 
of ideas and news from Muslim areas and groups outside the 
province, but as yet no means of breaching the barriers 
between Calcutta and the mofussil had been found. 
One major portion of the Indian population of the 
Calcutta region which did not become involved in the riots 
and hartals were the factory workers in the mill areas 
contiguous to Calcutta. There is no evidence that millhands 
attempted to enter the city as they had in September the 
previous year, a fact which can perhaps be partly explained 
by the spontaneous nature of the hartal on the 11th~ 
Agitators would have had little time to organise mill workers 
outside Calcutta and in any case the original hartal of the 
6th was intended to be a peaceful show of solidarity and it 
may be that memories of the previous year made the organisers 
wary of stirring up the mill populationw Undoubtedly too 
the main organisation for the original hartal was provided 
by local Bengali Hindu Congressmen none of whom had any great 
1 Statesman, 1919, 9 April, p.S. 
experience with the techniques of mass agitation or had as 
yet shown any general interest in the political potential 
of the labouring masses who surrounded the city. Certainly 
individuals like C.R. Das had exhibited some interest in 
the strike movement of early 1918, but apart from the 
activities of Pan-Islamic agitators amongst Muslim millhands 
in the period immediately before the riots of that year, 
there is no evidence of any sustained interest being 
displayed in the bulk of the factory population by the 
middle and upper class Bengali Hindus who dominated the 
local Congress organisation. 
The British claimed that 'respectable Muhammedans' 
in the city had been outraged by the hartal riots, and in 
particular by the spectacle of non-Muslims preaching in the 
1 Nakhoda mosque" Indeed, Nawab Chowdhury and the Moslem 
Hitaishi were vociferously outraged, but to little effect. 2 
The Muh~unmadi ridiculed the Nawab' s notice banning Hindus 
from preaching in mosques;J and although he succeeded in 
rallying the merchants of the Anjuman-i-Waizeen to condemn 
the call of a Muslim divine from Bareilly in the United 
Provinces to give up cow-slaughter4 , his influence in 
Calcutta was obviously on the wane and by the end of 1919 
he was an object of bitter ridicule by the Mussalman and 
Muhanunadi • 5 
The most noticeable outcome of the riots was the 
increasing Hindu involvement in the Khilafat movement in 
Calcutta. Throughout June and July a series of 'cloistered 
conferences and minor meetings' were held to discuss the 
issue 9
6 
and by September the authorities reported to New 
1 Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.)v July 1919, no.46; ibid., 
July 1919, no.47. 
2NNR, 1919, 11 April, Moslem Hitaishi. 
3Ibid., 25 April, Muhammadi. 
4 Statesman, 1919, 9 May, P-11. 
5Ibid., 7 Novembe:r,p. J. 
6Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), August 1919, no.55u 
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Delhi that 'there can be no doubt that interest and anxiety 
d . th f t f T k . . I 1 regar 1ng e a e o ur ey are 1ncreas1ng ~ This was 
especially so in the wake of the first All-India Khilafat 
Conference at Lucknow early in September where Gandhi1' as 
an unbidden but welcome guest, had pledged Hindu support 
for the Muslim cause. 2 The proof of the continuing strength 
of the new found communal unity in Calcutta under the 
aegis of the Khilafat movement came in October 1919~ 
At the behest of Gandhi it had been agreed that 17 
October should be observed through India as 'Khilafat Day'. 
In Bengal Hindu Congressmen along with Huq, Akram Khan, 
Mujibur Rahman and Najimuddin Ahmed issued an appeal to all 
Hindus and Muslims in the city to observe the day,J and in 
the first weeks of October Urdu posters appeared on walls 
throughout Calcutta reiterating the call. 4 
The day was a great success in Calcutta although it 
was les's widely observed in the mofussil. 5 Most Indian-
owned shops in the city, including those owned by Bengali 
Hindus and Marwaris, observed the harta1. 6 The Mussalman 
reported that 'the demonstration was unparalleled in its 
intensity and unprecedented in its solemnity ••• the Jain 
and Marwari leaders being most enthusiastic in co-operating 
with the Mussalmans', 7 and the Hindu-owned Amrita Bazar 
Patrika noted that the day was 'celebrated with great 
solemnity by both Hindus and Muslims' • 8 At midday prayers 
1Ibid., November 1919, no.15. 
2
owen, H.F., 1iThe Leadership of the Indian National Mov·ement' 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1965), p.4·4J. 
JMussalman, 1919, 17 October, p.5; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 
1919, 15 October, p.4. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), November 1919, no.16. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), November 1919, no.16. 
6 Ibid. 
7Mussalman, 1919, 24 October, p.2. 
8Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1919, 18 October, p.7. 
for the safety of the Caliph were offered in the Nakhoda 
mosque, and in the afternoon large crowds of Muslims, 
I 
numbering some 15,000 moved through the central areas of 
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thecity to attend a meeting at the Town Hall where Huq and 
various Hindu leaders addressed them in 1 mild tones 1 • 1 
In terms of mass participation and control the day was 
certainly a success. Not only had it illustrated the 
feasibility of Hindu-Muslim co-op~ration but it also 
ushered in an era of intensive communal co-operation in the 
city which was to radically alter the politics of twentieth 
century Bengal. 
The period 1918-9 was one of sharp contrasts in the 
political life of Calcutta. The energy expended in the 
uncontrolled riots of 1918 was not wasted again, and by 
1919 it had been channelled into more tightly organised forms 
of political agitation. The spontaneous leaders and 
organisations which flourished in 1918, and which had exerted 
strong influence over the various Muslim groups who 
comprised the mob of that year's affray, gave way to more 
formalised political organisations and leadership. By 1919 
formerly antipathetic communal groups had begun to fraternise 
at the political level and :r;~,..directed their pent-up 
frustrations against the paramount foreign authority rather 
than against one another. 
The contrast between the incidents of the two years can, 
however, be overdrawn. Certainly communal antipathy was 
strong in 1918, but economic grievances provided a stronger 
stimulus for discontent. As the pattern of the riots 
revealed, communal conflict played a ,minor role compared to 
the expressions of material distress, i.e. the looting of 
grain and cloth shops, and the absence of attacks upon 
Bengalis of either religion or upon religious institutions. 
In addition the frustrations of the Muslim groups actively 
involved were more overtly directed aga~nst the British than 
against their Hindu compatriots, perhaps with the exception 
1 Statesman, 1919, 17 October, p.8; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), November 1919, no.16. 
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of the Marwari mercantile magnates. Mob activity in 1918 
was indeed the culmination of the increasing disillusion-
ment of the Muslim middle- and lower middle-classes with 
their foreign rulers - a disillusionment which had grown 
since the first decade of the twentieth century. 
By the end of 1919 the older leadership of the Muslim 
community in Calcutta had been reduced to impotence. The 
younger pro-nationalist leadership had been hurried along 
the path of communal rapprochement by the intransigence 
., 
of their rulers concerning Muslim sentiment and by the 
spectre of mob rule. Consequently they had been forced to 
seize upon the religious, and conversely in many ways 
parochial and backward-looking issu·e of the Khilafat to 
assert their influence within the Calcutta community. They 
rode and for the moment controlled a volatile political 
tiger, but the inherent communal and religious fanaticism 
of the Khilafat question had as yet to be equated with a 
genuine support for the nationalist creed. 
Wealthier Muslims of the mercantile and professional 
elites in Calcutta may have looked askance at the recent 
examples of mob activity but emotionally or pragmatically 
they could not deny the sentiments aroused by the Khilafat 
question. For the first time in the history of Calcutta 
city the Muslim sans culottes of the city - like their 
Parisian counterparts of the French revolution, neither 
impecunious nor illiterate, but petty merchants, artisans, 
clerks and skilled workers - had called the tune and for a 
short period had led their leaders until the pattern of 
their agitation was moulded by men such as Huq, Kasem, 
Mujibur_Rahman and their Hindu counterparts. 
CHAPTER THREE 
KHILAFATISTS AND NATIONALISTS, 1919 TO 1923 
The observance of the Khilafat Day hartal in October 
1919 by both Hindus and Muslims marked the beginning of a 
new era of Muslim politics in Calcutta. For the first time 
large numbers of local Muslims became actively involved in 
a political movement which was both India-wide in mani.fes-
tation and anti-British in sentiment. In addition it was 
a movement which from its inception was regarded by its 
leaders as an ideal vehicle for Hindu-Muslim collaboration. 
Throughout the period 1918 to 1921 the poorer members 
of the Hindu and Muslim communities in the Calcutta area 
shared the economic distress caused by rapidly rising food 
and cloth prices. Minimal wage increases for jute mill 
operatives, who formed the greater proportion of industrial 
workers, in 1918 and 1919 did little to improve their 
economic position, and members of both communities were 
involved in the rising tide of labour unrest which reached 
its peak during 1920 and 1921. The prices of staple 
goods su.cl1. as rice, salt, wheat and cloth continued to rise 
erratically during these years and it was not until the end 
of 1921 that a definite downward trend in prices was 
observed. 1 Certainly prices reached their peak in the latter 
months of 1920, 2 and then began to decline but not without 
the occasional months such as May and September 1921 when 
sharp price rises were recorded.J 
The economic position of the jute mill labourers in 
particular was exacerbated by rising prices and also by the 
sharp drop in the price of mill products between 1920 and 
1921 " Exportiridustries throughout India were badly 
affected by this short, but world-wide, trade recession and 
the mill owners of Calcutta attempted to counteract their 
fall in income by restricting production and reducing working 
4 hours. The nett result for the average mill worker in 1921 
1
statistical Abstracts, 1911 to 1921, pp.602-5. 
2
statistical Abstracts, 1929 to 19]2, p.42J. 
Jibid., pp.42J-4; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep"); July 1920, 
no.106; ibido, February 1921, noo77; ibid., June 1921, no.6J. 
4 Cotton, C.W.Ea, Handbook of Commer,cial Information for India, 
(1924), p.117. 
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was that although by the end of the year the wage index had 
increased 50 per cent since 1914 1 food prices had correspon-
1 dingly increased by 78 per cent and he was working fewer 
hours so that in fact his economic position showed little 
sign of improvement. Compared with 1920, however, when 
the index of wholesale prices contrasted a 101 per cent 
rise since 1914 with a 40 per cent wage increase there 
were indications of a change for the better. The improvement 
was confirmed during 1922 and 1923 as food and cloth prices 
dropped slowly from 78 per cent to 72 per cent above the 
base year of 1914. 2 
Against this background of economic dislocation and 
distress the years following 1919 witnessed a sharp rise in 
Muslim political activity in Calcutta and indeed throughout 
India. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
Muslim concern for their future in India was channelled 
into the romantic and backward-looking Khilafat movement. 
The immediate object of the movement was to defend the 
temporal power of the Caliph, the spiritual head of Islam 
and the ruler.of the Ottoman Empire; but the enthusiasm 
with which his cause was embraced by the Muslims of India 
cannot be accounted for simply on the argument of extra-
territorial loyalties or total preoccupation with the past. 
The Khilafat issue came at a time when economic distress, 
domestic political uncertainty and disillusionment with the 
British had permeated Muslim society and undermined the 
influence of many of its former spokesmen. They had followed 
a policy of conciliating the British, both as a means of 
seeking advancement for their community and as a protection 
against the economically and politically more dominant 
Hindu communityo 
1 Buchanan, D.H., The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in 
India (1934), P·355; Statistical Abstracts, 1929 to 19321 
p. 423. 
2 Ibid. 
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In Calcutta Muslim bitterness and confusion had 
exploded in 1918 in a vicious anti-British and anti-Marwari 
riot; but the confusion of sentiment within the community 
was such that by 1919 the strong anti-Marwari feeling of 
the previous year had declined to be replaced by an alliance 
between Hindus and Muslims which was directed against the 
British. In the wake of the riot the older Muslim leadership 
proved incapable of concerted or effective action, and 
following an interregnum dominated by non-Bengali Pan-
Islamic journalists, a new leadership emerged. This comprised 
young men with a western education and professional back-
ground who were drawn mainly from prosperous mercantile, 
professional and landowning families. Scornful of the old 
style of communal leadership and the social and economic 
products of British penetrat~on into the sub-continent they 
joined ranks with their counterparts in the Hindu community 
to wrest power from their British rulers. 
The first definite sign of their growing influence 
within the community had been the Khilafat Day hartal of 
October 1919, which had been organised jointly by sympathetic 
Hindu Congressmen and the leaders of the Bengal Presidency 
1 Muslim League, namely Fazl-ul Huq and Mujibur Rahman. In 
succeeding months the growing extent of their influence 
within the community became increasingly evident. Commensurate 
with the growth of their influence was the upsurge of Hindu-
Muslim political co-operation in the city.. Indeed, if the 
new Muslim spokesmen were to succeed in their object of 
gaining concessions from the British they needed the support 
of the Hindu community who dominated the city economic ally, 
politically and numerically. 
1 Statesman, 1919, 7 November, p.J: Huq was president and 
Rahman secretary. 
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II 
In November 1919 the Bengal authorities reported to the 
Imperial government in Delhi that in the wake of the October 
hartal 'the advocates of Hindu-Muslim Unity [were] not 
abating their efforts 1 • 1 On the occasion of the Hindu 
festival of Diwali Urdu-speaking Muslims bearing gifts toured 
areas of up-country Hindu settlement in north Calcutta and 
preached the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity. During the Marwari 
Pinjrapole festival thousands of Muslims, including Fazl-ul 
Huq and his lieutenants Mujibur Rahman and Najimuddin Ahmed, 
were guests at the festivities, and later in November Huq 
and other Muslim leaders participated in the Jain 
Paraswanath procession. 2 But the political and social 
activities of Muslims were not confined to inter-communal 
reconciliation" At a meeting in the Nakhoda Mosque Akram 
Khan, a Bengali-speaking Muslim from Burdwan and a fervent 
advocate of Muslim participation in the activities of the 
Indian National Comgress, articulated the resentment felt 
by local Muslims over the doubtful future of the Caliph; 
and in the following month of December he led another meet:;i..ng 
at the Mosque where the audience of 700 welcomed the release 
of the interned Ali brothers.3 
The attitude of the Calcutta Muslims towards the 
Khilafat issue and the British was beginning to take concrete 
form~ By January 1920 the police reported that 1 the 
Muhammadan public has advanced further towards a corporate 
sense of its interests in the Turkish settlement' under the 
influence of Huq and other leaders. 4 Concern for the Caliph 
was not at this stage restricted to certain sections of the 
Muslim community of India; across the sub-continent loyalist 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), December 1919,no.5. 
2Ibid.; ibid., January 1920, no.5. 
3Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File no.292/19. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), January 1920 1 no.78 .. 
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Muslim leaders and their more radical co-religionists 
echoed similar sentiments of concern for the future of the 
Caliph, a fact which indicated the extent of Muslim 
pre-occupation with the issueo 
In Bengal prominent spokesmen of the old leadership 
such as the Nawab of Dacca and Sir Shamsul Huda were as 
moved by the matter as were the more nationalist-oriented 
leaders such as Huq and his associates - but the common 
interest ended once the means of rectifying the Muslim 
grievance had to be decided upon. For the older leadership 
the only course of action available was continued loyalty 
to the British~ whereas to the younger Muslim spokesmen of 
Calcutta a more promising alternative seemed to lie in 
co-operation with the more imaginative and aggressive 
Hindu-dominated Congress. 
In Calcutta the Muslim. leaders followed the pattern 
already established elsewhere in India under the aegis of 
Gandhi and various Muslims led by the Ali brothers. In 
November 1919 the Calcut:ta Khilafat Committee was formed 
under the presidency of Moulana Abdur Rauf Dinajpuri, a local 
merchant and friend of Azad's family who had been involved 
in Muslim agitation at the time of the Balkan Wars, and 
1 
with Akram Khan as secretary. Although distinct as an 
organisation from the Bengal Presidency Muslim League both 
bodies were dominated by the same group of men whose centre 
of activity was Calcutta rather than the mofussil, and 
whose political sympathies were becoming increasingly coloured 
by national rather thart communal considerations. 
The first trial of strength for the Calcutta Khilafat 
Committee came in December 1919 over the issue of the Peace 
Celebrations organised by the provincial government. Loyalist 
and. conservative Muslim organisations in the city indicated 
their willingness to participate; thus the Central National 
Mahommed.an Association and the Indian Moslem Association 
1Ibid., January 1920, no.5o 
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respectively nominated Abdus Salam, son-in-law of the late 
Nawab Abdul Jabbar, and G.H.C. Ariff, Nawab Chowdhury's 
protege, to the Peace Celebrations Committee, but in general 
the community remained aloof. 1 Most Muslims in the city~ 
under the leadership of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee and 
backed by local Hindu Congressmen2 and the Hindu and Muslim 
press, prepared for a boycott. 3 On December .4 C .R. Das, the 
leading Bengali Congressman, Byomkesh Chakravarti, spokesman 
for the Home Rule League and Fazl-ul Huq, 1the high priest 
of the anti-peace celebration movement 14 and president of 
the provincial Muslim League, issued a formal manifesto 
against the celebrations and nominated two Bengali Muslim 
members of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee - Akram Khan 
and Maniruzzaman Islamabadi - as chief organisers of the 
agitation. 5 
Certainly some prominent leaders within the Muslim 
community of Calcutta were concerned about the direction 
taken by the agitation. But men such as the Nawab of Dacca 
and Nawab Chowdhury found their opposition circumscribed 
by the fact that their power-bases were in the mofussil 
and not. in the city. Dr Abdullah Suhrawardy, whose family 
dominated the Muslim professional elite of the city, attempted 
to moderate Muslim sentiment by steering a narrow course 
between the more radical and conservative factions, and 
along with Abdus Salam he courted the All-India Moderate Party 
which held its first annual session at Calcutta in December 
1919. 6 However, social pressures were such that Suhrawardy, 
1 Bengal Govt, Political Dept, August J919, File no.IW-229, 
Progs 48-62. 
2Ibid., Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, File 
no. 292/19. 
3Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1919 1 4 December, p.6; ibid., 16 
December, p.6; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), December 1919, 
no.s. 
4Ibid., April, 1920, no.103. 
5Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File no.292/19. 
6statesman, 2 December, p.S; ibid., 30 December, p.6. 
after being arraigned by 'the extremists •• for his alleged 
.. moderate views on the Khilafat 1 , 1 and Abdus Salam bowed to 
the majority view and issued a joint statement of sympathy 
for the Caliph. 2 
The success of the boycott was largely due to the 
activities of the Calcutta K.hilafat Committee and its Hindu 
supporters - particularly the Marwaris~ Akram Khan and 
Marwari volunteers distributed rupees to beggars and poor 
families to keep them away from the free public meals 
offered by the local government; Abdullah Suhrawardy refused 
a government donation to provide a mela at the girls' school 
he had recently established and Muslim and Marwari shops 
throughout the city closede The Muslim press led by the 
Muhammadi and Mussalman urged the social and religious 
boycott of those who participated in the celebrations, and 
the police reported that 'so great was the fear of 
persecution that a grandson of Nawab Sirajul Islam went to 
the [public]~ dressed like a woman'. Even the editor 
of the Moslem Hitaishi, the leading Bengali Muslim 
communalist and anti-Congress newspaper, donated Rs 200 to 
Akram Khan's fund to bribe Muslim children away from the 
free food and fireworks offered by the British.J 
Elsewhere in Bengal, however there is little evidence of 
any effectively organised Muslim boycott of the Peace 
Celebrations. The Muslim jute mill operatives at Titagarh 
to the north of Calcutta ignored the celebrations at the 
instance of their sirdars who were thought by the British 
to be under the influence of local !llaulyis; 4 but in general 
the boycott was confined to the Calcutta area. The influence 
of the Presidency Muslim League and the Calcutta K.hilafat 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), January 1920, no.5. 
2 Statesman, 1920, 1 January, p.6. 
JFor details of the Muslim boycott see: Bengal Govt, Political 
Dept, Confidential Police Report, File no.472/19; Govt of 
India, Home Poll (Dep.), December 1919, no.5; ibid., January 
1920, nos 5 and 44. 
4Govt of India,Home Poll (Dep.), January 1920, no~ 45. 
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Committee did not extend beyond the city. In the mofussil 
------
the conservative landowning Ashraf families still retained 
considerable authority based on status and wealth,whilst 
the Presidency Muslim League was little more than an elitist 
club which catered to the political sophistications of the 
small number of westernised Muslims in Calcutta. The 
Calcutta Khilafat Committee was rapidly able to extend its 
influence within the city and proved a much more effective 
means of mass organisation than the older parent body, 
the provincial Muslim League. 
Within Calcutta the boycott was observed mainly by 
Muslims and Marwaris. The British noted that Bengali Hindu 
shopkeepers did not observe the boycott or join the 
predominantly Muslim and Marwari processions which wound 
their way through the central and northern areas of the 
city to the accompaniment of drwns and Urdu songs. 1 
Undoubtedly local Hindu Congress leaders gave support to 
the organisation of the demonstrations, but even so the 
majority of their Bengali co-religionists in the city still 
held aloof from what was essentially a Muslim communal 
grievance. 
In succeeding, years Bengali Hindu involvement in the 
Khilafat agitation certainly increased, but such support 
was subject to many qualifications and reservations which 
did little to create a lasting bond of common interest between 
the two major communities in the city. Much of the success 
of the communal rapprochement depended upon the personality 
of C.R. Das and his policy of conciliating Hindu and Muslim 
interests. In essence he had to balance the upper-class 
Bengali Hindu fears of Muslim resentment centred upon the 
economic and political hegemony exerted by Bengali Hindus 
in Calcutta and the province at large. Any attempt to 
conciliate such divergent resentments and fears led to 
compromises which involved the immediate political interests 
of one or other group and created further tensions which 
1Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
F i l e no • 4 7 2/ 1 9 • 
weakened the facade of communal unity. The Hindu-Muslim 
rapprochement in Calcutta appeared confirmed by the inter-
communal political activity during the Khilafat and later 
Non-Cooperation movements; but once the superficial accord 
between the Hindu and Muslim masses began to collapse there 
was a similar bifurcation of interests within and between 
the leadership groups of both communities which eventually 
led to the demise of the rapprochement-
Das was continually plagued by the fears of his 
followers regarding their economic and political interests 
in Bengal. His most effective support, in terms of finance 
and personal influence, came from the Bengali Hindu upper-· 
classes who formed the majority of landowners, and those 
engaged in western professions in Calcutta and Bengal. Many 
of the landowners were in the invidious position of forming 
a small economically dominant elite which subsisted on the 
rents of an impoverished Muslim peasantry. Large numbers 
of them supported Das and the communal rapprochement, but 
the spectre of any widespread involvement of the Muslim 
masses~and the social upheavals such involvement might 
entail,certainly qualified the nature of their practical 
support of Muslim political interests. 
The same was true of the Bengali Hindu professional 
class who more often than not were drawn from the landowning 
group. Not only did they keep a weather-eye on their rents 
from the mofussil but they were also loath to surrender any 
share of the stranglehold they exerted over education, the 
western professions and politics in the province~ Thus they 
could enthusiastically support the gathering of Muslims into 
the mainstream of the national.ist movement, but they were 
less ready to face the problems raised by increasing Muslim 
involvement in provinci<iland urban politics- The result of 
victory over the British by a united Bengali people would 
inevitably have meant concrete concessions in a variety of 
fields which the Hindu minority in the province was not 
prepared to make-
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Das' Muslim allies such as Huq 9 Abul Kasem and Akram 
Khan were plagued by equally strong pressures from their 
followers which, once the euphoria of the Khilafat movement 
had subsided, undermined their influence and the facade of 
Hindu-Muslim unity in Calcutta and Bengal. The basic 
weakness of the younger Muslim leadership was the fact that 
the bulk of their support was confined to Calcutta. The 
Muslim community of the city and its environs was 
overwhelmingly Urdu-oriented in ethos. Its interests were 
directed away from the Bengali mofussil towards the Urdu 
heartland of northern India and the problems of life in 
the polyglot metropolis of Calcutta. The Muslims of the 
city rarely extended any degree of sustained interest to 
their co-religionists in the mofussil, and in the final 
analysis they failed to make use of their primary strength 
of numerical superiority in the province. 
In part this failure was due to a simple lack of 
interest on the part of the average Muslim in Calcutta, but 
it also went deeper than this. Any attempt on the part of 
the leadership of the Calcutta Muslims to gain support in 
the mofussil would have required not only an appeal to 
religious sentiment but also, if the support was to be more 
than ephemeral, a genuine interest in economic uplift: 
and this would have meant an immediate alienation of the 
Bengali Hindu landowners who formed the hardcore of Congress 
support. Fazl-ul-Huq, indeed, saw the value of mass 
' 
involvement and vainly tried to enlist the support of the 
peasantry when he formed the shortlived Bengal Joatadars 
and Raiyats Association in 1920 on an avowedly non-communal 
basis. 1 But it was this very fear of an alliance between 
the Muslims of Calcutta and the mofussil which undermined 
the support C.R. Das could hope for from his co-religionists, 
and which was eventually to destroy the communal rapprochement 
built up during the days of his leadership. 
1Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.157. 
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The involvement of the Calcutta Muslims in the Khilafat 
and nationalist movements was not so much due to local 
exigencies but was rather an acquiescence on their part to 
the emotional appeal of a vanished era of Islamic glory 
in India. Immediate economic and political pressures 
certainly gave the movement added impetus, and the idea of 
a communal rapprochement had the immediate appeal of 
providing the Muslims with much needed allies; but for most 
Muslims in Calcutta the rapprochement had little validity 
beyond the immediate needs of the Khilafat issue. It 
merely held in abeyance the real problems which faced the 
community in the urban environment - problems which could 
only be solved by the economic and political uplift of the 
community at the expense of their Hindu compatriots. 
III 
In the months immediately following the fiasco of the 
Peace Celebrations the Khilafat movement in Calcutta rapidly 
gained strength. In January 1920 Abul Kalam Azad was 
released from internment and briefly visited Calcutta where 
1 he received a hero's welcome, and in the following month 
the Ali brothers and Dr Kitchlew 
Khilafat movement in north India 
leading figures of the 
arrived in the city to 
2 
attend the first provinciaL Khilafat conference. Azad 
reappeared from one of his whirlwind tours around India and 
after making several violent speeches at the conference he 
was unanimously elected president of the newly constituted 
Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee.J In reality, however, 
Azad was little more than titular head of the Khilafat 
movement in Bengal; certainly his presence and the presence 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), January 1920, no. 79. 
2 Ibid., July 1920, no.89. 
3Ibid. 
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of other national leaders gave added impetus to nationalist 
politics in the province, but the practical details of 
agitation were organised by local rather than national 
leaders whose focus of.interest was confined to the provincial 
level. It was men stich as Huq, the newspaper editors Akram 
Khan of the Muhannnadi and_ Mujibur Rahman of the Mussalman, 1 
Najimuddin Ahmed, a retired Deputy Collector and friend of 
Azad, and the merchants Majid Buksh, Hafe z Alla Bux 
Peshwari, Muhammed Osman - an Egyptian - Moulvi Muhammed 
Hashim and Shamsuddin Ahmed, to name but a ;few, who were the 
day-to-day organisers of Muslim political agitation in. the 
city. 
As a direct result of the Provincial Khilafat Conference 
March 14 was declared the occasion for a second province-wide 
hartal to protest against British policy towards Turkey. 
In Calcutta Huq attempted to organise Muslim college students 
with the formation of the Bengal College Students' 
A · t · 2 d th t M l . h t f M h ssoc1a 1on, an . e up-coun ry us 1m mere an s o ec ua 
Bazar in Ward VIII were reported to have begun a voluntary 
boycott of British goods.J At the instigation of Shaukat 
Alii telegrams and leaflets flooded the mofussil with the cry 
of 'Islam in Danger' 4 , and the Provincial Khilafat Committee 
embarked on a programme of t-raining professional agitators 
to tour the mofussil.5 Such were the social pressures 
generated by the campaign and the intensity of the sentiment 
aroused b~ the issue that even prominent loyalists such as 
the Nawab of Dacca, Moulana Abu Bakr of Hooghly and 
G.H.C. Ariff, Nawab Chowdhury's protege, gave the hartal 
their tacit blessing. 6 Local Congress leaders played an 
1In January 1920 both editors were warned by the authorities 
to tone down their language over the Khilafat issue: Govt of 
India, Home Poll (Dep.), January, 1920, no. 79. 
2 Mussalman, 1920, 5 March, p.J. 
3Ibid., 12 March, p.6. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep .. ), July 1920, no.90. 
5Ibid., April 1920, no.10J. 
6Ibid., Home Poll, 185 of 1925; Statesman, 1920, 29 February, 
p.15. 
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apparently minor role in the public organisation of this 
second hartal inspired by a distinctly communal grievance, 
but there· can be little doubt that they were largely 
responsible for the continuing enthusiasm the new direction 
of Muslim political agitation received from the Marwari 
community. 
Despite the vitriolic anti-British utterances of men 
such as Azad and the Ali brothers the spokesmen of the 
Muslims of Calcutta still moved with a certain degree of 
caution. In part this was dictated by their desire to 
retain the wavering support of the powerful but politically 
moderate Muslim leaders in the .mo(fussil, and also by 
lingering fears of unleashing mob violence once more in the 
streets of Calcutta. Huq and Kasem:. had eertainly echoed 
Azad's anti-British sentiments at the Provincial Khilafat 
Conference in February, and had even handed him undated 
letters of resignation from the Bengal Legislative Council 
to be used at his discretion, 1 but in practice their 
approach to the general problems of organisation and 
agitation was more circumspect. Students, merchants and 
artisans with a vested interest in the city, and imbued. 
with a new sense of inter-communal cooperation, were 
relatively easier to organise and control than the more 
turbulent and transient mill operatives in the districts 
surrounding Calcutta. As the Calcutta police later remarked 
the Muslim leaders were wary of stirring up something they 
could. not control so 'they announced that the coolie class 
was not to cease work on the day fixed for the hartal for 
2 
more than an hour at the time of midday prayer'. 
Indeed., one of the most notable aspects of the hartal 
was the lack of participation of mill hands who 1 except 
for one instance at a Barrackpore mill,J remained calm. 
1Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid. (Dep.), July 
1920, no.106; Statesman, 1920, JO July, p.J. 
2 Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
3statesman~ 1920, 20 March, p.Bo 
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In the city itself, however, the picture of Muslim 
' 
involvement was different. The hartal was very near complete 
with Muslim and Marwari shops throughout the city closed, 
butchers' stalls empty, fruit stands shuttered, dockyard 
:strikes and most industrial plants in the city closed for 
the day. Taxis and gharris remained off the streets and 
Muslims, Marwaris and up-country Hindus flocked to mosques 
throughout the city to listen to the exhortations of local 
and up-country agitators. The centre of interest during the 
day was the great Nakhoda mosque where special prayers were 
offered by Azad, Najimuddin Ahmed and Akram Khan for the 
safety of the Caliph. No violence was offered to the 
authorities and in every aspect the day passed as a peaceful 
and impressive illustration of the strength of Muslim 
sentiment • 1 
Elsewhere, however, the hartal was only sporadically 
observed. In the mofussil and amongst the Bengali Hindus 
of Calcutta involvement was minimalQ 2 As in the Khilafat 
Day hartal and the Peace Celebration boycott of October and 
December 1919 two important groups of the population of 
Calcutta remained passive: the Bengali Hindus as mentionedQ 
and also the mass of mill operatives in the crescent of 
i:rx:lustrial centres which surrounded the city. In succeeding 
months both groups began to participate more actively: the 
Bengali Hindus once the Non-Cooperation movement had been 
launched by Gandhi as a broad-based national political 
movement which incorporated the Khilafat agitation, and the 
mill workers during the years 1920 and 1921 when industrial 
unrest gave rise to a widespread series of strikes which 
disrupted all major industrial centres throughout the 
sub-continent. 
1For further details of the hartal see: Mussalman" 1920 , 
26 March, p,. 17; Sta tesm.§!!, 1920:.. 20 March 1, p. 8; Go~t of India, 
Home Poll (Depa), April 1920~ no.10J. 
2 Statesman~ ibido; Mussalman, ibid. 
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IV 
In the months following the hartal of March several 
important developments occurred which radically altered the 
nature and direction of Muslim poli.tical activity in Calcutta. 
The Calcutta Khilafat Committee came increasingly under the 
influence of up-country Urdu-speaking merchants such as 
Hakim Rehat Hussain, a drug merchant of Mechua Bazar, and 
rapidly extended its influence within the city through a 
series of ward and district sub-committees. These not only 
covered the metropolitan area but also the surrounding 
municipalities and contiguous districts such as Howrah and 
1 the 24-Parganas. Street collections and voluntary 
contributions from mercantile groups in the central wards 
of the city provided the Calcutta Khilafatists with funds 
which far surpassed those available to either the Provincial 
Khilafat Committee or the mushrooming Khilafatist organis-
sations in the mofussil, which relied solely upon the 
financial support of an impoverished Muslim peasantryu The 
result of this was the financial and organisational 
subordination of all the provincial Khilafat organisations 
to the Calcutta Khilafat Committee and its Urdu-speaking 
mercantile members. Such a development not only aroused 
resentment in the mofussil and in the council of the officially 
dominant Provincial Khilafat Committee, but also caused bitter 
disputes between the Bengali and non-Bengali factions in the 
Calcutta committee 
Rehat Hussain. 2 
led respectively by Akram Khan and Hakim 
Azad managed to prevent a complete public breakdown in 
the unity of the Khilafat movement in the province but 
factionalism and intrigue constantly plagued the entire 
organisation. Finance proved to be the major point of 
dissension and the cause of many disputes and well-founded 
1 Mussalman, 1922, 12 May, p.5; by this date it had 52 sub-
committees. 
2Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File no o 2 6 7/2 0 ,. 
1 OJ 
accusations of financial dishonesty and misuse. 1 So 
violent indeed did such disputes become that in mid-1921 
the Bengali-faction in the Calcutta Khilafat Committee 
bitterly denounced Azad in a letter to the British-owned 
Statesman when at one stage he failed to take note of their 
demands for the curtailment of the influence of the Urdu-
speakers of Calcutta. 2 The first major dispute occurred 
early in 1920 when the non-Bengali group protested that the 
Bengalis were using too much of the committees' funds 1the 
bulk of which was contributed by the non-Bengalee Muslim 
community of Calcutta' to finance Akram Khan's newspaper 
the Muhammadi. The Bengalis later countered this by claiming 
that the profits of the Zamana, an Urdu-daily edited by 
Akram Khan~ but partially financed by the Calcutta Khilafat 
Committee~ were being misused by the non-Bengalis and in a 
rage they established a new Urdu daily the Daur-i-Jadid.J 
Frequent examples of what the editor of the Inguilab-
i-Zamana, a Khilafatist Urdu language daily established 
early in 1923, described as 'factionalism and intrigue 14 
can be detailed ad nauseam for the years between 1920 and 
1923. 5 On the surface the disputes concerned money and 
organisational matters, and invariably took the form of bitter 
recriminations over financial misappropriations. In reality, 
however, they were symptomatic of the far deeper differences 
within the Muslim community of Bengal; diffences which were 
glossed over during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation 
movement"s but which nevertheless seriously weakened any form 
of consistent and united community action during the period • 
.. 1For deta.:Lls of the many and varied disputes see: ibido 1 Govt 
of India, Home Poll, 741 of 1922; ibid~, July 1920, no.97· 
ibid. (Dep.), January 1921~ no.JJ; ibid~, April 1921, no.4J; 
ibid.,.J"';ffie 1921, noc45; ibid.,n<;>.~1; ibid., September 1921, 
no.1; 1b1d .. ~ 18 of 1922 (June); 1b1dv, 25 of 1923 (March); 
ibid. (September). 
2statesman, 1921 9 27 May~ po6. 
3Bengal Govt~ Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, File 
no..,267/20o ·· 
4Ibid. !r File no. 1/2 J. 
5see footnotes l and 2i; also Statesman, 1921, 3 June, p.S; 
Mussalman~ 1921, 12 August, pp.4-5; ibid.~ 1922, 12 May, p.S; 
ibid~, 1923s 9 March1 Pw7i ibidu, 1923, 2 November, p.7; Govt of India, Home Poll ~Dep~ J $ December 1920, no. 74,; ibid~, April 
1921, no.41; ibido, June 1921, no.64~ etc. 
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The basic difference lay in the clash of interest• between 
the wealthier Urdu-speaking and mercantile oriented community 
of Calcutta and the Bengali-speaking agriculturalists of 
the mofussil. 
Within the councils of the various Khilafat organis-
ations the Bengali Muslim spokesmen such as Akram Khan, 
Mujibur Rahman and Najimuddin Ahmed proved not only to be 
more politically and socially radical than the Muslims of 
1 Calcutta, but also demanded greater participation: in and 
control over the Khilafat agitation by Bengali-speaking 
Muslims~ While they gained support for this demand in 
principle, in practice it proved difficult to gain adequate 
funds from the Calcutta Khilafat Committee to promote any 
sustained organisational activity in the mofussil. In 
addition the Bengali Muslim spokesmen, who were in a minority 
in both the provincial and Calcutta Khilafat committees, 
found that neither Calcutta nor the mofussil were prepared 
to subordinate themselves to any supreme authority with 
the result that no effective province wide organisation or 
programme emerged. 
Frequent attempts were made by Azad to reconcile the 
hostile factions but he met with little lasting success. 
In May 1921 the spokesmen of the Bengali faction - Akram Khan, 
Islamabadi; Mujibur Rahman and Wahed Hossain, a former lawyer 
and member of the Provincial Education Conference - denounced 
Azad as president of the Provincial Khilafat Committee and 
issued a statement that: 
We feel very strongly that the Bengal Provincial 
Khilafat committee has not been doing any 
propaganda work for the education of the masses o •• 
the committee is not at all in touch with the 
masses~2 
This particular storm passed but fresh disputes occurred 
later as the basic differences in outlook between the two 
groups were largely irreconcilable. 
1Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
2 St~~' 1921, 27 May, p.6. 
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Superficially, however, the Khilafat movement in 
Calcutta moved from strength to strengtha Innumerable 
impressive protest meetings were organised in the years 
between 1920 and 1923, 1 hartals held, 2 boycotts implemented, 3 
newspapers established, 4 the authorities flaunted, the police 
undermined, 5 agitators and politicians arrested and 
imprisoned in large numbers, 6 leading newspapers suppressed 
or fined,? and a host of other exciting and impressive 
events occurred. Yet divisions within the leadership 
multiplied and Muslim political activity or organisation 
never extended beyond a series of reactions to the immediate 
situation. The Presidency Muslim League was in practice 
replaced by the Calcutta Khilafat Committee, 8 and the voices 
of the Bengali Muslim spokesmen were muffled by the immediate 
interests of the Muslims of Calcutta. But for the 
intervention ofthe Gandhian Non-Cooperation programme and 
the support of Muslim agitation by the Hindus one suspects 
that the Khilafat movement in Calcutta and Bengal would have 
been of short duration. 
1E.g. Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid., 1921, 
no. 415; ibid., (Dep.), July 1920, no.97. 
2E ~ g" Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid. (Dep.) , July 
1920, no.106; ibid., August 1920, no.111; ibid., August 1920, 
nos 338-67 and KW; ibid., June 1921, no. 51; ibid., Sept ember 
1921 ,, no. 1; ibid., 18 of 1921 (November); Bengal Govt,Political 
Dept, Confidential Police Report, File no.267/20; Mussalman, 
1920, 6 August, pp.2,5; Statesman, 1920, 3 August, p.8. 
JE~g. Govt of I~dia, Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid. (Dep.),June 
1921, no.90; Mussalman, 1921, 9 September, p.5. 
4Daur-i-Jadid (Urdu daily); Paigan (Bengali weekly edited by 
Azad); Zamana (Urdu daily) ; Al Kamal (Urdu daily run by Bengal 
Provincial Khilafat Committee,; Asr-e-Jadid (Urdu daily); 
Inguilab-i-Zamana (Urdu daily ; Moslem Jagat (Bengali daily); 
Khuddam -cu-rau daily); Navayuga (Bengali daily); Raiyat 
(Bengali daily). 
5Govt of India, Home Poll, 18 of 1921 (November). 
6E.g. Ibid., 18 of 1922 (January); Mussalman, 1921, 2 December, 
p.5; ibid., 16 December, p.2; ibid., 1922, 1 January, pp.8,5; 
ibid., 17 February, p.5; ibid., 17 March, p.5; ibid., 14April, 
p.6; ibid., 1923, 9 March, p~5· 
7Navayuga (1920); Mlib.ammadi (1920, 1921, 1922); Asr-e-Jadid 
(1921); Daur-i-Jadid (1922); Paigan (1922); Zamana (1923); 
Al Kamal (1923); Moslem Jagat (1923). 
8No meetings were held between January 1921 and January 1925 ;: 
Musslaman, 1921, 28 January, p.7; ibid., 1925, 20 January, p.2. 
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The Non-Cooperation programme formulated by Gandhi as 
the ostensible means of giving greater expression to the 
Khilafat agitation, but in practice as the basis for 
evolving nation-wide agitation to include all indigenous 
groups within Indian society, gained currency during the 
first half of 1920. 1 Its non-sectarian aim of Swaraj 
offended the susceptibilities of neither Hindu nor Muslim, 
and in both cases offered a means of defeating the British. 
In Calcutta Azad, the Ali brothers, Ak.ram Khan and 
Mujibur Rahman preached the benefits of the programme2 
while at the same time cultivating rumours which 
were sedulously circulated to the effect that 
Government had ordered the transfer of the 
Muhammedan holy day from Friday to Sunday, the 
substitution of the name of the King-Emperor 
for that of the Khalif in the Khutba prayer, and 
the proscription of the Koran.J 
The British were cast as immoral and irreligious ogres and 
further wild accusations were hurled at them by speakers 
such as Najimuddin Ahmed who, in December 1920, declared 
that: 
The British Government openly gave permission 
to this effect, that if some sister or mother of 
yours went to the Police Department and requested 
permission to become a prostitute, then the British 
Government would at once consent. They would ask 
her with pleasure to go and sell her chastity so 
that your uncles and brother~ may waste their 
money and ruin their morals. 
The initial response to the Muslim community in the city 
was lukewarm, but by the latter half of 1920 support was much 
more widespread. Admittedly there were reservations amongst 
Muslims regarding the wisdom of boycotting schools and 
1For the type of appeal issued by Gandhi to Muslims 
Appendix III. 
2Govt of Ind~a, Home Poll (Dep.), July 1920, no.106. 
3Ibid., Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
4 1 Bamford Report 1 , p. 78. 
see 
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legislative institutions, but the consensus of opinion 
appears to have been that desperate times required desperate 
1 
measures. Despite reservations the majority of Muslim 
newspapers in Calcutta joined with the Hindu press in 
2 
vociferously voicing their support for the programme. Hindu 
nationalist leaders such as C.R. Das, who had remained 
behind the scenes of previous Muslim agitation since 1919, 
began to take a more active role in whipping up Muslim 
support and frequently appeared as co-speakers with their 
Muslim counterparts.J The more communally oriented Muslim 
leaders in Bengal, for example the Nawab of Dacca and Nawab 
Chowdhury, attempted to use their influence in the city to 
persuade the prosperous mercantile families to withhold 
their support: but with little success. 4 In the instance of 
the influential Anjuman-i-Waizeen5 Nawab Chowdhury at first 
stemmed the rising tide of support for the Non-Cooperation 
programme but by November 1920, under the influence of Abu 
Bakr, the members of the Anjuman gave their blessing to the 
new agitation, and in February 1921 removed all office bearers 
who retained their links with the Government. 6 
In August 1920 special sessions of the Indian National 
Congress, the All India Muslim League and the All India 
Khilafat Conference met in Calcutta to discuss Gandhi's 
project.,ed programme. 7 The sessions were turbulent~ and 
1 Ibid. (Dep.), July 1920, no. 95; NNR, 1920, 5 May and 11 Junej' 
Mussalman; ibid., 27 May, Muha~; Mussalman, 1920, 
20 August, p.7. 
2NNR, 1918, passim. 
JGovt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
4Ibid.; ibid. (Dep.), July 1920, no.94; ibido, August 1920, 
noo112; Broomfield, J., op.cit., pp.156-7; NNR, 1920, 5 May, 
~a yak. 
5see pages JJ, 84. 
6 Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), December 1920, nos 59 and 74; 
ibid., January 1921, no.JJ; ibid • ., June 1921, no.12; Mussfilmafl, 
19~0, 29 October, p.J; Statesman, 1920, 2 November, p.8. 
7Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), September 1920, no.70. 
8 Ibid. 
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proved the fina.l occasion when the younger and more radical 
Muslim leaders in Bengal and Calcutta presented a united 
front o 
The fly-in-the-ointment was Huq. His personal doubts 
about the Non-Cooperation programme had been growing 
throughout the early months of 1920, and his relations with 
his former colleagues within the community had suffered a 
serious deterioration. In April 1920 a petty incident 
concerning the presence of several prominent pro-British 
Calcutta Muslims at the wedding of his daughter had drawn 
a letter of censure from several of his colleagues led by 
Akram Khan and Mujibur Rahman. 1 And thro~ghout the months 
between April and August 1920 considerable pressure appears 
to have been exerted on Huq to bring him into line. 2 His 
doubts concerned the feasibility of Gandhi's whole programme: 
he viewed the proposed boycott of schools, administrative 
positions and the reformed legislative institutions as 
essentially detrimental to Muslim interests in the province. 
Jn addition his basic pragmatism recoiled at the vagueness 
of Gandhi'$ plans and,like Jinnah, he believed that more 
solid gains could be achieved by constitutional rather than 
anti-constitutional means. Wedded to the British parliamentary 
system, in which he saw a constitutional process ideally 
suited to the protection of minority interests, he was 
sceptical of Gandhi's demand of an ill-defined Swaraj before 
settlement of the baSic problem of conflicting communal 
interests in India. 
Nevertheless at the August session of the All India 
Muslim League, when his pleas for moderati.on were howled down, 
Huq publicly gave his support to the Non-Cooperation 
p:rogramme. A turn-about which drew the comment from the 
Bengal authorities that: 
1 Mussalman, 1920, 23 April, p.J. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), July 1920, no.106~ 
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He may have been;jhelped to this decision by the 
overt threats of.his former associates, that they 
would stump the country for the purpose of 
vilifying his reputation and ruining him 
professionally and socially. 1 
Certainly local Khilafatists led by Azad attempted to 
force Huq's hand by sending in the undated letters of 
resignation to the Bengal Legislative Council which he and 
his closest supporter, Abul Kasem, had written in February 
1920. 2 But in this instance both Huq and Kasem secretly 
repudiated the letters,J and, shortly after his public 
humiliation at the political comferences in August, Huq 
issued a statement to the Englishman and Statesman in which 
he criticised the Non-Cooperation programme as 'too vague' 
and attacked the leaders of the Congress whom he summed up 
as not possessing 'the brains of a barnyard fowl'. 4 
Throughout the months following, until the formal joint 
session of the Congress and Muslim League in November 1920 
when the Non-Cooperation programme was to be officially 
accepted as an integral part of the nationalists 1 programme, 
the split between Huq and the extremists led by Akram Khan 
widened. The Nawab of Dacca, son of Huq's former patron, 
however, proved an unlikely but willing source of support 
for the embattled politician. Dacca's influence in the 
mofussil protected Huq in his home base at Barisal, and the . 
Nawab's resignation from the Reception Committee for the 
special session of Congress early in August, when Huq 
attempted to do the same, no doubt struck a sympathetic chord 
in the relationship between them.5 
1Ibid., September 1920, no.70. 
2 See footnote 1, page 100; 
Debates, vol.LII, 1.9.20 
referred to as BLCD. 
also Bengal Legislative Council 
submitted 21 July. Hereafter 
JBengal Govt, Appointments Dept, September 1920, File no. 
18 L-71, Progs 217-18. 
4Ibid.; Statesman, 1920, 29 August, p.21. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), August 1920, no.112. 
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At the superficial level, however, apart from his 
statement to the British-owned newspapers, Huq remained a 
supporter of Non-Cooperation. Certainly the Navayuga, 
a Bengali-language weekly he had established in July 1920, 
remained an advocate of the programme, 1 but his private 
dealings with the spokesmen of the Muslim community in 
Calcutta continued to deteriorate. This was evinced by 
the vitriolic attack made on him by Mujibur Rahman, editor 
of the Mussalman, ·early in September when the sincerity of 
his support for Non-Cooperation was questioned. 2 
Immediately following the August meetings up-country 
agitators, led by Mahomed Ali, began a series of meetings 
throughout Calcutta to increase Muslim support for Non-
Cooperation. Under the spirited leadership of Akram Khan 
the Calcutta Khilafat Committee temporarily overcame the 
internecine warfare which too often hampered its activities 
and sent a stream of agitators into the mill areas and 
mofussil which surrounded the city. 3 Enthusiasm for the 
new political programme rapidly mounted in Calcutta and by 
November Non-Cooperation and the Khilafat cause.had almost 
become one for the average Muslim of Calcutta. 4 
At the November sessions of Congress and the League 
Huq once more attempted to plead for moderation, but threats 
of violence and a shower of shoes silenced him. The bulky 
figure and stentorian tones of Shaukut Ali proved his only 
defence and after hurriedly reaffirming his support for 
Non-Cooperation Huq slipped quietly from the pandal,5 and 
into the camp of the Nawab of Dacca. 6 
1Ibid., July 1920, no.,.106; ibid., December 1920, no.59; ibid. 
(B), August 1920, nos 338-67 and KW. 
2 Mussalman, 1920, 3 September, p.4. 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), October 1920, no.16. 
4 Ibid., Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
5Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File noo282/20. 
6Ibid., File no.267/20. 
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By the middle of December the differences between Huq 
and his former colleagues came to a head., Early in December 
Huq presided over the All Bengal Muslim Conference; organised 
by the Nawab of Dacca, and formally denounced Congress and 
the Non-Cooperation programme. 1 The Mussalman declared Huq 
'a turncoat' and both he and Kasem, his one loyal follower 
from the days of his glory as an extremist leader, received 
2 
a deluge of anonymous letters containing abuse and threats. 
In addition both were expelled from the Presidency Muslim 
League in January 1921. 3 
Huq's alignment with Dacca effectively removed him from 
the Calcutta scene. His power base had always been in his 
native district of Backergunge, and Calcutta had served only 
to provide him with a more sophisticated and important forum 
for his interests. His alienation from the Muslims of 
Calcutta precipitated a realignment of his activities, and 
he concentrated his interests for the next few years upon 
provincial rather than urban politics through the medium 
of the Bengal Legislative Council and with the support of 
his mofussil adherents. 
Other prominent Muslims in Calcutta also broke with 
the Khilafat organisations at this time. The most important 
of them were the Suhrawardy brothers, Abdullah and Hasan; 
their cousin Zahid; Rezaur Rahman Khan, a merchant and vakil 
from north Calcutta and Sheikh Mahboob Alley, a wealthy 
merchant, landholder and former Honorary Magistrate from 
Sealdah on the eastern border of the city. All four men 
rejected the concept of non-cooperation and successfully 
contested seats in the reformed Bengal Legislative Council 
between November 1920 and April 1921. 
1 Mussalman, 1920, 17 December, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), February 1921, no.J5. 
2 Mussalman, 1920, 17 December, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), December 1920, no.74; January 1921, no~JJ. 
3Mussalman, 1921, 20. January, p.2. 
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Abdullah Suhrawardy gained election to two constituen-
cies - Dacca and Calcutta North - and it is interesting to 
note that when he chose the seat he wished to retain he 
opted for the more peaceful Dacca rather than for his 
turbulent home constituency of Calcutta North where only 
1 four per cent of the electorate had polled. In January 
1921 he was replaced by Rezaur Rahman Khan, and in April 
1921 following the resignation of Zahid Suhrawardy, who 
had been appointed to the Calcutta High Court, Sheikh 
Mahboob Alley was elected to Calcutta South in a by-election 
at which 35 per cent of the electorate polled compared with 
barely 20 per cent at the previous contest. 2 
Despite the activity of these men in flouting the 
widespread sentiment in favour of Non-Cooperation within 
their community in Calcutta, best illustrated by the low 
level of polling in Calcutta North which included the more 
volatile Muslim settlements in the central wards of the 
city,3 they did not suffer the erosion of their influence 
in Calcutta as did Fazl-ul Huq. In the face of fiery 
denunciations by agitators, and the vitriolic criticisms 
of the Muslim press, 4 they remained figures of influence and 
prestige within the urban community. 
In part the reason for this;lay in the dichotomy of 
Muslim interests in the city, and the practical advantages 
of patronage which Abdullah Suhrawardy in particular possessed. 5 
Muslim sentiment, at all levels of society, was certainly 
1
statesman, 1921, 21 January, p.12:; ,ibid., 1920, 8 December, 
p.7; Govt of India, Reforms Dept, Franchise A, November 1920, 
nos. 1 0-1-..:.2". 
2Ibid; Statesman, 1921, 23 April, p.6; Mussalman, 1920, 8 
December, p.7; ibid., 1921, 16 December, p.2. 
3statesman, 1920, 17 November, p.7; ibid., 19 November, p.7; 
ibid., 8 December, p.7; ibid., 1921, 21 January, p.12; ibid., 
27 January, p.17; ibid., 23 April, p.6. 
4 NNR, 1920, November-December, passim; ibid., 1921, January-
Ap~l, passim; Banerjea, Sir S.N., A Nation in the Making (1925), 
p.334. 
5 Ikramullah, Begums., op.cit., passim. 
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sympathetic towards the cause of the Caliph. However, few 
of the more prosperous members of the Calcutta Muslim 
commnnity, whether merchants or members of the westernised 
professions, ever lost complete touch with the realities of 
practical existence in the urban environment. Such Muslims 
wanted the best of both worlds: the political defeat of the 
British and the tangible benefits of any devolution of 
power offered by the imperial authorities. Hence they 
supported the Khilafat agitation and were circumspect in 
their opposition to the Non-Cooperation movement, while at 
the same time they kept a weather-eye on current events 
beyond the bounds of the nationalist movement. 
At no staget however~ did they offer the Muslim 
community in Calcutta an alternative form of leadership. 
Personal rivalry between the Suhrawardy family and Nawab 
Chowdhury in the Legislative Conncil only served to 
exacerbate existing temperamental differences 11 while the 
Nawab rapidly lost influence in the city when he alienated 
many of the more conservative Muslim merchants and retired 
civil servants who were members of the Ceritral National 
Mahommedan Associatione For several years Nawab Chowdhury 
had been attempting to revitalise the Association as a 
distinctly communal political organisation, but when this 
failed he switched his loyalties to the Indian Moslem 
Association which was primarily a mofussil body dominated 
by the Nawab of Dacca and other wealthy land-owning Ashraf 
families~ The old rivalry between the Muslim merchants of 
Calcutta and the landowners of the mofussil was renewed and, 
in April 1921~ the embittered members of the Central 
National Mahommedan Association expelled Chowdhury and 
rejected any idea of a political liaison with the Muslims 
of the mofussil. 2 
1Broomfield, J., op.cit.~ pp.176-9. 
2 Statesman, 1921, 23 April, p.Sg 
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Not only did the alien mofussil account for little 
in the considerations of most Muslims in Calcutta but, 
more important still, both nationalist and communalist 
failed to take into reckoning the possible political worth 
of the large and unsettled industrial labour force which 
surrounded the city. In part these reservations of the 
permanently-settled Muslim population of Calcutta were 
matched by those of the Hindu leaders. 
C .R. Das in particular shared many of Huq' s reser-
vations about the practicality of Non-Cooperation but unlike 
him he acquiesced to popular support engaged by Gandhi 
and attempted to work for a reform of ideas within Congress. 
Following his initial failure to oppose Non-Cooperation he 
ostensibly accepted the programme until such time as he 
was able to offer a more attractive alternative. Many of 
his followers in the province, however, were also like 
the Muslims of Calcutta keeping a close watch on the 
current situation in Bengal. They may have espoused a 
nation-wide ideal but their response to it was moulded by 
provincial and communal considerations. They were more 
than prepared to encourage Muslim involvement in the Non-
Cooperation movement, and it is generally true that after 
1920 the Khilafat movement became so inextricably bound 
up with that of the general Non-Cooperation campaign that 
1 it is difficult to separate the two - despite the efforts 
of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee to retain some semblance 
of organisational .. J..ndependence against the inroads of 
local Congress bodies. 2 On the other hand Das' Hindu 
followers resented Muslims such as Huq and the Suhrawardies 
who seemed determined to wrest immediate gains for their 
community; gains which could only be achieved at the 
expense of the Hindu community of Bengale In addition the 
Hindus were loath to raise the masses. The large landowners 
1 Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925. 
2Ibid., Home Poll (Dep.), 1922, no.J27/IV; ibid., April 1921, 
no~41; Mussalman, 1921, 16 December, p.2. 
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because of their fear of the predominantly Muslim peasantry; 
the city-dwellers because of their memories of mob 
activity, and the Hindu community in the province at large 
because of the ever~present spectre of Muslim numerical 
su~riority •. Such fears qualified the outlook of most 
nationalist leaders of the Hindu community in the province 
and unde,rmined their support for Muslim political agitation 
and their belief in the sincerity of Muslim involvement in 
the nationalist movement. 
VI 
It was this qualified attitude of support and 
involvement which undermined the utilisation of the industrial 
and mofussil masses in the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation 
movements. Certainly throughout 1920 and subsequent years 
there were instances of strikes and industrial unrest which 
were directly related to the activities of political 
agitators, 1 but the majority of strikes arid industrial 
disputes can be accounted for more readily by the pressure 
of economic discontent. 2 Admittedly it is difficult to 
differentiate between political and economic motives during 
such a period and obviously there was a certain amount of 
interaction. The various Khilafat organisations, under the 
influence of Azad and Maniruzzaman Islamabadi, made sporadic 
attempts to organise the Muslim industrial workers and 
succeeded in whipping up a considerable amount of discontent 
in Howrah; 3 but their success was ephemeral. Hindu 
1Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File no.267/20; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), February 
1921, no.J5; ibid., June 1921, no.51; Labour Commission, 1929 
(Evidence), voloV, part 1,pp.121-4; Statesman, 1920, 20 March, 
p.8; ibid., 1921, 5 April, p.9. 
2 Bengal Govt, Report of the Committee on Indust;r-ial Unrest in 
Bengal, 1921, (1921), p.J. 
JBengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File No.224/2J; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), January 1921, 
no.75; ibid., December 1920, no.84; ibid., Home Poll, JOJ of 
1921; ibid. (Dep.), Jnne 1921, no.1J; Statesman, 1921,6 
November, p.11; ibid., ·1922, 18 January, p.11. 
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Non-Cooperators made similar attempts but they were in any 
case dubious about the value of arousing the turbulent 
mill-hands and l.oath to use communal arguments to rally 
1 
support. A close analysis of the strikes reveals that 
direct political motivation was the exception rather than 
2 the rul.e. Even when it did occur communal differences 
helped undermine the agitation as at Kanchipara in 1921, 3 
or else the failure of the outside agitators to provide 
sufficient funds turned the workers against them. 4 At 
one mill in Garden Reach for instance it was reported that 
'the Khilafat leaders beat a hasty retreat from the meeting 
in their motor cars' under a barrage of brickbats from a 
mob of starving millhands.5 
The difficulties entailed in organising labour in 
Calcutta have been discussed previously. Language, caste, 
race and religion plus the methods of recruitment and 
factory organisation all helped fractionalise the labour 
force and alienate it from the Hindus and Muslims in the 
city proper. Few Hindus or Muslims were enthusiastic 
about espousing the workers' cause: the Hindus for fear of 
raising the beast of the streets and setting in motion an 
uncontrollable process of social upheaval, and the Muslims 
of Calcutta because they were more pre-occup~ed.~ith the 
romantic aspects of the Khilafat movement rather than with 
the practical benefits of labour organisation which in this 
era was of unknown value~ 
1Mussalman; 1921, 4 February, p.6; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), December 1920, no.84; ibidq September 1921, no.1; 
ibid., 25 of 1923, February; ibido, January 1921 , no. 7 5. 
in India 107-8. 
Karnik, V.B., Strikes 
A., Factory Labour 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), June 1921, no~63. 
4Ibid., 18 of 1922 (July and August). 
5Ibid., February 1921, no.35. 
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In the trade union field. there are few examples of 
organised. union involvement in political agitation. 1 Only 
one example of the formation of a trade union by political 
agitators comes to light and. this was the Kankinara Labour 
Union. 2 Formed in 1921 by Khilafatists the union was active 
in the Kankinara mil.l district to the north of Calcutta and. 
received. support from Gandhi, C.R. Das and. Moulvi Latafat 
Hossein, a Bengali Muslim member of the Legislative Council 
whose influence was apparently not circumscribed. by his 
political differences with the Non-Cooperators. 3 Elsewhere 
strike committees were formed. by Khilafatists and. Non-
, - " 
Cooperators; put shortage of funds a-nd. communal suspicions 
invariably led. to the collapse of such committees and. the 
strikes they were involved. with. 
Apart from the Kankinara Labour Union other unions 
were active in and. around. Calcutta, particularly amongst 
the more homogeneous Muslim building workers, domestic 
4 
servants and. seamen... In general, however, their leaders 
were Muslim merchants and. professional men who avoided. any 
direct political commitments and. who were more concerned. 
with securing tangible concessions from employers and 
government. The best example of such a leader is Mahomed. 
Daud., a Calcutta lawyer, who was leader of the Indian 
Seamen's UnionQ5 Daud. was involved in a variety of strikes 
concerning seamen and. his interests also encompassed. domestic 
6 
servants and. shop-workers. There is evidence that at 
various times he received. the active support of politicians 
1Ibid.., Home Poll, 1921, no.4~5. 
;;Labour Commission, 1929 (Evidence), vol.V, part 1, p.271. 
3 Ibid.. 
4 Statesman, 1920, 13 January, p.20; Mussalman, 1920, 30 
January, p.5; ibid. .. , 1923, 19 June, p.5; ibid.., 22 June, 
p.5; ibid. .. , 1921, 7 September, p.5; ibid.., 3 November, p.11. 
5 see page 56. 
6
see footnote 4. 
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1 
such as Das, Gandhi, Azad and Huq, and he affiliated the 
Indian Seamen's Union to the Congress-inspired All India 
Trade Union Congress. But neither politicians nor the 
'loosely co-ordinated12 Trade Union Congress had any final 
say in the affairs of the Union. Willing though he was 
to receive the sy.pport of politicians Daud was also prepared 
to cooperate with the goverrunent and employers, and he was 
a member of several committees appointed by the goverrunent 
to enquire into labour unrest.3 
A somewhat similar union was the Howrah Labour Union 
formed in 1921 by Mazibar Rahman, a vakil from Howrah .. 
Personally, however, he was much more inimical to 'political 
agitators' than Daud. At first he appears to have flirted 
with Congress but he soon threw in his lot with the forces 
of law and order. Little more is heard of him after 1922 
and by 1923 the union was firmly under the control of 
Fazl-ul Huq, though the benefits he gained from this coup 
must have been negligible in view of the unions very small 
membership. 4 
The whole period 1919 to 1923 was one of intense 
political activity and superficial communal harmony. The 
crowds which thronged the streets, parks and squares of 
Calcutta during the peak periods of political unrest were 
impressive but details of composition reveal the essential 
weaknesses of the whole movement during the period. In 
the earlier stages of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation 
movements the bulk of demonstrators were Marwaris and 
Muslims.5 Bengali Hindus and up-country Hindus certainly 
1 Mussalman, 1921, 4 February, p.4; ~tate~, 1921, 26 April, 
p.5; ibid., 1923, 6 November, p.7; Saksena, R.N., Seamen in 
India ( 19 51) , p. 94. 
2 Myers, C.A., Labor Problems in the Industrialization of 
India ( 1 9 58 ) , p • 5 7 • 
3Bakha.le, R.R. (ed.), The Directory of Trade Unions (1925), p.55. 
4Bengal Govt,Political Dept, December 1921, File no.20P-1, 
Progs B249-50; Statesman, 1921, 2 September, p.5. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid. (Dep.), July 
1920, no.106; Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential 
Police Report, File no.267/20. 
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observed the various hartals~ but like the millhands of 
Howrah and Garden Reach, there is no evidence to indicate 
that they took a more active role in political agitation 
during the years 1919 and 1920. 
With the adoption of Non-Cooperation by C.R. D~s at 
the end of 1920, however, the Bengali Hindu involvement 
became nruch more obvious and reached its peak towards the 
end of 1921 when protests against the visit of the Prince 
of Wales precipitated mass arrests by the British. 1 But 
at the same time that Bengali Hindu involvement increased 
Marwari involvement decreased. Gandhi~s occasional visits 
during 1921 invariably caused a temporary revival of 
Marwari interest, but increasing resentment against the 
economic effects of the boycott of British goods and the 
attempts of Muslim volunteers to enforce the boycott 
strained relations between the two communities. 2 Officially 
the Marwaris remained active Non-Cooperators but in practice 
their enthusiasm steadily declined throughout 1921 ~J 
The decline in Marwari political activity was 
piecemeal but so too was the increase in Bengali Hindu 
participation. Bengali Hindu students and professional men 
were certainly involved in Non-Cooperation activities but 
only at specific times and there is little evidence of 
sustained Bengali Hindu interest. 4 The same comment can be 
made about the Muslim and Hindu millhands; violent flurries 
of activity by operatives from Howrah and other mill areas 
1Indian Annual Register. 1922, p.JJ9-40. 
2 Statesman, 1921, 16 July, p.15; ibid~, 2 September, p.7; 
ibid., 13 September, p.7; Mussalman, 1921, 9 September, p.5; 
Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), April 1921, noc42; ibid., 
18 of 1921 (September); ibid. (october); ibid., January 1921, 
no.JJ; ibid., February 1921, no.J5; ibid., 1922, no.J27/IV; 
etc~ 
Jibid~, 18 of 1921 (September);ibid. (October); ibid., 18 of 
1922 (July and August); Mussalman, 1921, 9 September, pw5• 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep~), December 1920, no~ 74; ibido, 
April 1921, nou42; ibid., June 1921, no.90; ibid~s. 18 of 1921 
(December); Statesman, 1921 ~· 26 January, po8o 
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often gained more credence than they deserved. Certainly 
Muslim mill.hands were prominent in the picketing of cloth 
shops and in the Civil Disobedience movement of 1921; in 
addition they staged several spectacular and violent 
demonstrations in support of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation 
programme,but such activities were ephemeral and highly 
organised. 1 They lacked spontaneity and were without any 
means of sustenance beyond the immediate bribe or emotion 
of the moment. 2 
The general picture which emerged for the period 1919 
to 1923 of the participation of the population of Calcutta 
in the political unrest of those years is of the preponderance 
of Muslims amongst the activists. Hindu leaders such as 
C.R. Das played a prominent role, but that of their 
co-religionists was sporadic and rendered inconsistent by 
the underlying Bengali Hindu fears of a province-wide Muslim 
awakening. The Muslims of Calcutta participated in the 
nationalist agitation not so much out of any genuine interest 
in, or understanding of, Gandhi's objectives, but rather 
because of the threats they believed were aimed at their 
religion and their Urdu-oriented society by the British. 
Their interests were neither national nor provincial but 
communal, a fact which was temporarily forgotten by them in 
the relief of finding allies amongst the Hindus. The communal 
rapprochement was a chimera whose hybrid character had yet 
to be tested against the realities of daily existence 
between Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta. 
1Govt of India 9 Home Poll, 185 of 1925; ibid. (Dep.), 18 of 
1921 (December); ibid .. , 18 of 1922 (February); ibid~, 18 of 
1922 (June); Statesman, 1921, 13 August, p.5; ibid., 19 
October, p.8; ibid., 1922, 2 February, p.5, 
2 Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 18 of 1922 (June); ibid. 
(July and August). 
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VII 
An examination of the life of the Muslim community 
in Calcutta between 1919 and 1923 at a level below that of 
the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation agitation provides an 
alternative picture of the influences working within the 
community. Certainly the experience of the nation-wide 
Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements cannot be discounted. 
Larger numbers of Muslims in Calcutta than ever befo~e 
had been involved in direct political action, and new 
groups had been introduced to the political arena. 
Prominent merchants and professional men no longer held 
sway over the community by simple virtue of their descent 
and social status, but had been faced with the necessity 
of directly cultivating and responding to the interests 
of other groups within the community. Thus the local 
mosque, mercantile association - no matter how informally 
organised - and Khilafat Committee had become the rostra 
from which would-be community leaders attempted to rally 
personal and party support. The previously anonymous mass 
of Muslim petty merchants and artisans in Calcutta had 
voiced their confused grievances violently in 1918 and in 
subsequent years it was they, rather than the British, 
whom aspi~ing leaders cultivated. 
The communal rapprochement had been another result of 
the Muslim political awakening and yet by the end of 1923 
with the Non-Cooperation programme in ruins, after being 
called-off by Gandhi in 1922, and the Khilafat issue 
virtually solved, by domestic-developments in Turkey, the 
rapprochement in Calcutta was showing definite signs of 
strain. The result of this was a realignment of Muslim 
interests from the international and national spheres to 
the provincial, district, village and urban level. 
Obviously the Muslims of Calcutta were in no way 
responsible for the termination of the Non-Cooperation 
programme or the demise of the Khilafat issue, but to what 
extent did they contribute to the gradual deterioration of 
the communal rapprochement in Calcutta? 
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Muslim petty merchant, artisans 9 unskilled workers 
and students in the city joined arms with Marwaris, up-
country Hindus and Bengali Hindus during the heady days 
of the nationalist agitation, but beneath the surface 
harmony older grievances and aspirati.ons were present. 
They broke forth sporadically throughout this period to 
cause inter-communal bickering which by 1923 seriously 
threatened to destroy the vestiges of communal harmony 
in Calcutta. 
Basically the increase in tensions resulted from the 
issues of korbani (cow slaughter)and municipal reforms. 
These were the ostensible causes of dispute, but they were 
the surface manifestations of more deep-seated suspicions 
which existed between the Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities of Calcutta; suspicions which led to a 
determination on both sides that the tangible benefits of 
urban life should not be gained disproportionately by either 
Such divisions had caused tension within the ranks 
oi' Khilafatists and Nnn-Cooperators to the extent that 
whilst the Khilafatists demanded the support of Congress 
they were slow to accept the leadership of C.R. Das; 
whilst the non-Muslim Non-Cooperators constantly played 
down the religious element in the Muslim political agitation, 
and were invariabJ.y suspicious of the Pan Islamic overtones 
of the Khi1.afa t movement. 1 
The de cis ion of C .R. Das final.ly to dispense with the 
last vestiges of the Non-Cooperation ideal, late in 1922, 
when he decided to contest the forthcoming elections to the 
Bengal Legislative Council,further split the unity of the 
Hindu-Muslim leadership. The more radical Muslim leaders 
such as Akram Khan, and the Muslim press, were opposed to 
this return to constitutional agitation, but they grudgingly 
acquiesced at the prodding of Azad. 2 
1 Ibid., 25 of 1923 (January). 
2 Ibid.; NNR, 1922, 15 November; Moslem Jagat; ibid., 1.7 
November, Muhammadi, ibid., 17 November, Mussalman. 
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As far as the Muslims of Calcutta were concerned such 
suspicions meant that a large proportion of the more 
eminent merchants and professional men within the community, 
who in public supported current political agitation, were 
also aware of the more immediate problems facing their 
community in the city. This led to a bewildering mixture 
of political loyalties: in the case of the trade union 
leader Mahomed Daud there was the flirtation with nationalist 
and moderate politicians combined with a willingness to 
cooperate with the British. Similarly with the wealthy 
Ispahani merchant family there was a father who took 
recourse to a British court to gain control of the Shia 
Imambara at Hooghly, thereby splitting the Persian community 
for many years, 1 and a son who used the same family fortune 
to.propogate the Khilafat and Pan-Islamic causes. 2 The 
Suhrawardy family provided yet further examples; the brothers 
Abdullah and Hasan opposed the Non-Cooperation movement and 
ent.ered the Legislative Council in J921 along with their 
cousin Zahid and his son Huseyn Shaheed. Yet both Abdullah 
and Huseyn Shaheed proved to be their own masters, and when 
Abdullah addressed the Council in support of nationalist 
agitation against separate electorates he was matched in 
his eloquence by Huseyn's support of the Khilafat movement. 3 
At a less sophisticated level communal tensions and the 
dichotomy of communal attitudes in this period are best 
illustrated by an examination of the perennial korbani 
disputes, and the furore over reforms to the municipal 
corporation. 
Disputes over k.o.rbani have been noted as early as the 
1890s and were a continual source of tension between the 
Muslim and Marwari communities. Gandhi had attempted to 
1 Bengal Govt, Political Dept, June 1923, File no.1C-23, Frogs 
B425-6; ibid., July 1923, File no.1C-27, Frogs B199-200. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), June; 1921 1 no.90. 
3 ' 
.m;&Q, Vol.V, 21.11.21 and 1.12.21. 
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solve the issue by a series of vain compromises, and even 
at the height of the communal rapprochement in Calcutta. 
the Marwaris persisted in their attempts to change Muslim 
-attitudes on the issue. At one stage they offered to buy 
the cows destined for korbani with the practical result that 
the Muslims 'succeeded in extorting fancy prices from the 
Hindus for the sale of their cows' but continued with the 
1 
slaughter ort the occasion of Bakr Id. At a later date 
the Marwaris offered the Muslims a more far-reaching bribe 
when in 1922 they proposed a cessation of korbani in return 
for a legislative ban on music before mosques, but to no 
avail. 2 Musl.ims were loath to give up what they considered 
an ancient right, and feared that once any concessions to 
Hindu or Marwari religious sentiment were made other 
time-honoured local religious practices may have been 
similarly attacked. 3 The nett result of this agitation was 
an increasing disparity between Muslim and Marwari interests 
which not onl.y increased tension between the two< communi ties 
but which in addition helped drive the Marwaris further 
into the camp of the opponents of C.R. Das the Hindu 
champion of the communal r~pprochement in Bengal. 
Throughout 1921 and 1922 the Corporation debates are 
full of instances when the Marwari businessman Amaludhone 
Addy attempted to obtain a formal municipal ban on korbani. 
His pleas were based on economic arguments of doubtful 
validity and were bitterly opposed by Muslim members of the 
Corporation. 4 So great was the feeling on this issue that 
even the nationalist press became involved and in 'J ~21, 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), January 1921, no .. JJ; ibid., 
April 1921, no.4J. 
2AICC Papers, 1922-23, File No.12, letters from the Calcutta 
Cow Preservation League dated 7.12.22, 20.12.22, 27.12.22. 
JGovt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), August 1920, no.112. 
4
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1920-March 1921, 
22.11.1920, pp.1017-21; ibid., October 1921-March 1922, 
14.12.1921, p.1J01; ibid., 18.1.1922, pp.1413-29; ibid., 
April 1922-September 1922, 21.7.1922, p.593; BLCD, Vol.II, 
4 .. 7.1921. 
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1922. and 1923 Hindu and Muslim newspapers followed a 
strictly communal line. 1 In both 1921 and 1923 agitation 
in the Corporation by men such as Addy produced a rash of 
minor Muslim demonstrations particularly in such centres 
as Mechua Bazar and Dharumtala where the spirit of communal 
2 
rapprochement was supposedly strongest. 
In part the intransigence of the Marwaris can be 
explained by their increasing disillusionment with the 
national.ist programme. The Non-Cooperation movement in 
Calcutta affected their economic interests, particularly 
with respect to the sale of foreign c.}.oth, and with the 
failure of Gandhi and C.R. Das to provide them with any 
tangible rewards for their sacrifices their alienation from 
the nationalists and Muslims increased. But their reaction 
was not an isolated. phenomenon; throughout northern India a 
conservative Hindu reaction against the eclectic socio-
political programmes of Gandhi had set in by 1923 and was 
particularly directed at this cultivation of Muslim support. 
Communal riots in north western India and the Moplah 
uprising in Malabar had given rise to renewed Hindu fears 
of Muslim violence, and confirmed the suspicions of many 
Hindus about the Pan-Islamic sympathies of many Khilafatistso 
The result of this orthodox reaction was a rapid growth in 
Hindu communalist organisations ranging from the heterodox 
Arya Samaj to the more conservative 1 .but equally anti-Muslim, 
Suddhi and Sangathan movements. In form all these movements 
aimed at a purification of Hindu religious and social 
practices, and the prevention of conversions to other faiths. 
Such interests found support in Bengal from groups like the 
Marwaris and the more orthodox Bengali Hindus who had been 
stirred by the korbani question, and who were also conscious 
1NNR, 1920, 11 August, Nayak; ibid., 13 August, Muhammadi; 
ibid, 24 Sept~mber, _Bavay~; ibi.s;k_J .. _1921, 11 Februaryt. 
Muhammadi; ibid., 1922 2 August, V:!:'Swamitra; ibid.,,1 August, 
Muhammadi; ibid., 1923, 9 .·]february, MuhammadL 
2 Mussalman, 1921, 9 September, p.6; Statesman, 1923, 7 
February, p.5; ibid., 11 February, p.7; ibid., 16 February, 
P• 5 • · 
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of the steady stream of converts to Islam in the mofussil, 
especially amongst the untouchables. 
In September 1923 the Hindu Dharma Sudharak Samity 
of Calcutta - a branch of the Hindu Mahasabha whose 
membership comprised mainly up-country Hindus - formally 
denounced korbani and 'Muslim atrocities' in Multan and 
Malabar, and stated that Hindus no longer had any sympathy 
with Muslim grievances. 1 The Muslim press led by the 
Mussalman responded vigorously to castigate the 'Hindu 
communalists' , 2 but this was only one of many such 
incidents which had bedevilled communal harmony in Calcutta 
since the early months of 1923. In July the Muslim merchants 
of Mechua Bazar and central Calcutta had assembled at the 
Nakhoda mosque to denounce the Arya Samaj, which in 
following·months became an object of vitriolic attacks by 
the Mussalman. 3 In the same month the police reported 
that the Calcutta Khilafat Committee 'was alive only in the 
hearts of anti-Suddhi and Sangathan extremists' who were 
busy organising mofussil bodies to counteract the activities 
of the new Hindu organisations~ 4 
Korbani and the activities of Hindu communal organis-
sations, however, were not the only issues to arouse 
communal antipathy in Calcutta. During the years between 
1919 and 1923 both major communities in Calcutta were drawn 
into conflict over the question of a reformed municipal 
constitution. In 1913 the majority of councillors on the 
Corporation had discussed the issue and had accepted the 
principle of separate electorates for Muslims.5 But by 1919, 
apart from the minority groups of Muslims and Europeans, 
1Ibid., 1923, 22 Sep~ember, p.11; Mussalman, 1923, 28 
September, p. 3~ 
2Ibid., 28 September, p.5. 
3Bengal Govt, Political Dept, Confidential Police Report, 
File no.1/23; Mussalman, 1923, 3 August, p.4; ibid., 31 
August, p.4; ibid., 28 September, p.5. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923 (July). 
5calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1913-March 1914, 
5.11.1913, pp.1233-4. 
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the Corporation c.ouncillors had decided against any such 
concession to communal interestso 1 In succeeding years 
a battle was waged in both the provincial Legislative 
Council and the Calcutta Corporation on the issue of 
separate electorates for Muslims. In general Muslim 
opinion seems to have been firmly behind the demand for 
communal electorates althqp.gh, as can be expected, the 
more extremist leaders such as Akram Khan and Mujibur 
Rahman condemned them as 'anti-national' • 2 Even Abdullah 
Suhrawardy thundered in the Legislative Council, against 
a chorus of criticism from fellow Muslims, that he would 
strongly oppose and empha~ically repudiate and 
denounce the innovation and heresy of elevating 
and exalting the principle of communal repre~ 
sentation into the shibboleth of my faith and 
the creed of my religion.3 
Orthodox Hindus and Marwaris, especially Amaludhone 
Addy in both the Legislative Council and the Corporation, 
vigorously supported these denunciations. The issues of 
korbani and the allegedly exessive pa,hdering to Muslim 
interests by Government and nationalists were bot}:l.·dragged 
into the interminable wrangling, 4 which even helped divide 
further the nascent labour movement when Hindu delegates 
to the Kankinara Labour Conference refused to sit with 
Muslim delegates because of the Corporation dispute.5 
In 1919 and 1920 the dispute had been largely confined 
to the small group of politically moderate and conservative 
Muslims in the city who remained aloof from the nationalist 
agitation. By 1922 and 1923 ,however, increasing m.imbers. 
1Ibid., October 1918-March 1919, 18.3.1919, pp.1422-6. 
2 Mussalman, 1923, 16 February, p.5. 
3 ]!£Q, Vol.V, 1.12.192J. 
4Ibid., Vol.V, 29.11.1921; Bengal Govt, Administration Report, 
1922-23, p,xvii. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923 (March). 
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of Muslims had either been alienated from, or were merely 
passive. observers of, the nationalist struggle. Their 
whole-hearted support of the anti-Government and anti-
constitutional forces had waned to be replaced by an 
increasing interest in the problems of life in their 
immediate environment. This process of increasing communal 
introspection gave rise to a renewed determination on the 
part of Muslims to seek benefits for their community, and 
on the part of Hindus to preserve the status quo. 
For both groups the municipality was a vital issue; 
not only did the Corporation provide an excellent forum 
for the pursuit and protection of group interests but, at 
the more practical level, it controlled considerable funds 
which it spent on slum-clearance, public works, education 
and a host of institutional projects throughout the city. 
In addition it was a profitable and respectable source of 
employment for men of all professions from sweeper to 
engineer and accountant. Whichever community could gain 
a voice loud enough to be heard in the councils of the 
Corporation would obviously have a good chance of assuming 
some of its powers of financial and employment patronag~. 
The more nationally minded Muslims, be they Khilafat;... 
ists or moderates, may have opposed the principle of 
communal electorates, but for many others the benefits of 
a community pressure group. in a previous.ly Hindu-dominated 
organisation were too obvious to be ignored. Indeed, in 
the face of Muslim intransigence, the Hindu opposition 
steadily waned. Certainly various attempts were made to 
fob the Muslims off with offers of a number of 'reserved' 
as opposed to separate electorates, but this suggestion 
was firmly rejected on the grounds that any Muslim elected 
by a mixed electorate would be no true representative of 
Muslim interests. 1 Opposition in the Corporation lasted 
longer than in the Legislative Council and amongst the 
1Bengal Govt, Political Dept, December 1921, File no.2A-12, 
Progs BJ6J; Calcutta Corporation, op.cit., 7.1.1919, p.1027; 
ibid., April 1922-September 1922, 21.7.1922, pp.590-4; 
BLCD, VoleV~ 22~11.1921. 
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group of nationalist politicians led by C.R. Das. The 
reason for this was the rapid approach of the 1923 eledtions 
which both Hindu madera tes and extremists in Bengal were 
going to contest for the first time. Das had at last 
broken the firm stand of Congress against involvement in 
British-inspired constitutional processes and was busy 
searching for electoral support - the same can be said of 
the moderates. The result was a renewal in the cultivation 
of Muslim support by leading Hindu politicians in the 
province. 
In the Bengal Legislative Council this led to a 
compromise solution of the municipal question when the Hindu 
moderates led by Sir Surendranath Banerjea accepted the 
suggestion of the European bloc that the Muslims be granted 
separate electorates for a period of 9 years after which 
1 joint electorates were to be accepted. In the opposition 
camp outside the Legislative Council any outspoken 
criticism of this decision was muted by Das who having 
gauged the strength of Muslim sentiment on this issue was 
not eager to alienate Muslim support on the eve of the 
provincial elections. Even the Mussalman which on 16 February 
1923 had condemned the principle of communal electorates 
performed a volte face and on 23 February tacitly supported 
the compromise with the acid comment that it was 1 a coconut 
2 
without a kernel'. 
So it was that the Muslims gained their wi.ll o:P. the 
municipal question, but the effects of this victory, 
korbani and the growth of Hindu communali.st organisations 
had seriously undermined the facade of communal harmony in 
the city. At the highest level of community leadership 
amongst the nationalists apparent amity was maintained, but 
amongst the masses in the city communal divisions multiplied. 
1Ibid., Vol.XI, 14.2.1923 and 19.2.1923. Bengal Govt, Local 
Self-Government Dept, October 1924, File no.1P-79, Frogs 
A3-4; Bengal Govt, Memo. to the Statutory Commission: 
Communal Representation in Legislative and Local Bo~ (n.d.), 
passim. 
2 Mussalm!_!g, 1923, 16 February, Pa5; ibi.de ,23 Feb,ruarY', p.3. 
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The silence of Das over the issue of the Corporation removed 
one cause of friction for the moment, but the communal 
rapprochement needed a more invigorating dose of practical 
ideas if it was to survive and grow. Vague political 
slogans no longer carried more weight than the immediate 
benefits demanded by Muslims,~ thus it was that Das agreed 
to the Corporation's new constitution and in addition 
began to search around for a more definite means of 
retaining Muslim support. 
By the beginning of 1923 communal distrust in Calcutta 
had mounted to the extent that the spectre of the 19.18 
riots once more stalked the city. However, by the beginning 
of 1924 communal harmony was apparently restored: confirmed 
bY the victory of Das' supporters in Muslim seats at the 
1923-24 elections and the Muslim reception of the Das 
Pact, which was adopted by the nationalists in December 
1923, and which provided for immediate and practical 
concessions to Muslim demands and aspirations in Calcutta 
and Bengal. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COMMUNAL REVIVAL, 1923 TO 1926 
1 31 
The signing of the Das Pact in December 1923 was the 
most important political event in Bengal during that year. 
1 Negotiations had. begun in September and. were completed. on 
9 December at the home of Khod.a Buksh, a wealthy Punjabi 
merchant and. eminent Persian scholar~ 2 
In essence the Pact was the final effort of C.R. Das, 
the provincial Congress leader, to salvage the communal 
rapprochement and. to secure the Muslim vote for the Swaraj _ 
Party at the forthcoming elections to the Bengal Legislative 
Council and. the reformed. Calcutta Corporation. To achieve 
this a pact which contained. two sets of provisions was 
agreed. upon by Das and. four Calcutta Muslims - namely Abul 
Kalam Azad., the ex-lawyer and. prominent Non-Cooperator 
Wahed. llossain, Syed. Nasim Ali, MLC for 24-Parganas Rural, 
and. ;Moulvi Abdul Karim, retired. government servant, pioneer 
of modern Muslim education in Bengal and. member of the 
Council of State.3 The first set of provisions conceded. 
the Muslims of Bengal a statutory majority share in the 
administration and. government of the province after Swaraj, 
whilst the second. provided. for the voluntary banning by 
Hindus of music before mosques, the freedom of Muslims to 
perform korbani, and. the promise of a greater percentage 
of Muslim employees in a Swarajist controlled. Corporation. 4 
The Muslim reaction in Bengal was immediate and. 
~avourable. At a joint session with the Bengal Provincial 
Congress Committee,the provincial Khilafat Committee under 
its president Mujibur Rahman, editor of the Mussalman, 
1Broomfield.; Jo, op.cit.~ Pw239. 
2Karim, Moulvi A.K., Letters on the Hindu-Muslim Pact (n •. d..), 
p~3; NNR, 1924, 1 Januaryv Swaraj. 
3Karim, Moulvi A.K., op~cit.; see page 34 for details of 
Karim's previous activities, also Azan, M.A., Life of Maulvi 
Abdul Karim (1939), passim. 
4
see Broomfield., J. ~ op~cit., p~246, and. Chatterjee, D.K.-, 
C.R. Das and. the Indian National Movement (1965), p.131, for 
details of the Pact provisions. 
ratified the Pact. So too did the Calcutta Khilafat 
Committee, and a meeting of Muslim MLCs at the house of 
Abdul Karim 
which gratefully acknowledged the Das Pact 
provisions regarding cow-killing and promised 
that Muslims would consider a solution if Hindus 
gave up the use of force and legislation.1 
Certainly the attitude of many Khilafatists abruptly 
changed when the Pact was announced: previously they had 
strongly opposed Das 1 scheme for Council Entry in favour of 
the more overtly anti-British and disruptive Non-Cooperation 
programme,to the extent of boycotting and disrupting election 
m.eetings organised by the Swaraj Party in Calcutta during 
Octobe~ and November 1923. 2 In December, however, they 
joir:ted with Azad and Mahomed Ali and attempted to rouse 
Muslim enthusiasm for the elections, and no doubt their 
a,ctivities contributed to the sweeping success of the Swar;;:~.j 
Party at the polls where it gained a maj.ori ty of elected 
seats··~'"'including half of those allocated to Muslims. 3 
An analysis of the elections to Muslim constituencies 
in and immediately surrounding Calcutta, however, reveals 
that the effect of the Pact on the Muslim population of the 
metropolis wa.s not completely favourable to Das. In part 
this was due to the continuing opposition to Council Entry 
of a minority in the Calcutta Khilafat Committee, which 
involved that body in internal dissensions so that it proved 
incapable of organising itself effectively for the elections. 4 
In part also the opposition was provoked by the simple 
dislike of some Khilafatists to taking orders from the Hindu-
dominated Swaraj Party. But the major source of contention 
·• 
was the strong suspicion of the whole process of Council 
1Govt of India,. Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923, December; 
ibid., 25 of 1924, January; Mussalman, 1924, 1 February, p.2. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923, November. 
3Ibid., ibid.,, December. 
4Ibid., 25 of 1924, Sept ember. 
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Entry, which was seen as a compromise with the British and 
a betrayal of the earlier, more politically revolutionary, 
programme of boycotting the British-inspired processes cr 
constitutional government< 
In fact neither the Swaraj Party nor the Khilafatists 
of Calcutta proved capable of or willing to present 
candidates for either of the two Muslim constituencies in 
the city. In the four Muslim constituencies which bordered. 
1 
on Calcutta only two Swaraj Party candidates stood. for 
election: namely Wahed. Hossain who secured. the Barrackpore 
seat in a straight contest where he won 1093 of the 1585 
votes cast; and. Syed. Nasim Ali who held. the 24-Parganas 
Rural constituency only after his successful rival, Dr 
Abdullah Suhraward.y~had. been disqualified. on the grounds 
f . t . t. 2 o 1ncorrec nom1na 1on. In Calcutta Abdullah Suhrawarcl,'y' s 
kinsman, 
captured. 
merchant 
the young Huseyn Shaheed. Suhraward.y, easily 
South Calcutta~3 whilst the elderly and. wealthy 
4 Mahboob Al-ley comfortably defeated. the Deputy 
Sherif of Calcutta, Rezaur Rahman Khan, for the seat of 
North Calcutta.5 
Neither of the men elected. had been actively involved 
in the political agitation of the preceding years. Indeed, 
Alley had. been prominent in the municipal politics of 
Manicktolla for many years until 1921 and in addition had 
.oeen an Honorary Magistrate in 1918 and 1921, 6 and like 
1 Hooghly cum Howrah Municipal, Barrackpore Municipal, 24-
Parganas Municipal and. 24-Farganas Ruralc 
2BLCD, Vol.XIV, 21.1.24; Statesman, 1924, 19 January, p.5; 
Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, March 1924, File no.6R-153(1), 
Frogs 1 3-24. 
3 HoS.S. Suhraward.y gained 393 of the 722 votes cast. Huseyn 
was the son of Abdullah's cousin Zahid. 
4 See PP•lll-12. 
5M.Alley: 463 votes; Rezaur Rahman Khan: 136 votes (previous 
incumbent), see PPi lll-l2Q 
6Bengal Govt, Judicial Dept, January 1922, File no.J 4H-1 of 
1921, Frogs B42-52. 
Suhrawardy had entered the reformed Bengal Legislative 
Council in 1921 in opposition to the demands of the Non-
Cooperation programme. Yet if neither had a record of 
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nationalist activity their abstention from the main current 
of Muslim politics during the previous years had not been 
made more heinous by overt collaboration with the British. 
Alley and Suhrawardy had made their sympathies for the aims, 
if not the methods, of the nationalists known in the 
legislative council - unlike Rezaur Rahman Khan who had 
been a vociferous opponent of the nationalists. 1 In addition 
both were members of wealthy and pre-eminent families in 
the city~ 
Between them the two candidates captured 856 of the 
1359 votes cast, which meant that barely 45 per cent of the 
3081 registered electors polled. In many ways the low vote 
was an indication of the confused state of Muslim opinion -
it was not a vote for the moderate or communalist candidates 
such as Rezaur Rahman Khan or Fazl-ul Huq who gained only 
three votes in the contest against Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, 
2 
or an outright declaration of sympathy for the Swaraj Party. 
Rather it was a compromise vote dictated by Muslim sympathies 
for nationalist goals and suspicion of the sincerity of the 
intentibns of the Swaraj Party. Muslim respect for C.R. Das 
was undoubtedly genuine and widespread, 3 but within Calcutta 
the electioneering tactics of the Swarajists did little to 
reconcile Muslim and Hindu opinion. This was es:pecially 
true in the turbulent central wards around Burra Bazar and 
Mechua Bazar where the most common of the Party's election 
slogans was 1 Gow Mata Ki Jai' - an obvious appeal to 
Marwari concern regarding korbani. 4 
1~, Vol~V, 21.11.1921 speech by Rezaur Rahman Khan. 
2 4 Ibid., Vol.XIV, 21.1a192 •. 
3sayeedt. Khaled B .. p Pakistan the Formative Phase, 1857-1948 
(1968)' p.67. 
4 Statesman, 1923, 29 November, p.8: 1 Gow Mata Ki Jai - 'Long 
Live Mother Cow'. 
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A more important factor in the raising of Muslim doubts 
in the city, however, was the outburst of Hindu opposition 
to the terms of the Pact. The British authorities in 
Bengal reported in December 1923 that: 
The Swarajists --- have over-reached themselves 
for the terms of the pact are so favourable to 
the followers of Islam that it has raised some 
suspicion among the faithful and intense resentment 
among a very large section of the Hindu community. 
So great is the dislike of the pact among the 
Hindus that several mass meetings have been held 
to condemn it and to impugn the honesty of purpose 
~~o!~:r~~frajist leaders who are its authors and 
At the joint meeting of the Bengal Provincial Congress and 
Khilafat Committees which ratified the Pact in mid-December, 
sufficient opposition from his Hindu followers had been 
voiced to force Das to reiterate that the bulk of the 
provisions 'cannot come into effect until the attainment of 
full responsible government'- a statement which drew a quick 
protest from Mahomed Ali. 2 But Hindu opposition was not 
silenced by Das 1 hasty qualification. In his newspaper, the 
J;.orward, he argued that the Muslims gained 'nothing more 
than what they are entitled to get in fairness and justice', 
but few other Bengali Hindu journals apart from the Bande 
Mata:vcam.. supported him. 3 The Viswamitra feared that 'such 
pacts and compromises [were] likely to excite the rowdy 
elements among the Moslems to cry for more and more'; whilst 
the former champion of the communal rapprochement, the 
Amrita Bazar Patrika~ declared 1 that the educated middle 
class recognise in this pact a wanton disregard not only of 
the Hindu but of true national interests' • 4 
1Govt of India~ Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923 5 December. 
2 Ibid.; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1923, 30 December, p.5. 
3NNR~ 1924, 25 December 1923~ Forward, B.ande Mataram. 
4Ibid., 23 December 1923, Viswamitra;_ Amrita Bazar Patrika. 
Public protest meetings in Calcutta on 25 and 28 
December echoed these sentiments: a meeting of Hindus at 
the University on the 25th resolved that the pact had 
I hak th f d t• f th H. d 1. . I 1 d s en e very oun .a 1ons o e 1n .u re 1g1on , an . 
on the 28th the moderate political leader Sir Surendranath 
Banerjea thundered above the catcalls of Swarajist inter-
jectors that 1 the Hindu community of Bengal and I may say 
all India is ablaze with indignation •••• The pact was made 
in direct contravention of the conventions created at 
Lucknow in 1916 1 • 2 Meetings to denounce the Pact multiplied 
during the first two months of 1924. Typical of their tone 
was one organised by the Marwaris of Burra Bazar on 19 
January which denounced the korbani provisions of the Pact 
and condemned 
the obstinate attitude of the Bengal Swaraj Party 
in attempting to confirm the Hindu-Muslim Pact, 
which has been vehemently opposed by the Hindu 
public of India and rejected by the Cocanada 
Congress.3 
Indeed, Das had failed to persuade the Cocanada session 
of Congress to ratify the Pact on a national basis in the 
face of opposition from Gandhi, who thought that 1 a pact 
[was] not possible at this stage'~ and Hindu communal 
organisations such as the All-India Hindu Mahasabha which 
claimed that the pact went 'against Hindu socio-religious 
values' .5 Such statements only served to confirm the 
suspicion of Muslims in Calcutta that the opposition of 
Congress to the Pact was 'because of korbani and because it 
1Amrita Bazar Patrikaf 1923~ 25 December, p.5. 
2 Mussalman~ 1924, 4 Januarys p.2. 
3statesman, 1924, 22 Jo.nuary, p~5; see also ibid., .3 February, 
p.9; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1924, 6 January, p.6; ibid., 16 
January, p.3; ibid., 17 January, p.6; ibid., 27 January, p.9; 
ibtd., 5 February, p.3; ibid., 13 February, p.6; ibid., 7 
March, p.7. 
4Ibid,, 3 June~ p.4. 
5Ibid., 15 Februarys P•7• 
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was under the influence of the Suddhi movement'. 1 
Das 1 however, was determined to preserve the Pact in 
Bengal; and to secure the Muslim vote at the municipal 
elections in 1924 he continued to cultivate the community's 
support in Calcutta. At the Calcutta Khilafat Conference 1 
held in March under the presidency of Mahomed Ali and Das, 
the Khilafat cause failed to gain much enthusiastic response 
from the audience. Those present, however, voted over-
whelmingly in favour of the Das Pact and. resolved. that no 
attempts should. be made to f9rce Das to implement its 
provisions "before" Swaraj had. been gained.. 2 The Muslims 
of Calcutta were not prepared. to concede any points on the 
issues regarding korbani, music before mosques or appointments 
to the Corporation but they were, for the moment, prepared. 
to take into account the fears of Das 1 Hindu bhad.ralok 
supporters regarding their position in the government and. 
administration of the province. The resolution was in 
fact an affirmation of Muslim support for a statement made 
earlier in March by Das in the legislative council when, 
in reply to a demand. by Musharraf Hussain from east Bengal 
for the immediate implementation of the Pact, he said 1 that 
the conditions of the Pact were meant to come into operation 
only upon the attainment of Swaraj'. 3 In the same debate 
Das received. the support of Huseyn Shaheed. Suhraward.y who, 
after informing the Speaker that 'I, for myself, Sir, am 
not a Swarajist' , 4 proceeded. to extol the Pact, no doubt 
with an eye to the material rewards a Swarajist victory at 
the Calcutta mCmicipal elections would. bring his community. 
1 NNR, 1924, 11 January, Asr-e-Jadid.. 
2 Ind.ian Annual Register, 1924~ January-March~ pp.93-96b. 
3Bengal Govt, Administration Report, 1923-24, p.iii. 
4BLCD, Vol.XIV~ 13~ 3.1924. 
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II 
At the municipal election held in Calcutta in April 
1924 1 the Swaraj Party not only won the majority of Hindu 
seats but also 10 of the 15 Muslim seats. Ten Muslim 
candidates had been nominated by the Congress Municipal 
Association, an electoral board organised by Das under the 
chairmanship of Huseyn Suhrawardys and all were elected. 
Suhrawardy's role at this time is not clear as neither then 
nor in the future was he a member of the Swaraj Party or 
Congress, and it can only be assumed that his appointment 
was a shrewd move by Das to enlist Muslim support by the 
utilisation of the prestigious Suhrawardy name. Perhaps, 
indeed, Suhrawardy's non-alignment with the Swaraj Party on 
any official basis served to neutralise Muslim suspicions 
of the Hindu-dominated Swaraj Party, and enabled the pa:fty 
to canvass a broader spectrum of Muslim votes than would 
otherwise have been possible~ Huseyn's relative Abdullah 
unsuccessfully contested the election as an independent, 
but both he and his brother Hasan held safe seats in the 
legislativ!:l council where he was being assiduously cultivated 
by the Swaraj Party. It seems doubtful if Abdullah in 
particular had any genuine interest_ in the Corporation, 
being muc~ more concerned with gaining the position of Speaker 
in the provincial legislature. 2 
Of the ten Muslim Councillors elected with the support 
of the Swaraj Party~ two were lawyersf namely Syed Nasim Ali 
of Das Pact fame and Abdur Razzack a brother of the trade 
union leader Mahomed Daud; five were up-country hide merchants: 
Ghulam Jilani Khan, Syed Mahomed Yakub~ Shamsul Huq, M.M. Huq 
and S.M.Z. Huq; the brothers Shamsuddin Ahmed, a lawyer, and 
1 Af'ter the 1923 reforms Calcutta City's boundaries were 
extended to include Cossipore-Chitpur 1 Manicktolla, and Garden 
Reach, and the number of wards was increased to 32 - see map, 
'Calcutta Municipal Wards, 1924 1 • 
2Govt of India sc Home Poll (Dep.), 112 of 1925, August~ 
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Abdul Halim, a clerk - Bengali-speakers long resident in 
the city and previously prominent in the Khilafat movement 
and Mahomed Hashim, secretary of the Calcutta Khilafat 
Committee before his imprisonment for six months in 1922. 
The remaining five councillors were independents: a popular 
physician Dr Khalil Ahmed, elected by the voters of his 
home district at Park Circus; two wealthy hide merchants 
Sheikh Karim Buksh and Mahomed Hussain; a prominent Shia 
lawyer, Honorary Magistrate and member of the Oudh family, 
Unsud Dowla; and a young but highly respected lawyer 
1 S.M.s. Rahman. 
The strongest vote for the Swarajist-supported candidates 
came from the central wards of the city in the area between 
Mechua Bazar, the Hooghly and Dharumtala St - the stronghold 
of up-country Muslim settlement - the old Manicktolla 
municipality, and the wards in the southern districts of the 
city which stretched from the Kidderpore docks inland to 
Ballygunge., The Muslim electorate of this area was 
predominantly Urdu-speaking and immigrant. It consisted 
mainly of merchants and artisans - reasonably prosperous, 
literate in Urdu only and barely influenced by the culture 
and society of either Bengal or ·the British - who had provided 
many of the Muslim participants in the Khilafat and Non-
Cooperation movements in the city. All nine seats in these 
areas went to candidates sponsored by the Congress Municipal 
Association. The opposition was minimal and consisted only 
of a maverick Swarajist, Abdul Hamid, a member of the 
provincial Khilafat Committee, and Mahabubal Huque, a 
supporter of Nawab Chowdhurys who later became a convert to 
the Swarajist creed. 
The other seat gained by the Swarajist candidates was 
in the area between Dharumtalla St and Park Circus. This 
electorate returned two members to the Corporation: one was 
1
statesman, 1924~ 22 January, p.S; ibid., 19 March, p.9; 
ibid.~ 25 Marchr P<l 8; Bengal Govt ,Judicial Dept, December _1924, 
File no.J.4M-3, Frogs B226-4o. 
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a popular medical prac ti tione:r:, Dr Ka Ahmeds who stood as an 
independent; and the other was a wealthy hide merchant, 
Shamsul Huq. Huq 1 s nationalist sympathies, material prosperity 
and respectable family background undoubtedly appealed to 
the Muslim professional class who had recently begun to 
move- to the new suburb of Park Circus from the crowded wards 
of central Calcuttae 
Elsewhere in the city the Muslim seats went to 
independent candidates without any opposition from the 
Swarajists.. The reasons for this are not hard to find. 
Although the Muslim population in all these wards, which 
covered the northernmost area of old Calcutta and the 
incorporated municipalities of Garden Reach and Cossipore-
Chitpur, comprised mainly Urdu-speakers, they were poor and 
mostly unenfranchised. The registered electors were mainly 
drawn from the ranks of the wealthy merchants, pensioned 
government servants and retired members of the professions, 
whose participation in post-war political movements had been 
minimal. All the councillors elected from these wards were 
members of prominent local families whose influence the 
Swarajists wisely refrained from challenging. 
At the first meeting of the newly-elected Council on 
11 April 1924 Das was elected Mayor, Huseyn Suhrawardy Deputy 
Mayor 'as a gesture towards the premier Muslim family in the 
city' ; 1 whilst Akram Khan~ the leading Bengali Muslim 
nationalist agitator~ and Moulvi Syed Muhanuned Karim Aga, 
2 
a prominent Persian merchant~ were elected Aldermen., In 
his congratulatory address to all four on behalf of the 
Muslim councillors Syed Nasim Ali commented that 
it was very gratifying to his communityevethat 
the leader of the Swaraj Party in Bengal had been 
elected as the first Mayor of Calcutta •••• He also 
welcomed Mr Das because he was the only man in 
Bengal who was trying to bring about the unity 
of the two communitiesQ•o•it was Mr Das who was 
1Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.250, 
2
calcutta Corporation, 
11.4 .. 1924, p.2; ibid., 
'Minutes', April 1924-September 1924, 
1 6. 4. 1 924' p. J. 
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at the bottom of the Hindu-Moslem pact and who 
had given effect to the request of the Mahommedans. 
It was Mr Das again who had tried his best to 
find out a Mahommedan as the Deputy Mayor.1 
The communal honeymoon in the Corporation continued 
for several months. On 23 April the Muslim councillors 
enthusiastically supported the appointment of Das' protege, 
Subhas Chandra Bose, as Chief Executive Officer for the 
Corporation and in seconding him Abdur Razzack remarked 
that his community would be very glad if Mr Bose 
was appointed the Chief Executive Officer as they 
considered him the second man in Bengal who was 
trying to improve the position of the Mahommedan 
community. 2 
In July the prayer of the Mussalman,that the Swarajist 
Corporation would give the Muslim community 'its due share of 
the loaves and fishes of office'( was in part answered when 
of the first 33 employment vacancies filled by the Corporation 
25 went to Muslims amongst whom was Haji Abdur Raschid Khan, 
an east Bengali, ex-lawyer, Non-Cooperator and Khilafatist, 
who was appointed second Deputy Executive Officer. 4 
But the politics and apparent communal accord of the 
Corporation were an illusion. The Muslim councillors were 
the representatives of a small enfranchised group which 
comprised only the Muslim professional class and wealthier 
merchants and property owners of the city. The majority of 
Muslims in Calcutta were little influenced by, or interested 
in, the mutual declarations of respect and admiration which 
echoed across the council chamber of the Corporation. Their 
lives and opinions were moulded not by the sophisticated 
provisions of the Das Pact nor by the limited 'loaves and fishes' 
1 Ibid • , p. 5 • 
2Ibid., 23.4.1924, p.B. 
3Mussalman, 1924, 2 May, Po5• 
4Ibid., 25 July, p.4. 
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at the disposal of the Corporation, but by the realities 
of daily life in the city - by their ability to pursue 
traditional patterns of social and religious life~ and. 
by the nature of their relationship with members of other 
communal groups. 
The pattern of Muslim political life in Calcutta 
between the advent of the Das Pact in December 1923 and 
the riots of 1926, which effectively shattered Das' dream, 
cannot be understood by an analysis of the refined voice 
of the Muslims of Calcutta in either the Corporation or 
the Bengal Legislative Council. Rather it must be explained 
by an examination of the state of communal sentiment 
amongst the groups which comprised the Muslim community in 
the city. The illusion of the period is that the 
sentiments echoed in the elite forums of provincial and 
municipal government set the pattern for Muslim behaviour 
in the province and city; but an examination of Muslim 
activity in both these institutions explains little in 
itself and clouds the image of the era if the influences 
of previously inarticulate groups upon the leaders of the 
community are not taken into account. 
The experiences of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation 
movements had created a greater .awareness amongst the 
generality of Muslims in Calcuta both of their own communal 
interests and of the potentialities of mass action and 
organisation. Groups of petty merchants and artisans who 
had been politically active in the period 1918 to 1923 
were prepared to admit the validity of constitutional 
processes to voice their views by 1924. But they were also 
conscious that the spokesmen of their community were 
increasingly dependent upon their support, and were no 
longer simply the representatives of elitist groups or in 
positions of power on the sole basis of personal or family 
wealth and social prestige. In effect this meant that 
despite the declared allegiance of Muslim politicians and 
community leaders to a specific party or political philosophy 
their activities were ·often not, in the final analysis,, 
dictated by party or philosophical loyal ties so much as by 
the demands of their communityw Only if this fact is 
accepted can the apparent contradictions in the political 
behaviour of Muslim leaders in Calcutta and Bengal be 
understoodo This does not mean that such men were cynical 
opportl.mists; undoubtedly many of them were men of principle 
with a genuine concern for the national ideal, but they were 
the representatives of a community which was not only faced 
with the problem of coming to terms with the concept of 
nationality, but which was also faced with the difficulties 
of maintaining a traditional way of life in the urban 
environment. 
III 
The salvaging of the communal rapprochement in the 
legislative council and Corporation was not matched by any 
similar movement amongst the mass of Hindus and Muslims in 
Calcutta. Hindu and Marwari resent~p.ent against the 
provisions of the Das Pact concerning korbani and music 
before mosques was matched by a widespread fear amongst 
Muslims of the city regarding the activities of Hindu 
communal organisations supported mainly by up-country non-
Muslim migrants. 
Both sides exhibited a tenderness of feeling regarding 
the sacredness of their own social and religious practices 
which resulted in the series of Hindu and Marwari protest: 
meetings to denounce the Pact, and a small but vicious riot 
in Howrah early in January 1924. The occasion of the 
riot was the failure of a Hindu religious procession to 
silence its band when passing a mosque: enraged by the defiling 
of the mosque with the carcass of a pig shortly beforehand, 
the Muslim congregation attacked the procession and left one 
Hindu dead and five wounded. 1 The Hindu press was outraged 
and placed the entire blame for the incident on the Muslims 
1 Statesman, 1924, 1 January, Po5; Govt of India~ Home Poll 
(Dep.), 25 of 1924, January. 
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'and the activities of fanatical maulvies'. 1 
Somewhat hysterically the up-country Hindus and Marwaris 
of Calcutta envisaged the spread of violence to the city 
proper and the Marwari Association of Burra Bazar wrote 
to the Commissioner of Police warning of a Muslim plot to 
seize local Hindu temples. Supported by reports in the 
Bengali Hindu dailies, the ~atantra and Bharatmitra, the 
Marwari Association claimed that the city was plastered with 
Urdu posters detailing the plot. However, in a confidential 
report the authorities noted that 'in fact, the combined 
efforts of the police could only discover one copy and 
that was placed inside the courtyard of the Dharumtala St 
mosque'. Late in June therefore, after exhaustive enquiries, 
the Commissioner of Police replied to the Marwari Association 
that 
on the subject of taking precautionary measures 
against any possible breach of the peace on the 
occasion of the coming Muhammedan festival of 
Bakr Id •••• I consider that [the planned] police 
dispositions will be quite sufficient to prevent 
any disturbance. 
On the 2Jr ..d I saw three representatives of the 
Hindu community on the subject of communal tension 
in Calcutta. The only definite point brought to my 
notice at this interview was the Urdu poster 
[which] you think is calculated to create bad blood 
before Bakr Id. I have as yet received no infor-
mation, other than your letter, which shows that 
this particular poster has received wide publicity ••• 
I would at this same time, like to sound a note of 
warning •••• It would be most unfortunate, in my 
opinion if either among the Hindu or the Muhammedan 
population of Calcutta, vague and indefinite 
rumours should be circulated about the possibility 
of trouble during Bakr Id. 2 
Suspicions were equally as intense on the Muslim side 
in Calcutta and. many remained convinced that the bulk of 
Das' followers in the city were unwilling to observe the 
1NNR, 1924, 3 January, Dainik Basumati, Dainik Bharat Mitra; 
ibid., 1 January, Amrita Bazar Patrika; ibid., 4 January, 
Hi tavadi. 
2Bengal Govt, Political Dept, September 1924, File no.12C-55, 
Frogs B20. 
terms of the Pact. The growth of Hindu communal organisa-
tions in the general spirit of the Suddhi and Sangatham 
movements only served to confirm their suspicions, and in 
the wake of the Howrah riot tension mounted in the city 
with the arrival of the Arya Samaj leader Swami Biswanand. 
Though he was ostensibly in the city to organise a popular 
movement for the reform of temple management, the anti-
Muslim overtones of his activities were obvious to all. 
He preached a more assertive spirit amongst Hindu youth 
based upon the cultivation of physical prowess and the 
development of individual means of self-defence, and as an 
example organised a procession through the central w.ards 
of the city past the Nakhoda mosque on 5 January to honour 
a visiting team of champion Hindu wrestlers from the Punjab. 
Many Muslims were convinced that the procession was 
specifically intended 1 to annoy [them] at their morning 
prayers and to insult their religion', and it was only 
with difficulty that the Police persuaded Biswanand to 
re-route his procession away from any mosque. Furious, 
Biswanand complied but not before he had bluntly stated 
that the Government not only in Bengal but all 
over India had definitely taken the side of the 
Muhammedans against the Hindus [and] that it was 
necessary for the Hindus to prepare themselves to 1 protect their religion; their women and themselves. 
Immediate conflict was avoided but suspicion remained 
on both sides. The Hindu press was generally provocative 
in tone, reports of Muslim outrages on Hindu women multi-
plied and Muslims were blamed for most cases of communal 
strife. 2 The Marwaris of Burra Bazar joined with up-country 
Hindus to form a vigilante committee to protect their women, 3 
and letters began to appear in the Hindu press urging Hindus 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1924, January. 
2NNR, 1924, passim. 
3Ibid., 6 May, Dainik Basumati. 
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and Marwaris not to rent houses or business premises to 
Muslims~ 1 Frequent appeals appeared in the press for 'Hindus 
2 to organise against Mussalmans' and it was even claimed 
that 'Moslem goondas have been perpetrating inhuman 
atrocities upon non-Moslems' in an attempt to wreck the 
Das Pact·. 3 
•i 
The Muslim reaction to this mounting tirade was one of 
confused anger. The Urdu d<:tily, the Asr-e-Jadid, fonnerly 
a staunch supporter of the nationalist cause, asked its 
readers: 
Has the natural order of things been changed in 
the world? Or else how is it that the most 
dependent and conquere-d religion of many thousand 
years is issuing a challenge to the mo~t powerful 
and conquering religion of the world! 
A riot at Garden Reach between up-country mill hands, when 
600 Hindus attacked a group of 300 Muslims who were allegedly 
performing korbani killed one and wounded 37,5 and an 
incident at Kankinarah,where the congregation of a mosque 
was deliberately taunted by the playing of music6,did little 
to convince the Muslim community of the sincerity of Hindu 
intentions regarding the provisions of the Das Pact. 
Inevitably the growing alienation of the mass ofHindus 
and Muslims in the city began to take a more sophisticated 
form than the continual press warfare and occasional riot. 
In the Corporation and provincial legislative council 
disillusionment with the Swaraj Party was occasioned by two 
issues, namely the defeat of the moderate ministry formed 
1Ibid., 11 June, Swatantra. 
2Ibid., June-July, passim. 
3Ibid., 11 June 1 Bi,jali. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (B), 284/iii of 1924. 
5Indian Annual Register, 1924, July-December, p.75. 
6Bengal Govt, Police Dept, November 1925, File no.5R-4 of 
1924, Frogs B70-77. 
in January and the question of the employment of Muslims 
by the Corporation. 
The moderate ministry was forced to resign in August 
when the three ministers - Fazl-ul Huq, A.K. Ghuznavi and 
S.N. Mallick - were defeated in a division of the house by 
Swarajist lobbying. The defeat of the Muslim-dominated 
ministry was not seen as a permissible political manoeuvre 
on the part of the Swaraj Party,but rather as a communal 
1 
move. Hypersensitive to Hindu opposition in any form, 
even avowedly staunch Muslim supporters of the Party were 
annpyed by its tactics in the legislative council and failed 
to remember that the whole point of Council Entry, as 
rationalised by Das, was to wreck the Reforms of 1919 more 
effectively than Gandhi's flagging Non-Cooperation programme. 
Similar resentment was roused amongst the Muslims in 
the Corporation. Though Das had appointed 25 Muslims as 
against 8 non-Muslims in the first batch of positions 
filled by the municipality, Hindu opposition to this move 
soured Muslim appreciation of Das' attempt to fulfil his 
promise and the Mussalman noted: 'It seems that when Muslims 
are benefited communalism at once creeps in: when Hindus 
are benefited to the total exclusion of Muslims it is 
something different~. 2 
Direct conflict between Hindus and Muslims in the 
Corporation, however, developed not out of the distribution 
of 'loaves and fishes', although this was undoubtedly a 
contributory factor, but rather out of the more mundane 
issue of the exhumation of a body buried beneath the floors 
of the Municipal Market in ward XIII. 
1
statesman, 1924, 2 September, p.9; ibid., 5 September, p.S; 
Bengal Govt, Administration Report, 1923-24, p.ii; Baker, D.E.U., 
'Nation and Region in Indian Politics: a study of the 
Swarajya Party, 1922-1926' (unpublished M.A. thesis, W .A., 
1966), pp.26J-66. 
2 Mussalman, 1924, 25 July, p.4. 
148 
IV 
The 'Pir Burial Dispute' first became a subject o£ 
public debate in Calcutta late in October 1924 when a jewish 
councillor D.J. Cohen moved a resolution in the Corporation 
which called for the exhumation of the body of a beggar 
buried over the main drains under the meat section of the 
Municipal Market. 1 The Corporation appointed a committee 
which consisted of five Muslims - the councillors Syed 
Nasim Ali and Abdur Razzack, Abul Kalam Azad, the prominent 
divine Moulana Abu Bakr and the president of the Calcutta 
Khilafat Committee, Abdur Rauf - and six non-Muslim 
councillors to report on the issue. The report of the 
committee, which was submitted in December 1924, recommended 
that the body either be exhumed or the tomb properly sealed; 
however, all the Muslim members of the Committee dissented 
and urged that the question should be dropped as the site 
had become a shrine for the butchers of the market, all 
of whom were Muslims~ 2 
The controversy centred upon the Muslim claim that the 
body was that of Dada Sahib a popular Madrassi pir who had 
been revered by the butchers of the market, and the demand 
of Hindu councillors that the authority of the Corporation 
should not be flaunted.J The Muslims claimed that when the 
1 pir 1 died they had approached the deputy mayor, Huseyn 
Suhrawardy, for permission to erect the tomb,and, indeed, 
Suhrawardy not only authorised the burial but became 
president of the Grave Management Committee formed to 
administer the tomb. 4 In retaliation against the adoption 
of the recommendations of the majority of members of the 
1
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1924-March 1925, 
22.10.1924, p.1J99; also known as Hogg Market and New Market. 
2Ibid., 12.11.1924, p.1528; ibid., 18 .. 12.1924, pp.1867-76. 
Jibid,, p.1869; Mussalman, 1924, 24 Octobe:r, p.4; Statesman, 
1924, 17 October, p.11. 
4Ibid., 5 November, p.5. 
investigating committee by the Corporation, the butchers 
allegedly threatened bloodshed, Muslim ratepayers organised 
a protest meeting at the Town Hall, and the Calcutta Khilafat· 
Committee isued leaflets in Urdu which called upon the 
Muslim councillors to protect the rel.igious interests of 
their community and bitterly denounced the Swarajist Hindu 
councillors. 1 
In part the controversy appears to have been precipitated 
by the rather naive political activities of Huseyn 
·suhrawardy. Embarrassed by the furore he was in part responsible 
for~ Suhra-wardy attempted .. to refurb;[sh his image in the 
Swaraj Party by organising a hartal amongst employees of 
the Corporation to protest against the recent arrest of 
2 Subhas Chandra Bose. The irony of the situation was that 
Suhrawardy's activities on behalf of the Muslim butchers 
of the Municipal Market were probably intended to achieve 
the same end. The Market was a valuable source of 
contributions to the coffers of the Swaraj Party~and in 
August 1924 the British reported that over 15,000 rupees 
had been collected from stallholders in the Market - a 
collection which had particu.larly outraged the unwilling 
Muslim donors .. Suhrawardy apparently attempted to lessen 
this feeling of outrage by giving his blessing to Muslim 
sentiments over the burial of the pir in the hope of 
reviving support for both himself and the Swaraj Party. 
Unfortunately the convoluted scheme backfired and only 
succeeded in adding to the Muslim sense of alienation from 
the Swaraj Party. 3 
The Hindu councillors refused to give way on the issue. 
They accused the Muslims of 'looking at the matter from a 
purely communal point of view'~ and based their own stand 
1Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1924, 6 October, p.4; Mussalman, 1924, 
5 December, p .. 7; ibid~, 5 November, po5• 
2Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1924, November. 
Jibid., August; ibid., September; ibid., December. 
4
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1924-March 1925, 
18.12.1924, p.1870~ 
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on the principle of the authority of the Corporation to 
regulate such matters. The dispute dragged on in the 
council chamber throughout 1925 and was further complicated 
by controversies concerning Muslim demands regarding 
education and the implementation of the Das Pact. 
In December 1924 the Muslim councillors led by Syed 
Nasim Ali attempted to persuade the Corporation to establish 
a separate system of Urdu-medium schools for Muslim children 
in the city with a fixed allocation of one third of the 
Corporation's education budget, Ali defended himself 
against charges of communalism when he stated that: 
His idea of Hindu-Muslim unity was not the fusion 
of one community with the other, each losing its 
identity and its distinct characteristics, but 
his idea was that the two plants must grow side 
by side, and if it was found that one plant had 
grown bigger at the cost of th.,.e other, the other 
plant must be given the opportunity of having its 
proper place •••• It seemed to him that real unity 
would come when a Mussalman could be a true 
Mussalman and a Hindu a true Hindu., His idea was 
that if they started separate schools that would 
not stand in the way of unity and would be for the 
good of the Motherland~ 1 
But neither his demand, nor a similar one issued by a meeting 
2 
of Muslim ratepayers on November 23, were acceded to by 
the Corporation and the matter was shelved by referring it 
back to the Corporation Standing Committee on Educationo3 
In April 1925 Ghulam Jilani Khan attempted to remove the 
impasse created in this and other disputes concerning 
Muslim interests by the device of passing on controversial 
questions to the interminable discussions of Hindu-dominated 
standing committees,when he moved a resolution that the 
1Ibid.,, 17~12.1924, p.1847. 
2Mussalman; 1924~ 5 December, p.7. 
JCalcutta'corporation, 1 Minutes 1 ? October 1924-March 1925, 
17.12.1924, p"1864~ 
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nwnber of Mahonnnedan members in the different 
Standing Committees be fixed in proportion to 
their population within [Calcutta City] and that 
such members be elected by Mahonnnedan Councillors 
and Aldermen., 1 
This resoJ.ution also failed, and both incidents served only 
to increase the tension between Hindus and Muslims in the 
Corporation based on the realisation of the representatives 
of the mi.nority connnunity that their voice counted for 
little in the Hindu-dominated body. 
Outside the Corporation the activities of the Hindu 
Mahasabha did little to encourage communal harmony. In 
April 1925 a meeting of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, 
atte!lded by 5,000 up-country Hindus and addressed by 
Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Malaviya 1 denounced connnunal 
representation and the Das Pact 'as injurious to and 
destructive of the growth of common nationality' • 2 The 
Hindu press gave the meeting much coverage and in addition 
devoted lengthy articles to the evils of korbani;3 whilst 
the Muslim press in turn bitterly attacked the Hindu 
Mahasabha and Arya Samajists who it claimed wished 'to 
drive the Muslims out of India'.!+ 
The tragedy of the situation was that Hindus and 
Muslims who were genuinely concerned to preserve the spirit 
of the Das Pact proved incapable of achieving this goal. 
Perhaps the most fervent of Das' Muslim supporters were 
Bengalis such as Akram Khan and Mujibur Rahman yet their 
influence within the city had waned with the decline of the 
Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements, and they were 
themselves increasingly alienated from the Swaraj Party by 
1Ibid., April 1925-September 1925, 3.,4.1925, p.200., 
2Mussa1man, 1925, 14 April 9 pp.2 and 3; Statesman, 1925, 
12 April, p.9; ibid .. , 14 April, p.9. 
3 E.g. NNR, 1925, 1 April, Dainik Bharat Mitra. 
4Ibid .. , 17 and 24 April, Muhannnedan; Govt of India, Home 
Poll (Dep.), 112 of 1925, April. 
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the failure of Das to start upon his promised programme 
of rural reform. In January 1925 Das had appointed Akram 
Khan to rally Muslim villagers to his scheme for village 
re-organisation, 1 but by March it was evident that the 
scheme would be stillborn as it of necessity 'involved 
hostile acts towards landlords which the important landlord 
element among C.R. Das' followers would not countenance 1 2 
In April the Mussalman impatiently called on Das to start 
the programme, 3 but by the following November the Swaraj 
Party had performed a volte face on the issue. This was 
brought about by the introduction of the Bengal Tenancy 
Act Amendment Bill into the legislative council. Ironical) .. y 
the bill contained many provisions for uplifting the 
position of the peasantry similar to those proposed earlier 
by Das, but it also contained provisions which placed the 
financial responsibility for many of these measures upon 
the .. landlord.. Das was forced to espouse the cause of the 
Hindu landowning elite and fought the bill with the argument 
that it was an attempt by the British to drive a wedge 
between Hindu. landlord and Muslim tenant! 4 
Such was the disillusionment of Das' Bengali Muslim 
supporters that in December 1925 Mujibur Rahman, editor of 
the Mussalman and former opponent of Muslim separatist 
tendencies, wrote regarding separate electorates that while 
separate representation is bad in theory, it is not 
at all an ideal to be followed and we have no especial 
love for it. But it is. a necessary evil - an evil 
which is to be maintained so long as there is mutual 
distrust between Hindu and Mussalmans - so long as the 
attitude of the generality of the Hindus towards 
Mussalmans is not what it should be.5 
1 Ibid., January. 
2Ib id. , March. 
Jibid., April. 
4Ibid.., November. 
5Mussalman, 19~5, 25 December, Po7• 
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Amongst the Urdu-speaking nationalist sympathisers in the 
Muslim community of Calcutta the same realisation was 
becoming apparent~ The attention of the mass of Muslims in 
the city was no longer wholly absorbed by the nationalist 
and Khilafat agitation and had turned inwards to the issues 
of community life in Calcutta. The Das Pact had attempted 
to resolve some of the more common causes of communal 
friction but suspicion on the part of Hindus and Muslims 
in the city had virtually invalidated it. Das proved 
unable to grant the full extent of Muslim demands in the 
face of opposition from his Hindu followers, with the 
result that his sympathisers amongst the Muslim leaders 
were forced to adopt a more communalist stance in reaction 
to Hindu intransigence and the impatience of their own 
fold.owers. 
Just as the Bengali Muslim nationalist sympathisers 
were driven towards a more communal outlook,the Swarajist 
Muslims of Calcutta found that the pressure of events was 
driving them towards a greater community of interests with 
tne politically and socially conservative Muslims they had. 
formerly opposed. This tragedy was further compounded by 
the death of Das in June 1925, and the split which developed 
in the Swaraj Party and involved two major factions gathered 
behind Das' successor as leader of the provincial Congress 
organisation and Mayor of Calcutta, J.M. Sen-Gupta, and 
his rival Subhas Chandra Bose. The already limited interest 
of Hindu Swarajists in the Das Pact was further submerged by 
the struggle for power which developed in the party and 
which involved a frantic search by both factions for support 
often at the expense of party principles formulated by Das. 
v 
The extent of the alienation of Muslim Swarajists in 
the Corporation is perhaps best illustrated by the crises 
which developed in the second half of 1925 over the issue of 
the pir burial. In May 1925, ·in order to prevent a division 
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of the Swaraj Party bloc in the Corporation along communal 
lines 1 Das submitted the question of the pir buriaL'.to 
the Advocate-General of Bengal for. an opinion. 1 In August 
the Advocate's opinion was submitted to Das' successor 
Sen-Gupta and stated that on legal grounds the body should 
be exhumed. 2 Sen-Gupta had. no option but to accept the 
report, and on 14 August all the Muslim councillors,with 
the exception of Huseyn Suhrawardy,walked out of the council 
chamber in protestc 3 On the 15th the nine Muslim representa-
tives elected with the support of the Congress Municipal 
Association severed all connection with it. 4 Even Azad 
issued a statement that he opposed the exhumation in 
view of the strength of Muslim sentiment although he stated 
'I have always considered the burial an outrage and shame 
for the Muslim community' v5 
Protest meetings were organised to support the walk-out 
and former Non-Cooperators and Khilafatists such as Abu 
Bakr and Abdur Rauf, a merchant and family friend of Azad, 
joined with conservatives such as the up-country merchant 
Nasir Ahmed, who had issued an anti-Swarajist leaflet in 
1923~ to denounce the 1 Swarajist Corporation 1 , 6 Indeed, 
the British noted that 'the Mohammedan community in general 
have adopted this thorny question as a rallying point for 
resisting Hindus'~7 Muslim frustration was further 
heightened by a spate of communal riots which occurred in 
1 CaJ.cutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1925-September 1925, 
7.5.1925, pp.261-62. 
2Ibid., 14.8 .. 1925, pp.1952-99 .. 
3Ibid. 
4 Statesman, 1925, 15 August, Pc7• 
5Ibidw, 19 August, p.3. 
6Ibid,.,, 25 August, p.5; ibid., 6 October, p.7; Govt of India, 
Ho~e Poll (Dep.), 25 of 1923, November. 
7Ibid,,, 112 of 1925, Septemberv 
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and around Calcutta between July and September in which the 
Hindus undoubtedly trounced the Muslims. The first riot 
occurred. on 3 July when over 2,000 Hindus attacked 200 
Muslims in the Kidderpore dock area over an alleged instance 
' 8 1 of korbani and badly wounded 3 of them. In August the 
congregation of a mosque at Titagarh was soundly thrashed 
for protesting against the music of a passing Hindu 
procession, 2 and later in the same month the lesson was 
repeated by up-country Hindus at Kankinarah. 3 
However, due to the ability of Sen-Gupta to persuade 
his fellow Hindu councillors to shelve the pir burial 
issue, in spite of exhortations to them from newspapers 
such as the Amrita Bazar Patrika to 'stand firm 14 , the 
Muslims were persuaded to return to the Corporation and 
the breach was apparently healed.5 
But by the end of 1925 the attitude of Muslims towards 
the Swaraj Party was irrevocably changed. No longer could 
any aspiring Muslim leader identify himself closely with 
the party. Gone were the days when Muslim nationalist 
sympathisers could safely declare their support for the 
party and attack the more conservative elements within their 
community. As late as December 1924 supporters of the 
Swaraj Party under the direction of Huseyn Suhrawardy and 
Abdur Rauf had. been able to disrupt a conference organised 
in Calcutta by the ex-ministers A .K. Ghuznavi and Nawab 
6 Chowdhury, but by the new year the attitude of the Muslims 
in the city had begun to change. Early in 1925 even Abdul 
Karim, one of the Muslim negotiators of the Das Pact, felt 
1Ibid., Home Poll, 205 of 1926; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1925, 
3 July,p.5; ibid., 4 July, P-2; ibid., 3 October, p.6; 
ibid., 7 September, p.5. 
2Ibid., 25 August, p.5; Mussalman, 1925, 25 August, p.4; ibid., 
27August, po5• 
3Ibid., 1 September, P~ 2; Amrita Bazar Patrika, .1925, 
1 Sept emb er, p. 5. 
4NNR, 1925, 6 October, Amrita Bazar Patrika; ibid.., 4 October, 
.Dainik Basumati. 
5calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1925-March 1926, 
21.10.1925, p.1352. 
6statesman, 1924, 31 December, p.7; Home Poll (Dep.), 25 of 
1924, December. 
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constrained to issue a statement which clarified his 
political position as candidate for the 24-Parganas Municipal 
by;_electi:on. ·-- In<-'-a-=--retter to the Mussalman he stated that 
regarding the announcement in your paper about 
the -.,Swara-jya party having supported my candidature 
in the coming election I have received numerous 
enquiries as to whether I have signed the Swaraj 
creed •••• I have not signed the Swaraj creed. I 
have, however, agreed to vote with the Swarajists 
in matters of general national importance. I have 
been a nationalist ever since I entered politics, 
and this is the chief reason why the Swarajist 
agreed to support me under certain circumstances. 
As regards matters involving communal interests, I 
am under no commitment to any particular party 
and I shall act as a Muslim as well as national 
considerations may require,1 
Karim eventually withdrew from the election and the 
Swarajist candidate Mahabubul Huque did in fact win the 
seat. But the number of votes Huque gained was less than 
the total he received when he unsuccessfully contested the 
seat in 1923, and barely 25 per cent of those entitled to 
vote did so compared with 80 per cent at the previous election. 2 
Huque 1 s victory in September was further qualified by the 
defection of Abdullah Suhrawardy in the previous month from 
the Swaraj Party. The British thought this was due to 
his failure to gain election as Speaker of the legislative 
council after many Hindu Swarajist MLCs refused to fulfil 
their promise to vote for him;J whilst this may have been 
part of his reason no less important a factor must have been 
his assessment of the current state of Muslim sentiment in 
the province, and particularly in his home city of Calcutta. 
Yet further indications of the disillusionment of the 
Muslims of Calcutta with the Swaraj Party were the attempts 
made during 9925 to revive and re-organise the Bengal 
1 Mussalman, 1925, 21 ;Apri+, p~5,. 
2Ibid., 10 September, pDJ; ibid., 17 October, p.J; Bengal 
Govt, Appointments Dept, June 1924, File no .. 6R-4, Frogs 1-14. 
JGovt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 112 of 1925, August~ 
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Presidency Muslim League, the provincial Khilafat Committee 
and the Calcutta Khilafat Committee as organisations to 
defend the interests of the community. 
In August 1924 the president:, secrj:ltary and assistant 
secretary of the Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee had 
resigned to make way for three staunch supporters of the 
Swaraj Party - namely Moulana Akram Khan, Haji Abdur Raschid 
Khan, ancl Mahomed Mohsin Alley - in an attempt to revive 
the organisation by binding it more closely to the Swaraj 
1 Party. With the rapid decline of Muslim support for, 
and faith -in, the Swaraj Party, however, the gambit failed 
and in August 1925 a: further attempt was made to revive the 
2 
committee by Abul Kalam Azad. At the same time moves 
were afoot to revive the Calcutta Khilafat Committee which 
by mid-1925 was not only bankrupt but was under the 
presidency of the dissident Swarajist Abdullah Suhrawardy. 3 
In September 1925 fresh elections were held for the 
position of presid,ent of the Calcutta Committee with Azad, 
Abdur Rauf, Huseyn and Abdullah Suhrawardy and Y.C. Ariff~ 
. 4 
the shadowy but powerful labour leader, as candidates. 
The meeting was attended by several thousand. Muslims and 
apparently broke up in confusion without the election being 
held.5 Later in October Azad, by means of a personal fiat, 
achieved the amalgamation of the provincial and Calcutta 
Khilafat committees, 6 and on 15 November was secretly 
elected the president of the new organisation by a bare 
quorum of committee members.? His high-handed tactics, 
however, did not help his cause and only added to the 
factionalism and intrigue which beset the community at this 
1 Mussalman, 1924; 29 August, p.7. 
2Ibid., 1925, 22 August, p.4. 
3Ibid.., 25 June, p.2; ibid., 10 September, p.4. 
4Ibid., 27 October:, p.J. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., p.4. 
?Ibid., 17 November, p.4. 
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time. The provincial Khilafat Committee in fact quietly 
vanished from the scene after this dispute; the Calcutta 
Khilafat Committee continued as an independent but 
insignificant organisation and. Muslim attention: in the 
city was turned. to the revival of the Presidency Muslim 
League. 
In January 1925 a meeting was convened. of the surviving 
committee members of the provincial league elected. in 1921, 
'to consider how the League might again be an active and 
representative body devoted. to the service of the community' 
under the chairmanship of Abdul Karim. 1 Azad attended this 
2 
meeting but at the next, held in February, he was absent, 
as it was increasingly apparent that the main body of 
support for the revived. organisation came from the more 
vocal critics of the Swaraj Party such as Abdullah Suhraward.y, 
Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Karim, Mahomed. Daud., Fazl-ul Huq 
and. Syed. Nasim Ali - men of diverse political leanings 
united. by a negative attitude towards the nationalist cause 
as preached. by the Swaraj Party. 
Between February and. December 1925 there is no evidence 
available to indicate the nature of steps taken to revive 
the League,but on 6 December a meeting was convened. to 
elect officer-bearers.J Against the background of the 
personal animosities made public by the fiasco concerning 
the Khilafat Committees the meeting was bound to be turbulent. 
About 100 leading Muslims attended. and. Azad.'s candidate, 
Haji Abd.ur Raschid. Khan, was elected. president. However, 
his election was challenged. by Huseyn Suhrawardy and Mujibur 
Rahman, voices were raised. and in the confusion the meeting 
had to be adjourned without the election of a full committee. 
Later evidence indicates that a committee faithful to Azad 
1Ibid.., 20 January, p.2. 
2Ibid.., 19 February, p.4. 
3Ibid.., 8 December, p.6. 
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was elected at some stage but the League as a focus for 
Muslim interest was dead until revived in the 1930s under 
the aegis of Jinnah. 1 
The latter half of 1925 was a period when the Muslims 
of Calcutta began to cast around for a viable alternative 
to the Swaraj Party~ The Corporation disputes, communal 
riots, and failure of the Das Pact to satisfy the heightened 
expectations of Muslims in the city served to alienate 
both the Muslim middle and lower classes in Calcutta. 
1919 the Muslims and Hindus of the city had been linked 
by two different kinds of political activity. Between 
Since 
1919 and 1923 the communities had attempted to work together 
in Gandhi's anti-constitutional nationalist movement~ 
which had involved direct political action by the mass of 
Hindus and Muslims in the city, but this had failed. By 
1923 D.as had recognised the failure of this programme, 
and in December of the same year he attempted to revive 
the political co-operation of the two communities by 
formulating the Das Pact. In essence he replaced Gandhi' Si 
programme of mass action with a formal political agreement' 
which was to operate at the provincial level and within the 
framework of the existing constitutional structure. This 
in turn proved a failure and by the end of 1925 the Muslims 
and Hindus of Calcutta had drilfted even further apart. 
None of the Muslim ministers in the various ministries 
of the period - Fazl-ul Huq, Nawab Chowdhury or A.K. 
Ghuznavi - had widespread power bases in the city, and in 
any case they were tainted by their collaboration with the 
Britishu Feeling against the British still ran high amongst 
the Muslims of Calcutta, so that following their disillusion-
ment with the Swaraj Party they were in fact alienated from 
both the nationalist and moderate streams of political 
activity in Bengal. The result was that leaders of the 
community turned inwards towards a more sectarian view of 
politics and grasped at various patently communal issues 
1Ibidov 1926, 26 August~ p.7; Indian Annual Register, 1926; 
January-June, pp.74-75. 
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in an attempt to achieve some form of organisational unity 
within the political world of Muslim Calcutta. 
The attempted Khilafat and Muslim League revivals 
failed abysmally, but a more popular and nebulous focus 
of Muslim attention in the city was slowly emergingQ The 
answer of Muslims elsewhere in northern India to the Suddhi 
and Sangatham movements had been the development of counter 
Tanzeem and Tabligh movements inspired by the romantic and 
backward-looking Urdu Muslim· concept of the position of 
-
Islam in India. As early as April 1925 the Musf?alman had 
urged the formation of 'a powerful tanzeem and tabligh 
societyQ •• ~immediately to save the Muslim community from 
the impending peril of being swallowed up by the Arya Samaj'. 1 
And in July it reiterated the call when it wrote that: 
We confess that, in 1920 and 1921, we were under 
the impression that the need for communal 
organisations - for communal political organis-
sations at any rate- had ceased •••• But from our 
experience of the past few years - from the fact 
that the educationally and otherwise advanced 
community ••• has thought it necessary to carry on 
their communal propaganda - we have come to the 
conclusion ••• that communal organisations for the 
Mussalmans are indispensible, at any rate for some 
time to come.2 
In May Dr Kitchlew, a prominent north Indian Muslim 
leader and friend of the Ali brothers, organised a meeting 
in Calcutta to urge the formation of a Tanzeem movement 
with the support of Sir Abdur Rahim, Nawab Chowdhury and. 
Abdul Karim.3 In November of the same year, at a meeting 
of up-country Muslim millhands in Howrah, Y.C. Ariff and 
Abdullah Suhrawardy also expounde~:- the need for such a 
communal organisation, 4 but as ~he speeches at this meeting 
indicated the Tanzeem movement was in no sense a political 
1Mussalman, 1925, 23 April, p. 4. 
2Ibid., 23 July, p.4~ 
3Ibid., 20 May, pQ5; Statesman, 1925, 16 May, p.10. 
4 Mussalman, 1925, 1 December; p.2. 
movement or party in the same terms as the Swarajist 
creed or Swaraj Party. In spirit it was aimed at the 
preservation and defence of the culture and religion of 
the Urdu-speaking Muslims of India. It was the emotional 
response of a community which saw itself as fighting for 
existence, and which was also in the process of rejecting 
the leadership of both conservative loyalists and 
nationalist sympathisers. 
Although the speeches at the Howrah labour meeting 
were admittedly the expression of one particular group 
of Muslims, and in part represent the traditional attitude 
of labour organisers amongst Muslims in the Calcutta area 
against involvement in political agitation and intrigue, 1 
they did articulate the disillusionment of Muslims with 
their experience of political parties~ politicians and 
political agitation to date. In his opening speech 
Y.C. Ariff 
referred to the resolution that they had passed 
at a previous meeting to steer clear of politics, 
whether Swarajist or Khilafatist, and said that 
he agreed with them that·they had first to 
improve their economic position_by thrift ••• and 
then to think of politics 
and was followed by an anonymous sirdar who denounced 
politicians and 
said that they, the workers did not want to have 
anything to do with politics or political leaders., 
The political leaders, he said, only sought to 
benefit themselves, arid they did not care for the 
poor workers.2 
One suspects that this general feeling of dissatis-
faction was shared by many Muslims across the Hooghly in 
Calcutta, and it would indeed partly explain the frantic 
search for a new means of communal expression which 
developed in 1925Q That the search failed was made evident 
For an example of this attitude: BLCD, Vol.XVII (4), 2J.J.1924, 
Mahomed Daud~. MLC (Labour): 'Sir, labour wants Mr. Babu and 
Maulvi in the Cabinet, that is, it wants Commoners for its 
interests Q a. though I personally do not approve of dyarchy · 
yet there is no other alternative for me than to support it'. 
2 Mussalman, 1925, 1 December, p.2. 
by the riots which occurred in Calcutta during 1926. They 
were the ultimate expression of the community's disillusion-
m~nt with the Swaraj Party, and of the frustrations 
engendered by the inability and failure of their leaders 
to provide them with an alternative means of expression 
either in the councils of the nationalist movement or by 
way of a united communal political organisation. 
VI 
The mood of the Muslim community in Calcutta during 
the early months of 1926 was one of increasing bitterness 
and frustration. A temporary but sharp increase in the 
price of basic foodstuffs such as rice and wheat caused 
widespread material distress amongst the poorer masses of 
both communities in the' city, 1 whilst the spiritual distress 
of the Muslim middle-class mounted as a result of a fresh 
betrayal by the Swaraj Partyo In December 1925 the 
Government announced its intention to reserve to Muslims a 
larger share of appointments in c13rtain departments. The 
decision differed from one of the promises incorporated in 
the Das Pact only with regard to the time of implementation, 
but the whole scheme was bitterly opposed by Hindu MLCs, 
Swarajist and otherwise, to the chagrin of Muslims throughout 
2 Bengal. 
Throughout the period between January and April 1926 
sentiment within the Muslim community swung irrevocably 
against the Swaraj Party. The Mussalman scorned it as 1 the 
Party which turned out to be inimically disposed towards the 
Mussalmans', 3 and few nationalist sympathisers within the 
1Chowdhury, A.C., Report on an EnguiiT into the Standard of 
Livine of Jute Mill Workers in Ben~a~1930), p.25; Statistical 
Abstracts, 1929 to 1939,pp.42J-24, 442; Buchanan, D.H., ~ 
DevelOJ2~0f CaJ2italist Enter12rise in India (1934),p.J55. 
2 Bengal Govt, Administration ReJ2ort, 1925-26, p.ii. 
JMussalman, 1926, 1 March, p.4. 
community dared voice their sentiments after the mutwalli 
of a mosque in Mechua Bazar called i.n the police to eject 
Azad when he attempted to explain the policies of the Swaraj 
P t t th t . 1 ar y o e congrega 1on. 
The months were also marked by fresh attempts to 
achieve some form of unity within the community. Amongst 
the Muslim merchants and artisans of the city regional and 
cultural organisations such as the Nadia and Dinajpur 
Muslim Associations, and the Tanzeem-ul-Mussalman of Ward 
VIII were established. 2 At a more sophisticated level 
previously inimical leaders such as Huq and Mujibur Rahman 
who had written of Huq in May 1925 that he was 'by his 
very temperament, so fickle and indecisive, so weak and 
invertebrate, so devoid of tenacity and resolutions ••• 
emotional and sentimental 13 - temporarily settled their 
differences. They formed the Bengal Moslem Council Party 
which, although nationalist in sympathies, 'advocated Muslim 
communal demands' 4 very much as did the popular Urdu daily 
the Asr-i-Jadid which claimed that although 'Muslims must 
organise on communal lines, we still, however, want Swaraj 1 .5 
Other Muslim leaders in the city were also casting about 
for a new basis of support 3 and their activities were made 
all the more urgent by the approach of the elections to the 
legislative council at the end of the year. Sir Abdur 
Rahim and his son-in-law Huseyn Suhrawardy secured support 
from many up-country Muslims in Central Calcutta because of 
the interest they took in the Tanzeem-ul-Mussalman of Ward 
VIII, 6 and shortly after the establishment of the Bengal 
1Ibid., 27 April, p.6. 
2Ibid., 4 February, p.3; ibid., 2 March, po6; NNR, 1926, 
1 May,Matwalla. 
3 
Mussalman; 1925, 30 May, p.4. 
4Ibid., 3 March, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 
112/V/1926, April. 
5NNR, 1926, 29 January, Asr-i-Jadid. 
6Ibid., 1 May, Matwalla. 
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Muslim Council Party Rahim issued a manifesto for a rival 
Bengal Muslim Party. In this he claimed that 'it will 
think in detail- for all sections and classes of the people', 
advocated a federal constitution for India and demanded a 
statutory majority share for Muslims in the government and 
1 
administration of Bengal. The basic difference between 
the two parties was in their attitude towards the British 
Rahim remained attached to the British connection whereas 
Huq followed a more strongly anti-British policy patterned 
on that of the Swaraj Party. 
The revival of Muslim communal organisations was, 
however, violently interrupted on 2 April by the first of 
a series of massive communal riots which disrupted life 
in the city for the next six months. As reported by the 
Calcutta police: 
The immediate cause of the rioting was the failure 
of the band of an Arya Samaj procession to cease 
playing their instruments when passing Dinu 
Chamrawallas moque in Harrison Road at the time of 
the Azan or 'invitation to prayer' •••• The passing 
of the mosque at the junction of Harrison Road 
and Central Avenue had been successfully negotiated; 
music had been stopped without difficulty and the 
procession passed in safety. They arrived at Dinu 
Chamrawalla 1 s mosque, however, at the time when the 
muezzin was about to pronounce the Azan.~.and 
silence on the part of the band was again invoked., 
This time, however, the direction was not immediately 
obeyed ••• one drwnmer.; •• continued obstinately to beat 
his drum and •• ~supplied the spark to set off the 
powder train which events of the past few years had 
combined to: prepare .2 
Initiated by up-country Muslims and Hindus the riot 
spread across the city. Muslim boatmen from Kidderpore, a 
thousand strong, attacked strolling Hindus and the police 
post in the Eden Gardens,J mosques and temples in Mechua 
1Indian Annual Registeri 1926, January-June,pp.65-67; ibid., 
July-December, pp.95-98. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll, 11/:XXV of 1926: contains a copy 
of the official police report on the riots. 
Jibid., 11/VII of 1926. 
Bazar and Burra Bazar were defiled and J.ooted, homes and 
shops set alight, inflammatory leaflets were iss.ued by 
both sides and the central areas of the city were given 
1 
over to rampaging mobs intent upon murder and arson. 
Further complications were caused by the fact that 
business people of both communities were introducing 
from outside the province hired professional 
hooligans, called goondas, to protect their houses 
and these ruffians endeavoured to justify their 2 pay by attacking members of the opposite community. 
The most remarkable features of the outbreak were 
the unprecedented attacks on religious institutions and 
the massive outbreak of incendiarism. In none of the 
previous riots in the city had temples, mosques or gurdwaras 
been attacked, yet between April 2 and April 15 some eight 
temples, three _gurdwaras and ten mosques were looted and 
defiled, in addition to which Muslim mobs invaded and 
severely damaged the Presidency College and a nearby Sanskrit 
school. 
The first attack on a religious institution occurred 
in the predominantly Muslim area of Mechua Bazar where a Hind,u 
temple was attacked, its image of Shiva destroyed and all 
portable property removed. The frequency of such outrages 
increased and the next building attacked was a nearby Sikh 
gurdwara which was looted and then destroyed by fire. In 
Ward VII a mob of Muslims attacked a temple dedicated to 
Kali and were only driven off with the help of Bengali Hindu 
students resident in the area. In retaliation Hindus in the 
district mounted a series of destructive raids on Muslim 
institutions, and by the evening of April 3 religious buildings 
belonging to Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Jains were in flames 
throughout the central areas of Calcutta. 
1For a detailed description of the riots see Appendix IV. 
2Lytton, the Earl of, Pundits and Elephants (1942), p.169. 
Roving mobs drawn from all the Indian communities in 
the city were active throughout the period, and in the 
congested lanes and courtyards of central Calcutta and the 
dock areas looting, murder,.desecration and incendiarism 
raged unchecked. Sikh cloth stalls, Marwari homes, Muslim 
workshops, doss houses, temples, mosques, buses, trams and 
moneylenders' offices all fell victim to the mobs who on 
one occasion between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. on April _'3 had 
started more than 50 major fires. 
By April 5 the trouble had extended to the dock areas 
along the riverfront and in Kidderpore. Hindu carters and 
Muslim crane drivers battled it out on the docks and _ghats 
of the city, and in Kidderpore local Hindu residents were 
summoned to the defence of a temple by the loud blowing of 
a conch shell when a nervous priest sighted a mob of some 
2, 000 Muslims who were about to attack the bui1.ding. 
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For the first time in the history of Calcutta,Bengalis, 
both Hindu and Muslim, were also involved in the rioting. 
From the limited reports available 1 it would appear that 
those involved were not outsiders, but rather the residents 
of the areas where the riots took place. The Muslims 
responsible for attacks on Hindu and Sikh religious 
institutions i.n the Mechua Bazar area were the petty merchants 
and artisans who lived in the shadow of the .Nakhoda mosque; 
whilst the mobs who rampaged through Burra Bazar comprised 
Bengali students, Marwari merchants and clerks 9 and the 
up-country Hindu carters and durwans who lived in the area. 
One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the 
police in controlling the situation was their inability to 
make arrests., All too frequently the mobs simply vanished 
into the laneways and bustees of the area, and it was virtually 
impossible for the authorities to gauge whether the assembled 
1The main sources of information on the riots are the various 
government reports a1.ready mentioned in the footnotes and the 
voluminous report included in the Indian Annual Register. The 
reports which appeared in local newspapers are lurid and 
unreliable, and unfortunately the riles of the provincial. 
Judicial and Police Departments, and court files pertaining 
to the prosecution of those arrested during the riots, were 
1 not availab1.e for scrutiny'. 
congregation o.f a loca.l mosque or temple was merely a pious 
gathering or a potentiai mob prepared to ]_aunch itself into 
the streets once more. 
Indeed, the local mosque and temple appear to have been 
the focal poi.nts of communa.l organi.sation during the riots. 
Later investigations which imp.licated Y.C. Ariff and Huseyn 
Suhrawardy reported that they had been seen haranguing the 
congregations of various mosques. Men such as the Peshwari 
brothers, Mina and Allah Baksh, were likewi_se implicated 1 
and it would seem that it was figures such as these prosperous 
up-country Musli.m merchants and moneylenders who emerged as 
the passi.ng .leaders of the mobs; particu.larly when, as was 
the case with the Peshwari brothers, they were figures of 
local importance who as estab.lished merchants, artisans or 
moneylenders played an important role in ward politics and 
were usua:lly on the management committee of their local 
mosque. 
There are no reports avai.l.able to indicate that the 
millhands from the areas which bordered on the city took any 
part in the riots which were confined to the central wards of 
the city and the dock areas. There was no massive invasi_on 
of.' operatives from Howrah or Garden Reach whi.ch indicates 
that the origins of the riots lay in the city itse.lf, and 
which also indicates that there was no overal.l organi sa tionQ 
In 1918 the limited participation of the mi.ll-operatives.had 
been carefully cultivated, yet in 1926 they are absent - a 
point which wou.l.d seem to reinforce the arg·wnent that the 
riots were a localised phenomenon, and that their organisation9 
if any 1 was most.ly restricted to the ward level. 
Order was not restored unti.l the 15th by which time 44 
people - 24 Hindus, ·1 9 Muslims and one of 1 doubtful 
nationa.lity' - had been ki11_ed and _584, mostly up-country 
• 1 H1ndus, wounded. 
1
see footnote 2,p •. l64, source of most o:f the detai.ls concerning 
the riots. 
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The respite was temporary, however. A comp1.ete 
pokisation of the press occurred along communal lines. The 
feel.ing of the Muslim masses that they had been worsted, 
and the refusal of leaders of both communities to accept 
responsibility helped maintain the high level of tension. 1 
So too did the nascent efforts of various groups of 
up-country Hi.nd.us - such as the tough Punjabi. j_amadars aru::l 
2 durwans = to organise in self-defence. The Government 
moved against the worst press offenders and prosecuted the 
Sultan, a Bengali daily edited by Maniruzzaman Islamabadi. 9 
for its provocative articles concerning Marwaris and the 
Hindu Mahasabha, and three other Muslim newspapers~ the 
Hanafi, an Urdu daily, and the Islam Jagat and Muhammadi 9 
both Bengali dailies. The Hindu press was even harder hit, 
and the Amrita Bazar Patrika and four other Bengali Hindu 
dailies felt the lash of official displeasure.3 
Nothing, however, could stem the pent-up frustrations 
of the past few years and on 22 April the second phase of 
rioting exploded when a brawl between rival Muslim and Hindu 
teams of carters in Mechua Bazar developed into a repeat 
performance of the earlier catastrophe. Unlike the earlier 
round of rioting, however, this phase was not marked by 
attacks on religious institutions. Confrontations between 
the two communities took the form of running battles in the 
streets with swords, daggers, .lathis 9 soda-water bottles 
and bricks accounting for most of the casualties. There 
were fewer outbreaks of incendiarism and the spontaneity 
of the earlier riots had vanished to be replaced by a 
determination on both sides to soundly thrash the other.- The 
size of the mobs had increased, and the roving bands of 
1 Lytton, The Earl of, op.cit.; Amrita Bazar Patrika 9 1926 1 
4 April, p.4; Mussalman, 1926, 8 April, entire issue. 
2Govt of Indi.a, Home Poll (Dep.), 112/V/1926, October-November; 
Statesman, 1926, 27 April, p. 7. 
3 see footnote 2, page 164; Statesman, 1926, 18 May, p.S; 
Mussalman, 1926, 22 April, p.4. 
several hundred which had characterised the first phase 
were replaced by larger groups which nwnbered several 
thousand. The scenes of the battles moved from the lanes 
and alleyways of the bazaars to the modern avenues which 
now cut through central Calcutta. 
Peace was again restored on 9 May but this time the 
death toll was even higher with 66 dead and 391 wounded -
the majority of casualties on this occasion were Muslims~ 
Both sides appeared exhausted by the bloodbath, and 
yet more was to come. The Hindu and Marwari communities 
had overcome their initial shock and began to organise in 
retaliation. The Marwaris struck at the Musli.ms through 
an economic boycott by refusing to rent houses or business 
1 premises to them and by dismissing Muslim employees. The 
Commi.ssioner of Police reported in May that: 
the economic communal. boycott which began early 
in April ••• still persists •••• It is reported that 
the Marwaris who have hitherto depended upon local 
Muhammedan dyers have imported a nwnber of Hindu 
dyers from their own country. The boycott of 
Muhammedan bandsmen, tailors, coachmen and syces 
sti.ll continues. 2 
In addition the Hindu Mahasabha began to take a more 
overt stand against Muslim aggression. Throughout June 
leaders of the Mahasabha, such as Malavi.ya and Moonje, 
addressed public meetings in the city and called upon the 
up-country Hindus to organise. On 30 June Malaviya addressed 
a meeting of 6,000 up-country durwans and jamadars 'who had 
taken a prominent role in the previous riots' and urged 
them 1 to be united and to sacrifice even their life for 
religion's sake'; whilst early in the same month Moonje 
urged the members of the Burra Bazar Hindu Sabha to 1 throw 
off their mild manner' towards Islam. 3 
1NNR, 1926, 13 June, Dainik Soltan. 
2 Govt of India, Home Poll, 11/XXIII of 1926. 
3Ibid., 187 of 1927; ibid., 11/V/1926, October-November; Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, 1926, 27 July, p.3; ~alman, 1926, 27 July, 
p.3. 
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Petty incidents of' further communal strife in the 
central areas of the city did little to ease tension in 
Calcutta. An a.lleged korbani incident before a Sikh 
gurdwa:r:,~ late in June, .1 a series of Marwari protests 
organised by Byomkesh Chakravarti 9 former president of the 
provincial. Home Rule League and ironi.cal.ly one of the 
earliest advocates of the communa.l rapprochement 9 against 
police restrictions on the annual Ra;jrajeswari procession 
through Burra Bazar in the same month, 2 and a flood of 
rwnours and leaflets such as one which warned 1 Moslems 
Beware! Otherwise the Hi.ndus will eat you up' 3 helped 
undermine the efforts o:f peacemakers throughout May and 
June, 4 and kept alive the spirit of communa.l hatred., 
An attempt by Malaviya and Sir Abdur Rahim to establish 
a Hindu-Muslim concil.iation board fai.led miserably because 
of the 
total inability of the popular leaders to restrain 
the members of their community. So strong was the 
communal fanatacism that to show moderation was to 
run the risk of losing popular favour, and this no 
leader had either the strength or courage to doc5 
Just as the prosecution of the more offensive communal 
newspapers came too late so too did a Government Order 
issued on 6 June to restrict music before mosques in an 
attempt to remove one of the immediate causes of confl.ict. 6 
The orde,r raised a furore amongst both Hindus and Muslims g 
1Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1926 9 24 ,June, p.5; ibid. 9 26 June, 
p.5; ibid., 27 June, p.5; Govt of India, Home Pol.l (Dep.), 
112/V/1926, J·anuary June:-September. 
2 Statesman, 1926, 2 June, p.7; ibid., 3 June, p.4; ibid .. , 
5 June,p.S. 
3Benga1 Govt, Po.litical Dept, December 1926, File no.12C-13, 
Progs B484-5. 
4 . 4 Statesman, 1926, 1 May, p.7; ibid., 1927 9 23 April, p.1 ; 
ibid.,, 1926, 8 May, p.5. 
5Bengal Govt, Administration Report 2 1925-26 1 p.ix. 
6 Indian Annual. Register 2 1926, July-December, p.84 gives the 
terms of the Government Order, see a.lso Appendix IV. 
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the Hindus and Marwar:is were f'urious at what they described 
as an infringement 1 of their traditional rights' and 
organised a hartal on 3 June when the G.O. was first mooted? 
whilst the Musl.ims claimed that the restricti.ons were too 
limited and that music should be banned comp.letely and not 
1 
only at times of prayer9 
The situation was not helped by a recrudescence of 
communalism within the Corporation, On 2 June~ 64 councillors 9 
Hindu and European 9 demanded that the recent activities of 
the Deputy Mayor should be investigatedo 2 The allegations 
contained in the demand were never made publ.ic, but it 
seems that Huseyn Suhrawardy had indeed played a 
disreputabl.e role in the riots which contradicted his 
proclaimed na tional.is t sympathies, The British authorities 
had in .fact thought of externing him from the province and 
the Commissioner of Police reported that~ 
During the disturbances in April. Mr Suhrawardy? 
like many other people, showed himself to be a 
violent communal partisan. His activities, howeveri 
were distinct from those of others in the first 
place because he was found to be very intimate.ly 
connected with two men of the hoo.l:igan-.leader type 9 
namel.y Mina Peshwari and A.llah Baksh Peshwari.3 
In addition the Commissioner reported that on 3 April. 
Suhrawardy was found at the site of a .looted Hindu shop 'and 
his attitude was such as to create suspicion that he had 
encouraged the looters'; on 13 July he made a vio.lent.ly 
anti-Hindu speech at the house of Sir Abdur Rahim and on 
14 July Suhrawardy and A.l.lah Baksh Peshwari visited Mechua 
Bazar 1 and incited the Mahomedans to resist the procession 
and abused other Mahomedans who sought to dissuade them 1 ~4 
1Ibid., p.89; Amrita Bazar Patrika 1 1926 1 6 Ju.ly, p.5; 
Statesman, 1926, 16 May, p.10; ibidq 9 June, p .. S; ibid., 
3 June, p.4; ibid., 5 June, p.S; Mussa.lman, 1926 9 15 June 1 p.29 
2 Ca.lcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1926-July 1926, 
2.6o1926, PP•394-409e 
3Govt of India, Home Po.ll, 209/26 of 1926. 
4Ibid., the final quote refers to the processi.on which 
precipitated the third phase of the riots., 
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Rumours concerning Suhrawardy' s activi.ties had gai.ned 
widespread publi.c credence by earJ.y May 9 along wi. th other 
simi.J.ar ones concerning the .labour leader Y. C. Ariff and 
the Deputy Executive Officer 9 Haji Abdur Raschid Khan, who 
was also secretary of the provincial Khilafat Commi.ttee. 
Such rumours and accusations drew the exasperated comment 
from the Mussalman thatg 
After the Calcutta riots a crusade against the 
Mussalmans has begun in the Calcutta Corporationo 
The MusJ.im Deputy Mayor must go. The faqir' s 
dead body in the [Municipal Market]Q •• must be 
exhumed and lately the fi.at of the Amrita Bazar 
Patrika has gone forth that Haji Abdur Rashid 
Khan ••• must go because he [is] the Secretary of 
a public body~ viz. the Bengal Provincial Khilafat 
Committee ..... If any Mussalman expects to remain in 
the Corporation he must henceforth be sl.avishly 
subservient to the Hindu majority. 1 
Muslim members of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee 
and the All-India Congress Committee attempted to scotch 
the rumours and appealed to Sen-Gupta to 'calm the communal 
? frenzy' of Hindu Swarajist councillors.- But their position 
was further weakened in the same month when, at the annual 
session of the provincial Congress at Krish:nagar 1 the Das 
. 3 Pact was formally annulJ.ed. Sen-Gupta did in fact oppose 
the move and later managed to get the conference declared 
unconstitutional, but the damage was done., 4 
The result of the allegations agai.nst Suhrawardy in 
the Corporation was the resignation of the enti.re bloc of 
Muslim c ounciJ .. lors, after a monster meeting attended by 
1 Muslim leaders of aJ.l shades of opinion' on 6 June at the 
1 Mussalman, 1926~ 18 May, p.4. 
2Ibid., P•7• 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 112/V/1926, May; Mussalman, 
1926, 25 May, p.6. 
4 Bengal Govt, Administration Re:Qort. 1925-5.£,, p.x. 
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Town Hall. which caLled on them to resi.gn. On 2 June 
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Counc:i1.1.or Shamsuddi.n Ahmed stated in the Corporation 1 that 
he had heard that to be in a mi.nori.ty was a great crime 
but he now found that to be a Mahommedan was a greater crime' 9 
and thereupon led the Muslim cou:ncLllors out of the chamber. 2 
On the 25th the councillors formaLly noti.fi.ed Sen~Gupta that: 
I:n pursuance of the resolution passed. at a public 
meeting of the Muslim rate~payers of Calcutta in the 
Town Hal.l on the 6th .. o .. we hereby send our resignations 
as a protest against the injustice of the non-Muslim 
Council.lors who 1 having taken advantage of the minority 
of the Mahommedan Councillors in the Corporation despite 
our protest, have appointed a Committee of Enquiry into 
the conduct of the Mus.lim Deputy Mayor without framing 
any defi.nite chargesP and also we feel that we can 
serve no purpose by continuing to serve in the 
Corporati.on in such a helpless minority .. 3 
The breach was final1.y healed in August whe:n 9 at a 
secret session of the Corporation 9 the Muslim councillors 
were presented with the evidence against SuhDawardy which 
they apparently accepted.o 4 Face was saved by allowing 
Suhrawardy to resign voluntarily but Hindu and European 
feeling against him still ran highvand when on 19 August he 
attempted. to speak on the riots in the l.egislative council 
the entire Hindu and European bloc = official and non-official 
walked. out.,5 
The immediate result of the Corporation dispute and the 
annulment of the Pact was the closing of Musl.im ranks., The 
communi.ty uni.t ed in early June to protest against the proposed 
impeachment of Suhraward.y 9 and in the same month leaders of 
various facti.ons in the province and city joined with Sir 
Abdur Rahim to form the Bengal Provincial Tanzeem Committee. 
1Mussalman 1 1926, 8 June? p.5. 
2 Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes 1 , April 1926=July 1926, 
2.6.1926, Po399. 
3I:bid. 9 Gazette, Vol .• :IV, 26.6.1926, p.222 .. 
4 I:bid.., 7.8.1926,p.494. 
5
.Indian Annual Register, 1926, .July-December, p. 238. 
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It was intended to be an organisati.on for Musl.ims in Bengal 
on a purely non-pol.i.tical and non-sectarian 
basis [to J retain cominunal. self-respect whil.e 
cultivati.ng friendly relations with s:ister 
communities.~.to eradicate un-Islamic customs and 
habits and to reform mosques and makhtabs.1 
The effect of this feverish affirmation of connnunal 
loya.lties was to precipi.tate the third and final phase of 
the riots which J.asted from 1·1 JuJ.y to 28 Julyo The trouble 
started in central. Calcutta 1 on the occasions of the annual 
~Tagannath Car festival on 11 July, when the embers of the 
Rath Jatra procession of Paikpara were attacked by 
2 Muhannnedans in Duttabagan1 • Fighting spread throughout thE~ 
central wards of the city again. Whilst instances of 
incendiarism and attacks upon religious institutions were 
rarer than in the previous riots the overtones of religious 
conflict were still strong. The worst days of rioting were 
,July 11th, 15th and 21st: the first was the occasion of the 
Jaeanath Car festival, the second the date of the postponed 
Rajrajeswari procession of up-country Hindu celebrants, and 
the last being the great Muslim festival of Mohurram. On all 
three occasions the police had to open fire upon brawling 
mobs of Hindus and Muslims with the result that more than 
~30 rioters were killed and wounded. Throughout the period 
the police and troops were 'frequently faced with the 
necessity of immediately dispersing large crowds of persons 
/ 
who were keyed up to the highest pitch of religious and 
communal frenzy', and whilst they successfully prevented 
f'urther attacks on religious buildihgs, by the time law and 
order had been estab.lished the last phase of ri.ots had 
claimed some 28 dead and 226 wounded., 
1Bengal Provincial. Tanzeem Committee, Aims and Objects (1926), 
reference by courtesy of Dr Hossainur Rahman. Amongst those 
present were Abu Bakr, AoK. Ghuznavi, Mujibur Rahman, Ghulam 
Jilani Khan, A- & H.S. Suhrawardy, Abdul Kari.m, Syed Nasim 
Ali, A.K. Fazl-ul Huq, Y.C" Ariff and Maniruzzaman Islamabadio 
2Govt o:f I:ndia, Home Poll, 11 /XXV of 1926. 
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By July 28 the great communal riots in Calcutta 
were vi.rtuaJ.ly over; further minor outbreaks occurred in 
September and October at K.idderpore and in the area of 
1 Mechua Bazar, but both sides were exhausted and the city 
settled into a sullen peace so that by mid-October the 
Commissioner of Police could report to New De:lhi that 
'communal feeling appears to have improved appreciably and 
2 
all armed pickets have been withdrawn from the streets'. 
Indeed, on the occasion of Durga Puja in Calcutta on 
October 18 over 4oo Hindu processions moved peacefully 
through the city without incident, and the sight of the 
Nawab of Murshidabad and Maharaja Tagore driving together 
through the streets of central Calcutta provoked an enthusiastic 
response from the milling crowds. 3 
The contrasts between the riots of ·1918 and 1926 are 
striking. AdmitteC:ly on both occasions the :up-country 
Muslim and Hindu millhands of the contiguous industrial 
townships were notable only for their absence but here the 
similarity endso The economic motivations o.f 1918 were not 
present, and from the first instance the pattem of the riots 
was distinctly religious~ Marwari, Hindu, Sikhf Jain, 
Benga.li, Punjabi, Bihari - all were involved in the riots 
which were centred upon the destruction of individuals and 
property belonging to the opposing religious group. Little 
of this had occurred in 1918, just as the participation of 
Bengalis - Hindu and Muslim - had been minimal; but in 1926 
religion and not race had been the primary factor in the 
riots. Certainly the role of the Bengalis diminished after 
the first phase when their temples and mosques had been 
indiscriminately subject to attack. With the decline of 
1 Statesman, 1 926, 7 September, p. 8; Amri ta Bazar Patrika, 
1926, 19 October, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 
112/V/1926, January, June-September. 
2Ibid. , Home Poll., 11 /XXIII of 1926. 
Jibid. 
overt attacks on religious institutions the main participants 
in the riots were up~country settlers in the city 9 as can be 
seen from the spread of the riots which rarely extended 
beyond the bounds of Wards VII=XI and ward XXV - the main 
centres of up-country settlement. Those most actively 
involved were in fact inhabitants of the city who responded 
to inf.luence from beyond the borders of Benga.l. and to tensions 
peculiar to the urban environment. Indeed~ Huseyn Suhrawardy 
quite clearly stated in May 1926 that the Muslim quarrel was 
not with the Bengali Hindus but rather 1 with Marwaris, 
Hindusthanis and Arya Samajists 1 o 1 Again un.like 1918 
economic motives are hard to find; certainly there were 
instances of looting and Marwari wealth attracted the 
animosity of many, but in spirit the riots of 1926 were 
much more communal. with murder rather than loot as the main 
goal of the rampaging crowds of petty merchants, shopkeepers 9 
hawkers and artisans who fought in the streets of the city. 
The riots were in fact a purely urban and non-Bengali 
? phenomenon- the mofussil remained relatively quiet,- as 
did the transient population of the mill areas. Perhaps 
the best summary of this fact was given by the local 
authorities when they wrote after the riots in an attempt to 
detail their causes th~t 
the coming elections~ the ever increasing 
competition among the middle-classes for that kind 
of employment of which Government employment forms 
so large a part, the growing claims of Muhammadans 
to take such a share in that employment as is 
justified by their advancement in education and 
their political needs, the attempt to create a 
united Mahomedan party, and the necessity felt by 
the SwaraJya party to retain in their ranks as many 
Mahomedans as possible 9 all of these factors in the 
situation combined to create a desire in the mind 
of the respective leaders to secure a following 
1NNR, 1926, 1 May, MatwaLla. 
2Throughout 1926 there were a series of communa_l disturbances 
in various parts of the mofussil precipitated mainly by Suddhi 
and Sangathan organisations, and conf.lict between Muslim 
peasants and Hindu_ l.and.lords and moneylenders. The riots in 
Calcutta did not a1.ter the pattern of communal conflict in the 
mofussil appreciably: Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.) 1 
112/V/1926, .:.eassi!_l!Q 
And that 
among the masses 9 such as can only be attracted 
by appeals to the aggresslve slde of thelr 
rellglous emotlons.1 
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the general c.leavage between the two communities 
has been further emphasised and increased by the 
various communal movements which have been organised 
during the past two years. The most important of 
which is the Suddhi movement ••• by the formation.,. 
of the League for the protection of Hindu women ••• 
the implications of which are obvious 1 and the 
activities of the Cow Protection League •••• And also 
by the Das Pact which served on.ly to increase the 
cleavage 9 si.nce it deprived the Hindus of a number 
of posts 9 to which they believed themselves to be 
rightly entitled 1 and since it could not be brought 
into effect sufficiently speedily and completely 
satisfy the Muhammedans.2 
The riots were an expression of the depth of despair 
into which the Musli.ms of Calcutta had been plunged by 
their inability to come to terms with the numerically and 
economically dom:tn.ant communities .in the city. They lived 
in Calcutta yet had no strong voice in the affairs of the 
city or community of :interest wi.th thei.r co-re.ligi.onists in 
the mofussile Some li.nk. with their co-religionists in the 
mofussil may have increased their sense of identification 
with Benga.l and undermined thei.r reliance upon the Muslims 
of the northern Gangetic regions of India for a sense of 
commlllal identity which tragically involved the transference 
of prdb.lems peculiar to that region to the urban environment 
of Calcutta. 
VII 
Throughout the remaining months of 1926 the Hindus and 
Muslims of Calcutta prepared for the elections to the Bengal 
Legislative Council due in November. The Hindu nationalist 
1Govt of India, Home Poll, 209/26 of 1926. 
2Ibid., 11 /XXV of 1926. 
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press adopted a surprisingly concil.i.atory tone towards the 
Muslims no doubt in an attempt to win some support for the 
1 Swaraj Party. In the Corporation also Sen-Gupta attempted 
to dampen Muslim hostility by hushing up the Suhrawardy 
dispute, and by firmly squashing attempts by some Hind~, 
councillors to re-open the question of the pir burial. 
But the overtures of the Swaraj Party were in vain. 2 
After 1 a heated discussion' in September, the Bengal. 
Provincial Khilafat Committee in a fi.nal burst of activity 
rescinded a previous motion that Muslims should stand as 
Congress candidates, 3 and support for distinctly Muslim 
political parties mounted. Not only were Huq's Bengal 
Musl.im Council Party and S:ir Abdur Rahim's Bengal Muslim 
Party supporters canvassing Muslim votes but the Suhrawardy 
family, Abdur Rauf and Mujibur Rahman - who had split with 
Huq for some unknown reason - had formed yet another party, 
the Independent Muslim Partyo 4 Al.l three parties based their 
e.lection stand on opposition to the Swaraj Party., In 
supporting the Independent Muslim Party the Mussalman warned 
its readers to 'Beware of Muslim Swarajists 1 and to 'Vote 
for I.M.P. candidates. They are s.lavish neither to Hindus 
nor Bureaucracy!'S A similar .line was followed by Huq's 
supporters but ironically both parties were weakened by the 
suspicion of many Muslims regarding the previous Swarajist 
connections of their candidates~ many of whom were suspected 
of only having resigned .from the Swaraj Party to contest the 
el.ection fol.l.owing which 1 they were said to want to rejoin 
the fo]_d 1 • 6 Conversely it was reported that Sir Abdur Rahim's 
1NNR, 1926, October-November, passim. 
2Calcutta Corporati.on, Gazette, Vol.IV, 18.9.1926, p.770. 
:3Mussalman, ·1926, 16 September, po3• 
4Ibid., 2 September, p.4; i.bid., 29 September, p.4D 
5Ibid., 6 November, p.S. 
6Govt of India, Home Po.ll (Dep.), 112/V/1926, January, cTl.me-
September. 
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hand was strengthened 'not through attachment to the British 
but through hostility to the Hindus' • 1 
So strong was Muslim feeling in Cal.cutta against the 
Swaraj Party, many of whose Hindu candidates campaigned 
under slogans such as 'Hinduism in Danger' and 1 The Pact is 
the same thing as Cow-Killing 1 , 2 that Huq's party being the 
least communal. in tone virtually vanished from the Calcutta 
scene before the elections which developed into a straight 
out battle between the candidates of the Independent Muslim 
Party and the Bengal_ Muslim Party. In Calcutta there was 
only one Swaraj Party candidate for both North and South 
Calcutta,namely Abdur Razzack the Corporation councillor. 
In North Calcutta Sir Abdur Rahim soundly defeated Razzack 
and two independent candidates by securing 641 of the 648 
votes polled, whi.lst in South Cal.cutta Huseyn Suhrawardy gained 
\' 
728 votes compared with 182 for Rahim's. candidate Shamsul 
3 Huq and 2 for Abdur Razzack. In the Muslim seats surrounding 
Calcutta the Swaraj Party put forward two candidates -
Mahabubal Huque in 24-Parganas Municipal, and Qutbuddin 
Ahmed in Hooghly cum Howrah Municipal, the first being the 
previous inc·wnbent and the second because of his reputed 
sway over the trade uni.on movement" Both were soundly 
defeated by independent candidateso 4 
Admittedly the polling percentages in Calcutta were low, 5 
but the fi.gures did reveal a compl.ete rejection of the Swaraj 
Party on the part of the Muslims of the city. Support for 
the Suhra.wardy and Rahim factions may not have been 
overwhelming, and the commlm:i ty was still divided by personal 
1Ibid., April .• 
2 Huque, M. Azizul, A Plea for Separate Electorates in Bengal 
( 1 9 3 1 ) ' pp. 6-7. 
3BLCD, Vol.XXV, 11~3.1927; Statesman, ·1926, 19 November, p.7. 
4 6 Ibid.; ALCC Papers, 192 , 
gained ·18 votes and GhuJ.am 
Ahmed gained 379 votes and 
File no.G-52 (:ii); Mahabubal Huque 
Hussain Shah gained 544; Qutbuddin 
A.R. Sattar gained 826. 
5North Calcutta: 32 per cent; South Calcutta: 39 per cent. 
rivalries 1 and the absence of any finn set of political 
convictions 9 but the break with the mainstream of the 
nati.onal.ist movement and the collapse of the communal 
rapErochement in Calcutta was complete~ 
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1 E.g~ Rahim's candidate for 24-Parganas Rural - Ghulam Jilana 
Khan, hide: mercnant and Corporation dounci.ll.or - was defeated 
by A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, another hide merchant, a supporter 
of' A.K. Ghuznavi whQ... led a dissident faction in Rahim's party 
_:whicli differed hot in princip.les but in support for Rahim's 
l.eadership: Mussa.lman, 1926, 27 November, p.5. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STRUGGLE FOR MUSLIM UNITY, 1926 TO 1932 
18~ 
Muslim sentiment in Calcutta following the elections of 
November 1926 is best il .. lustrated by two events early in 
1927: namely the controversy concerning the formation of a 
provinci~l ministry early in January 9 and the elections to 
the Calcutta Corporation i.n the fol.lowing ApriJ .• 
The ministerial controversy involved the arch-rivals 
Sir Abdur Rahim and A.K. Ghuznavi 9 el.der brother of A.H. 
Ghuznavi and a weal.thy ,zamindar from east Benga.l. During 
the e.lections Rahim had taken fu.ll advantage of the .legacy 
of bitterness left by the Ca.lcutta riots 9 and appealed to 
1 the Mus lim el.ectora t e on a distinctly communal. p.latformc 
The result was a sweeping victory for his party, which 
gained a majority of seats i.n the legislati.ve council. 2 
However, Rahim's influence over the Muslim MLCs was not 
complete; his sori~i.n-law Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy had 
opposed him during the elections as had a coterie of 
~legisl.ators under A.K. Ghuznavi .. 
In January the Governor, Lord Lytton, invited Rahim 
to f'orm a ministry 9 but to gain a working majority he needed 
the support of the Muslim and non-Swarajist Hindu MLCs, 
and this he was unable to secure., Rahim's role as arch-
communal.:ist had alienated Hi.ndus of al.l factions and the 
Hindu press launched a vitriolic campaign against him: the 
Ananda Bazar Patri.ka warned the Muslims that 'no sel.f-
respecting H:indu member of the Council will. agree to become 
his colleague 1 9 ·
3 whilst the Dainik Baswna ti threatened that 
1 the Hindus wi.l.l 9 by no means~ tolerate 'Rahim Raj' in 
Bengal. 1 • 4 W:ithin four days Rahim was forced to admit defeat 
1Bengal Govt, Appoi.ntments Dept, February 1928, File no. 
6R-77 (1-5) of 1928, Progs A1-5. 
2 . 
Broomfield, J., op.cit., p.280. 
3NNR, 1927, 21 .January, Ananda Bazar Patrika. 
4Ibid., 23 January, Dai.nik Basumati. 
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and the Hindu press was jubi.lant. The Governor then 
approached Ghuznavi. who managed to form a ministry with the 
support of the former Swaraji.st Byomkesh Chakravarti" 
In Calcutta the Musl.ims :interpreted Rahim's defeat as 
an instance of Hindu communalism, and they were i.nfuriated 
by the appointment of Chakravarti whose involvement with 
the Hindu Mahasabha during 1926 was well known. Ghuznavi's 
action served only to turn the lukewarm support Rahim had 
received from the city's electors at the November polls 
into widespread sympathy. Apart from his own newspaper, 
the Hanafi, 1 previously critical journals such as the 
Asr-e-Jadid, Soltan and Mussalman added their voices to the 
chorus of protest which greeted Rahim's resignation. 2 In 
addition Mujibur Rahman and Maniruzzaman Islamabadi, both 
former Congressmen, joined with other leading Muslims in 
the city, during ,January and February, to protest against 
the political defeat of the man many of them had opposed 
at the recent eJ.ecti.ons. 3 Muslim students demonstrated in 
vari.ous parts of the city in February and March against 
the 1Ghuz-Chak' ministry, 4 and on 8 February a massive 
crowd of _'50,000 Musl:ims gathered near the Town Hall to 
listen to a panel of speakers~ led by Mujibur Rahman, 
denounce Ghuznavi and aJ.so Huseyn Suhrawardy who supported 
him .. 5 
In the hour of his defeat Rahim had accomplished the 
seemingly impossible feat of uniti.ng the Muslim community 
behind one political leader to an extent that had never 
been achieved before. Indeed, for several months he rode 
a wave of immense popular support; but it was a negative 
1Ibid., 31 ,January, Hanafi. 
2Ib. d 21 J 1 .• , , arruary, 
Asr-e-Jadid; ibid., 
1 February, p.5. 
3Ibid. 
Soltan; ibid., 2.5 January, Soltan, 
29 ,January, Soltan; Mussalman, 1927, 
4Ibid.; ibid., 8 February, p.,_'5; ibid., 1 March, p.4; 
Statesman, 1927, 22 February, p.10. 
5Mussalman1 1927, 8 February, p.5. 
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support based on anti-Hindu sentiment which proved too 
ephemeral to provide a lasting bond between the divergent 
Muslim political factions which rallied to his defence. 
And by the end of 1927 facti. onali.sm had one e more destroyed 
the unity of Muslim politics in Bengal. o Personal antipathy 
between Rahim and other Muslim leaders was in part responsible 
for this; but so too was the convo.luted poli tieing of Rahim 
himse.lf, and the absence of any basic politica1 philosophy 9 
communal or otherwise, wi.thin the community in Ca1.cutta 
and Bengal at large. 
The immediate effect of the anti-ministerial agitation 
in Calcutta was to revive the bitter tensions of the ri.ots 
of the previous years., Rahim was hai.led as a hero and 
when he resigned in April from the legislative council in 
protest against police action in Ponabalia~ east Bengal 9 
which involved the death of several rioting Muslim peasants, 
his protaganists in the city gained another opportunity to 
show the strength of Muslim feeling. At a huge public 
meeting on the Maidan, Fazl.-ul Huq and Mujibur Rahman 
joined with him to attack the ministry, 1 and, when it 
survived a vote of no-confidence in the legislative council, 
the Mussalman wildly denounced Ghuznavi 1 s supporters as 
1 The Shameless Betrayers Who Muslim Bengal Will Not Forget 1 • 2 
The tangled web of Muslim politics in Bengal at this 
time is difficult to unravel. The ministerial controversy 
had precipitated an un1.ikely al.liance between Sir Abdur 
Rahim, Fazl-ul Huq and Mujibur Rahman against the Ghuznavi 
ministry - which was also opposed by the Swaraj Party~ In 
Calcutta Rahim undoubtedly had the support of the Mus.lim 
mercantile and professional middl.e-cl.asses, for he stood as 
the champion of Muslim aspirations against both the 
entrenched Bengali Hindu upper-classes and; for the moment, 
more moderate leaders such as Ghuznavi who sought to work 
1Ibid., 10 March, p.5. 
2Ibid., 15 March, p.5. 
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in co-operation with non-Swarajist Hindus and. the Imperial 
authorities. Once in the opposition, however, there was 
a subtle change in Rahim's political manoeuv,ering. At 
one level he was a martyr at the hands of' Hindu communalists, 
yet at another he was the pragmatic politician who was 
prepared. to seek allies in any quarter to accomplish ·the 
destruction of' the much hated ministry. 
The Corporation elections of' April 1927, and the 
subsequent by-election in north Calcutta, when Rahim 
regained his seat in the legislative council, are the best 
indicators of' the tortured policy he attempted to follow. 
Shortly bef'ore the municipal elections Rahim organised. 
the Muslim Councillors Associatien with the support of 
Mujibur Rahman, editor of' .the MYssalman, and Abul Kasl!lm, 
Huq 1 s friend who had supported Rahim against the Suhraward:y 
family in the November 1926 elections. 1 The Association 
gained the support of' ten councillors, 2 all of' whom were 
re-elected, and sponsored. four other candidates ... 
K. Noorudd.in, brother-in-law of' Khwaja Nazimud.d.in a wealthy 
east Bengali aristocrat and. zamind.ar, and. thrae merchants: 
Mahomed. Ali Khan, Mahomed. Raf:f'ique and. Munshi Ramjan Ali 
Khan. Obviously Rahim was not ·u.n.aware of' the political 
changes wrought in Calcutta during the previous decade 
for the Association was deliberately organised. to secure 
the support of Muslim groups in Calcutta which had. becom~ 
politically conscious in the years since the Great War,, 
In particular Rahim sought to conciliate the up-country 
Muslim mercantile groups of' Meohua Bazar and. central 
Calcutta, hence the nomination of four candidates from this 
I 
area. Such men were the representatives of groups which had. 
shown their :first signs of' political consc:i.ousness during 
the pre-war agitation concerning the Balkan Ware, and who 
1 Ibid.., 22 March, p.4; NNR, 1926, 11 September, Dainik Sol!!.n• 
2
unsud Dowla, Dr M. Hossain, Sheikh Kerim Bux, M. M.ahomed 
Hashem, M.M. Huq, M. Abd.ur Razzack, Shamsul Huq, S.M. Yakub, 
Ghulam Jilani Khan, M. Solaiman (who had. replaced. S.M.S. 
Rahman when he died. in 192.5). 
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subsequently had taken more vociferous and sophisticated 
roles i.n the riots of' 1918 and the nationa.list agitation 
which followed. The early 1920s had seen the 1 politicisation1 
of the Mus.lim mercantile and artisan groups o.f central 
Calcutta - no longer were they a si.lent majority who could 
be readily discounted. Rather they were a politically 
conscious and experienced conglomeration of groups whose 
awareness had been extended from the group to the community 
by the poli tica.l apprenticeship of the last ten years., 
The four candidates put forward by the Muslim 
Councillors' Association secured election without diffi.culty, 
whereas the four Muslim connci.llors who refused to join 
Rahim's Association were defeatede 1 Three independent 
candidates also fought the elections, but only one, a 
prominent physician Dr s.z. Ahmed, was el.ectedi .Mahomed 
Ishaque, a lecturer in oriental languages at Calcutta 
nniversi ty, and Mahabubul Huque 1 a MLC suspected of l.eanings 
2 towards the Swaraj Party, were defeated. In May council.lor 
Ghulam Jilani Khan, a member of the Muslim Councillors' 
Association, died suddenly and his seat was gained by 
another nominee of Rahim - Mahomed Akbar. Popularly called 
the 1 Frui. t King of Cal.cutta 1 Mahomed Akbar was reputed to 
be 1 the wealthiest Peshwari fruit merchant in the city 1 ,J 
and exerted consi.derabl.e influence amongst the up-conntry 
Muslim stall.holders who sold frui. t in the munici.pal markets 
and bazaars of Calcutta. In additi.on, as a leading member 
o:f the Peshwari commnnity in the 
I 
city, he was a vital means 
of contact for Rahim with the Punjabi. and Pathan settlers 
:in the central wards who held an important share i.n money-
lending, carting and the leather trade" 
1 Dr K. Ahmed, Abdul Halim, S.MoZo Huque, Shamsuddi.n Ahmed. 
2Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.V, 5.Ju1927, p.650; 
ibid., 19.J.1927, pp.76J,800. 
3statesman, 1927 1 15 May, p.10. 
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One noticeable feature of the Corporation elections 
was the apparent absence of involvement on the part of 
Rahim's main rivals - the Ghuznavi and Suhrawardy :families. 
In January Huseyn Suhrawardy and Abdu.l Karim had unsuccess-
f'ully attempted to organise a body of candidates for the 
elections, 1 but apart from that brief burst of activity 
there is no evidence of participation by members of either 
f'amily ~ In part this can be explained by thB nature o:f 
the support the Suhrawardies and Ghuznavies had in the 
citys and the personal antipathy which ex.i.sted between 
Rahim and his son-in-law Huseyn Suhrawardy who had 
justified his support :for A.K" Ghuznavi on the grounds that: 
Sir Abdur Rahim has declared to all. possible 
political people that he could not, on any 
account, co-operate with me or with the members 
o:f my partyo2 
In November 1926 Huseyn Suhrawardy had been elected 
MLC :for South Calcutta, and, in ;January 1927~ Y.C" Arif:f 
won the Calcutta regional Muslim seat to the Imperial 
Legislative Assembly with the support o:f Abdullah Suhrawardy. 
Ari:f:f 1 s rival, Mahomed Ra:f:fique, had been sponsored by 
Rahim and was compensated :for his defeat with a seat in the 
Corporation. From the results of these elections it would 
appear that the Suhrawardies main base o:f electoral support 
c,omprised the smaJ,l and wealthy mercantile and pro.fessionaJ, 
sections of the Muslim community in Calcutta who :formed the 
electoral body to the legislative assembly~ and the 
majority o:f enfranchised Muslim electors to the legislative 
council in the southern areas o:f the city~ 
During the riots of 1926 Huseyn Suhrawardy had exerted 
some measure o:f influence over the Muslim mobs of central 
Calcutta;J but this proved ephemeral and appears to have 
1 Mussalman~ 1927, 1 January, p .. 7" 
') 
"'Ibid., 12 February~p. 7: the party IL Suhrawardy refers to 
is the Independent Muslim Party. 
3Benga.l Govt, Police Dept~ March 1926, F'ile rw.Po31-9 (1-J), 
Progs A26-28~ 
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been valid only in the absence of' l.eadership from the more 
prosperous merchants and artisans of the areac Once ~he 
riots were over and normal. conditi.ons bad been re-established 
mob orators and the .leaders of the moment passed from the 
scene, and the traditional voices of authority within the 
sub-communal groups reappeared. Indeed, the November 
elections and later the Corporation elections reaffirmed 
the fact that the more prosperous Muslims in this area were 
supporters of Rahim's brand of constitutional communalism 
rather than of Suhrawardy 1 s ephemeral mob poli.ticing. The 
position of the Ghuznavi fami.l.y was somewhat different; 
they were based in east Bengal. and, apart from the indirect 
influence the family exerted through its connect:ion with 
the Suhrawardies, it had no distinct power base in Calcutta. 
At the time therefore the Suhrawardy sphere of influence 
extended over the professi.onal and weal thi.est mercanti.l.e 
sections of the Muslim community in the city; whilst Rahim, 
temporarily at least, had the support of the recently 
' politi.cised mercantile and artisan lower classes. In 
addition since the ministerial controversy Rahim had been 
the focus of Musl.im. attention and sympathy in the province 
to the ex.cl.usi.on of mos.t other Musl.im. leaders of any 
prominence, including Huseyn and Abdul.lah Suhrawardy. 
The north Calcutta by-election in May ·1927 further 
illustrates the nature of Rahim's support in the city and 
his political tactics. Rahim was faced with two opponents 
Y.C. Ariff 1 MLA 9 who was supported by the Suhrawardies, 
and Sheikh Abdul Wahab a relatively insignificant merchant 
who stood as an independent. In the final count Rahim. gained 
572 votes against 175 cast for Ariff and a meagre 4 for 
Wahab in an election where barely 44 pe:r: cent of the registered 
e.lectors po:lled. 1 Shortly afterwards Ariff and Wahab issued 
a joint petiti.on agai.nst Rahim. 1 s elect:ion, and aJ.leged that 
he had gained the seat by means of 'corruption and bribery 1 , 2 
1 Statesman, 1927, 4 May, p.9; ibid., 8 May, p .. 9" 
2Bengal Govt, Appoi~tments Dept, February 1928 9 File no.6R-77 
of 1927, Progs 1-5~ 
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SpecificaLLy they charged that prior to the Corporat:ion 
e.lect:ions Rahim had entered :into an agreement .for mutual 
su.pport wi.th var:i.ous Mus.lim c ounc:i..ll.ors ::J.nd wou.J d.-be 
counc:Ll .. lors? had r br]J:ed 1 Mahboob Al.l.ey to withdraw his 
candidature to the seat t-:'or north Calcutta~ threatened. 
various el.ec tors wi.th v:i.ol.ence s and had tried to induce 
Ari.ff to withdraw from the contest on the u..n.derstand.ing 
that Mahomed Raffique would cancel his peti.tion against 
Arif"f' s el.ection to the Imperial. Legis.J.ative Assemb.lye The 
allegations agai.nst Rahim were dismissed but in retrospect 
one suspects that more than a grain of truth was contained 
in them. 
The ministerial controversy stirred Calcutta at a 
time when memories of the riots were sti.J.l fresh and communal 
relationB in the city were tenseo The .loca1 Hindu press 
had reverted to its provocative comments once the el.ections 
1 
were over 1 and in December 1926 bitterly attacked Muslims 
in general. as re sponsi.bJ.e for the assassination of Swami 
Shradhanand 9 the leader of the Arya Samaj 9 in northern India. 2 
In January the l.eaders of' the Musl.im c anununity were assai.led 
as 1 Hi.ndu haters' 9 'murderers' and the 1 instigators of all 
ri.ots' , and :it was cl.aimed. that they were p1.anning to 
establish a Musli.m ra,j and forcib.ly convert the Hi.ndus of 
3 Benga.l. The Hindu communi.ty ln Calcutta was ca1led upon to 
organise in self-defence, and Shrad.hanand was extolled as a 
martyr for the H:i.nd.u cause., On ,January ·1 MaJ.av:iya and Gandhi 
cha:ired a meeti.ng at Burra Bazar at which 50 9 000 rupees was 
pledged for a memorial. to Shradhanand; 4 and :Later in the 
month Shamsud.d.:i.n A:luned. earned the condemnat:ton o.f the Hindu 
1NNR, 1927, 21 Decem.ber 9 1926 9 ~tr:ik.a9 et al. 
2 Ibi.de ~ 25 December 1926 9 Ananda Bazar Patri.k.a~ Da:inik Baswnativ 
Viswami.tra; :ibid., 28 December 1926 9 Vo teranga 9 Hindu Sabha, 
Swat antra. 
3Ib. - J. J..d.~ 9 • anuary, passim. 
4 Mussa.lman~ 1927~ 1 ,January, p.J., 
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:i.:r1 the Corporation that 'the 
Sw-ami_ 1vas not a natio:naJ. 1.ead.er but a comml:tnal leader and 
·) 
that was the :feeling of the Mahommedan community' ...... 
The Corporation ignored Muslim sentiment 9 however, and 
early in February named a park a:fter Shradha:nand - a man 
the Mu.hanunadi described as a 'murderer and assassin o:f 
'3 MuJ1ammedans 1 • • The ~lme_:g complained that 1 Muslim 
:fee:li.ng had been trampled underfoot [and that] rank 
communalism was rampant in the Corporation'~ 4 However, there 
was little that the Muslims could do and this incident plus 
the ministeria.l controversy sent a :fresh surge of anti-Hindu 
sentiment through the conunun:i.ty i.n Calcutta. Rahim 
capitalised this feeling into direct support for himself 
through the medium of' the Mu.slim Councillors Association and 
the Bengal Provincial Tanzeem Committee, which he and 
Mujibur Rahman revived in mid-April .• 5 The conuni ttee seems 
to have been of short duration but ±~or a few months at 
least it charulelled the anti-Hindu :feeli:ng o:f its several 
thousand up-country Muslim members from central Calcutta 
into a forma.l organisation under the direct control of 
Rahim. By mid-1927, however, Rahim's popularity had begun 
to wane, and the unity he had imposed on his community 
dissolved with the re-emergence of various antipathetic 
political :factionsu 
1 Ibid~, 22 ,January, p.4a 
2Calcutta· Corporati.on, '.Minutes', October 1926-Maroh 1927, 
12o1.27, pp.2069-71o 
3NNR, 1927, 11 .January, M~,?.dio 
lj. 
Mussalman, 1927, J February, p.5. 
28 Apr:il, 
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II 
In part Rahim's fail.ure to nnite the Muslims of Bengal 
behi.:nd one J.eadsr was due to his political opportnnism, 
which negated any po:ii tical programme he may have ,c.laimed 
to possess. Following the installation of the Ghuznavi 
ministry he .had gai .. ned the support not only of the more 
extreme connn.una]_ists with:in hi.s commun:ity, but also of the 
:p_ationa.list sympathisers because of his proc1.aimed policy 
of 1 const:i. tutional obstruction to the present Government'. 1 
He had posed as the champion of Muslim opposition to the 
bureaucracy and Hi.ndu c ommnna1.ists, but in September 1927 
he per:formed a volte face. 
The 'Ghuz-Ghak' ministry finally succumbed to the 
attacks of its Musli.m and Hindu opponents in~August, and 
in September Nawab Musharraf Hussain, an east Bengali 
landowner and friend of Rahim, formed a ministry with 
P .c. Mitt er, a Hindu J.andowner and former supporter of the 
moderate politician Sir Surendranath Banerjea. Rahim 
gave the ministry his blessi.ng and immediately earned 
the condemnation of many of his co-religionists.. In 
Calcutta Mu.jibur Rahman and Fazl-ul. Huq attacked him for 
siding with the bureaucracy, and his influence amongst the 
up-country merchants and artisans of the city suffered a 
sharp deci.ine. 2 .Anti-British sentiment was rampant amongst 
the Musl.i.m masses of the city, and Rahim's support of a 
ministry which not on1.y included a prominent Hindu landowner, 
but which was a1.so pl:edged to support the bureaucratic 
s·ystem, shattered his image as the guardian of Muslim 
i.nterests and opponent of the bureaucracy. He was assailed 
by the press of both conununi.ties as the eminence grise of 
Bengali politics, 3 and h~.s influence within Calcutta was 
severely reduced. 
1 Statesman, 1927, 4 May, p.9. 
2 Mussalma_g, ·1927, 27 September, Po5. 
3Ibid.; NNR~ 1927~ 21 Sept~mbe_~-ll. Amrita Bazar·Patrika; ibid., 
23 September, Soltan; ibid., 29 September 1 Muhammadi. 
The Mu.sharraf Hussain ministry lasted. barely nine 
months before it too co:Llapsed. 9 and. the refonned. consti-
ution was suspended. The constitution was revived. later 
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in 1927 9 but the pattern of shortlived ministries continued.~ 
However 9 the instabiJ.i ty of ministries after 1926 was not 
a new d.eve:l.opment. What was unique was the dominant role 
played by the Mus:lim b:l.oc in the l.egis1.ative council after 
1 926 9 and the po.l.i.cy of" rural reform pursued by all the 
ministries. 
These developments were aided by two factors: namely 
the growing cohesiveness of the Muslim bloc, at least on 
matters pertai.ni.ng to rural reform in which communalist 
and Nationali.st Musl.ims shared. a common interest; and. the 
realisati.on of Musl.im politicians in the council that 
they could gai.n a majority of votes with the support of the 
represe:ntati.ves of' the depressed. class Hindu peasantry 
who were also interested in rural re:fonn. 
The tragedy of these years lay in the fact that throughout 
Bengal. there were a considerable nwnber of Musl.ims prepared. 
to seek an understanding with the Hindu community; but from 
1926 onwards the pol:iti.caJ. roles of the two communi ties were 
in a. sense reversed.. The Hindus rather than the Muslims 
took on the atti.tudes of an embatt1.ed. community, and. resisted. 
poJiti.cal. and economic changes in the province of the kind 
that mi.ght chall.enge their dominant position. 
In Ca.lcutta, where the Muslims were i.n a numerical 
minority and the J.andlord-tenant conflict was of no immediate 
rel.evance 1 the batt1.e that was fought concerned the material 
benefits of urban life as represented. by the powers of 
patronage which the Corporation exerted in the fields of 
emplo-yment and education~ But Calcutta was more than this 
for it was also the only major city in Bengal. As such it 
was the centre f'or higher education, emp.loyment in goverrunen t 
service and the professions, and the pivot of trade and 
industry in the provi.nce - and. to date it had. ,been firmly 
in the hands o:f the Hindu upper-classesw Obvi.ously if the 
Mus1.i.ms i.n the city were to gain a greater share in its 
government they had to seek some means of' breaki.ng the impasse 
192 
created by Hindu domination~ For most of the Muslim leaders 
in the city this meant a closer identification with 
provincial politics either by means of supporting the 
established ministry or Congress" The rationale was that 
in the former case such support would undermine the land-
owning basis of Hindu power, or in the latter instance that 
by reforming Congress from within voluntary concessions 
would be gained. from the Hindus. 
However, no matter what political loyalties they 
proclaimed. at the provincial level Muslim leaders in 
Calcutta were dependent upon a broad. spectrum of support 
within the city~ which they were.careful to maintain~ The 
previous decade had witnessed. the emergence of formerly 
quiescent sub-communal groups into the political arena, and. 
in municipal pol.i tics they were now a factor to be reckoned. 
with. In addi.tion, the riots and mass political movements 
of the years since 1918 had amply illustrated the awesome . .i
if temporary, power of the mob, No leader of the community 
could afford to ignore the future, and the indications were 
that popular participation in politics would increase rather 
than decrease. 
This struggle for influence in the years after 1926 
was col.oured by several factors, not the least important of 
which was the increasingly intransigent attitude of the Hindu 
commnnity., This invariably precipitated. a counter 
intransi.gence amongst the Muslims and limited the occasions 
for compromise which at least some of the Muslim leaders in 
the city would. have welcomed.. Other important factors were 
the various personal feuds which engaged. the attention of 
many Muslim .leaders and also the dissolution of Congress 
into ri.vaJ_ factions" Each faction attempted to outbid the 
other as the champion of Hindu interests in the province, 
to the detriment of their own political honesty and the 
efforts of Muslims who sought to identify with the nationalist 
movement" 
19) 
III 
Following the Corporation elections of April 1924 the 
Muslim councillors maintained their stand against the 
Swaraj Party, and entered into an alliance with the non-
Swarajist Hindu and European representatives. In return 
for Muslim support for the election of Sir Rajendranath 
Mookherjea as mayor it was agreed that two Muslims would be 
elected Aldermen, the deputy mayor would be a Muslim, 
and that certain other claims and demands for the 
Muslim community, such as especial facilities for 
primary education, bustee improvement [and] a 
certain proportion of appointments in the 1 Corporation ••• would be wholeheartedly conceded to. 
But something went drastically wrong. The Muslim's 
partners in the coalition failed to vote for any of the 
five Muslim candidates for Aldermen, with the result that 
only one Muslim - the trade unionist Mahomed Daud - was 
elected as an independent, along with the provincial Congress 
leader Sen-Gupta and three non-Swarajist Hindus. In the 
mayoral election the Muslim's partners failed to put forward 
a candidate and the election turned into a contest between 
Sen-Gupta and J.N. Basu, a prominent member of the Hindu 
Mahasabha, who was supported by some non-Swarajist Hindus 
and Sen-Guptas 1 rivals within the Swaraj Party. 
Confused by the defection of their allies the Muslim 
bloc split. The majority abstained from voting in the 
contest, but three cast their votes for Sen-Gupta and. tipped 
the balance in his favour. As a conciliatory gesture towards 
the Muslims Sen-Gupta then supported the successful bid of 
2 Unsud Dowla for the position of deputy mayor. In response 
the entire Muslim bloc declared its qualified support for 
the Sen-Gupta faction on the understanding that the Muslims 
1 Mussalman, 1927, 7 July, p.4. 
2Ibid.; ibid., 10 April, P• 6; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 
32 of 1927, April; Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1927-
September 1927, 11.4.1927, p.1; ibid., 17.4.27, p.JO. 
would be given greater representation in the various 
Standing Committees - proof that they too could be as 
pragmatic as Rahim! 1 
The new alliance proved as fragile as the old, however, 
for the Muslims were soon enmeshed in the fighting between 
the rival factions of the Swaraj Party in the Corporation. 
In the selection of a chief executive officer in May the 
Muslim councillors supported the re-appointment of the 
incumbent, Subhas Chandra Bose, and immediately came into 
conflict with the Sen-Gupta faction who branded them as the 
1 neo-champions of the Congress Party' for having dared to 
support the leader of a rival faction. 2 In August therefore 
when the Muslims called a special meeting of the Corporation 
to consider the question of Muslim employment their move was 
peremptorily squashed by Sen-Gupta who refused to discuss 
their grievances. 3 
For the remainder of 1927 and, indeed, until the 
Corporation elections of 1930 Muslim politics at the municipal 
level remained in a constant state of flux:. Aware of their 
hopeless minority a rump of the Muslim councillors - twelve 
to thirteen strong with Razzack and Nooruddin invariably 
supporting Sen-Gupta and Daud sometimes with the Swaraj Party 
because of his union affiliations - attempted to gain temporary 
advantages by siding with a variety of Swarajist and non-
Swarajist factions in the council chamber. Thus in September 
1927 they joined with the non-Swarajist opposition to oppose 
the refusal of the Swaraj Party to appoint a chief executive 
officer who would not sign the Congress creed; 4 and then 
abruptly swung to the support of Sen-Gupta when he agreed to 
1 Mussalman, 1927, 7 July, p.4; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 
32 of 1927, May. 
2 Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1927-September 1927, 
9.5.1927, pp.47-53. 
3Ibid., 13.8Q1927, p.539; Govt of India~ Home Poll (Dep.), 
32 of 1927, August. 
4Ibid •• September: Bose was arrested shortly after hi~ 
appointment in May and a replacement had to be decided upon 
in September. 
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appoint a committee to consider the question of Muslim 
employment by the Corporation. 1 In January 1928, however, 
the Muslim councillors, led by Mahomed Yaqub, opposed a 
resolution sponsored by Sen-Gupta that the Corporation should 
observe the Simon Commission hartal on February 3. Yaqub 
argued that though the Simon Commission2 was an insult to 
India and Indians 
and they were as much Indian as others ••• they 
were opposing the resoluton on the grounds that 
their Hindu friends had never systematically 
regarded their request to eliminate the differences 
between Hindus and Mahommedans.3 
Again in February th~y oame into conflict with Sen-
Gupta over disputes concerning Muslim education in the city,4 
and his opposition to the appointment of Haji Abdur Raschid 
Khan as deputy executive officer because of his previous 
connections with Huseyn Suhrawardy.5 But at the mayoral 
elections in April 1928 the Muslims voted for Sen-Gupta, to 
defeat a formerly favoured Hindu, Subhas Chandra Bose, in 
return for the election of Abdur Razzack as deputy mayor. 6 
Immediately after the elections, however, the old 
alliance between the Muslims, non-Swarajist Hindus and 
Europeans was resurrectedc 7 With the support of their new 
allies the Muslims gained 33 seats in the eight Sta:nding 
Committees compared with the eight won by the factions of the 
8 Swaraj Partyc This alliance in turn barely survived the year, 
1
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes'~ op.cit., 2~9.1927, pp.865-
68; ibid., Gazette, Vol.VI, 10.9.1927, pp.717-33o 
2 0ffi.cial title was The Indian Statutory Commission. 
3calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1927-March 1928, 
30.1.1928, pp.1853-61. 
4 Ibid., 22.2.1928, p.2167; Statesman, 1928, 1 March, p.16" 
5calcutta Corporation, op.cit., 22.2.1928,p.2207. 
6 Ibid., April 1928-September 1928, 2.4.1928, pp.4-5; Govt of 
India, Home Boll (Dep.), I/1928, April. 
7Mussalman, 1928, 16 June, p.4. 
8
calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XII, 31 • .5.1930, pp .. 62-66. 
and was fatally weakened when its non-Swarajist Hindu members 
defected to the Swaraj Party in disputes concerning the 
Simon Commission and Muslim education. 1 
Through the year such quarrels frequently disrupted the 
new alliance, and also involved the Muslim councillors in 
heated arguments with the Swarajist factions~ 2 However, 
at the all-important mayoral elections in April 1929 the 
Muslim councillors finally broke with their allies and 
once more voted for Sen-Gupta in return for which Abdur 
Razzack was again elected deputy mayor.J Such was the 
confusioncaused by the tactics of the Muslim councillors 
that even the Mussalman ventured the general remark that 
'it did not quite understand the attitude and position of 
the Muslim Councillors who today are with one party and 
tomorrow with another' • 4 For the remainder of the year 
Musl,im loyalties in the Corporation remained fairly constant., 
No controversial topics .disturbed the councillors, and, against 
the background of the Civil Disobedience movement and the 
first Round Table Conference, the Muslim representatives 
adopted an attitude of wait and see with an eye to the 
Corporation elections due in March 1930a 
IV 
The politics of the Corporation can best be understood 
in the light of the confused state of Musl.im sentiment in 
Calcutta and. the mofussil. The ministerial controversy had 
provided the community with some sense of political unity, 
and for a while it looked as if the Muslims might be able to 
1Ibid., Vol.VIII, 1.9~1928, po699; ibid., 'Minutes', April 
1928-September 1928, 28.8.1928,p.1029. 
2 Mussalman, 1928, 13 November, p.4. 
JCalcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1929-September 1929, 
10.4.1929, p.2. 
4Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.)~ 17/1929, April. 
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organise a single political party to represent their 
interestso The Muslim Co;uncillors Association was followed 
by the Bengal Provincial Tanzeem Committee, and in May 1927 
the Bengal Presidency Muslim League was revived under the 
aegis of Sir Abdur Rahim, Fazl-ul Huq and Mujibur Rahman. 
A committee of 66 was established with Rahim as president, 1 
but by the end of 1927 the organisation was virtually 
defunct having been split by Rahim's support for the 
Musharraf Hussain ministry and the controversy which developed 
over th S . c . . 2 e 1mon omm1ss1on. 
The Simon Commission proved the rock upon which the 
new found Muslim unity finally foundered, for it provoked 
leaders of all communities in the sub-continent, particularly 
the Muslims, into evolving definite plans for the poli tf,cal 
future of their communities. The commission was sent to 
India to assess the working of the Reforms of 1919, with a 
view to their future extension, by means of consul ta ti ons 
with the representatives of the various provincial governments 
and communal groups~ The exclusion of Indians from the 
commission provoked almost universal resentment in India, 
but nevertheless many leaders did agree to cooperate with 
it, and it was upon this decision to cooperate or non-
cooperate that the Muslim community in Calcutta was divided. 
In January 1928 the provincial Muslim League, still 
under the nominal presidency of Sir Abdur Rahim, decided to 
boycott the commission, at a meeting attended by Huq, 
Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Karim and Akram Khan, in accol:'dance 
with a similar resolution recently'passed at a secret meeting 
between Sen-Gupta and Rahim. 3 In the following month the 
League also supported the .hartal of February 3, 4 but its 
action counted for littleo The majority of Muslims ignored 
1 Mussalman, 1927, 28 July, p.2. 
2Ibid., 13 December, p.2. 
3Ibid., 1928, 18 January,p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 
32 of 1927, November. 
4 Statesman, 1928, 2 February,p.12. 
198 
the protest and their shops and stalls throughout the city 
did a flourishing trade on the day as did those of the 
Marwaris who also ignored the hartal. 1 In general the Muslim 
press supported the boycott; 2 so did A.H. Ghuznavi3 though 
his elder brother, A.Ko Ghuznavi, 4 opposed it and was joined 
in his condemnation by the Muslim councillors who voted 
against the Corporation decisions in February and August 
to boycott the commission on the grounds that 
non-cooperation had been tried before but bad 
failed., ••• The Mahommedans had practiced non-
cooperation with English education and the result 
was that they were now at the lowest rung of the 
ladder so far as political and economic progress 
arid advancement were concerned [and] the 
Mahommedan Councillors were united in the opinion 
that their educational requirements should be put 
before the Education Committee of the Statutory 
Commission.5 
It was clear that despite the .decision of men such as 
Rahim~ Fazl-ul Huq and Mujibur Rahman to cooperate with 
Congress in the early months of 1928] on the issue of boy-
cotting the Simon Commission, the majority of Musl.ims in 
Calcutta did not share their opinion. Indeed, even such 
a fervent boycotter as Mujibur Rahman admitted at the annual 
session of the All-India Muslim League, held in Calcutta 
during December 1927, that despite his support for the boycott 
1 
I look upon separate representation through 
separate electorates as the corner stone of Muslim 
politics and am forced to admit with regret that 
between the two great communities of India there 
is still 'doubt, hesitation and pain'~6 
Mussalman, 1928, 4 February, p.5; ibid., 1927, 31 December, 
p.,3; Bengal Govt, Administration Report. 1927-8, pp.7-8. 
2NNR, 1927, November-December, ~ssimi} ibid.,, 1928, January-
February, passimc 
3Mussalman~ 1927, 15 November~ p.5" 
4Ibidu, 1928 ~ 9 February, p. 11. 
5calcutta Corporation~ Gazette~ Vol.VIII, 1.9.1928, p.699. 
6Indian Annual Register, 1927, July-December, pp.438-51; 
Mussalman, 1927, 31 December, pp.3, 5; ibid., 1928, 
12 January, p.5. 
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Mujibur Rahman's speech indeed gives a further clue to the 
reasons for Muslim opposition to the boycott other than those 
given in the Corporationw 
In May 1927 Mahomed Ali Jinnah had offered Congress a 
f'ourteen point programme which embodied certain concessions 
to Musl.ims in return for their acceptance of joint 
electorates with a reservation of seats~ The nationalist 
1 press in Calcutta approved of the programme, but many 
Muslims had second thoughts once the Simon Commission was 
appointed and the possibLli ty of further consti.tutional 
reforms became evident" 
At the Calcutta Khilafat Conference in August 1927 
Mahomed Ali raged against Jinnah 1 s programme, and he warned 
the Muslim community 1 that a 'large section of their fellow 
countrymen were day and night planning and preparing for 
organised action in attacking Moslems whenever the opportunity 
presented itself 1 Q 2 Also 9 in the following month, the 
Rangila Rasul court case in the Punjab convinced many Muslims 
that Hindu communalism once more stalked the landoJ 
Throughout 1928 the reaction of Muslims in Calcutta 
towards the Si.mon Commission c.larified with the majority 
for cooperation and the minority against. In the legisl.a tive 
council, during a debate on the commission, Fazl-ul Huq,and 
Sir Abdur Rahim spoke in favour of separate electorates 4 
a viewpoint whi.ch alienated them from Congress later in 
the same month when it reiterated its call for a boycott 
and adopted the Nehru Report 0 which advocated joint 
electorates without a reservation of seats for Muslimso Huq, 
indeed~ did not need the prompting of the Nehru Report to 
reverse his stand on non-cooperati.on :for on August 3 he 
joined the legislative council commi.ttee which was appointed 
1NNR, 1927, May, passim. 
2 Indian Annual Register, 122.2, July-December, P~330o 
3Mussalman, 1927, 19 September, pQ_5., 
4 BLCD, Vol..,X.XX, L8.1928; Indian Annual Register 2 1928, July-
December, p.277. 
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to assist the Simon Commiss:io:n •. l The .l\T2,hru Report did 
however influence .the attitude of the .Mus:li.m press in 
Calcutta which, with the exception of the Muss<:~.lman, turned 
2 
against the boycott and denounced Congress. 
The controversy raged thrmJ.ghout the ~Last months of 
1928 and came to a head i.n December~ At the Calcutta 
session of the All-Ind:ia Kh:Lla±~at Conference hed.d in that 
month, the violently anti-boycott and ant:i-Congress speeches 
of Mahomed AJ.i. precip:itated a\ brawl between the supporters 
and opponents of the boycott in which up-country thugs, 
hired by Mahomed Ali, Sir Abdur Rahim and Huseyn Suhrawardy, 
thrashed the supporters of Mujibur Rahman and other 
boycotters with lathis and folding chairs.J By this stage 
the issue had be come one of Benga:Li-speakers versus Urdu-
speakers9 of the Urdu traditionalists of Calcutta fighting 
the BengaJ.i Musl.im nationa.list sympathisers of the mof'ussil; 
with men such as Mujibur Rahman prepared to seek joi.nt 
electorates, because of the numerical majority heJ.d by the 
Muslims in the mofussil, 4 and Urdu~speaking J.eaders such 
as Rahim and Huseyn Suhrawardy guided by.sentiment in 
Calcutta, which was opposed to anythi.ng but separate 
electoratesQ 
Early in December 1928 Rahim and Suhrawardy had made 
up their differences, and at the All-Bengal Muslim Parties 
Conference in Calcutta had rallied to the defence of 
separate electorates;_) whiist the opposition had stated their 
views at the Calcutta session of the A1.1.-lndia MusJ.im League 
in the same month. 6 Meanwhile in DeJ.hi. A.K" Ghuznavi had 
1Ibid., p.278. 
2 NNR, 1928~ September, passim. 
JMussalman, 1928, 22 December, p.J~ 
4Ibid., 18 August, p.J. 
5NNR, 1928 1 28 December 9 Soltan; ibid. 1 JO December, Hanafi. 
6Ibid., 24 December, Hanafi; ibrid., 27 December, Sol tan; 
Indian Annual Register, 1928, JuJ.y~December, pp. 394-401, 
417-21. 
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joined with Mahomed Ali to reject the Nehru Report at the 
Muslim All-Parties Conference, 1 and shortly afterwards a 
final showdown occurred at the All-India Khilafat Conference 
in Calcutta. 
Mahomed Ali arrived in Calcutta on December 20 and on 
the 22nd he organised a meeting of the near..;moribund 
Calcutta Khilafat Committee at which 30 delegates were 
elected to represent the Muslims of Bengal on the Central 
Khilafat Committee in Delhi - all JO were opposed to the 
Nehru Report. On the 21st, however, the Bengal Provincial 
Khilafat Committee - to which the Calcutta committee was 
constitutionally subordinate - had elected JO delegates 
to the central body on the basis of their support for the 
Nehru Report! This meeting had been a full scale battle: 
tough Peshwari carters and shoemakers? under the leadership 
of Huseyn Suhrawardy and Mahomed Ali, had invaded the 
headquarters of the provincial committee, beaten several 
members, 'threatened to smash the faces' of others, and had 
driven the remaining members of the committee onto a second 
floor verandah where they finished their meeting behind a 
barricade of chair~:~ and desks whilst the invaders sacked 
the rest of the building. The outraged members of the 
provincial committee unsuccessfully appealed to the Central 
Khilafat Committee, which support!=!d Mahomed Ali, and then 
boycotted the Khilafat Conference on December 28 when 
Mahomed Ali denounced the Nehru Report and consigned its 
'Nationalist Muslim' supporters to hell! 2 
v 
By the end of 1928 the Muslims of Calcutta were divided 
into two major political camps: the Nationalist Muslims 
who were prepared for some compromise with Congress, and men 
1Ibid., pp.416-17. 
2Ibid., pp.402-08; Mussalman., 1928, 22 December, p.J. 
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such as Sir Abdur Rahim, Huseyn Suhrawardy and Fazl-ul 
Huq who stood firm on the question of separate electorates, 
and who opposed any concessions to Congress demands as 
embodied in the Nehru Report. 
The Nationalist Muslims of Calcutta were, for the 
most part, Bengali=speakers from the mofussil such as 
Mujibur Rahman~ Moulana Akram Khan, Shamsuddin Ahmed, 
Jallaluddi:ri Hashemy, Wahed Hossain, Abdur Razzack and K. 
Nooruddin. In the years between 1924 and 1928 their 
relationship with Congress had experienced. many set-backs, 
and at times some of them had openly disowned it. 
Nevertheless, in spirit they remained closer to the more 
radical politics of the nationalist cause than to the 
moderate politics of communalists such as Rahim and the 
Suhrawardies, and by late 1927 most of them had re-established 
1 formal relations with the local Congress. They first 
emerged as a distinct group in January 1928 when a number 
of 'Nationalist Muslims of Bengal' met at the house of 
Shamsuddin Ahmed to revive the Bengal Provincial Khilafa-t 
Committee and organise the Muslim boycott of the Simon 
C . . 2 omm1Ss1on. The meeting was dominated by Mujibur Rahman 
and Akram Khan, and set up a~ ad hoc Khilafat committee, 
affiliated to the Central Khilafat Committee, whose members 
were later to be involved in the uproarious December meeting 
with the supporters of Mahomed Ali and Huseyn Suhrawardy. 
They were at the same time members of the provincial 
Muslim League, but their attempts to force a more pro-
Congress political programme upon it were frustrated by 
Fazl-ul Huq and Sir Abdur Rahim, with the support of the 
Urdu-speaking Muslims of Calcutta. So they sought to revive 
the Khilafat committee as a rival provincial organisation 
for Muslims. 3 
1Ibide, 1927,22 November, p.6: all the above mentioned 
'Nationalist Muslims' plus Azad, HajiAbdur Raschid Khan 
and 6 others were elected to the Bengal Provincial Congress 
Committee for 1928. 
2Ibid., 1928, 5 Jarmary, p. J. 
3Ibid., 1927, 13 December,. p.2. 
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The Nationalist Muslims were motivated by class rather 
than communal interests, and they believed that Congress 
was a more viable political vehicle for social change than 
any other existing organisation. They saw themselves as 
the champions of the peasantry, the majority of whom were 
Muslim, whereas their opponents in Calcutta were, with 
few exceptions, more responsive to communal interests as 
articulated by the urbanised and Urdu-speaking Muslims of 
Bengal - the majority of whom lived in Calcutta. The 
distinction is of course over-simplified as the overwhelm-
ingly Muslim composition of the class the Nationalist 
Muslims championed inevitably made them susceptible to 
communal pressures, and there were men such as Fazl-ul Huq 
in t]le opposition who moderated their communalism in an 
attempt to gain the support of non-Congress Hindus. In some 
ways the aims of both groups were similar: both wished to 
destroy the economic and political domination of the Hindu 
landowning classes, and to achieve this the small group of 
Muslim landowners was to prove itself prepared to sacrifice 
its class interests for the sake of the community - but here 
the similarity .ended. The Nationalists Muslims sought a 
far-reaching social revolution in the province, whereas 
their opponents within the community sought only to 
replace Hindu economic and political domination with Muslim 
economic and political domination based on the talents of 
the Muslim mercantile and professional classes in Calcutta 
and the Ashraf families of the mofussil. 
In fairness to Fazl-ul Huq it must be admitted that he 
stood somewhere between these two extremes. Basically he 
was sympathetic to the nationalist cause, but disagreed 
with the tactics of Congress. He was convinced that the 
only way to improve the economic, educational and political 
position of the Muslims in Bengal was by erecting a barrier 
of constitutional safeguards such as separate electorates, 
and various measures of legislative reform such as rural 
reconstruction based on land reform. Indeed, he attempted 
to moderate the communalism of his own stand by seeking 
an alliance with leaders of the Hindu peasantry who stood 
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in opposition to Congress and its Hindu landlord supporters. 
The problem of the Nationalist Muslims in capturing the 
support of their co-religionists in Calcutta was compounded 
not only by their pre-occupation with social change and the 
mofussil, but perhaps more important still by the failure 
of the provincial Congress to give them any substantial 
support. Not only was the Bengal Congress split into three 
major factions behind Sen-Gupta, Subhas Chandra Bose and the 
'Big Five', 1 which fovght one another for support, but the 
Hindu landowning classes were haunted by the spectre of 
Muslim numerical superiority in the province 1 and bitterly 
opposed any moves towards social change and land reform. 
So it was that when, in October 1927, the secretary of 
the All-India Congress Committee, Srinivasa Iyengar, attempted 
to organise a unity conference in Calcutta to settle 
outstanding communal grievances, it was virtually scuttled 
by the opposition of orthodox Hindu and Marwari landlord 
and mercantile organisations when concessions to the Muslims 
concerning korbani 1 music before mosques, and the Suddhi and 
2 Sangathan movements were mooted. 
Admittedly the hostility raised amongst the Muslims in 
Calcutta by this and previous incidents waned in the later 
months of the year when anger against the Simon Commission 
temporarily united Hindu and Muslim; but such fluctuations 
only serve to illustrate the fluid nature of Muslim 
sentiment at the time. It was not firmly set against 
Congress or the nationalist cause, and the Nationalist Muslims 
were determined to prove that Muslims could function as an 
integral part of Congress, but upper-class Hindu intransigence 
1The two best studies of the complicated factionalism in 
Bengal nationalist politics at this time are Bhola Chatterji's 
monograph, As ects of Ben al Politics in the Early Nineteen-
Thirties ( 1969 1 8Jpp. , and Girija K. Mooke:r(jea 1 s Europe 
at War, 1938-1946 (1968 , pp.218-20 in which he discusses 
the support the factions had in Calcutta. 
2 AICC papers, 
October, p.5; 
pp.50-58. 
1926-28, File no.G-64; Mussalman, 1927, 29 
Indian Annual Register, 1927, July-December, 
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in Bengal was such that the formation of any constructive 
policy of cooperation with the Muslims proved impossible. 
During 1929 both the Nationalist Muslims and their 
opponents sought to establish themselves on a firm footing 
in the province~ In February the National.ist Muslims, led 
by Mujibur Rahman, attempted to gain the support of Muslim 
students in Calcutta with the formation of the Calcutta 
Muslim Young Men's Association, 1 under the auspices of a 
provincial body they had established in the previous year. 2 
But the organisation met with little success, 3 and indeed 
it seems that Fazl-ul Huq's attempts to organise the 
students in the form of district associations was more 
effective in rallying their support to a particular faction. 4 
In August Nationalist Muslims from Be:t'tgal extended their 
activities, however, and linked up with like-minded Muslims 
elsewhere in India at the conference of Nationalist Muslims 
in Allahabad;5 and in October they launched their first 
distinct organisation aimed against social and religious 
conservatives in the community. This was the short-lived 
League Against Mullaism which was aimed at 
Moulvis, Pirs, Faqirs and other so-called religious 
leaders whose mentality and attitude of mind are 
based on 1 Mullaism', and who thus mislead Muslims 
in the name of religion gnd keep them away from 
progress and solidarity. 
In addition the Nationalist Muslims captured control 
of the presidency Musli.m League in December following the 
resignation the previous July of its president, Sir Abdur 
Rahim.7· Mujibur Rahman was elected president antl the entire 
1 Mussalman, 1929, 12 February, p.7. 
2Ibid., 1928, 26 July, p.2; ibid.' 16 October, p.7. 
3Ibid. ' 1929, 12 March, p.6. 
4Ibid., 1928, 6 September, P• 2o 
5 Ibid., 1929, 5 October, p. 3; AICC papers, 1929, File no.G-40. 
6 Mussalman, 1929, 5 October, Po7• 
7Ibid., 5 October, P•7• 
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committee was made up of his friends and supporters. 1 
But the opponents of the National.ist Muslims were not 
idle. Earlier i.n the year they had gathered at the 
Calcutta home of a wealthy merchant, Abdur Rahim, and, 
under the chairmanship of Bengal's premier Muslim aristocrat, 
the Nawab of Dacca, they had formed a loose parliamentary 
alliance styled the United Muslim Party. The majority of 
leading Muslims in the province, with the exception of 
Sir Abdur Rahim and the Nationalist Muslims 9 attended, and 
a coterie of 18 led by Fazl-ul Huq formed a subsidiary 
party - the Bengal Praja Party - with the object of 
2 
championing the cause of the Muslim and Hindu peasantry. 
The search for unity by the opponents of the Nationalist 
Muslims had been made all the more urgent in 1929 by the 
disarray in which the provincial. elections of May had 
found the community~ Split into rival factions by the 
controversies over the Simon Commission and the Nehru Report 
the Muslims had indeed cast a decidedly anti-Swarajist 
vote, but as the Statesman commented: 1 No Mussalman has 
been elected under any party ticket and so it is difficult 
to guess who wil.l go to which side. 1 J The provincial Muslim 
League had put forward several candidates but only one, 
Shamsuddin Ahmed, 4 gained election despite the caution 
with which the Nationalist Muslims proclaimed their 
sympathies for Congress. As Huseyn Suhrawardy pointed out~ 
Not a single Mussalman has dared to appeal to the 
electorate on the Swarajist ticket. Many 
Swarajists had stood as Muslim League candidates 
[but] not all Muslim League candidates [were] 
Swarajists or ant~-ministerialists.S 
1 ' Ibid., J December, p.2. 
2 Ibid., 2 July, p.4; Statesman, 1929, 4 July, p.8; NNR, 
1929, 19 July, Muhammadi. 
Jstatesman, 1929, 20 June, P•7• 
4Ibid., p.8. 
5Ibid., , p. 7. 
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Indeed, in tbe fia:nl count .30 of the 39 Muslim MLCs 
declared their support .for the ministry formed by the two 
east Benga.li zamindars 9 Khan Bahadur C .M" Faro qui and 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, in partnership with the Hindu moderate 
1 Kumar Shib S. RayD 
In Calcutta Huseyn Suhrawardy easily held the 
constitutency of South Calcutta against the opposition of 
Shamsul Huq, a Corporation councillor and former Swarajist; 2 
whilst Sir Abdur Rahim's former constituency was won by 
Abdur Rahim - the wealthy hide merchant at whose home the 
United Muslim Party was later formed. Sir Abdur Rahim 
had refused to contest the seat on the grounds that 'there 
is no possibil.i ty of the candidates who will be elected 
from the Muhammedan constituencies acting together as an 
organised political body' • 3 And when Y.C. Ariff resigned 
from the contest on the same grounds Abdur Rahim was 
elected unopposed. 
The remaining months of 1929, and the early months 
of 1930, saw the virtual eclipse of the Nationalist Muslims 
in Calcutta. Muslim opposition to the Nehru Report, 4 
concern over the resurgence of aggressive Hindu communalism 
under the aegis of the Hindu Mahasabha, which had once more 
raised the cry of Hinduism in danger 1 5 and opposition to 
the boycott of the Simon Commission,6 had all combined to 
create a climate of opinion within the Muslim community 
in which any move for a reconcil.iation with Congress was 
well nigh impossible. Certainly the Nationalist Muslims 
were as concerned as other Muslims at the growing strength 
1Ibid., 13 June, p.13; Suhrawardy gained 542 and S. Huq 
gained 387. 
2Ibid., 16 May, p.12. 
3Ibid. 
4 NNR, 1929 7 14 January, Asr-e-Jadid; ibid. 9 19 March, 
Jamhoor et al. 
5Mussalman, 1929, 27 August, p.S; ibid., 1930, January-
February, :eassim; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 17/1929, 
March; ibid .. , Aprj_l; ibid., August .. 
6Ibid., January. 
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of Hindu communaJ. orga:n::Lsation, 1 and in September of the 
same year they jo:i.ned w:Lth Sir Abdur Rahim, Huseyn 
Suhrawardy and Fazl~ul Huq to organise the Palestine Day 
2 protest against the British and Jews in the Holy Land .. 
But the differences between the two groups were too great 
to be overcome, and the politics of the Muslim community 
in Calcutta came to be dominated by a loose political 
coalition gathered around the United Muslim Party and Huq's 
Bengal Praja Party, rather than by overt nationalist 
sympathisers. 
The importance of this newly-established coalition 
was that, despite its brittle nature, it represented the 
first occasion on which the Mus.lims of Ca.lcutta and the 
mofussil had united to form a common front~ It included 
spokesman of the Muslim mercantile, artisan and professional 
classes from Calcutta alongside representatives of the 
landowning Ashra.f families from the mofussil, and leaders 
of the popular peasant movement such as Huqa As far as 
Calcutta was concerned the coalition heralded the entry of 
the Muslim mercanti.le and artisan groups into the larger 
political arena of provincial politics through the medium 
of a province-wide and communal political party.. No 
longer were the members of the Muslim professional class 
in Calcutta the sole spokesmen of their community: at last 
they had been joined by co-religionists who provided the 
coalition with a broader spectrum of support in the city. 
At the beginning of 1930 the Nationalist Muslims formed 
their own provincial. poli.tical party at Dacca, 3 and from 
that stage onwards their acti.vi ties were confined mainly 
to building up support in the mofussil. FazJ.-ul Huq too 
was active in the mofussil where 1 with the support of 
depressed-class Hindus, he extended the influence of the 
Praja Party. In addition Huq sougHt to obtain more support 
1 Mussalman 1 1930, ,January~February, :eassim. 
2Ibid., 
(Dep.), 
1929, 21 September, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll 
17/1929,September. 
3statesman2 1930 1 4 ~rune, p.9; Mussal.man 9 1930, 21 March, 
p.2. 
from his co-religion~sts in Calcutta, and in 1930 he 
re-entered. active poli t;j_cs in the city when he gained. a 
seat on the Corporation. 
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1929 was al.so a year of widespread. industrial unrest 
in Bengal, particu.l.arly in the area around. Ca.lcutta where 
the majority of industrial concerns were located.. The 
number of industrial disputes had. risen sharply in 1928, 
and. 1929 saw the first general strike in Bengal during 
which nearly 3,000,000 working days were lost and. some 
272,000 workers, mainly from the jute mil.ls, staged. a 
1 
massive protest. 
The main causes of the strike were not related. to any 
sharp rise in prices~ such as had. occurred. during and. 
2 
after the Great War, but were directly related. to the 
working system in the jute mills. Immediately after the 
1914-18 war the mills had. restricted. their production in a 
successful bid. to mai.ntain high world. prices 1 and. in doing 
so had. reduced. the working week for mill operatives from 
60 to 54 hours. 3 To compensate the workers for the lost 
hours they were granted a bonus payment, khoraki, 
equivalent to the rate for six hours, and. until 1928 the 
system worked. well. 4 
At the end of 1928, however, the demand. for jute 
products was so great that the 60 hour week was re-introduced, 
a reduced. hourly rate of payment replaced. the khoraki which 
1Labour Commissio~2 1929 (Evidence), VoloV, part 2, p.126. 
2Buchanan, D.Ho, ~he Development of Capitalist Enterprise 
in: India (1934) ~ p.355. 
3Lab our Commission, op. cit o , pp. ·127 -28. 
4Ibid.., p.128. 
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was abolished, a:n.d the bonus incentive piece rate for the 
highly paid and skil.led weavers was discontinued. 1 The 
trouble was that while the demand for jute products was 
high, market prices had begun to fall so that the mills 
sought to increase product:i:on while at t:Jte same time 
reducing the costs of operation,. The position was further 
complicated by the grievances of workers concerning the 
absence of standardised wage rates between different mills, 2 
and the lack of contact between the European managements 
and the workers, who were at the mercy of the sirdars, many 
of whom were blatantly corrupt.J 
As mentioned there was no dramatic increase in the 
price of basic foodstuffs during this period, but the 
abo1.i tion of the khoraki payment was equally disastrous. 
The average worker barely made ends meet with khoraki, and 
was usual.ly heavi .. ly indebted if he remitted money to his 
village and family. 4 The reduced wages of 1929 turned 
desperation into despair and precipitated a spontaneous 
demonstration of worker protest, which caught the 
bureaucracy, management and political leaders of all factions 
off-guard.5 
One of the most noticeable features of the 1929 
general strike was the negligible impa.ct it had upon the 
life of Calcutta.. As in the previous spate of strikes 
during the ear.ly 1920s the Hindu and Muslim leaders of the 
city were remarkable only for their J.ack of involvement, 
and the organisation and finance of the strike remains 
something of a mystery. 
1Ibid., p. ·129; GadgiJ., D.R., ·The Industrial Evolution of 
India in Recent Times (1948), p.24J. 
2 Labour Commission, 1929, p.216. 
Jibid., pp.J41-2. 
4 Labour Commission, 1929 (Evidence), Vol.V, part 1, pp .. J1, 121. 
5Ibid .. , part 2, p.1J1. 
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To a large extent the str~ke appears to have been 
spontaneou.s wi.th a J.eadersh~p hav~ng emerged on.ly after 
the movement had begun ~n the m~lls of the Kank~nara area 
to the north of' Calcutta ~n July. 1 The Kank.i.nara Labour 
Un~on nnder Moulv~ Latafat Hosse~n2 took a lead~ng part ~n 
the ~n~tial strike, but once it had spread to other mills 
the movement came under the control of 1 Mother Das Gupta' 
Miss Shalini Das Gupta a U.S. educated Ph.,Do - who·had 
the support of Dr B.C. Roy, one of the 'Big Five' faction 
leaders in the local Congress. 3 Miss Das Gupta helped 
revive the moribund Bengal Jute Workers' Union, which had 
originally been established in 19234 by men who were later 
involved w~th the Communist Party of India,5 when she 
real~sed the potential of the strike movement in August, 6 
and soon became the accepted,. leader of the striking workers. 
In September the mill management, under pressure from the 
Government, hammered out a settlement with Miss Das Gupta 
which in effect re-established the oJ.d hour1.y rate of 
work, recognised the 60 hour week, re-insti.tut ed the 
khoraki payment as a 10 per cent overall wage increase, and 
mollified the weavers by restoring their piece rate system 
of payment.7 By early October the strike was over despite 
the efforts of a dissident faction in Miss Das Gupta's 
union to discredit her and her 'bourgeoise' supporters, 
and who also clai.med to have been the original founders 
of the union. 8 
In part at least the strike was encouraged by members 
of the Communist Party of India,9 but the split with Miss 
1 Ib~d. , p. 129. 
2 See page 117. 
3Labour Commission 2 1929 (Evidence), Vol.V, part 2, pp.132-36. 
4Ibidq p. 147. 
5Meerut Conspiracy Papers, Bengal Exhibits, passim. 
6 Labour Commission, op.cit., po144. 
7 Ibid. , p. 136; Buchanan, D .H., op. cit., p. 354. 
8 Labour Commission, op.cit., p.147. 
9Meerut Conspiracy Papers, Bengal Exhibits, Eassim. 
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Das Gupta was an ind:ication that their influence was 
marginal, and they certainly did not provide her with the 
considerabl.e funds she had at her disposal .• The source 
of finance is still. a mystery: the Bengal Jute Workers' 
1 Union charged no membership fees, and though the Bengal 
Provincial Congress Committee gave 10,000 rupees to an 
2 
earlier jute mill strike in January, it was generally 
believed that most of the finance was provided by Marwari 
jute speculators, who were interested in prolonging the 
strike to force up the price of the stocks of jute products 
they held. 3 
Whatever the answers to these various mysteries are it 
seems certain that direct involvement by Congress and 
Muslim leaders was minimal. In part this was due to the 
factionalism in Congress which dissipated its energies 
and destroyed its unity of purpose. Certainly the leaders of 
the three main factions - Sen-Gupta, SoC. Bose and Dr B.C. 
Roy - were peripherally involved: but more often as rivals 
than as allies. 4 There was also considerable suspicion 
of the motives of Congress on the part of some union leaders;5 
the Kankinara Labour Union in particular was antipathetic 
towards Congress and in February 1929 its president, Moulvi 
Latafat Hossein, had declared in a debate on labour 
conditions initiated in the legislative council by a Hindu 
member of the Swaraj Party that: 
1 
2 
I am pleased to see that a member of the Swaraj 
Party has brought this motion. I am not sure 
whether the mover really feels for poor labour 
or he wants more newspaper publicity for his lip 
sympathy for the working classes. There are very 
few politicians of his party who have been 6 
sincerely identified with the cause of labour. 
Buchanan, D.H., op.cit., p.4JJ. 
Mussalman, 1929, 29 January, p.2. 
3Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 17/1929, August; Labour 
Commission, op.cit., p.146. 
4Ibid., pp.136-50; Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 17/1929, 
August. 
5Ibid., January. 
6 BLCD ____ , Vol.XXXI, 11.2.1929. 
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On the Muslim side trade union leaders such as Mahomed 
Daud were involved in the strikes of 1928-29. Their 
position, however, was weakened by internal disputes in 
the unions they controlled, the fact that these unions were 
directed towards seamen and not mill operatives, and the 
confusion in Congress which weakened any possibility of 
joint action. 
In 1926 the Bengal Mariners' Union and its subsidiary 
the Indian Seamen's Union,had been involved in a leadership 
struggle between its president Mahomed Daud and its 
secretary, an ex-seaman named Aftab Ali. Daud retained 
control o:f both unions, but Ali and several other committee 
members seceded and formed a rival body the National Seamens' 
Union of India. The quarrel was patched up in 1927 when 
Daud became the president of a single union - the Indian 
Seamen's Union- with Aftab Ali as its secretary. However, 
the unions' troubles were not over as during 1926 it had 
affiliated with the Bengal Trade Union Federation - the 
provincial committee of the All-India Trade Union Congress 
and as a result it became involved in the faction disputes 
of the local Congress which controlled the provincial trade 
union federation. 1 
Eventually the seamen's union severed its links with 
the central and provincial trade union organisations because 
of excessive interference in the unions internal affairs,2 
but several of its committee members retained their links 
with Congress and were consequently dragged further into the 
quagmire of its internecine disputes. Both the Swarajist 
Muslims Mahabubul Huque and Shamsuddin Ahmed were on the 
committee of the Indian Seamen's Union and were involved in 
1 Govt of Bengal, Administration Report. 1926-7, p.48; 
Mussalman, 1926, 23 October, p.7; ibid., 11 December, p.6; 
ibid., 25 December, p.7; ibid.,JO December, p.6; Joshi 
Papers, File no.25, 1926, letters dated 8, 9, 16 Feburary 
1926 and 9 March 1926; Saksena, R.N., Seamen in India (1951), 
PP. 1 O, 94. 
2 Govt of Bengal, 
Labour Commission 
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strikes it organised during 1928; 1 whilst the general-
secretary of the union, Abdul Matin Chowdhury, was one of 
the members of the Bengal Provincial. Khilafat Committee 
who clashed violently with Mahomed Ali and Huseyn Suhrawardy 
in December 1928. Daud, Mahabubul Huque, Aftab Ali and 
Shamsuddin Ahmed had also become closely identified with 
the Bose faction in Congress during 1927-28, and had 
alienated many of their co-religionists by supporting the 
boycott of the Simon Commission. 2 The involvement of 
Nationalist Muslims in the union lost it much sympathy 
amongst the Muslims of Calcutta and it failed to take any 
prominent role in the general strike of 1929. 
The general strike illustrates several important facts 
about Muslim attitudes in Calcutta during the period. At 
the beginning and end of the 1920s the industrial areas 
which surrounded Calcutta were the scene of massive waves 
of industrial unrest: yet in both instances the Muslims of 
the city failed to give their co-religionists involved in 
the strikes any marked degree of support. Certainly on 
both occasions the number of Muslims involved was large 
at least in proportion to their total percentage of the 
indus trial lab our fore e - but at no time did the Muslims of 
the city rally to the support of the Muslim labouring 
class of the contiguous municipalities. 
In part this can be expl.ained by the spontaneous nature 
of both series of strikes, and the fact that their causes 
were economic rather than communal or political. In 
addition the transient nature of the Muslim and Hindu mill 
population made organisational continuity difficult. 
Perhaps a more important factor, however, was the attitude 
of the Muslim population of Calcutta towards mass movements 
and the participation of the lower classes in politics. 
The disputes within the maritime trade unions during the 
1 Mussalman, 1928, 21 .January, p.7; Meerut Conspiracy Papers, 
Vol.V, Exhibit 67. 
2Ibid., Exhibits 26, 35, 1335. 
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late 1920s had revealed a hard core of opposition to overt 
political activity, particularly in liaison with Congress, 
on the part of many Muslim trade unionists, and doubtless 
Miss Das Gupta's activities aroused similar suspicions. 
Po.li tical activity within the trade uni.on movement 
had come to be equated with the radical social outlook of 
the socialists within the Communist Party of India and 
Congress. Muslim leaders in Calcutta may have favoured 
social change, but they looked askance at any restructuring 
of the social order: they wished to replace the Hindu elite 
rather than create an egalitarian society. The strikes of 
1928-29 were a form of popular protest with which they had 
little sympathy. They wanted no part of any supra-communal 
social movement; and whilst they undoubtedly wished to 
improve the economic position of the workers they had no 
interest in rousing a political animal in which class 
consciousness may have ranked stronger than communal loyalties. 
Certainly the Bengal Praja Par~y was a mass-oriented 
political organisation, but it was essentially Muslim in 
membership and directed against the Hindu landowning elite 
in Bengal. 
The same argument can be applied to the maritime trade 
unions, and is nowhere better illustrated than by the 
factional disputes of the 1920s. The disputes were essentially 
a conflict between the class-conscious and politically 
active Nationalist Muslims who wished to alter society, 
and their opponents who sought material uplift within the 
framework of the existing social order. 
The Muslims of Calcutta - from the Urdu-speaking 
artisan class to the anglicised professional class - were 
generally not interested in the form of social protest 
represented by the strike movement. The mobs generated 
by the community in previous years had not comprised the 
indigent or illiterate, who sought a new social utopia, 
but rather the petty merchant, artisan and student who 
wished to reap the mat eria.l and political benefits of the 
existing social organisation. They had .li ttl.e in common 
with the impoverished and illiterate mil.lhands of the 
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industria.l areas, and were motivated by a different set 
f . t. 1 o asp1ra 1ons. 
The Nationalist Muslims may have been sympathetic, 
but they were enmeshed in the factional disputes within 
Congress, bereft of any wide basis of popular support and 
short of finance. In addition their interests were, for the 
main part, bounded by Bengal and the rural masses rather 
than by the transient and semi-industrial.ised Urdu- and 
Hindi- speaking labouring masses of the Calcutta region. 
VII 
In March 1930 the third elections to the Corporation 
were held, and a new phase of municipal politics was 
entered upon with the emergence of Fazl-ul Huq as spokesman 
of the Muslim community. 
new 
In all 27 Muslims stood for election including 13 
previous incumbents of whom 11 gained re-el.ection. 2 The 
councillors were Fazl-ul Huq, who secured a seat in the 
up-country Muslim stronghold in wards VIII-XII; Ebrahim 
Golam Hussain Ariff, an elderly Gujerati merchant related to 
Y.C. Ariff, who defeated Mahomed Solaiman for the seat which 
covered wards I-VIII; Sheikh Woozir Chaudhuri, a Bengali 
merchant, returned with Mahomed Hashem against the opposition 
of Munshi. Ramzan Ali Khan to the double seat in wards 
XXVIII-IXXX; and M.G. Rasul, a journalist and former railway 
1My use of the term 'mob' within the urban context of 
Calcutta has been influenced by the work of George Rude. In 
particular two essays in his published collection Paris and 
London in the 18th Century: Studies in Popular Protest (1970), 
namely 1 The Pre-Industrial Crowd', pp.17-34, and 'The Gordon 
Riots: A Study of Rioters and their Victims', pp.268-92, 
seemed pertinent to my arguments. 
2Elected : Mahomed Raffique, Dr s.z. Hussain, S.M. Yakub, 
S. Huq, Abdur Razzack, M.M. Huq, M.A. Khan, N .M. Hashem, 
Unsud Dowla, Dr M. Hossain, M. Akbar - defeated: M. Solaiman, 
M.R. Ali Khan. 
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worker, who won the seat for Cossipore-Ch:itpur. Apart 
from the dr~feated :i,ncumbents the only other unsuccessful 
candidates of any prominence were Mahabubul Huq1.1e and 
Huseyn Suhrawardy. 1 
The interesting feature of the elections was the 
return of so many previous incumbents and Fazl-ul Huq, 
plus the defeat of the radical communalist Huseyn Suhrawardy 
and the Nationalist Muslim Ma11,abubul Huque. The results 
indicated that the Muslim electorate was far from dissatis-
fied with the political tactics of their representatives 
:i_n the previous Corporation council, and in fact supported 
their policy of compromise with various non-Muslim factions. 
The vote was one for moderate communalists such as Fazl-ul 
Huq: ~en who, unlike Suhrawardy or Mahabubul Huque, were 
not identified with one or other extreme of the political 
spectrwn, but who were pragmatically prepared to compromise 
with non-Muslim factions to further the interests of their 
community. 
Another interesting aspect of the elections was the 
change it revealed in Muslim attitudes since the 1920s. 
The number of Nationalist Muslims el.ected had been sharply 
reduced to be repl.aced by a more strongly communal Muslim 
bloc in the Corporation. That the emergent bloc was 
motivated by a spirit of moderate communalism has been 
discussed, and yet it represented a distinct change from the 
nascent and f'luid commLmalism of the 1920s. The Muslim 
councillors now had a 9tronger sense of communal identity 
which set them apart as a distinct bloc within the Corporation. 
During the 1930s this group consciousness strengthened to 
the extent that it was possible to observe the tactics of 
a sharply defined communal bloc, as opposed to individual 
Muslim action, more clearly than in the 1920s. 
By 1930 the kind of Muslim councillor elected had also 
changed~ In the 1920s past and present stalwarts of the 
nationalist movement had been elected in large numbers, but 
1 Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XI, 1.3.1930, p.6oo. 
I 
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by 1930 the bulk of Muslim representatives were drawn from 
different backgrounds. The majority came from the up-
country Musli.m mercantil.e class and few of them had played 
more than a peripheral role in the various political 
movements since the Great War. Their contact wi.th Congress 
had been margina.l, yet they represented the recently 
poli ticised Mus.lim petty merchants and artisans of Calcutta. 
The result was that communal, rather than national interests, 
intruded more strongly than before into the politics of the 
Muslim bloc in the Corporation. 
The full extent of the pragmatism of the newly-elected 
Muslim councillors is best illustrated by the storm which 
developed in Calcutta early in 1930 over the Civil 
Civil Disobedience Movement and the Round Table Conference. 
Disobedience was introduced by Gandhi as a non-violent 
campaign to disrupt both British rule and the series of 
Round Table Conferences, which had been organised by the 
British to discuss plans for constitutional reform. 
Muslims throughout India were infuriated by the 
disruptive tactics of Congress, and saw them as yet another 
sign of the refusal of Hindus to face the realities of the 
communal situation. They feared that Congress wished to 
force the British to grant Swaraj before constitutional 
safeguards for the minority communities had been agreed upon. 
The Muslims of Calcutta were certain that it was another 
1 plot inspired by the Hindu Mahasabha; A.He Ghuznavi and 
Abdullah Suhrawardy issued a statement which condemned the 
policy of Congress2 , and on April 15 the Muslims of the city 
~ 
from merchant to gariwalla - ignored the Civil Disobedience 
hartal held on that day .. 3 In later months the attitude of 
the Muslim press mellowed somewhat out of respect for the 
1NNR, 1930, January, passim. 
2 Statesman, 1930, 16 January, p.12. 
3Mussalman, 1930, 17 April, p.5; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), 1938, no.248. 
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personal sinceri.ty of' Gandhi and antipathy towards the 
British. 1 But the Muslim representatives in the Corporation 
firmly opposed Civil Disobedience, and at a meeting of 
Muslim ratepayers in May they denounced the campaign, 
Congress and the 'tyranny of the Corporation 1 o 2 
Indeed, the 'tyranny of the Corporation' rather than 
Civil Disobedience was the main source of the councillor's 
grievances - with the programme of Congress providing 
an extra weapon in their hands for the inunediate struggle 
within the Corporation. At the elections for mayor, deputy 
mayor and aldennen on 4 April 1930 the Muslim councillors 
had again become entangled in the cross-fire of Congress 
factionalism. In retum for the promise of a Muslim deputy 
mq.yor and two Muslim aldermen, the Muslim bloc had backed 
Sen-Gupta and lost. Sen-Gupta was elected mayor, but in 
the meantime the dissident Congress factions had achieved 
a temporary accord and one of their own number was elected 
deputy mayor, and the Muslim candidates for the position 
of aldermen, Nationalist Muslim and communalist alike, were 
3 defeated • 
Huq was furious at the result of the elections, and 
he accused Sen-Gupta of breaking the pact he had recently 
agreed upon with Azad during one of the latter's infrequent 
visits to the city. 4 He claimed the Hindu councillors had 
not had 
the generosity to recognise the spirit in which 
the late Mr C.R. Das used to work with the 
Mahonunedan community both in the Corporation and 5 other fields of political activity in the country. 
1 NNR, 1930, 13 March, Sol tan; ibid., 11 June, Khadem; ibid., 
9 July, Jamhur. 
2 Statesman, 1930, 29 May, p.10; Mussalman, 1930, 27 May, p.3. 
3calcutta Corporation, Gazette, vol.XI, 31.5.1930, pp.62-66; 
ibid., 'Minutes', April 1930-September 1930, 8.4.1930, pp.2-7o 
4I~id., Gazette, VoloXI, 3.5 .. 1930, supplement n.p. 
,5Ibid. 
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Later i.n May the Mus.lims suffered a further humi.l.iation 
when they failed to gain more than nominal representation 
in the various Standing Committees, and on May 13 Huq led 
the Muslim councillors 1 out of the C.orporation chambers. 
On Sunday May 25 the dissident councill.ors held a 
meeting in the Town Hall at which Fazl-u.l Huq launched a 
general attack on Congress, Civil Disobedience and the 
Corporation. He declared that: 
For the first time in the history of this city, 
Moslem ratepayers and citizens of Calcutta had 
felt themselves constrained to rise in protest 
against the tyranny of a section of their countrymen 
in the conduct of the affairs of the Corporation. 
The Mahommedans of India were a long suffering 
race but their patience was now exhaused. 2 
Four days later Huq and the other councillors issued a formal 
statement that: 
Moslem Councillors have been generally branded as 
opportunists, but our opportunism has only been 
a necessary corollary of the Congress policy;.·~ 
we have always felt that it was necessary for us, 
in defence of Moslem interests, to ally ourselves 
with the party which offered us the greatest 
opportunity for serving our community and 
protecting its interests. We have always realised 
that it is necessary to have as much representation 
of Moslem [interests] as possible in all Committees 
and offices in the Corporation in order to make the 
Moslem voice impressive and effective. In making 
alliances with non-Muslim groups we have always 
kept this point of view, but we emphatically deny 
that i.n doing so we were actuated with a selfish 
desire merely to scramble for seats. Bitter 
experience has taught us that Moslem interests have 
seldom been safe in non-Moslem hands [and] non-
Moslem i.ndifference to Moslem interests has always 
compelled us to adopt this policy in pure self-
defence.3 
1Ibid., 17.5.1930, p.1208. 
2Ibid., Vol .• XXII, 31.5.1930, p.66; Statesman, 1930, 29 May, 
p.10; Mussalman, 1930, 27 May, p.3. 
3calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XII, 31.5.1930, p.69. 
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Support for the Muslim councillors was complete amongst 
their co-religionists in the city. 1 Even the pro-Nationalist 
Muslim ;newspaper, the Mussalman, thought that the Swaraj 
2 Party had gone too far, and on May 17 declared that though 
the Muslims were a minority in the Corporation 'they have 
been asserting themselves in a manner calc-q.lated to make 
the majority realise that the [Muslims] are a factor that 
cannot be ignored or trifled with'.3 The Dainik Soltan 
was less restrained in its comments and remarked bitterly 
that the Hindus in the Corporation were 'trampling upon 
the just rights and privileges of the Moslems at every 
meeting 1 • 4 Indeed, so strong was J1uslim feeling that when 
a hartal was observed in the city on May 6, to protest 
against the arrest of Gandhi, the Muslims refused to observe 
it; indeed, they made a point of keeping their shops and 
stalls open all day and well into the evening. 5 
In June, however, in the midst of Muslim agitation 
against Congress and Civil Disobedience, the dispute in the 
Corporation was settled and the Muslim councillors retuned 
to the council to support Sen-Gupta. The Hindu councillors 
had agreed to allot the Muslims greater representat·ion on 
the Standing Committees, a;nd a larger, though unspecified, 
share of appointments to positions in t~e Corporation: 6 
thus a new alliance was created. 
The alliance lasted barely three months before it 
disintegrated as the result of a dispute concerning the 
!Illection of Subhas Chandra Bose as mayor in August 1930. 
1Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 18/VI/1930. 
2 Mussalman, 1930, 3 May, p.4. 
3I9id., 17 May, p.4. 
4NNR, 1930, 15 May, Dainik Soltan. 
5Govt of India~ Home Poll (Dep.),18/VI/1930. 
6 Statesman, 1930, 19 June, p.21; Mussalman, 1930, 14 August, 
p.3. 
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This time, however, factional in-fighting had once more 
set Sen-Gupta and Bose against one another, and the 
unsuccessful Muslim candidate for mayor gained the vote of 
the Sen-Gupta faction. 1 Muslim opposition to Bose had 
grown with his espousal of Civil Disobedience and his 
policy of using employees of the Corporation as agents for 
that programme: particularly Hindu and Muslim teachers in 
Corporation schools who were threatened with dismissal 
if they did not 'join the Congress, use Khadder or do 
picketting 1 • 2 
The alliance in the Corporation was, however, weakened 
by developments outside the realm of the Calcutta 
municipality; for in the Bengal Legislative Council Muslim 
MLCs, under the leadership of Huq 1 s Praja Party and with 
the support of depressed-class Hindus, were busy launching 
a series of b;ills against the economic dominance of the 
landowning classes in the province. In August 1930 the 
Bengal Primary (Rural) Education Bill, which placed the 
cost for the education of the children of Muslim and Hindu 
peasants on the estates of landowners, was passed in the 
face of bi~ter opposition from the Hindu Swarajists. 3 
This heralded a series of bills which panicked the Hindu 
landowning classes and forced the provincial Congress into 
a more intransigent attitude towards the Muslim community, 
for, 'since the patrons of the two major Congress factions 
were the chief spokesmen of the local [Hindu] landed 
aristocracy', 4 it had little alternative but to champion 
their interests. 
1Calcutta Corporation, Gazette~ Vol.XII, 23.8.1930,p.626; 
Govt of India, Home Poll (Dep.), 18/X/J930. 
2Ibid., 18/VIII/1930. 
3McDonald, G. 'Communal Groups in the Bengal Legislative. 
Council, 1927-1935' (1969), pp.22-31 et seg. 
4
chatterji, Bhola, Aspects of Bengal Politics in the Early 
Nineteen-Thirties (1969), p.17. 
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Such developments inevitably meant the negation of 
all that the Nationalist Muslims worked for in Congress. 
To their credit it must be admitted. that they remained. 
loyal to Congress in the early years of the 1930s in the 
vain hope that they could. reform it from within, and. 
continued. to fight both Hindu and Muslim communalism~ 
Perhaps, however, it would have been better if the anger 
that Akram Khan had directed at the Muslims of Calcutta 
when he wrote in 1931 that: 
The Urdu-speaking non-Bengali Moslems are sitting 
tight on the very breast of Calcutta [and] are 
going to determine the destiny of 2-! crores of 
Bengali Moslems ••• to fulfill their own selfish 
designs-~ 1 
had. been turned against the Hindu landowners whose view 
of the world was defined solely in terms of their class 
interests. 
VIII 
For the remainder of 1930, and. the following two 
years,the issue that divided the two major communities 
in Bengal was that which concerned separate electorates. 
In August 1930 Fazl-ul Huq was nominated. as a Bengali 
Muslim representative to the second. Round Table Conference 
in London. Despite a speech prior to his departure in 
which he 'openly accused the Hindus of being inimical to 
2 the interests of Moslems', once in London he proved. willing 
to compromise on the question of joint electorates, for 
which he received a rare accolade of praise from the 
1NNR, 1931, 29 May, Muhammad.i. 
2Ind.ian Annual Register, 1930, July-December, p.351. 
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Nationalist Muslims. 1 However, this praise was withdrawn 
when the presidency Muslim League decided that after all 
2 it would boycott the conference - a decision which proved 
embarrassing when Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, 
reached an agreement for the discontinuation of Civil 
Disobedience, a political amnesty and the representation 
of Congress at the conference. 
Gandhi's decision altered the complexion of the 
conference, and. caused further commnnal tension when he 
supported the claim of the Nationalist Muslims for represen-
tation in London. The provincial Muslim League sought 
representation,3 but, in view of its demand for joint 
electorates without reservation, 4 it was opposed by other 
Muslim organisations in the province: Huseyn Suhrawardy, 
as president of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee, protested 
against the representation of the Nationalist Muslims; 5 
whilst in May 1931, at the All Bengal Muslim Conference in 
Calcutta, Shaukat Ali, Fazl-ul Huq and Abdullah Suhrawardy, 
after 1 a great reception from the Muhammedan commnnity', 
came out with a firm demand for separate electorates. 6 
The question of separate electorates was of especial 
concern for the Muslims of Calcutta for, under the terms 
of t~e constitution adopted by the Corporation in 1924, 
the system of separate Muslim mUnicipal representation was 
to expire at the end of 1932. In August 1930 Abul Kasem 
failed in an attempt to introduce a bill for the continuation 
of separate electorates in the legislative conncil:, 7 and a 
1Mussalman, 1930, 13 December, p.5; ibid. 9 16 December, p.4. 
2Ibid.., 1931, 1 January, p~5· 
3Govt of India, Reforms Dept, 1931, KW to 35/31-R (XIV). 
4 Mussalman, 1931, 31 March, p.2; ibid., 16 April, p.6. 
5Govt of India, Reforms Dept, 1931, KW to 35/31-R (XIV). 
6 Ibido, Home Poll, February 1931, 18/II; Indian Annual 
Register. 1931, January-Jnne, pp.309-11; NNR, 1931, 29 May, 
Muhammadi. 
7BLCD, Vol.XXXV, 15.8.1930. 
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similar move in February 1931 likewise failed. 1 By 1932 
therefore it had dawned on the Muslims of Calcutta that 
they were bound to the compromise solution they had 
accepted in 1923. However, they were not prepared to give 
in easily, and sought to gain the advantage by agreeing 
to accept joint electorates with a reserv~tion of an 
increc;1sed number of seats. 
The failure of the second Round Table Conference, 
the withdrawal of the representatives of Congress, and 
the renewal of Civil Disobedience did little to ease 
communal tension. The attitude of Hindus and Muslims had 
hardened over the question of separate electorates. J:n 
Calcutta whilst the leaders of the Hindu bhadrolok busily 
agitated against Muslim demands in an increasing number 
of public demonstration9, 2 the Muslim community solidly 
supported the demand of men such as the Suhrawardies, the 
Ghuznavies, Fazl-ul Huq, Mahomed Daud and Latafat Hossein 
for nothing less than separate representation for the 
community.3 
Further communal conflict in tne Corporation complicated 
the situation. In April 1931 the Muslims had managed to 
get Abdur Razzack, albeit a Nationalist Muslim, elected 
deputy mayor, but later in the month the Hindu councillors 
made it patently clear that the entire Hindu bloc would 
oppose the continuation of separate Muslim representation 
4 
after 1932.. In August recriminations reached a new peak 
over the appointment of a deputy executive officer; the 
Muslim candidate, and acting deputy executive officer, 
1Ibid., Vol.XXXVI, 16.2.1931. 
2 Statesman, 1932, 4 August, p •. 12. 
3Mussalman, 1932, 10 July, p.4. 
4
calcutta Corporation, Gazette, VoL.XIII, 18.4.1931, p.1055; 
ibid., 25~.4.1931, pp .. 1089-90; ibid., 'Minutes', April 1931-
September 1931, 22.4.193~, pp.48-52. 
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Abdur Raschid Khan, was replaced by a nominee of Congress 
though the decision was rescinded in October and Raschid 
Khan was gazetted as the permanent officer. 1 This minor 
victory was, however, obscured in the following April whm 
Fazl-ul Huq was defeated in the mayoral contest. 
Huq was soundly defeated in the contest by the 
candidate put forward by a united Congress front, Dr B.C. 
Roy, and suffered the further humiliation of seeing a 
former supporter turned Nationalist Muslim - S.M. Yaqub 
elected deputy mayor, despite the opposition of the 
majority of Muslim councillors. 2 The weakness of the Muslim 
position was again clearly illustrated and Huq lashed out 
savagely at both the European and Hindu councillors, whom 
he believed had joined forces to defeat him despite a 
pact he claimed had been arranged between the Musl.ims and 
Congress regarding the elections. 3 In part opposition to 
Huq may have been aroused by a certain amount of covert 
activity on his part aimed at the Nationalist Muslims; 
for shortly before the mayoral elections he had allied 
himself with communalist leaders from elsewhere in India 
in an abortive attempt to capture the presidency Muslim 
League from Mujibur Rahman and his supporters. 4 
In August 1932 the Muslims and Hindus of Bengal 
received the bombshell of news of the Communal Award. Child 
of the Simon Commission and Round Table Conferences the 
Award allocated the Muslims of Bengal 48,..4 per cent of the 
seats in the proposed Bengal Legislative Assembly and 
reduced Hindu representation to 39.2 per cent of the seats 
with nearly half of these set aside for depressed-class 
1Ibidw, 24.8.1931, pp.781-99; ibid., October 1931-March 
1932, 7.10.1931, pp.1102. 
2 Ibid., April 1932-September 1932, 11.4.1932, p.7. 
3statesman, 1932, 21 April, p,6; Govt of India, Home Poll 
(Dep.), 18/II/1932, February. 
4 Mussalman, 1932, 5 March, pp.4, 6. 
Hindus. The Bengali Hindu upper classes were horrified 
by the proposal and furious at their reduction to a 
statutory minority. The Hindu press, without exception, 
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totally rejected the Award with the Sakti stating bitterly 
that: 'The Indian Nation is in truth Hindu- the advent of 
the Moslems in India is a misfortune and of the English 
an accident'. 1 
The Muslims on the other hand were jubilant. Protests 
were raised t"hat they should have been awarded a majority 
2 
of seats, but these were merely a matter of form and the 
Award was readily accepted. 3 The Nationalist Muslims 
added their denunciations to those of Congress but their 
reasons were certainly not the same. They had based their 
support for joint electorates on the fact that the Muslims 
were a numerical majority in the province and would benefit 
at some time in the future when the principle of one man, 
one vote was adopted: so it was that the Mussalman greeted 
the Award with the headlines 'Muslims Go To The Wall: 
4 Statutory Minority Fpr Muslims in Bengal'. 
In Calcutta the immediate effect of the Award was to 
spur the Muslims to a renewed outburst of activity in 
support of communal demands.· As the British noted: 
Muhammedan opinion may be described shortly as 
satisfied.~.there are indications that the 
Muhammedan leaders are to make every endeavour 
to secure seats in constituencies which have 
hitherto [been] regarded as more or less closed to 
them, e.g. landlord and commerce seats. Attempts 
are being made, it is said, to found a Muslim 
Chamber of Commerce.$ 
1NNR, 1932, August, passim; ibid., 27 August, SaktL 
2 Star of India, 1932, 17 August, p.1; ibid., 29 August, 
p.8; ibid., 19 August, p.8. 
3Ibid., 23 August, p.8; Govt of India, Home Poll, 41-4/32 
and KW of 1932. 
4 Mussalman, 1932, 17 August, p.5. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll,41-4/32 and KW of 1932. 
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What they might also have added was that the Communal 
Award had encouraged the Muslims of the city to renew the 
cry for separate electorates in the Corporation. In August 
Abul Kasem raised the issue again the legislative council, 
but when he met with no success Huseyn Suhrawardy and 
Fazl-ul Huq organised a 'monster protest meeting' in the 
1 
city on November 27. The Muslim leaders in fact had 
little room for manoeuvre on the issue being bound by 
the compromise accepted in 1923, so that when the Government 
offered them joint electorates with 19 reserved seats -
44 per cent of those allocated for open contest, or 30 
per cent of the total number of seats, when the Muslims 
compromised barely 26 per cent of the city's population3 and 
16 per cent of the registered municipal electorate4 - they 
accepted. However, Fazl-ul Huq continued to grumble that 
they should have been offered 20 seats!5 Huq's grievance 
was certainly churlish as the compromise had been worked 
out at a meeting between representatives of the Government 
. 6 
and the Praja Party from wh1ch he had been absent. 
1BLCD, Vol.XL,22.11.1932; Indian Annual Register, 1932, July-
December, p.161; Sta:r,: of India, 1932, 28 November, p.1. 
2 The total number of seats was ,48 for the non-Muslims plus 
21 reserved for the Muslims. o{~.this, however, 2 non-Muslim 
and 2 Muslim seats were for Garden Reach which was once more 
separated from the Calcutta Corporation in 1933. Thus 
excluding Garden Reach the number of elected non-Muslim 
seats was 46, and elected Muslim seats was 19. 
3census, 1931, Vol. VI, part I and II, p. 105. 
4
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1930-September 1930, 
30.7.1930, pp.883-5· 
5BLCD, Vol.XL, 16.12.32; Calcutta Corporation,Gazette, Vol. 
XIII, 1 0. 12 • 1 9 32 , p. 1 50 (b) ~ 
non-Muslim seats 46 
Muslim seats (reserved) 19 
Aldermen 5 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce 6 
Port Commission 2 
Calcutta Trades Association 4 
Nominated 10 
6 BLCD, V 1 XL 0 0 ' 1 6 • 12 • 1 9 32. 
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But the Corporation was not the sole focus of renewed 
Muslim agitation in Calcutta. The question of separate 
electorates had also influenced Muslim trade unionists, 
at least those such as Mahomed Daud who led a union comprised 
solely of Muslims,into giving increased support to the 
principle of separate representation in the hope that they 
might gain a share of the seats allotted to labour 
interests. 1 
In 1931 Huseyn Suhrawardy had attempted to wrest control 
of the Indian Seamen's Union from Daud but had failed. 2 
However, the reaction of Congress to the Round Table 
Conferences had served to alienate Daud, especially after 
the abortive session of the All-India Trade Union Congress 
at Calcutta in 1931 when Subhas Chandra Bose had sought to 
force his particular brand of socialism upon the recently 
reconciled seamen's union.3 By the end of 1932 therefore 
Daud was moving towards collaboration with the Muslim 
communal leaders who were prepared to fight the battle 
for the representation of his union in the proposed Bengal 
Legislative Assembly. However, a more important issue at 
this stage was the question of the representation of Muslim 
commercial interests, the major portion of which were 
centred upon Calcutta. 
In June 1932 the Government had indicated to Muslim 
commercial interests in Calcutta that it would consider 
giving them a seat in the proposed provincial legislative 
assembly, 4 and in August the Muslim Chamber of Commerce 
was formed in the city.5 The membership comprised the most 
important Muslim merchants, manufacturers and bankers in 
Calcutta along with 'persons engaged in or connected with 
1See page 227 and chapter 6. 
2Govt of India, Reforms Dept, 1931, KW to 35/31-R (XIV). 
3Ibid., Home Poll, 18/VI/1931; ibid., 18/X/1931. 
4Govt of India, Reforms Dept, 221/32-R of 1932. 
5Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, May 1934, File No.1R-38, 
Frogs 31-50. 
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art, science and literature', and soon accounted for some 
90 members with a capital investment in Bengal of some 
1 200 million rupees. The new organisation claimed that 
its members controlled 75 per cent of Bengal's coastal 
trade, and had the 'major interest' in the salt, raw jute, 
rice, hide and skin trades in addition to the tanning and 
shellac industries. 2 It argued therefore that it was 
'evident that for the Muslim commercial community in Bengal 
the question of representation in the [Legislative Assembly] 
is the question of life and death to their economic 
existence'.3 
An exaggerated argument perhaps, but Muslim mercantile 
interests were served poorly by the three great chambers 
of commerce which regulated the city's trade and commerce. The 
Marwari Chamber of Commerce established in 1900 was 
exclusively Marwari; 4 the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce 
established in 1887 rarely had an elected Muslim on its 
committee,5 although it held seats in various important 
bodies such as the Imperial Legislative Assembly, Bengal 
Legislative Council and the Calcutta Port Trust; whilst the 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, which had been founded in 1926, 
had barely a 10 per cent Muslim membership and was closely 
6 tied by political sympathies to Congress. 
±bid., ibid., May 1934, File no.1R-43 of 1933, Progs A3-5; 
ibid., Commerce Dept, February 1933, File no.3C-2, Progs 
B155-61. 
2Muslim Charn.ber of Commerce, Report, 1934, p.1; Bengal Govt, 
Appointments Dept, May 1934, File no.1R-38, Progs 31-50. 
3Ibid. 
4 Cotton, C.W.E., Handbook of Commercial Information for India 
( 1 92 4) ' p. 36. 
5Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, Report, 1932, p.xxii; 
Mussalman, 1927, 16 April, p.7. 
6Indian Chamber of Commerce, Report, 1926, p.1; ibid., 
~' p. 89; ibid.' ..12.1Q., pp. 68-70; ibid.' ~, pp. 47' 61. 
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There is no evidence available to indicate the 
involvement of Muslim politicians in the foundation of the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce, and it was dominated in the 
first instance by the wealthy Cutchi Memon community which 
had never been noted for its overt political activities. 1 
In its first formal committee elected in 1933, however, 
one of its vice-presidents was Ahmed Ispahani whose kinsman, 
M.A.H. Ispahani, was soon to take a prominent role in 
local politics. Also amongst its committee members were 
A.R. Siddiqui, a merchant and barrister; Mahomed Raffique, 
MLA; A.F. Rahman, MLC,and K. Nooruddin, a former Alderman 
and Nationalist Muslim, and brother-in-law of Khwaja Nazimuddin. 
The latter three had been active in municipal politics at 
various times and in addition all four had contacts with 
leading provincial politicians such as Fazl-ul Huq, 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Suhrawardies and Sir Abdur Rahim. 
The new committee represented the first public liaison 
of the Muslim professional class of Calcutta with the 
wealthiest section of the Muslim mercantile class in Bengal. 
Undoubtedly Muslim industrialists and merchants had provided 
finance and support for Muslim politicians on previous 
occasions, but this was the first time they had emerged to 
organise themselves on a definite communal basis. Their 
desire for a more prominent role in the economic fortunes 
of Bengal, and for political representation in its government, 
had precipitated them into direct action 1 and they found 
ready support from the Muslim professional class of Calcutta~ 
The concentration of wealth represented by the membership of 
the Muslim Chamber of Commerce was doubtlessly attractive 
to the Muslim political leadership, as was also the network 
of contacts which existed between the Muslim mercantile 
community of Calcutta and other important commercial centres 
such as Bombay, Karachi, Madras and Rangoon. 
1 Bengal Govt, Commerce Dept, February 1933, File no.3C~2, 
Progs B 155-61 • 
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By the end of 1932 the Muslims of Calcutta were stirring 
with renewed energy and vigour. In contrast to the 1920s 
Muslim political activity in the city had taken definite 
form around a variety of communal organisations, and large 
sections of the community were now actively involved in 
the political arena. Muslims of various economic backgrounds 
were caught up in the awakening of a separate communal 
consciousness at the political level. Through the medium 
of the Corporation, the maritime'trade unions and the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce a new unity of purpose was 
emerging within the community in which a wide variety of 
grievances and aspirations were for the first time blendred 
into a more compr.ehensive sense of communal identity4 
The Communal Award had raised the morale of the 
community, and offer~d the Muslim profess:il.tJnal and mercantile 
classes of Calcutta a chance of greater political power 
in Bengal - a chance they were determined not to lose 
despite the storm of Hindu opposition which had been 
unleashed by the Award. 
CHAPTER SIX 
UNITY AND SEPARATISM, 1932 TO 1935 
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In March 1933, amidst the furore created by the 
Communal Award, the first municipal elections under the 
systemof joint Hindu and Muslim electorates were held in 
Calcuttae 
During the previous year communal sentiment in Bengal 
had suffered a further polarisation under the impact of 
the Communal Awarde The Hindus were outraged by the proposed 
reduction of their community to a statutory minority, and 
the Muslims were grudgingly pleased by the increased 
representation granted to their community. At the same time, 
however, the Muslims were aggrieved that they had not been 
awarded an outright majority of seats in the proposed 
legislative assembly. In Calcutta the arguments for and 
against the Award raged as bitterly as in the mofussil, 
yet an important counter development in the city temporarily 
clouded the growing gulf of differences between the two 
largest communities in the city. 
Under the terms of the municipal act of 1923 the 
Musli.ms of Calcutta had gained representation through 
separate electorates for a period of 9 years. From 1933 
it was agreed that the Hindus and Muslims should share a 
common electoral role and joint electorates, though this was 
modified in 1932 to allow a degree of separate representation 
for the Muslims by means of a reservation of a set number 
of seats. 
Such an arrangement confused the electoral activities 
of the Muslim leaders in the city for the Hindu vote had now 
to be considered. Admittedly the municipal and provincial 
organisations of Congress were divided by factional disputes 
which helped render their influence increasingly ineffective, 
but even in its debilitated state Congress possessed more 
effective means of mass organisation than any Muslim 
political body. Indeed, Congress was a factor to be.considered 
by all Muslims who aspired to the post of Corporation councillor. 
On the Hindu side also the Muslim vote could not be 
discounted; not necessari.ly because of any altruistic 
motives, but rather out of the practicalities engendered 
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by the power struggle within the provincial Congress. The 
two main factions in Congress were gathered about Sen-Gupta 
and Dr B.C. Roy, and both haphazardly sought the support 
of sympathetic Muslim candidates in the municipal elections. 
Their objective was to increase the voting strength of 
their particular blocs in anticipation of the vital vote 
for mayor, which followed the general municipal elections. 
II 
Prior to the elections the Muslim leaders of Calcutta, 
and indeed of the province, participated in a round of 
complicated manoeuvres calculated to rouse electoral support. 
I 
In November 1932 'a group of young, energetic, patriotic 
and progressive men' met in Calcutta, under the leadership 
of Khwaja Nooruddin, Mujibur Rahman and M.AoH,.Ispahani, 
and formed the New Muslim Majlis. 1 The immediate aims of 
this organisation were to sponsor a bloc of Muslim candidates 
for the election, to secure 'the just rights of Muslims 
in the Calcutta Corporation', and to join hands 'with 
progressive and nationalist bodies' to gain freedom for 
India. 2 
Until recently Nooruddin, brother-in-law of the east 
Bengali zamindar and politician Khwaja Nazimuddin, had been 
a supporter of the Nationalist Muslims. The unwillingness 
of Congress to face the communal problem and the furore 
which greeted the Communal Award, however, had alienated 
him from any close contact with the main body of the nationalist 
movement. In addition his experiences in the Corporation 
during the last few years had doubtless convinced him of 
the necessity of forming a distinct communal group to 
1
star of India, 1934, 6 Oc.tober, p.9; Ispahani, M.A.H., 
Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him ( 1966), p. 4. 
2Ibid. 
represent the Muslims in the municipality. Along with a 
similarly disillusioned Nationalist Muslim, Mujibur 
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Rahman, who edited .the Mussalman, Nooruddin sought to offer 
the Muslims an alternative to the political stand of 
Congress on the one hand and the growing isolationism of 
the extreme communalists on the other. 1 Unlike Nooruddin 
and Rahman, however 9 Ispahani had not previously been 
involved in politics. He was the younger son of a wealthy 
merchant family of Persian origin which had settled in 
Calcutta at the turn of the century, having made a fortune 
in the indigo trade of southern India. After several years 
at Cambridge during the 1920s Ispahani had subsequently 
managed the London office of the family business before 
he returned to Calcutta in 1931. 2 
Ispahani appears to have been initially attracted to 
the New Muslim Majlis because of its forward looking policy: 
it identified strongly with the proclaimed political goals 
of' Congress, particularly Swaraj, yet it also clearly 
enunciated communal demands. The voice of the Nationalist 
Muslims had been rendered ineffective within Congress by 
the indifference of its Hindu leaders; whilst the anti-
Congress and more communalist Muslim leaders had largely 
abandoned their anti-British and anti-bureaucratic stand 
in exchange for a: negativ~ policy of anti-Hinduism. The 
Majlis was established to provide the Muslims with their 
own distinctive platform as part of the nationalist struggle, 
and was .largely the response of the younger members of the 
Muslim mercantile elite of Calc'utta against the intransigence 
of Congress and the overweening influence of the Ashraf 
leaders from the mofussil. 
Other Muslim organisations and groups, however, soon 
emerged in Calcutta to rival the New Muslim Majlis. Early 
in February 1933 Huseyn Suhrawardy along with Abul Kasem; 
1 Ibid. , p • 5. 
2 For further details of the family seep. 123. 
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Mahomed Raffique, a Corporation councillor; Mohsin Khan, 
secretary of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee; Khwaja Abdul 
Gani, a wealthy merchant of Park Circus and a supporter of 
the trade unionist Mahomed Daud; and Mujibur Rahman, formed 
the Calcutta Muslim Association as an alternative to the 
M .1. 1 aJ 1s. 
Unlike the la:tter body the new association was not 
noticeably nationalistic in outlook: rather it made an 
issue of defending the Communal Award and separate electorates 
whilst denouncing both the British and the Hindus. 2 Indeed, 
it was on the issue of separate electorates that Mujibur 
Rahman defected from the Majlis. Initially it was prepared 
to accept joint electorates in Calcutta as a fait accompli, 
and was willing to enter into negotiations with Congress 
over the Communal Award. 3 
One side effect of Rahman's defection was the closure 
of the Mussalman, which had latterly been financed by 
members of the New Muslim Majlis. -4 Early in 1933 it was 
replaced by the English-language daily, Star of India, which 
was l.avishly financed by A .. H. Ghuznavi and several anonymous 
and wealthy merchants from Calcutta.5 The new journal 
supported Suhrawardy 1 s association,6 and achieved rapid 
popu.lari ty at the expense of the Muss'alman, which languished 
for want of finance and Rahman's editorial skills, 
In addition to the two new groupings of Muslim leaders 
at least three others emerged to put forward candidates. 
The largest of these centred upon a number of Nationalist 
1 Star of India,1933, 6 February,p.S; .ibid., 20 February, p.5. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ispahani, M.A.H., op.cit. 
4Mussalman, 1932, 11 November, p.2. 
5Indian Annual Register, 1933, July-December, p.211. 
6
star of India, 1933, 28 March, p.S. 
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Muslims, amongst whom were Shamsud.dinAhmed, Abd.ur Razzack, 
Mahomed Hashem, S.M. Yaqub, Jallalud.d.in Hashemy,. Mahomed 
Ali Khan and M.M. Huq, all of whom had been Corporation 
- -
councillors and protagonists of the nationalist cause during 
the 1920s. The se<cond group comprised men such as M.M. 
Momin, a wealthy Bengali businessman and an ex-municipal 
commissioner of Chittagong, and A.K. Fazl-ul Huq, both of 
whom were distinguished from previously mentioned groups 
by the nature of the support they received from the Hindu 
community. 
In their bid for electoral success the candidates of 
the New Muslim Majlis - Nooruddin, Ispahani, A.K.M. Zakariah, 
a prosperous merchant with extensive business interests in 
S.E. Asia, Dr R. Ahmed, a physician and former Nationalist 
Muslim journalist, and Abdul Baset, a Bengali-speaking 
merchant from Beniapukur in ward XIX - had secured the support 
1 
of the Roy faction in Congress. The Nationalist Muslims 
on the other hand remained loyal to the Sen-Gupta faction 
which also supported Huq and Momin against candidates .of 
the New-Muslim Majlis and Ashraf leaders from.the mofussil. 2 
Further loose groups of candidates also vied for 
seats: for example Fazlur Rahman, a former Corporation 
councillor and trade union o·rganiser, and Syed Ahmed Ali, 
a relative of the east Bengali politician Nawab Faroqui, 
both of whom received the support of Khwaja Nazimuddin and 
the British Municipal Electors' Committee which had been 
recently formed by the European electoral body.3 In addition 
there were a large number of independent candidates who 
ranged in prominence from the former Swarajist Mahabubal 
Huque to .the obscure Arabic teacher Mahomed Tahir. 
1Ibid., 3 August, p.4. 
2 . 4 Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XVII, March 1933, 
supplement. 
3star of India, 1933, 28 March, p.4. 
Broadly speaking the Muslim candidates were divided 
into three categories: independents; those alligned with 
various factions in Congress; and lastly those who stood 
as the representatives of purely communal organisations 
and coteries led by men such as Huseyn Suhrawardy and the 
Ashraf politicians from the mofussil. The alliance of a 
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large number of Muslim candidates with Congress was not 
symptomatic of a revived communal rapprochement, but was 
rather indicative of the pragmatism of men such as Huq and 
Ispahani who realised that for the present Congress held 
the key to success in the municipal elections. In addition 
personal alignments were also guided by the rivalries which 
existed between men such as Huq and Suhrawardy - and even 
between the ex-Nationalist Muslims- so that on the eve of 
the elections former critics of Congress such as Huq were 
championed by factions of that party along with former 
Nationalist Muslims such as Nooruddin. On the other hand 
some of its Muslim supporters of longest standing, for 
example, Mujibur Rahman and Mahabubul Huque, bad aligned 
themselves with the more intransigent opponents of Congress. 
The divisions amongst the Muslim candidates were in 
fact more a reflection of the factions which existed within 
the community independently of Congress, rather than of any 
deep-seated differences in political outlook: for above 
ev,erything else all the candidates stood for the defence and 
extension of Muslim interests. 
In the municipal elections, which were held in March 
1933, the largest number of reserved Muslim seats went to 
candidates supported by the Sen-Gupta faction. They gained 
seven seats in the first count and eight in the second when 
the election of Abdul Baset to ward XIX was set aside in 
1 favour of Fazl-ul Huq. Seven o·f the eight elected, with the 
1Ibid., 3 August, p.4; Calcutta Corporation,Gazette, Vol. 
XVII, 4 March 1933, supplement; ibid., 22 April 1933, p.976; 
ibid., Vol.XVIII, 22 July 1933, p.404; ibid., 3 August, 1933, 
p.517. Those elected: Shamsuddin Ahmed, S.M. Yaqub, 
M.A. Momin, M.M.Huq, Mahomed Ali Khan, Abdur Razzack, 
S.M. Hashem, 
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exclusion of Momin who defeated Syed Ahmed Ali one of 
Khwaja Nazimuddin's proteges, were former Corporation 
councillors, and only one candidate sponsored by the Sen-
Gupta faction- Syed Jalaluddin Hashemy, MLC -was defeated. 
The second largest group of successful candidates was that 
which comprised the six independents amongst whom was the 
doyen of the Muslim community of Garden Reach, Unsud 
Dowla, and a retired army officer from Park Circus, Captain 
Dabiruddin Ahmed. Ahmed had be en a nominated member of the 
Corporation since 1928, and in the elections defeated Fazlur 
Rahman another protege of Khwaja Nazimuddin. The remaining 
independent candidates were all obscure figures about 
1 
whom little is known or remembered nevertheless, they 
defeated rival candidates of localJ: prominence such as 
Mahabubul Huq~e and the former councillors Mahomed Solaiman 
and Dr Mahomed Hossain. 
Of the remaining seats four went to candidates sponsored 
by Suhrawardy 1 s Calcutta Muslim Association, 2 whilst three 
went to candidates of the New Muslim Majlis, namely M.A.H. 
Ispahani, A.K.M. Zakariah and Dr R. Ahmed. 
K. Nooruddin,leader of the Majlis, had stood for 
election but was defeated in ward XIV by Shamsul Huque, a 
member of the Calcutta Muslim Association. However, after 
the elections Nooruddin was elected Alderman with the~~upport 
!7 
of Dr B.C. Roy's faction which had won the maJority of open 
seats in the Corporation. 3 
Superficially the election results would seem to have 
been a rebuff for the communalist cause amongst the Muslims, 
yet was this so? The Calcutta Muslim Association fielded 
four candidates and secured four seats, whereas the avowedly 
pro-nationalist New Muslim Majlis, which put forward a 
1Hafez Aminuddin, Basar Ali, Mahomed Muslim, Dr,S. Hossain. 
2The former councillors Mahomed Raffique, Mahomed Akbar, 
Shamsul Huque and s.z. Ahmed. 
3star of India~ 1933,28 April, p.4; Calcutta Corporation, 
Gazette, Vol.XVII, 29 Apri.l. 1933, p. 1007. 
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similar number of candidates, gained three seats and lost 
one to the Calcutta Muslim Association. In addition amongst 
the successful candidates supported by a Congress faction 
were included men such as Fazl-ul Huq and Momin both of 
whom were champions of communal rights and critics of 
Congress, though admittedly not of the nationalist goal of 
independence. Of more immediate importance, however, was 
the failure of candidates put forward by Ashraf leaders 
from the mofussil such as Nawab Faroqui and Khwaja Nazimuddin 
to gain election, and the return of so many former 
councillors. Eleven of the newly-elected councillors had 
sat in the previous council where, Nationalist and communalist 
alike, they had united to form the first distinct Muslim 
bloc in the history of the Corporation. 
The return of so many former councillors would seem 
to indicateavo~ of approval for the development of a 
communal sense of identity within the Corporation, along 
with the rejection of interference in the affairs of the 
urbanised Muslim community by their co-religionists in the 
mofussil. The vote was a victory for the Muslim mercantile 
class of Calcutta who amply illustrated their independence 
of the mofussil, disdain for the allies of the bureaucracy 
and wariness of Congress by returning a majority of members 
from their own class along with men such as Fazl-ul Huq, 
Momin, Suhrawardy and Ispahani, who _were critics of the 
bureaucracy and Congress, and champions of the communal 
cause, albeit in differing degrees. 
The tenuous nature of the various Muslim electoral 
alliances was made clear immediately after the elections 
when the struggle for position of mayor occp:rred in April. 
The majority of Muslim councillors appear to have sunk 
their differences and decided to use their increased voting 
strength in the Corporation to elect a .Muslim mayor, with the 
support of the European bloc and the non-Swara.jist Hindus. 1 
1
star of India, 1933, 10 April, p.5; ibid., 12 April, p.1; 
ibid., 29 April, p.1. 
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Momin emerged as the favourite, and the Muslims were confident 
of success particularly as the rival Congress factions 
appeared unable to agree on a .joint candidate. 1 
At the last moment, however, Congress united to 
sponsor S.K. Basu as mayor, and, with the vote of four 
Nationalist Muslims 2 and a dissident member of the Majlis, 3 
he was elected. In addition at the subsequent election for 
the position of deputy-mayor another candidate of Congress -
Abdur Razzack - was elected in place of Mahomed Raffique 
who had received the majority of Muslim votes. 4 
These elections provoked a bitter outcry in the Muslim 
press led by the Star of India, 5 and in the succeeding 
months of 1933' the Muslim bloc in the Corporation began to 
exhibit a new cohesion and unity in a determined effort to 
use the full force of its inc:fea·sed representation. In 
June Momin resigned from the Finance Standing Committee in 
protest against the paucity of Muslim representation in all 
the standing committees, and later in the month he was 
followed by three Nationalist Muslims - S.M. Yaqub, Shamsuddin 
Ahmed and Mahomed Ali Khan - who resigned from the Services 
Standing Committee after they had failed to persuade the 
Hindu councillors to agree to fix a percentage rate of 
Muslim recruitment and employment by the Corporation. 6 
The action of the Nationalist Muslims was particularly 
noteworthy as until April they had been strongly attached 
to the Sen-Gupta faction in Congress, but throughout 1933 
1Ibid., 20 April, p.5. 
2 Mahomed Ali Khan, Abdur Razzack, Shamsuddin Ahmed and S.Mo 
Yaqub. 
3Abdul Baset. 
4
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1933-September 1933, 
2 9. 4. 19 3 3' pp. 1 -8 . 
5star of India, 1933, 13 May, p.5. 
6 Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1933-September 1933, 
7.6.1933, pp.285-99; ibid., 7o8o1933, p.813. 
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disillusiorunent with the organisation permeated their ranks. 
There was a noticeable tendency for them to identify more 
closely with exponents of the communal cause such as the 
leaders of the Majlis and men such as Fazl-ul Huq, whilst 
at the same time they continued to proclaim their 
nationalist sympathies. The relentless attacks of Hindu 
leaders upon the Communal Award, which newspapers such as 
Sen-Gupta's Advance denounced as 'the result of a well laid 
conspiracy [and] intended for the purpose of thwarting 
India's freedom movement', and the constant dismissal of 
1 
communal differences as 1 not the essential problem',-· made 
the position of the Nationalist Muslims untenable. 
In addition the persistent refusal of the Hindu bloc 
in the Corporation to discuss the grievances of the Muslims 
regarding employment roused widespread Muslim resentment 
in the city. Popular protest meetings were organised by 
Haji Mahomed Akbar, councillor and 'Fruit King of Calcutta', 
and were an obvious indication to the Nationalist Muslims of 
the strength of feeling amongst their co-religionists in 
the city. 2 Further signs of the direction which Muslim 
sentiment in Calcutta was taking were not wanting: the 
membership of the New Muslim Majlis swelled to several 
thousand during the year, and was drawn mainly from the educated 
Muslim youth of the city especia.J_ly after the Majlis opened 
an employment bureau for them in May 1933?_whilst later in 
the year Huseyn Suhrawardy, Abul Kasem and A.K. Ghuznavi 
attracted crowds of more than 10,000 when they held rallies 
4 in support of the Communal Award. 
The exasperation of the Muslims with the Hindus, inside 
and outside the Corporation, mounted and was typified by 
a letter which Fazl-ul Huq wrote to the Statesman in October 
1NNR, 1934, 19 January, Advance. 
2 Star of India~ 1933, 20 May, p.4; ibid.,- 22 May, p.4. 
3Ibid., 25 May, p.3: no exact membership figures are given. 
4Ibid., 7 November, p.5; Statesman, 1933, 5 October, p.9. 
when he stated that: 
I am prepared to bEl hanged if I cannot demonstrate 
to the satisfaction of any judge that the Hindus 
of Bengal constitute the very personification of 
communalism based on intense selfishness. 1 
The New Muslim Majlis took a leading role in the 
agitation concerning the employment of Muslims by the Corpor-
ation. In May 1933 they had organised an employment bu~eau 
for younger educated Muslims, to counter the claim of Hindu 
spokesmen that the limited number of Muslim employees in 
the service of the municipality was due to the absence of 
literate and qualified Muslim applicants. Also in 
succeeding months the Majlis carried on a propaganda 
through the columns of the Star of India, 2 and organised a 
series of rallies to air Muslim demands.3 
Muslims of all factions joined hands to support the 
Majlis, and, on November 19 at the Town Hall, the leaders of 
the organisation, along with Momin, Abdul Karim, Abul Kasem, 4 
G.H.C. Ariff, Mahomed Raffique, Shamsuddin Ahmed, Mahomed 
Akbar and Huseyn Suhrawardy, issued a joint statement which 
condemned the attitude of the Corporation towards the Muslim 
community. 5 Early in December 19 Muslim councillors, who 
had all attended the Town Hall meeting, called upon the 
mayor and formally requested that a special meeting of the 
Corporation should be held to consider the question of Muslim 
employment. 6 
The dispute dragged on into 1934. The Muslim councillors, 
under the leadership of Momin, demanded a 50 per cent reser-
vation of recruitment for their community until Muslims 
filled one third of the positions offered by the Corporation, 7 
1Ibid., 12 October, p.6. 
2 E.g. Star of India, 1933, 22 September, p.1. 
3Ibid., 16 November, p.10. 
4In 1933 he was nominated by the Government to the Corporation. 
5calcutta Corporation, Ga~ette, Vol.XIX, 2.12.1933,.p.117. 
6 Ibid. 1 'Minutes', October 1933-March 1934, 22.12.1933, p.1600. 
?Ibid., 9.12.1933, pp.1970-80. 
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whilst the Hi.ndus countered this argument with the bald 
declaration that the 'Muslims of Calcutta were mainly Urdu-
speakers with no right to be consideved 1 • 1 However, in 
February 1934, the Muslims finally managed to force a vote 
on the proposal, and though they voted as a bloc, with the 
exception of Zakariah who abstained, they were defeated on 
the grounds that the proposal 'would be ill-advised and 
injudicious on broad general grounds of policy and would 
also be hardly practicable R. 2 
The role of the Corporation in the political life of 
the Muslims of Calcutta had radically altered by the early 
1930s. In the years immediately following the Great War 
it had been the forum of elitist politiqs with the mass of 
pol.i tically active Muslims in the city more interested in 
the nationalist agitation than in the municipal debates. 
By the 1930s, however, nationalist politics were an integral 
part of the discussions within the Corporation where the 
representatives of the various communities were no longer 
the spokesmen for elitist communal sub-groups, but rather 
were men with a far broader basis of support in the city. 
IV 
One of the most distinctive features of Muslim political 
l.ife in Calcutta during 1933 wa·s the strengthening and 
solidarity of the distinct Muslim bloc in the Corporation. 
At the time of the elections the community had appeared 
hopelessly divided once more, but under the impact .of 
disputes concerning the Communal Award and the failure to 
gain concessions from the Corporation a growing sehse of 
unity began to permeate the ranks of Muslim leadership. 
1Ibid., 9.1.1934, p.2082. 
2Ibid., 1.2.1934, p.2248. 
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The New Muslim Maj.lis provided the nucleus around 
which this occurred. Originally led by men with declared 
nationalist sympathies, the Majlis had vainly sought to 
work with Congress, but it soon fell victim to the factional 
disputes within that organisation which so often made its 
sponsorship of the Muslim cause inconsistent and erratic. 
The Nationalist Muslims found themselves in a similar 
position, as did mavericks such as Huq and Momin, with the 
end result that the rivalries and political differences 
which separated such groups palled in significance when 
compared with the increasing gulf between the interests of 
the Muslims and Congress. 
In retrospect it is tempting to read into this 
situation~ a history of two well-defined hostile camps which 
were moving apart fast in sympathies and aspirations; but 
the story is much more complex than this. A genuine and 
widespread sympathy for nationalist goals existed amongst 
Muslims as did a strong anti-British sentiment. 1 But Muslim 
sentiment was also compounded by the determination of the 
leaders of the community that the Muslims in Bengal should 
enjoy the political and economic benefits of their numerical 
superiority, and the reaction which this determin:tion stirred 
in the ranks of the Hindu elite. In Calcutta men such as. 
Momin, Ispahani, Huq, Nooruddin and various Nationalist 
Muslims sought at different times to achieve the demands of 
their community through collaboration with Congress, but in 
the Corporation and legislative council such attempts failed 
with monotonous regularity. 
In many ways the Communal Award, and the intransigent 
attitude which was adopted towards it by the majority of 
Hindu leaders, marked the point at which the interests of 
the two communities proved irreconcilable. The Award 
boosted the morale of the Muslims in Bengal, and it precipi-
tated the community's leaders into efforts to increase its 
1 . 
Govt of India~ Home Poll, 39/11/33: 1933 report on Musli.m 
sentiment in Bengal. 
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representation in the proposed. provincial' legislative 
assembly by securing a number of seats reserved. for special 
interests such as labour and. commerce. The obvious 
opportunities for political advancement, which were offered. 
by the Communal Award., were sufficient at this time to 
convince the leaders of the Muslim community in Calcutta 
and. Bengal of the urgent need. for united. communal action. 
The bankruptcy of the shadow play of factional po.li tics 
which they had. indulged. in during the previous decade was 
apparent to all, as was the realisation of the need. for 
greater Muslim nni ty in Bengal. 
The initial impact of the Communal Award. upon the 
political life of Calcutta bad. been minimised. by the 
implementation of the revised. electoral proced.u~e for the 
Corporation which ushered. in a short-lived. period. of Hindu-
Muslim political co-operation: by the end. of 1933 this had 
passed., however, and. the Communal Award. proved. a bond. which 
helped. nnite the Muslim community and. divide it from Congress. 
In the Corporation by late 1933 the Muslim Majlis, 
with its growing network of ward. associations in the city, 1· 
gathered. the majority of Muslim councillors under its wing. 
Meanwhile outside the Corporation and. within the Presidency 
Muslim League, the Muslim Chamber of Commerce and. the trade 
union movement old. riva.lries were being healed., or at least 
qamouflaged., and. Muslim activists were stirring to secure 
the benefits of the Communal Award. for their community. 
At the Horwah session of the All-India Muslim League, 
held. in October 19·33, Huq appeared. on the, platform 'and. was 
2 greeted. with rapturous cheers', in contrast to the jeers 
which had. driven him from the same organisation in 1921.3 
Huq 1 s speech was mainly a condemnation of the activities of 
1 Star of India, 1934, 6 October, p. 9. 
2Ibid.., 1933, 23 October, p.4. 
3see pages 110-11. 
the Hindu Mahasabha, and of the Communal Award for not 
providing the Muslims of Bengal with a statutory majority 
in the legislative assembly. He was joined on the platform 
by Abu.l Kasem, a former friend from whom he had been 
alienated since the provincial elections in 1926, 1 Sir 
Abdur Rahim, the Nawab of Dacca, Sir A.K. Ghuznavi and the 
2 doyen of the Suhrawardy family, Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy. 
In their speeches both Huq and Kasem stated that the Muslims 
were prepared, despite some dissatisfaction, to accept the 
Communal Award, and warned the Government not to yield to 
threats of the Hindus who were making every possible attempt 
to 'gradually wipe Mussalmans out' • 3 
The Advance, newspaper of the Se:~m-Gupta faction, 
dismissed the meeting as unrepresentative of the Muslims of 
Bengal and warned the community against 'being bamboozled 
by the foolish threats and challenges of men such as Kasem 
and Ghuznavi1• 4 But there can be little doubt that in gen,eral 
terms the resentment expressed at the meeting was felt by 
most l.eaders of the Muslim community in Bengal and Calcutta. 
What the Advance failed to observe was that on the 
p.latform at the Howrah meeting were representatives of the 
Muslims of Calcutta and of the mofussil. Not only had 1933 
witnessed a growing cohesion amongst the Muslim leadership 
of Calcutta but it was also a year in which the bonds 
between the city and mofussil were streng.thened. The Muslim 
merchants and professional men of Calcutta were not unaware 
that the politics of the Corporation offelred, them limited 
scope and that, if they were to make any impact upon the 
1 See page 184. 
2
star of India, 1933, 23 October, p.4. 
3Ibid., 26 October, p.9; Indian Annual Register, 1933, July-
December, p.211. 
4 NNR, 1933, 24 October, Advance. 
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politics of Bengal, they needed to enter the larger arena 
of provinci.al politics. However, just as the Muslims of 
Calcutta needed the numerical support of their co-religionists 
elsewhere in Bengal, the Muslims of the mofussil were 
conscious of the need to secure the impressive financial 
resources and expertise of the Muslim mercantile and 
professional classes in the city. 
In ~ovember the Presidency Muslim LefOl.gue held its 
annual session to elect office-bearers. Admittedly the 
meeting rejected the Communal Award and separate electorates 
but in the latter case only in favour of joint electorates 
based upon universal sufferage, which would have secured 
a Muslim majority vote. 1 What was more important about the 
meeting 9 however, was the composition of the elected committee: 
it incl.uded representatives of all the Muslim factions who 
had participated in the earlier municipal elections, many of 
whom had been bitter personal rivals for years. The president 
was the elderly Moulvi Abdul Karim, and amongst the vice-
presidents were Fazl-ul Huq, Momin and the ex-Nationalist Muslims 
Maniruzzaman Islamabadi, Akram ·Khan and,. Mujibur Rahman. Other 
office-bearers included Dr R. Ahmed of the Muslim Majlis, 
Akram Khan's son Moulvi Khairul Anam Khan, Abdur Raschid 
Khan and S. Zaman, both of whom were employed by the 
Corporation in executive posi tions''and had been proteges of 
rival factions in Congress. Other committee members included 
K. Nooruddin 9 Shamsuddin Ahmed, Jalaluddin Hashemy, MLC, 
and M.A.H, Ispahani. 2 
The denunciation of the Communal Award by the Presidency 
Muslim League was different.in.tone from that of its all-
India parent bo9.y. In essence, however, both rejected the 
·'-..- '-
idea of the Muslims being maintained as a statutory minority 
in the proposed legislative assembly, and the differences 
1Indian Annual Register, 1933, July-December, pp.217-18; 
Statesman, 1933, 30 November, p.19. 
2
..s.tar of India, 1933, 29 November, p.12. 
between the two were more apparent than real. Further 
support for the Award was forthcoming from other Muslim 
groups in Calcutta during 1933 when the Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce and the Muslim maritime trade unions made moves 
towards gaining representation in the new provincial assembly -
moves which were supported by a cross-section of Muslim 
leaders in the hope that the total Muslim representation in 
the assembly would be increased. 
v 
The lascar population of the Calcutta region in 1933 
stood at approximate.ly 55,000 ,... all of whom were Muslim. 
over 23,000 of these men were organised into five unions: 
Just 
the Indian Seamen's Union (ISU) with 15,000 members; the 
Bengal Mariners' Union (BMU) with 5,000 members; the Indian 
Quartermasters 1 Union (IQU); the Indian Seamen's League (ISL) 
and the Indo-Asiatic Seamen's Committee (IASC) which had a 
combined membership of nearly 3,500o 1 The BMU, ISU and IQU 
were in effect a federation of unions under the leadership of 
Mahomed Daud and Aftab Ally, but throughout 1933 and 1934 
a.ll three were dogged by disputes which weakened their unity: 
first with Joshi's National Trade Union Federation and then 
wi.th rival claimants f'or leadership such as Huseyn Suhrawardy. 
Nevertheless, all three were united in their demand for 
separate representation in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, 
and in Septemberc'1933 they submitted a joint memorandum to 
the Government. They claimed five of the eight seats set 
aside for labour representatives in the provincial assembly 
plus one seat in the~Imperial Legislative Assembly 'for the 
2 
seafaring community of Bengal' - a somewhat exaggerated claim 
1 Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, October 1934, File no.1R-54, 
Progs A43-54. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll, File no.18/x/1933 of 1933; ibid., 
Reforms Dept, File no.221/32-R of 19j2. 
in view of the :fact that the Muslim seamen constituted 
barely 11 per cent of the labour population which the 
provincial government proposed to enfranchise. 1 
250 
The unions' organisation and bargaining power were 
weakened by the dj_sput es which wracked them during 1933 
and 1934, and, whi.ch :led to a temporary multiplication of 
rival ux1ions. In ~Turte 1933 dissident members of the BMU, 
supported by Joshi, established a rival union, the Inland 
Mariners' and Waterside Workers' Union, and succeeded in 
getting the BMU disaffiliated from. the provincial committee 
of the Na tiona.l Trade Union Federation although it remained 
2 
a member of the central body. In the following November 
further defections occurred when Huseyn Suhrawardy caused 
a split in the ISU and IQU by challenging the leadership 
of Aftab A:ll.y, a former Nationalist Muslim, and established 
a rival IQU.J At the Bombay session of the National Trade 
Union Federation in December 1933 Daud forced a confrontation 
with Joshi over the incident concerning the disaffiliation 
of the Bengal Mariners' Union 'the previous June. Daud 
rejected Joshi's leadership as 'undemocratic', withdrew 
the BMU from the all-India body and, with the support of 
several other dissatisfied unions from. the coalfields of 
Bengal and Bihar, he formed the All-India Trade Union 
Federation with: 1 The avowed policy [of co-operation] with 
Government and employers' organisations with a view to 
establishing harmonious relations between the employers and 
4 the employed. ' 
In the same month the rival Indian Quartermasters' 
Union founded by Huseyn Suhrawardy was reconciled with the 
parent body under the presidency of Suhrawardy. 5 From this 
1Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, October 1934, File no. 1R-54, 
Progs A43-54. 
2Govt of Indi.a, Home Poll, File no., 18/VII/1933 of 1933 .. · 
3Ibid., 18/XI/1933 of 1933o 
4Tb:!d., 18/I/1934 of 1934; Star of India, 1934, 5 January, 
Po9o 
5Govt of India, Home Poll, File no.18/I/1934 of 1934. 
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stage onwards he emerged as an important~ if controversial, 
figure amongst the Muslim trade unionists in Ca.lcutta. 
During 1934 the breach between the federation of 
unions, which included the BMU, ISU and IQU 9 and the 
National Trade Union Federation was healed. The rival Inland 
Mariners' and Waterside Workers' Union was formally 
amalgamated with the Bengal. Mariners 1 Union in September 
1934 1 1 and the various maritime trade unions were reaffiliated 
with Joshi's all-India organisation. But by April 1935, 
fo.llowing the unification of the All-India Trade Union 
Congress and the National Trade Union Federation on a 
2 distinctly socialist platfprm1 the reconciliation was in 
ruins. 
The final break was in part due to the activities of 
Huseyn Suhrawardy, following his election as president of 
the Indian Quartermasters' Union i.n December 1933, and of 
the Ind.ian Seamen's Union late in 1934.3 His position was 
further strengthened by the support he received from Fazl-ul 
Huq, who was patron of the Bengal Mariners' Union in 1934, 4 
as well. as founder-president of the Indian Seamen 1 s Welfare 
League - a small seamen's saving cooperative - which he 
placed under Suhrawardy 1 s direction early in 1935. 5 
Like Daud, who was now in retirement, Suhrawardy was 
wary of union invol.vement in the nationalist movement. But 
unlike Daud he was more overtly communal in sympathies and 
conservative in social outlook: for example, when he 
attacked the labour programme of Congress in 1934 he stated 
that the 
1Ibid., 18/X/1934 of 1934; Joshi Papers, File no.81, letter 
dated 6.1.1935. 
2Govt of India, Home Poll, File no.18/IV/1935 of 1935. 
3 Ibid., 18/VI/1935 of 1935. 
4Ibid., 18/VIII/1935 of 1935. 
5Ibid., 18/V/1935 of 1935; Joshi Papers, File no.81, 
letter dated 6.1.1935. 
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Moslems of Bengal ••• did not have any sympathy 
with a movement which might tend to upset the 
existing social structure •••. They must have a 
definite .labour and agriculturalist policy which 
at the same time would be bas1d on the continuance 
of the present social system. 
Proof of Suhrawardy's increasing influence came in 
December 1934 when he successful.ly negotiated the settlement 
of a strike which included 6,000 stevedores at the Calcutta 
docks. The strike had been organised by the Port and Dock 
Workers' Union, a communist-controlled union which had been 
formed in March 1934 to rival the Dockers' Union led by 
2 Aftab Ally. Ally's organisation had been supported by 
Congress, and Suhrawardy stole a march on both unions when 
he negotiated a settlement and led most of their members 
into. his own Calcutta Dockers' Union. He bitterly denounced 
tb.e 'Red Flag' Port and Dock Workers' Union, and declared 
that his own union was to work 'for the furtherance of 
healthy relations between employers and workers' .3 Part 
of his success lllldoubtedly was also due to the concern he 
disp.layed for unemployment amongst the lascars and stevedores 
of Calcutta of whom 59;000 out of 172,000 were unemployed in 
19 35. 4 
But Suhrawardy 1 s success drew the envy of his rivals 
in the trade union movement, especially those of more 
pronounced nationalist sympathies, and in July 1935 Jalalluddin 
Hashemy arid Fa.iz Ahmed defected from the Indian Quartermas-
ters' Union to form the National Quartermasters' Union.5 
Suhrawardy's anti-socialist outlook and his opposition to 
1 Statesman, 1934, 5 July, p.16. 
2 Govt of India, 
of 1934; .ibid., 
P•7• 
Home Poll, 1934, File no.12/5; ibid., 12/5/34 
18/XII/1934; Star of India, 1934, 15 January, 
3Govt of India, Home Poll, File no.18/VI/1935 of 1935; ibid., 
18/I/1935 of 1935. 
4Ibid., 18/VI/1935 of 1935; Saksena, E.N., Seamen in India 
(1951), p.25. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll, Fi1.e no.18/VI/1935 of 1935. 
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social change had alienated the nationalist sympathisers 
amongst the Muslim trade unionists, particularly after 
April 1935 when the All-India Trade Union Congress and 
the National Trade Union Federation had been reconciled and 
had jointly condemned Congress for being socially reactionary. 1 
Both union organisations had immediately sought to conciliate 
the former Nationalist Muslims and Hashemy had been appointed 
secretary of the Bengal committee of the All-India Trade 
2 Union Congress. 
Suhrawardy's position was further complicated by a 
resurgence of the rivalry between himself and Fazl-ul Huq. 
In July 1935 Suhrawardy's influence in the Bengal Mariners' 
Union was undermined when Huq and Faiz Ahmed were elected· 
president and secretary respectively to replace the Nawab 
of Dacca and other office-bearers who shared Suhrawardy's 
conservative social views. 3 In addition the union was 
reaffiliated to the National Trade Union Federation. 4 
Suhrawardy still controlled the Indian Quartermasters' Union 
and the Calcutta Dockers' Union,5 but their combined member-
ship amongst the 5,000 Muslim stevedores and 55,000 lascars 
in the Calcutta area was limited, and it in no way compared 
with the large number of registered members of the other 
Muslim maritime trade unions. 6 When the Government finally 
allocated Mus.lim maritime unions representation. in the 
provincial assembly the Calcutta Dockers' Union and the 
Indian Quartermasters' Union were excl.uded from the electorate 
which comprised the membership of the Bengal Mariners' Union 
a:q.d the Indian Seamen's Union. 7 
1Ibid., 18/IV/1935 of 1935. 
2l b i d • ' 1 8 /X I 1 9 3 5 0 f 1 9 3 5 • 
3Ibid. , 18/VII/.19 35 of 19 35; Bengal Govt, Administration 
Report, 1935-36, p.XXVIII. 
4National Trade Union Federation, Report of the Third Annual 
Session, Calcutta, 1937, p.47. 
5Govt of India, Home Poll, File no.18/VII/1935 of 1935. 
6Bengal Govt, Appointments Dept, October 1934, File no.1R-34, 
Progs A43-lJ.4; ibid., Commerce Dept, February 1936, File no. 
2R-14, Progs B1-4. 
7Ibid., Appointments Dept, December 1936, File no.1R-362, 
Progs B584-86. 
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The decision was a great victory for Huq, who by this 
time had assumed the role of general patron to all the 
maritime trade unions in Calcutta, and it helped broaden 
the basis of his popular support in the city. The exclusion 
of Suhrawardy had curta;i_led the influence of,~ tp.e socially-
conservative Muslim faction within the city;·· and secured 
for Huq the support of the more socially radical Muslims 
who filled many of the top positions in the unionSv 
However,although the elimination of Suhrawardy marked 
a defeat for the cause of the socially-conservative Muslims, 
the recognition of the special political interests of the 
unions was a victory_ for the communal cause in general. 
The representation of the unions in the proposed legislative 
assembly bound further groups within the Muslim community 
to the defence of communal interests. Whilst the addition 
of a large number of nationalist sympathisers to Huq's 
following may have helped radicalise his own interest in 
social change and uplift, there can be little doubt that 
in turn the necessity of defending their claims to special 
representation bound such Muslims c.loser to the communal 
cause and set them further apart from the supra-communal 
nationalism preached by Congress. 
Along with the Muslim maritime trade unions the only 
other Muslim 'special interest' which gained separate 
representation in the Bengal Legislative Assembly was the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce. Unlike the maritime unions, 
which gained representation with relative ease due to the 
long-recognised importance of the Bengali Muslim lascar 
community, the Chamber of Commerce experienced considerable 
difficulty. 
When first established it gained ready recognition from 
the Government, and immediately lodged a request for a seat 
1 in the provincial assembly; and, following representation to 
the Viceroy, 2 it gained seats on the Calcutta Port Trust, 
1 See pages 229-32w 
2
star of India, 19 33, 4 January, p. 4. 
2.5.5 
the Managing Committee of the Calcutta Madrassah and various 
other semi-officia.l organisations, 1 despite opposition 
from the leading non-Muslim mercantile bodies in the city. 2 
But in 193.5, when the Provincial Delimitations Committee 
presented its report on the allocation of seats in the Bengal 
Legislative Assembly, the Chamber of Commerce found itself 
at the centre of a bitter storm of controversy stirred up 
by the opposition of~ Hindu mercantile interests to the 
claims of the Muslim merchants and. industrialists of Calcutta. 
The first signs of trouble occurred early in 193.5 when 
the Calcutta Port Trust rejected a dempnd by the represen-
tative of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce that the recruitment 
of Muslims by the port authorities should be fixed at one 
third of the tota.l intake o The Port Trust not only rejected 
the Muslim request, but also denounced the principle of 
separate rep~resatation, a sentiment which was echoed by 
the Hindu members of the Provincial Delimitations Commlltee. 3 
As early as 1933 the Hindu committee men had written notes 
of dissent which dismissed the claims of the Muslim Chamber 
of Commerce oh the gro'unds that it was a communal organisation, 
as yet had not proved its worth, had been deliberately 
organised to capture a seat in the provincial assembly, and 
its membership comprised mainly non-Bengalis~ 4 In 193.5 
when the final evidence regarding claims to special repre-
sentation was being considered the Hindu opposition was 
reinforced by criticism from the Indian Chamber of Commerce, 
couched in similar terms to the notes of dissent written in 
19 3.3, .5 and the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce which 
1Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1934, pp.2-6. 
2Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1933, 
p.10; ibid.,~' pp.271-3. 
3Ibid., p.144. 
4Govt of India, Reforms Dept, 1933, KW to 82/33-R, Vol. II. 
5Ibid., Indian Delimitations Committee (1936), Vol.III, 
pp.164-6; Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 
.l2..12,, PP·3.5-6. 
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ridiculed Muslim claims and stated that: 
The Muslim Chamber consists for the most part of 
non-Bengali Mahommedans; it has been in existence 
for barely a year [sic] and during this time it 
could hardly have been said to have established 
itself as a body of commercial opinion carrying 
the weight and authority entitling it to the 
allocation of one seat in addition to which its 
members are predominantly non-indigenous to the 
province. ·j 
The Hindu members of the Delimitations Committee made 
a final effort to minimise the claim of the Muslim Chamber 
of Commerce in June 1935 when their leader N.K. Basu 
summarily stated that the Muslim merchants of Calcutta 
'were of no importance' • 2 But their opposition failed, and 
in July the Chamber's representative before the Committee, 
A.H. Ghuznavi, 3 was advised that it had been awarded one 
seat in the provincial assembly and three of the fifteen 
provincial votes for the Bengali commercial seat in the 
Imperial Legislative Assembly. 4 
The Muslims were jubilant, 5 but not so the Hindu 
commercial community; and in November 1935 its representatives 
in the Corporation pushed through a resolution which declared 
that: 
The allotment of one seat to the Muslim Chamber 
of Commerce, a communal organisation as its 
nomenclature signifies, disturbs the balance of 
communities in the legislature proposed under the 
terms of the Communal Award @l.nd] the Muslim Chamber 
of Commerce dominated as it is by non-Bengalee 
Mahommedans will provide a scope for outsiders to 
exercise influence in the political and adminis-
trative life of Bengal.6 
1Ibid., p.171. 
-
2 Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1935, p.144. 
3Govt of India, Indian Delimitations Committee {1936), Vol! 
III, p. 19 3. 
4Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1935, pp.49,135: 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce, 3 votes; Bengal National Chamber 
of Commerce, 6 votes; Marwari Association, 3 votes; Bengal 
Mahajan Sabha, 3 votes. 
5 Ibid • , p . 1 4 4 • 
6
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 1935-March 1936, 
15.11.1935, pp.1545-48. 
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VI 
In the Corporation, during the early months of 19 34, 
the differences between the Hindu Nationalists and the 
Muslims had been exacerbated by the united opposition of 
the·Hindus to any concessions to Muslims on the vital issue 
of employment by the municipality. However, in April 1934 
the unity of the Hindu bloc was shattered over the question 
of the mayoral election. The Sen-Gupta faction, led 
since his death in July 1933 by S.C. Ghose, proved to be 
the weakest in numbers and sought the support of the Muslim 
councillors by promising to vote for their mayoral candidate 
1 Fazl-ul Huq. The New Muslim Majlis, which by this time 
had come to the conclusion that: 
Whatever the Hindus did in the Corporation, 
however communal in nature, was lauded as genuine 
nationalism but when we demanded the same rights, 
we were branded as communalists,2 
threw its support behind Huq. So did Momin who organised 
several meetings amongst the up-country Muslim merchants 
and artisans of the city to advance Huq's cause. 3 
At the election on April 11 a member of the Sen-Gupta 
faction gained the chair and ruled that the ten nominated 
councillors could not vote. It was an unconstitutional 
ruling and the nominated councillors, the European bloc and 
the rival Congress faction, led by Dr B.C. Roy and B.K. Basu, 
left the council chamber in protest. In the absence of the 
49 dissident members a rump council of 4o voted in Huq as 
4 
mayor with S.C. Ghose as deputy mayor. The Muslim community 
of the city was delighted and on April 13 the Presidency 
Muslim League organised a mass meeting, attended by over 
20,000 Muslims, at which Akram Khan congratulated Huq on 
1 Statesman, 1934, 12 April, pp.3-4. 
2IsRahani, M.A.H., op.cit., p.9. 
3star of India, 1934, 2 April, p.S; ibid., 9 April, p.4. 
4 Statesman, 1934, 
Gazette, Vol.XIX, 
12 April, pp.3-4; Calcutta Corporation, 
14.4.1934, supplem~nt. 
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his elevation to the mayorali ty. 1 The dissident councillors 
were far from pleased, l:).owever, and under the leadership of 
Abul Kasem they organised a petition to the Government 
against the recent elections. 2 
On May 11 the election was set aside on the grounds 
that the nominated members should have been allowed to vote, 
and on May 17 fresh elections were held.3 The meeting was 
a complete farce with the rival groups gathered at opposite 
ends of the council chamber; each elected its own chairman 
who fought the rival candidate for possession of the chair 
with the aid of his supporters, paper weights and musty 
volumes of debates. Abuse in Bengali, Urdu and English was 
hurled around the chamber and .With the dignity o'f the 
Corporation shattered the meeting was closed, and the 
struggling councillors were ejected from the building with 
the help of municipal durwans ~ 
The Government immediately suspended the council until 
July, and the rival groups launched campaigns to rouse 
support. The Sen-Gupta faction held meetings at which Huq 
was depicted as the innocent victim of the British 
burea:ucracy and big business 5 - the opposition candidate 
having been Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, a prominent local business 
magnate - and began to negotiate with the nominated 
6 
councillors and the European bloc for support. However, 
support for Huq was not forthcoming: the nominated and 
European councillors were prepared to vote for Momin, but 
refused to support Huq as they were still bitter about his 
earlier electioneering tactics. 
1Ibid., 21.4.1934~ p.878~ 
2 Statesman, 1934, 19 April, p.7. 
3Ibid., 17 May, p.8; Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XIX~ 
19.5. 1934, suppleme~J]_t _ 
4Ibid. 
SNNR, 1934, 21 May, Moslem. 
6 
Star of India, 1934, 17 May, p.5; ibid., 21 May, po1; ibid., 
1 June, p. 8. 
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In July a third attempt to elect a mayor and deputy 
mayor was made. Sarkar and B.N. Roy Chowdhury were easily 
electep in, spite of the opposition of the Muslims and the 
Sen-Gupta faction. Huq was naturall.y disappointed but 
took comfort from the fact that: 
For the first time in the history o.f this 
Corporation Mahommedans have shown a solidarity 
of which the community may well be proud. I 
hope that this s o.lidari ty will continue and that 
the Mahommedan members realising that they are a 
very small minority i.n the midst of hostile 
influences will maintain their solidarity in 
order to uphold the best interests of their 
community consistent with the advancement of the 
country as a whole. 1 
In what remained of 1934, and until April 1935, the 
Corporation remained a quiet forum of dull. debate with 
neither side eager to precipitate another confrontation; 
but outside the red brick building on Corporation Street 
the new-found solidarity .lauded by Huq was steadily 
permeating the community. In various parts of the city 
local associations of Mus.lim ratepayers were organised by 
Musli.m councillors such as Momin, Fazl-ul Huq and Raffique 
who founded the Muslim Ratepayers' League in Kidderpore and 
the Beniapukur Muslim Associati.on in ward XX. 2 These 
organisations provided a convenient means of communication 
between the Muslim leaders and the mass of their followers 
in the city for they operated through the local mosque. On 
Friday evenings in particular, when the congregation. was at 
its largest, the mosques of Kidderpore and Beniapukur were 
the scenes of intense po.litical discussions which invariably 
resulted in the presentation of petitions to the local 
authorities in support of the Muslim councillors. 3 The 
1 Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', July 1934-September 1934, 
4.7.1934, p.12. 
2
star of India, 1934, 6 November, p.5; ibid., 19 November, p • .5. 
3Govt of India, Reforms Dept, Franchise, 1935, File no.S/2/35-F. 
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Muslim Majlis had also begun to recruit extra members in 
and around the city, 1 and in July Fazl-ul Huq, Momin and 
Aziz Rahim - son of Sir Abdur Rahim - formally joined the 
. t. 2 organ1sa 1on. 
In May the Nationalist Muslims in the city had quarrelled 
with Azad when he publicly attacked Huq whilst on a visit 
to the city,3 and there was a perceptible shift in favour 
amongst them in support of Huq 1 s plans for social reform 
and rural uplift in cooperation with the Hindu depressed 
classes. 4 The attitude of the Hindu leaders towards the 
Communal Award did little to conciliate them, and the demands 
of organisations such as the All-Bengal Hindu Conference, 
which sought joint· electorates on a restricted property 
franchise, or failing that separate electorates with Hindu-
Muslim electora,l parity, served only to widen the credibility 
gap between the two communities.5 Former Nationalist Muslims 
such as Mujibur Rhampn publicly equated Hindu communalism 
with the Congress-directed nationalist movement, 6 and early 
in 1935 the final break occurred between the local Congress 
leadership and the main body of Nationalist Muslims. The 
occasion was the Bengal Provincial Conference, held at 
Dinajpur in north Bengal, when a resolution which condemned 
the Communal Award was passed in the face of angry protests 
from the Muslim delegates who walked out en masse.7 
1
star of India, 1934, 6 October, p.9. 
2Ibid., 27 July, P•7• 
3 . Ib1d., 2 May, P·5· 
4NNR, 1934-1935, passim. 
5 statesman, 1935, 7 February, p.20; ibid., 14 February, p.9. 
6
star of India, 1934,\""25 September, p.8. 
7statesman, 1935, 25 April, p.22; Govt of India, Home Poll, 
File No. 18/IV/1935 of 1935. 
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During 1934, Fazl-ul Huq, Sir Hasan Suhrawardy and 
Huseyn Suhrawardy were inyolved in a dispute with the 
university authorities in Calcutta which concerned Muslim 
representation in the Senate. The dispute dragged on for 
several years and was of significance because the Senate 
had an important voice in setting the guide-lines for 
general educational policy throughout Bengal. The Muslims 
claimed increased representation in order to counter moves 
such as a recent decision of the Senate which removed Urdu 
from the list of vernacular languages to be used in tertiary 
and secondary examinations. But the Hindu press, led by 
the Advance, claimed that any increase in Muslim participation 
in the deliberations of the Senate would mean that 'the 
temple of learning will be reduced to a market place and 
1 
cease to be a place for men of learning and honour'. 
Disillusioned Nationalist Muslims joined in the 
argument, and they launched a general attack on the upper-
class Hindu cultural bias of the university, and the monopoly 
of education held by the Hindu intelligentsia and land-owning 
2 
classes. In October 1934 Huq and the Suhrawardies organised 
a mass meeting of Muslim students from all parts of Bengal to 
form the All-Bengal Muslim Young Men's Conference in Calcutta, 
in the wake of which the Star of India warned that: 
Hindu Nationalist papers might try to hide their 
fear behind a mantle of verbal abuse; but they know 
full well that the tide of Muslim power in Bengal 
has turned and that the Muslims have at last a 
reasonable chance of coming_ into their own.3 
Out, of this flurry of renewed Muslim activity at the 
communal_ level the figure which emerged most strongly was 
that of Fazl-ul Huq. He was a leader of charismatic qualities 
1 NNR, 1934, 23 March, Advance, et al. 
2
star of India, 1934, 
November, p.9; ibid., 
16 December, p.8. 
22 September, p.1; ibid., 1935, 9 
14 November, p.6; 14 December, p.12, 
3Ibid., 1934, 9 October, p.2: also gives details of the 
students' conference. 
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in both the city and the mofussil. Erratic, volatile and 
at the centre of most political controversies since his 
entry into provincial politics in 1912, Huq was by this 
time the focus of Muslim political interest in Bengal. Amongst 
the rural masses and the Nationalist Muslims Huq gained 
support because of his demands for rural and social reform; 
whilst in Calcutta his activities in the Corporation and 
amongst the maritime trade unions had assured him of a broad 
basis of popular support, which ranged from the lascar 
community of the Kidderpore docks to the up-country Muslim 
mercantile and artisan groups of central Calcutta. 
Huq's genuine sympathy for the peasantry, be it Hindu 
or Muslim, his western education, powers as an orator, and 
contacts with the Ashraf families of the mofussil and 
metropolis, raised him head and shoulders above all other 
leaders of the community. He was the only figure who 
appealed to Muslims from both rural and urban Bengal at a 
time when the community realised the need for solidarity. 
Certainly his relations with the Suhrawardy family were 
rarely good, especially after he had ousted Huseyn Suhrawardy 
from any prominent position in the Muslim trade union movement 
in 1935, but this did not prevent either of them from working 
together at the time in defence of communal interests 
particularly when the Communal Award was under attack from 
Hindu leaders, and the need for Muslim unity temporarily 
obscured such personal rivalries. 
VIII 
In April 1935 the annual mayoral elections were held in 
Calcutta. The Muslim councillors were determined to get one 
of their number elected mayor and formed the Muslim 
Councillors' Party, under Nooruddin, with the object of 
putting Fazl-ul Huq forward as their candidate. 1 The idea of 
1Ibid., 1935, 1 April, p.1. 
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the party had first been formulated at a meeting of the 
Muslim Majlis in February at which leading merchants, 
industrialists, trade unionists and politicians in the city 
had supported a resolution, proposed by M.A.H. Ispahani, 
1 
which called for Huq's election as mayor. 
Rwnours spread that the rival factions of Congress 
had united to put forward their own candidate, and meetings 
of Muslim ratepayers' associations in Kidderpore and 
Beniapuk.ur urged the Muslim councillors to actively support 
2 Huq against Congress. Indeed, the Congress factions had 
united to sponsor a candidate, but to the surprise and 
satisfaction of the Muslim community it was Huq.3 
On April 30 Calcutta gained its first Muslim mayor -
Fazl-ul Huq - who was elected by a unanimous vote in the 
absence of the European and nominated councillors who 
boycotted the election. 4 
The reas:ns for the action of the reconciled factions 
of Congress are obscure. At the best one can surmise that 
it was a genuine gesture of conciliation on the part of the 
Hindu leaders, and at the worst that Huq's election was not 
so much a sop to Muslim sentiment as to dissidents within 
Congress, who threatened to perpetuate the breach within the 
organisation in the absence of a candidate suitable to 
both factions~ Most likely the truth was compounded of 
both these considerations; certainly events in the Corporation 
during 1935 illustrated the fact that the extent of Hindu 
willingness to compromise with the Muslims on issues of 
any importance was strictly limited, and in fact the whole 
facade of cooperation crashed disastrously in December 1935. 
1 Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XXI, 23.3.1935, p.760. 
2 Star of India, 1935, 3 April,p.4; ibid., 19 April,p.5. 
3Ibid., 22 April, p.1; Statesman, 1935, 2 May, p.12! 
4
calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', April 1935-September 1935, 
30.4.1935, pp.2-3. 
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In his early months as mayor Huq performed a volte 
~ in his public attitude towards Congress. In September 
1934 he had dramatically resigned his seat in the provincial 
legislative council to successfully contest a seat in the 
Imperial Legislative Assembly, in order to fight the 
'machinations of Pandit Malaviya' in national politics 
and the agitation of Congress against the Communal Award. 1 
However, by June 1935 he was openly extolling the virtues 
of Congress: at a meeting in the Calcutta Town Hall on 
June 3 he told the Muslim audience that Congress was 1 the 
most nationalistic organisation and that it deserved the 
support of every Indian, irrespective of religion 1 • 2 Again 
in July at a gathering in Noakhali he urged Muslims to join 
Congress as it was 'the only party concerned over India's 
welfare 1 • 3 
However, in this instance Huq was out of sympathy with 
his followers in Calcutta. Muslim resentment had been 
aroused by the opposition of Hindus to the claim of the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce for a seat in the Bengal 
Legislative Assembly; in addition the university controversy 
raged on to reach new heights of bitterness in November 
when the Senate moved to abolish makhtabs in the city in 
4 favour of non-sectarian schools. The opposition of the 
Hindu leadership to the Communal Award also showed no sign 
of abating, and in the Corporation the Muslim councillors 
soon found that the presence of a Muslim mayor did nothing 
to sway the Hindu majority in favour of Muslim demands. 
In the last half of 1935 the Muslim councillors made 
various attempts to settle the perennial question of the 
employment of Muslims by the Corporation. 5 The negotiations 
1
star of India, 1934, 22 Septembe~, p.1. 
2Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1935, 4 June, p.8. 
3Ibid., 18 July, p.10. 
4
star of India, i935, November, passim. 
5Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XXI, passim; ibid., 
tMinu'tes', October 1935-March 1936, passim. 
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were fruitless, however, and in August the Muslim represen-
tatives requested a special meeting of the Corporation to 
discuss their demands for the reservation of one third of 
the annual rate of recruitment until 25 per cent of those 
employed in municipal service were Muslims. 1 However, the 
• 
meeting was continually blocked by the Hindu councillors 
until Huq indicated his displeasure by walking out of the 
council chamber in the middle of a debate on celebrations 
2 to mark the Golden Jubilee of Congress. As a result on 
December 13 Momin was permitted to move a resolution Which 
contained the Muslim demands, with the promise of 
sympathetic consideration from Congress, af-ter which it 
was agreed that a Special Committee should be appointed 
to consider the issue.3 
The Muslims were exasperated by this time-honoured 
method of compromise, but they agreed to the proposal. 
Their patience failed, however, when the Hindu majority 
demanded that it should appoint the Muslim members of the 
committee, and a violent debate reminiscent of the election 
scenes of 1934 ensued. Eventually Huq's temper snapped and 
he roared at the stunned councillors that they should 
let the whole thing be cabled to England about 
this communalism in the Calcutta Corporation •••• 
Let the people in England see that we cannot 
discuss a simple communal question in a dispass-
ionate manner and yet we want self-government in 
India.4 
The silence that followed this outburst was only 
temporary and soon invectives were once more bouncing around 
the chamber and only ceased when Momin led the Muslim 
councillors out of the Corporation. Huq attempted to 
adjourn the meeting but he was ignored by the remaining 
1Ibid., 25.11.1935, p.1665. 
2 Ibid., 13.11.1935, p.1500. 
3 Ibid., 13.12.1935, pp.1777-84. 
4Ibid. 
councillors; and when they proceeded to nominate a 
committee he left the chamber. 1 
266 
At the next meeting of the Corporation on December 16 
only three Muslims attended - Huq, A.K.M. Zakariah and a 
nominated councillor Mahomed Saadatullah - and the mayor 
? 
submitted a letter of resignation from 15 Muslim councillors.~ 
In addition Huq announced his own resignation as an elected 
councillor though he retained his position as mayor. 3 
In their letter of resignation the 15 councillors 
stated that: 
We feel the time has come for us, the Moslem members 
of the Calcutta Corporation, to make a statement 
regarding the circumstances in which we have been forced 
to take the extreme step of tendering resignation of 
our office as Aldermen and Councillors of the Calcutta 
Corporation. 
For years past, there has been a strong and 
widespread feeling in the community that appointments 
in the Calcutta Corporation were being made to serve 
the interest of political parties and factions, and in 
open violation of all principles of equity and justice. 
Those who. have had any opportunities of being 
acquainted with the state of affairs in the Corporation 
know very well that these suspicions are not groundless. 
Vacancies are seldom advertised,and the outside 
world knows nothing as to when vacancies occur and how 
they are dealt with; all we find is that in many cases 
persons with indifferent qualifications are pitchforked 
into the highest posts merely because they happen to 
be backed by political parties in or outside the 
Corporation. Moslem candidates practically never get 
a chance, because Moslem Councillors in the Corporation 
are in a hopeless minority, and they are generally 
outside the political sections or schisms that divide 
the Corporation. 
From time to time, the representatives of the 
Moslems in the Corporation have been trying to protect 
the interests of the community by having a definite 
percentage of appointments ear-marked for Moslem 
candidates. In spite, however, of the best efforts that 
1 Ibid. 
2 Statesman, 1935, 19 December, p.7; see illustration. 
]Calcutta Corporation, 'Minutes', October 193;5-March 1936, 
16.12.1935, p.1786;ibid., Gazette, Vol. XXIII, 11.1.1936, 
p. 236. 
have been repeatedly made, all attempts to induce the 
Corporation. to recognize the legitimate claims of 
Moslems have always ended in utter failure. 
In this connexion we wish to emphasize the essential 
fact that the Moslem members in the Corporation have 
never thought of pushing the claims of incompetent 
Mo~lems or of impairing the efficiency of the various 
services by ever suggesting a lowering of the standard 
of recruitment. We have reasons to believe that non-
Moslems have been appointed on many occasions by 
ignoring the claims of better qualified Moslems. Even 
at the present moment, if a thorough investigation were 
undertaken it will be fOlmd that there is a greater 
percentage of graduates and undergraduates amongst the 
Moslem employees than amongst the non-Moslems holding 
similar or higher positions in the Corporation. 
In order to make one more attempt to obtain justice 
and fair treatment for Moslem candidates, twelve 
Aldermen and Councillors submitted a requisition to the 
Mayor under Section 38 of the Calcutta Municipal Act 
with a view to consider the whole question of Moslem 
appointments. After several adjournments, this meeting 
was finally held on Friday, December 13, at 5 p.m. 
To avoid acrimonious discussion the Mayor called 
an informal conference ,of a dozen Councillors and 
Aldermen, representing various groups, to arrive at 
an agreed solution of the problem. After prolonged 
discussion it was decided that Khan Bahadur M,A.Momin 
would move his resolution seeking to fix a percentage 
and the Hon. Mr" B.K. Basu would move an amendment for 
reference of'the matter to a small committee of seven 
Aldermen and Councillors. It was expected that all 
causes of friction and controversy would cease to exist, 
and that the amendment of Mr. Basu would be accepted by 
the House quietly and without much comment. 
When the matter came up before the meeting, the 
proceedings were marked by disorderly scenes. In spite 
of repeated appeals from the Mayor:. members began to 
indulge in personal attacks and recriminations and 
some of the members treated the whole proceedings with 
levity and contempt, It was evident that most of the 
members who were present were in no mood to take things 
seriously, and some even attempted to stultify:_the 
proposals by suggesting wild amendments. The Moslem 
members. present in the meeting left the House as a 
protest arid the amendment of Mr. B.S. Nahar was passed 
in a House from which all the Moslem mebers had 
already retired. 
The Moslem members of the Corporation feel. that it 
will serve no useful. purpose for them to occupy seats 
in a Corporation where l;hey are openly subjected to the 
oppressive domination of an unsympathetic majority. 
The Corporation may decide to act in any way they like, 
but we, on our part, cannot consent to be party to a 
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state of things which is condemned by our conscience 
and which we can not sincerely and honestly approve. 
We have, therefore, decided to tender our 
resignation which we request the House to accept. 
The letter dealt only with the immediate grievance of 
the community regarding employment, but. it was indicative 
of the more comprehensive communal s-pirit which now permeated 
the Muslim community of Calcutta. Indeed, it was proof of 
the fact that Muslim communal consciousness in the city by 
the end of 1935 was not a sentiment espoused solely by a 
select group of religious fanatics and political conser-
vatives. Rather, it was an attitude fostered in the 
minds of a variety of Muslim groups - from the up-country 
Muslim traders of central Calcutta to the Bengali-speaking 
lascars of Kidderpore - who found their aspirations~ for 
political, economic and social advancement in Bengal opposed 
by the Hindu elite. For a variety of reasons, many of which 
were not necessarily complementary, these groups had found 
solace and strength in an identification with a larger 
cause - that of their community at large. 
Just as 20 years earlier Gandhi had realised the potential 
of mass agitation and had attempted to rally the diverse 
peoples of India to the cause of the nation, the Muslims of 
Calcutta by 1935 were well on the way to evolving their 
own cause which would transcend the interests of the 
component groups within the community. 
In 1918 the cry which rallied the community had been 
'Islam in Danger', and it had evoked a crude response from 
large numbers of Muslims in the city. However,its appeal 
was limited, and once the immediate religious and economic 
grievances had faded any comprehensive sense of community 
consciousness had also waned to be replaced by more immediate 
interests centred upon the various sub-groups within the 
community. 
By 1935, however, the situation had radically altered. 
The cry was no longer the simplistic 'Islam in Danger', 
based upon ill-defined religious sentiment, but was rather 
the more definite 'Community in Danger'. The new spirit 
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CORPORATION AGAIN 
IN LIMELIGHT 
MOSLEMS RESIGN 
~FORCE() TO TAKE THE 
STEP" 
''Tiu· ,...:,,._·rel.-Hy t,. tho• ( 'o.~rp{lrati"" 
ha:-, rt•<·l'i\t•d .1 -.i~llo'tl !>tatt'lllt'nt b\ 1.') 
)1 .. ~1<·!11 ( 'ou!lei!l,n.., tel!dl:"t',iug l~tcir 
rt·si);!;ot.ltt••u. 
Tilt:<~ .11111c un,·em•·Bt \\:l-. mat.lc ilv tlw 
~h.\t•r (:'llr. A. 1\: ..... 1'1'.l1d HuqJ ·at a 
JJH·t"ting ol t!u• ('.:i• 11tt~ ( urporatiou. 
•·1 tiutl''. in· :.uld<.'EI. "Out (•n•ut" :Hl• 
pn'(:ipitatiu:,;: tu·.\:lld.; n ~1tua~iuu whid1 
m:'y •·omp(•l nte u!,., lq 1{'-.Jgu. Hut 
UntJI tllilt ('Oiltiii~PIH Y ,\1 hi~ 1 propO<.(-
tu gu 011 \\<th th<· \1u1k, partll'Ula.tll· 
lu:'(.'LIU~e- thC'IE' lw: l,('l•l! a lwav\· art·l~­
flllllatiou uf a rn•al" whit h 1 "1"'!~ to g:l't 
nd vf a.'- ;.non a-. po-.,Jil(e. 
"[ufuttunatL·I.\ otwe again", th(' 
)ta~·or (·outmnt·ti, '·\\t; arf' \'Prv mmh 
in tlw lilltC'Iq.(ht, ;\In! on thi, U<·ta-.ioh 
Uldt:'r (·ireum-.tant·(•<; \\ ],jdJ, l think. 
f'\'('IV r•atriotic Indian wdl dt'l'ply 
d('pt~n·.'' 
THE STATESMAN. 
EARTH TREMORS 
AT QUETTA 
MIDNIGHT SHOCK 
}'HOM Ol P.: (Of:P.F~I'O:XDE~T. 
Ql'ETT.\, l> .. •c. li'. 
FALLING INCOME OF 
CALCUTTA PORT 
SIR JOHN WOODHEAD'S 
l\llSSION IN DELHI 
!u.-1\,. :·;~~·:.·;~.\· ~:~\'t\~:~11111',\1~\~~j~\11(:t. k •t;:~" '-h:~~: FROll Ol'll DELHJ :lHlCF. 
\Ia'! al-.o ft·lt at \'onu. 3\J nult•,., uorth of I 11 Jo.:-.1>\\ 
f..lut•tt 1 hut on 11 mut h '-llltllt'l !>I lie. I :...tr John \\'oudh<'ntl, Fttlanle ~(('lll-
'-' lrt.dJ, :mot!w1 !>t.11Hon ;,outh of I 1•1, G'" l'rlllllPnt ol H('ngal IS on a. 
Qtlf'tl,•, .11-.o It'll ti•C' ,.l10tk hut un otltPr I ~hott ''" t to ~~ \\ Ddlu On Tue·d.J\' 
pl.ue <.nuth, l'ht 01 \\e-t of QU<'ttl nwrntn<> b(' I.J,lt.J ;1 fH.ttu:•d It ""' 
.\ nnuh It>-.~ SP\ctc -,\u,Ek, th.1t on 1,~:·l~• ~~~on~P;~.~\:0~ 
llt'l·emi.Jol'r II, wa., t':otpC't'i('rH'Pll e\·en .;,t 
C'haman, ~·o milcs north of Q•1etta nnd ~~y~~ C~o~:.d of ~~~~ 
at '>OIIIP othr-t· pl.tef''>. '1 ·s i~ probably 
due to th: fact that the t•pi<·l'nlre 61 
tl,j .. monnnJ{s shcwk wn'> '><'\'e1·al miles 
tuu·th of· QtiC'tta nnd nPan•r to Chaman. 
The l'l'•·uJ·teii{'O of :-.h()(·k"i C\'l'n !>iX 
month;: after the g1·eat ('a,rthqnake hn<; 
hr'<'ll n•,pon-.!hle for c·:IU!>ill~ a!:trm 
~tnong th~ J'('):.idf'-nt"-'-P"cially thP 
•gnomnt ontos-though S('('ure in the 
('arthquakP·rC'«i<otr.nt huts in whieh 
lht>y arc uuw li,·iug. 
lndu!.u-ies nnd 
l.aUour Department 
\1 h[•n the que!>tion 
of lhe jute indu,try 
in Bengal ''as d!S· 
('U~<o~cd. 
ln the nftPrnoon 
Sir John !>IIW Sir 
lir olohn Woodllla•d. Mohnmnd Zaffar-
ullah Khan, Co1umen·e Metilbf'r ntuJ, it 
1:; utuJcr.-.t ... ~.d, n·~rf'scntcd to him the 
U}'HY THEY RESIGNED {l't,nf."nlled {n.n1 r1 r~•cir11~.~ column.)· llrt'"t•ut po-ition o[ the Port of l'al-
ll )fo-..leln <·andidatc.~. twPke Aldermen cut a, the P.'\'enu<'s of which are 
:tud Count'illors suhn1ittPd n rcquis:tiou d\\ irH..lhng. 
t11 the Ma\or under Sc<·tion 38 ot th•• It nHI\' be rL'(:alled iu th s l'Cnn<>;.;ion 
C'akutta \iunil"ipal Ad with a \'if'w to that a {:o!tfNeme rcpn·st'nting the rail· 
ThP f,,l\o't' inp: i-. th,• l11!1 t,...xt of t!t<· eon~itl(•r tht• whoiP quc<-tiou of M{l.~IPnl \\:1.'~ • .shii'P•ug untl f()lllnlP.r(;ial iuter· 
atat{•nwnt !,\Lhluitthl ou ~ .• tuu!a.' n:g;ht llj•pointn)('nh. Aftl'l· I<PH•ral adjourn- l'~h ha-. (,ecu (·aiiC'd by the t.'ommercc 
to J.lr. ,\. K. Fa71ul lluq, Ma.\IH' (.f nwtn-<, tlli.., nwctinp; was hno:~lh· h<"ld 011 !\lcm' N •ur Friday nc:~:t wht'n the 
t:akutta, by l.j ~Jn.;h·rn Councillor, of l'ridH~, DP<·('miJH l:l, at G p.~l. que<,tiun ot the rail·shipp.ng COJU(X'ti-
the Corporation. It h:h now I.K'('It J)[:o'OBI>Eiti.Y Sl:l<::\1·::-; tio11 ,,j\( IJ& di-;.cussed. 11•e coofer· 
i~,n{'(\ for publiE·atlOII ·-- '·Tn a\·oid 1HTimonio~l'> di~U>,)o.jon thc t·n1·e h:l~ primnrily been called to 
"Wt- h•cl the tuue ha~ (011\e for U'i, :\Javor (•tdh•d nn inf01·mat (·onferenee ut dilJt the point of view of the various 
the Moslem mC'miN•r<. of tilt' (.'allutta a Joz<•n Coundllono ami AldC'nne-n, re- iutereff~S (Oill'erned. 
~. ~;~;£~~~t~~,':· c\~{.,',';~:~::~~: (':t:;~l':.~,';(\ ~"~ ~;~('~~;.~~;r ~:i~:?~~i o~·-~~~·:sp,~b,('~.~~i~eft;; •l.\l'E "W .\H'' 
ha~·e hN•ll foncd to take t!tc extrenH:! p!·nlonj!Pd di~ens~ion it was de(·id"d It h iutere~tmg to noJte that \'\·hiie-
stl·p of tpndering n•o;;q~nation of Oll"r tlwt 1\:h:m BHiwdur .M. A. Momin th~ :.hi~p;ng: intl·re.t.s hove teen blum-
offit·P a<. Aldt>rlllt"ll aud ('uum·ii!OJ·, t..f 
1 
wouhl mo\·e his re-.olution S('l'king to ing the raiho\'1\YS for undercutting tbt::m 
the ('altutLl C'orporal1•m. li:t a ren·Pnblge- and the Bon. Mr. B. K. and taking oway thf'ir traffic, tbe- raii-
"F'or .wars pa'>l, th<.·re ha~ ll('<>n n Ba'itl \\onld mon~ un anwndment fl)r ways retort that they have bUffered 
strOhJ! ;tnrl widt•<:.[)l'l•:HI fe('llug in tht> n·.ft>rPn<·(• of the mntter to n !>lllnll C'O~l- from !iilllilur treutUieut by tne sbipping 
l 
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REVISED TARIFF 
VALUES 
IMPORT ANT NOTICE 
RESULTANT INCREASE IN 
DUTIES 
!'t>:W Dl!:t.HI, Dec 17. 
A flw:tffe of India t;xtraordinary 
publil-ll<'s the re,·i~Pd t::lriff ,·alnations 
101' impOI'tf'd n• tiC':es wbid1 will {'orne 
into for('(! from Jnnuary 1, 1936, aod 
will operate until the fl'lld of tbat 
(·nlendur \'eAr. 
This n~tdiention, whiC'h is pubbhed 
b~· the ('ommerl·e Dt>p11rtm('nt und{'r 
St'e~ion ~ of the Indian Tariff Act. 
!>U~l'l'iONI('-; notj6('ations of the !>allle 
dt'pal tment on thE> subjec·t of tariff 
,-al1111tions IS"U('({ this time last n·nr 
and lll'-0 during the <·urrent; Year. 
1'hf'se tariff \'aiU('!; ha.\·e IJpen bast>d 
entire!~· 011 current prices. Important 
l'hanges. l10w-ever, nre notieNI in the 
t·a.,e of t·ocunuts ami coconut oil. 
The pr~nt tarilf on Poconut (hu-;.k-
ed) imported ft-o!U the Stmits, Dutdt 
Eo!:t Indies ami Siam, per 1,000 h~ 
Rs. H; this hn~ b£'('n rah,ed to Rs. 5.3 
per 1,000. In the case of unht1skc>d 
{·Ol·onuts from the same conntrie!: the 
es:h-tin~ tariR of Rs. 62 has heen raised 
to lh. b7 -8 per 1 ,000. 
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rommunit.v that ll{Jt)Ointment-, in thl' m1ttce of se,·cn Aldt•rmen and Coun-::1!- (·CIH[~<llli< . .., 1tl the pn'Ot. Cotumf'rC'ial 
Cakutt:l Corpo1ation W<'re IJC'ing nwdc lo.r-.. It wa<> cxpcded that all c·,ltlsC~ inte!{'Sts, on the other hand, prt.'fer In the case of C'O<'onnts from Ceylon 
to ~c>r<:e the iutPrl' l of politi(·:tl parti"~ ot fri~ tion und <·ontron•r.'>_v would C'Ca:.c the :~!aftl!. quo .?s thl'y i.IC'nefit !no-t by the pre.!oent \·aluntion i!l Hs 28-8 per 
and J,,('tion<:., and in op(•n ,·it1iatioo cf to ext-.t, and that the amcndment; d the rate \1nr. 11,000 tLnd tbis tigure bas been raised to 
al! pt"indptes of t>quit~· and ju>.ti1·C'. ~lr. Bn-.n_ 'A'"'I ld ~ nl"<'C'pt{'d h.v tin• The <·onferenre, will thus r('prr-sPnt Rs. 45 pPr 1,000. 
']'ho;.e who ha,·e had an.v oppohuniti(•., Hc,uo.,(' qmf'tly a1hl l'·ithout mtu·h c·orn- thrl'e toutliC'ting intcresb. and the t;:~sk Fo1· c-oeonuts (o:hel· th::n !tlaldi\·es) 
of f.M:om~ 1H·quamt1•d with tl1e ;,{ate (lt 1\l(•nt. of thO:' (hairman, the- Commeree Mem- the es.•stilig rnte of R~. 22-12 ha!i IJ<'en 
alfair, in the Corporation know vcry "Wht•n the mattcr <·amc up b('for·e bN, I" not likely to be on ea!:.>y one. raiSf><J to R'!. 30 per 1,000. 
well tl1at th('-.e .;.u~()it·iono., :~n• uot thE' lllet>tiJJg, tht! pro(·('(•ding"i were Thl' conference is, tb('rf'-forc, not likely Hegarthng copra or coeonut; kernel 
~rounJlh". mark('d hy di'iordt•d.\' .'>('£'1\C'-.. lu spill• to take nny decisions, but only to for- from :Ill)' l>')tlrcE>, the present; tariff 
"Vnr·mwih nre !>('ldom adn~rti-.Pd, of I'~"P<>atPd app('alos from the Mayor, mHiatl' the <.Iemonds made- hy the t'ari- ntlue ol lf,c. 6 p<'r C\1't has UeC'n rai:.ed 
and the out;,ide y,-or!d kuows not bin~ nwml)('rs l.cg· n to indulge in pcrsonnl ouo; intere!>ts fur de('ision in dne- C'Ollrse. to lb. g per cwt. 
a.~ to ~~.·lwn uH·arwie<> O(·(·ur and how nttack.s r.nd rC'(·I·imin:ttions and <..omo> ot A jute manufaC'tUrprs' d('pu·ation . 1'he vnluntion of <·oeonut; oil, \\·l~iC'h 
thf-y arl." dealt with; all ''c lind i-; that tho lnPmbcrs tn·ntcd the "·hole proN>C'tl- will wnit rn Sir Frank !\'oy<e, !\IC'lnber 1~ now ~s. 10 pl'r l'Wt. has ~n nu~ed 
in many ('lt'-('S perMm, with indiffN·l'ut ill!:!;" With 1(~\ity anti (·onkmpt. It \\·a~ ill c·ha•,..e vf Indu!"-.trif'" nnd Lnbou 1·, un to Hs. 13. 
q•Jalific.ttiou.'> are pitl'ldor·kpd into the e1·id('nt th.~t mo~t of the ill('tllhNs wfw Tl!UI'Sd.~·. Thfl- d('pntation "·ill Lie f<~FFF.CT OF ({E\'AI.fA1'10~ 
lughe.,t po'>t'- lnNelv L~·<·auo.,e tht•v wt•re pn·'it•nt \n•t·e in no mood to takP headed iv Mr. H H. I:Jurno; and will The f'ffE"Ct of these changf'S in the 
!laJtpl'n to .t..e !Jm·kt·d l;y po!iti<·al padi('~ thm,g., sf'tHJUo.,h, and some e\f'!l at , 011 ,_1-,t of Mes, 1s Scott, Motg.tn n11tl tariff y,·ill be thot the omount Df dnty 
Ill or OUh1de th<' Corporation. Mo.-.lcm t('mpt('d to stult1f.v thf" p!Opo<:.,tl, !. 1 B M B1rf,1 to be paid will 00 proportionat<>ly in-
candidatC'-. )H';tdi{:tlly n('\'er p;et tt !>ll,!~l!;{''-t111g \\lid ampmluwnto;, Thc I · cteosf'd 
chan(·(', IJC'(·au-.e Mo<.ll'ln l'oli!H illors in :\ln..,lcnt nwmbe1;, pt(_'~C'nt tn the mcetmg The only otht>r impodnnt cbnnge i.'i 
the Corporation 11re in a hopei(''-~ mino- left the Hou~;e no., a , tot.e-,t, 1md tlw DIFFERING VIEWS in re-spE'<'t; of sodium hydro sulphide. 
nt.\', awl tiH'y arc g;<•uPrall.v ouhide the auwmlnwnt of Mr B S !'\ahar- W3" The tnriff on this chf'mi('al, a·hich is 
poiJtic·al i;h·t:ono; o1 ~(hhnh t\wt <!i,·idl• pa'>f-<'d tn a Hou'ie imm whtdl ~JI the LEADERS' DEFINITIONS OF largely used m the textile mdustry, j-, 
the CMporatwn. ~Io-..lf'm nl('mbers lwd ah-Pady retn·E'd, PATRIOT'ISl\1 Rs. 42 per cwt. nnd has ·t..ef'-n 'rf'duced 
"HOSTILITY" TO :\IO:o;LE:\IS m~;~~~~cf(~~~o~l~.~~ ~e~~~r:c;~et!~~ ~~:~~j to Rs. :n per cwt.-.(s.iuciated l,r~ss . 
. "From tinw to tnm·, the reprl',Pnta- purpo'iP for them to OC'l'U(l~' Sl'ats in n FROM Ut:R CORHE8PU~DE.ST. CALCUTTA t:·:l; ~:~c:.h~r.~\ilr:)~l·~~~~ri(:ltl~(~~l't~l:"/:,c~~~~~~~~; Corporation \\'hC't·c they nrc open! . ..- !>Ul.l~ . M.\Oit.\S, Dec. IG. 
t,f lh& ('Ollli!JIIIIIty hy havm;; a d<'(Jnite j.c•d('d to the opprcs'>ii'C domi~oution ol T~·o difl('l·ent \'iews were ex:pre-ssed at Those returnlng-
'"'n{·lltag:e of ap 11ointlllCllh e;tr-markcd an un">."mputhPtic nwjorit.~'. The Cor- the llpl'ning of the Tamilnad l,rO\·in.C'ial 
lor J.fo>,h·n-. 1 alld!tLd(•<.. lu "'!Jite, hm\·· poration ma_v dccitlc to t~(·t in any wuy (.\_.:1gn••h S\\lldl'~hi F.ll:hibition at Con· 
<·l',,r, of 1 he 1 ("t t•lh,, t..; that hal·(' bPC'Il thpy tik(', hut w~. on our p:ut, C'nnnot gr('<..~ Hou~e, ~ladras, ~·('!>teni:J.y. 
n•[N•atPdly rnadt•, all at\Ptupt<. to intlul·C ~~:~i~·~Jn\-.to<'~d~~~;~;dtol)~~ ~t1 :1rte 1 .~:,,~.1:!'.:7~ Mr S Sah'::unnrthi "rl'fen·Nl to th~ Corporation to rl•{o;~11i1.l' the l;·giti· .,,n,l whieh v.e {,
111 
not !>iucerd)· aud J.f11.Nii n~ "the 1l11iform of patrinti~m'' 
mate dairn~ of ~lo~lvuJ~ I.:! It• :dna\~ and _..aid it hJd <'Oille to stn.v. It was, he 
t-ndt·d i11 ut;Pr ladllt••. . hn:~~~·~·\::~~rot\:;:n•tore, tlt•(·idl'tl to tpn addNI, thC' n·li!.!;ion.., duty oE ever.\· 
pl~~~i:~ th~~ 1 r>1 01~1~~~~::·:~11 11'(; .~~\t~l\ h'::)t \ 11111(' dr-r· our resignntion "hit h 1\ e r('(!Ul'"t :;~~!:,a~:w<~~~~-~~~?l~l~~~d:~ 1::~~ ~ri~:::m;;.~: 
to Calcutta will find that the 
entirely reorganized and re. 
decorated GRAND HOTEL 
offers the best and most econo-
mical •cheme of board-resi· 
de•.ce ever devised for them. 
Officers Mo.,!Ptn weml)('f~ m tl 11_. (-'cJJt)Oratwn til~~~~~;~\ to ~~e{:l)t);~min. Ahnl 1-:a.~f'm. unohtainablt= to g('t :umdesld sul.lstitutf's 
}la\'e IIP\'I'r t !oought ot pll-.IIIIIV: tiP• :.f A H fspahano. K. No{)r\ldt!HJ,, K nnJ to U~ his i.IC'o;t endP31'0Ur'3 to SC'e OR ShOrt Or extended leaVe, 
~!arm~ f'f lF!!OiliJ>I'II'IIt :O.Jo-.IPIIl'> 01'. {>t ~hm~td.At ~~, l:;&Q~t_b.s-~I·J~m.~l~~n~l!:~rts.v;;~ that Indian nrtid~s. t~k the r~aee of Commercial mmn 
:~~·~:~.i:\/'::~ t-~~~~: 1 11(~~{:,:;:;! t~;r- ~~:~~:.;.<:,\1; ~1~:£~~}("~~'.,~~~.X~.~:;r~i ~:' H~~~erA '~~~ !l ::~.~~ig~~~~:~;~·~~~0i1~P 1 :~~ 1ouw nt (' e.H- "' 
of tl.e _,,.,,.,,.,.d of H·••"''"'""'- We .. .,,.,.. ,.,, ... ' ... " .. In , .• ,,.,, . .,, to the" ,.,"'" ·"'· Jomol passing throu~h Calcutta, anJ 
lmve n·:~~~~~h to f,pfl~·,·e that non· ~loha:•wtl. who opcned the eKhibition. Planters Mo~lt .. rrh haq·. I.•·Pn. app<>tnlt-d on tn:IIJ\' MR. A. K. FAZLUL HUQ ~ !".aid: "\'ou \\-ill llj!:rl'e with mc t!~~t ~he are all specially catered for 
V·ut.'>lou.; 1._,. 1guonll!!: tlw c!aim'i. of swrrdri!l,i spirit ig to be fostE'rt:U ut 
l)('tter 11 ualdit•d )Jo-.l(•u1,_ Jo:\ 1• 11 at tlw £'ALCL;:::E 1\!:'~~~~~~ID To ;:~!\ ~;\.:!Jei 1~a;;,~ o:P~~ic~~~~~~i~a~~~s~i:~ =~~pe~ii~:5~tes~le~~n:tst c;~~~: ~:~~~~~ w:~~~lll1:·:11t~;.r~~~~:.ntl:~' :.~;~~~~~nf~~",~:j l'\'ervthing fot·f'ign. The- n~eessity of 
tlmt llu·•e ;, a "'""'"" l"'"''"'"~c of A '"P'"'ent,.ti<e <>f the ·"".fomo" m<<-<national gomlwill and hacmoniou, room•, 3 first class orchestra• ~r:&dnate.:; tmd Hutlt·r"Fwf 1wtPs nmong-~c \\as inf:1nncd h..- the Mayor of Calcutta relationship b(•twcen th~ ,·nrious coun. frequent Concerts and En• th~ Mo·,lpm Plllplo\(:~" t;lall l~lllOil~'' Olr. A. K. F:{,.!ul Ii·tq) on Tt_te~day triC'S of the world is l>cing increa,.ingly tertainments, yet on the most 
the nou.J.In-.lt·nl" ii(Jidtll" .o.,imdar or tlt:1t he hnd ~ent in lti'> re!.ip:nnliOn to felt and ndl·o<:at-cd, partit·nlo:~rly at the moderate inclusive terms, 
hii!I•N poo.,iti•JIJ-. in th(' c;;'rporation. thc Ch:ef E-"<'C'ldil·e OftiC'cr of the Cal· prt'!"-.l'nlt a,HII nt nn_v ti;nedours shho_uld Full details from the Manager. 
·"lo onh·r !.:J 11 ,.-tkP nn{• mon~ att"llll't; C t' not P t w C'Otltltry o o Rnyt mg 
.. ol,tain ju~ottt(' ami f:ur tn•atn}('nt tor cu~~ d;.~r:;(~ ~~\.f" drawn into a rlis- ~r~:~::~:;lll ~onrlthl~:;~~;~~;.tional. eplrit GRAND. HOTEL 
lVunlunH'J tn ne.tt (.;olumn!. cussion in the auhjeet. 
was compounded of a set of frustrations which encompassed 
all group~ within the community. The immediate threat was 
not t~ Islam the religion but rather to the economic, 
social and political aspirations of the various Muslim 
groups in Calcutta which had become more articulate and 
politic.ally conscious since 1918. The political experiences 
of the last 17 years had taught them the value of concerted 
action, so that following their alienation from Congress 
they now looked outwards from the sub-communal group to 
the community at large for a means of achieving their goals. 
By the end of 1935 the entire Muslim bloc in the 
Corporation, including Huq: in his capacity as mayor, had 
resigned. Never before in the Corporation had Muslim 
leaders exhibited such a comprehensive degree of unity. In 
the years since 1918 the Muslims of the city had soug~t 
to find a political modus vivendi by a variety of me>pns, 
the principle one being in some sort of compromise with 
Congress. By the end of 1935, however, such attempts had 
been abandoned. In 1918 the Muslim community of Calcutta 
was largely isolated from its co-religionists elsewhere in 
Bengal, but by 1935 its leaders had expanded the scope of 
their interests from the municipal to the provincial level, 
and in succeeding years the Ashraf families of Calcutta and 
the mofussil renewed their links in an attempt to seize 
control of the province from the Hindu minority. 
However, in Calcutta during the years between 1918 and 
1936 the leadership of the Muslim community had undergone 
radical changes. In 1918 a handful of wealthy merchants 
and aristocratic pensioners, loyal to the Imperial authori-
ties, had been the spokesmen of a relatively inarticulate 
community. By 1936 on the other hand new group~ of Muslims 
had been introduced into the political arena, and the leaders 
of the community were subject to increased pressures from 
below. Merchants, artisans, ratepayers and trade unionists 
who had been silent in 1918 had found various means of 
expression by 1936 and demanded that any leader of the 
community heed their voices. 
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In Calcutta this meant that the Corporation was of 
increased importance from the viewpoint of Muslims by 1936, 
whilst for Bengal as a whole it meant that the relatively 
wealthier, better organised, more articulatte and non-
Bengali ;Muslims of the city had begun to emerge from the 
cocoon of the metropolis and were set to enter upon a new 
phase of politics which was destined to dramatical;Ly alter 
the history of the province. 
._. 
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with their heritage of Moghul culture and memories of power 
lost, .looked down upon the mass of their Bengali-speaking 
co-religionists and the immigrant Urdu-speaking Muslims of 
Calcutta. 
All three groups provided the main spokesmen of the 
community before 1918, and were regarded by the British as 
the 1 representatives,v of the Muslims of Calcutta. In fact 
they were not so much the representatives of the community 
in general, but rather were the representatives of the 
three most articulate Muslim groups within the city. The 
mass of Muslims in Calcutta were inarticulate and divided 
into a variety of geographic, occupati.onal, linguistic and 
racia.l groups which ranged from the tall, pale-skinned, 
Pushto-speaking Pathan moneylenders of Mechua Bazar to the 
dark and lithe Benga.li-speaking lascars of Kidderpore. 
Prior to 1918 all of these sub-commnnal groups had, 
except for one instance, remained largely anonymous in the 
pub.lic li.fe of the community and Calcuttao The one instance 
was the occasion of the Balkan Wars when the various Urdu-
speaking Muslim mercantil.e and artisan groups of central 
Calcutta had been stirred by the wave of Pan-Islamic sentiment 
which swept Muslim India at the time. 
Local agitators such as Abul Kalam Azad, who identified 
with none of the three dominant Muslim groups in Calcutta, 
and north Indian agitators such as the Ali brothers, 
capitalised upon the concern of the poorer Muslim mercantile 
and artisan groups and involved them in their first experience 
of mass politics. The experience proved ephemeral, but it 
revealed that the supposed spokesmen of the Muslims in the 
city had little measure of contact with the majority of 
their co-religionists. They exerted influence more because 
of their relationship with the British and their ability to 
prosper within the urban environment, than because they had 
any great community of interests with their fellow Muslims. 
This point was made even more sharply by the events of 
the years 1918 and 1919 which swept aside the traditional 
Musli.m leadership i.n Calcutta. In 1918 north Indian Muslim 
agitators involved the Urdu-speaking Muslim masses of Calcutta 
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in a huge and tragi.c outbreak of rioting whi.ch was prompted 
by a medl.ey of rel.igious ~ economic and anti=Bri tish grievances. 
The old l.eadership proved incapable of controlling the Muslims 
of central Ca.lcutta and, fol.lowing an interregnum of north 
Indian Muslim domi.:nation, a new leadership emerged wi thi.n 
the city in 1919. Admittedly the new leaders were drawn 
from the previously dominant Muslim groups, but they 
identified with the community at large rather than with the 
particular interests of their parent groups. 
Their role was facilitated by two major political 
developments in the sub-continent: namely the advent of Gandhi 
and the growth of the backward-looking Khilafat movement 
amongst the Urdu-speaking Muslims of the land. With its 
evocation of the past glories of Islam and anti-British 
overtones the Khilafat movement swept the Urdu-speaking 
Muslims of India into the main~tream of the nationalist 
struggle against foreign rule. Gandhi was of vital importance 
because he offered the Muslims the moral and practical 
support of the Hindu community in their struggle against the 
British, and by his sympathetic attitude towards Muslim 
aspirations he captured the support of the younger Muslim 
leaders throughout British India. 
Gandhi also provided the inspiration and agi tationa.l 
means, through his programmes of hartals and Non-Cooperation, 
whereby the mass of previously inarticulate Muslims could 
express their grievances. The younger Muslim leadership, 
which had become increasingly disillusioned with British 
rule over the last decade 9 eagerly grasped the hand of 
friendship offered by Gandhi; and from 1918 to the mid 1920s 
the communal rapprochement and the nationalist programmes of 
agitation provided the political creche for a large number 
of Muslim groups in Calcutta. 
This development was particularly evident in the central 
areas of Calcutta where Muslim settlement was concentrated. 
The immigrant lower class Muslim mercantile and artisan group-s 
of this part of the city provided a fervent and articulate 
following for the proponents of the romantic Khilafat 
movement and the anti-British nationalist agitation. 
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But the chimera bred by the attempted amalgamation of 
the Khilafat and nationalist causes proved an unruly beast. 
With the failure of the Non-Cooperation programme and the 
settlement of the Khilafat issue no leader in India proved 
capable of sustaining the communal rapprochement. It had 
served a primary purpose of introducing increasing nUmbers 
of Hindus and Muslims into the political arena, but in this 
process were sown the seeds of communal dissension. 
The Muslims of Calcutta were swept into the hybrid 
movement on a wave of religious and economic frustration, 
and once these stimuli had faded their heightened sense of 
communal and political consciousness turned inwards away 
from the national scene to the more familiar world of the 
community and the sub-communal group. The experiences of 
the last few yenTS had revealed both the bankruptcy of the 
old form of elitist leadership, and the importance of mass 
action in the sense that the limited power and influence 
of the sub--communal group acting independently had been 
clearly revealed. With the breakdown of the communal 
rapprochement Muslim interest in Calcutta slowly began to 
centre upon the concept of the community as the only 
alternative focus of Muslim attention. 
In Calcutta the waning of the Hindu-Muslim political 
liaison led to a splintering of the Muslim leadership, a 
multiplication of political factions and, in 1926, of a 
violent outburst of communal hatred. The Muslims of the 
city had apparently slipped into a morass compounded of 
aimless factional bickering, anti-Hindu and anti-British 
sentiment, and a general frustration with their economic and 
political role in the city. 
Undoubtedly this was true, but several important changes 
had occurred, and were occurring, within the community. 
Firstly throughout these years there was a growing sense of 
communal consciousness - the ways and means of its expression 
may have differed, as is evinced by the multiplication of 
Muslim political factions, but nevertheless all the factions 
were primarily concerned with securing greater support in 
the city by furthering distinctly communal demands. Secondly 
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the leadership of the community had altered radically. 
The majority of leaders were still drawn from the mercantile 
and professional families, but they no longer served as the 
representatives of these groups alone; rather, in their 
attempts to secure a broader basis of support, they championed 
the interests of a broader spectrum of sub-communal groups 
in recognition of the increased social and political 
consciousness of many of their co-religionists. This forced 
upon them the task of espousing the aspirations and 
grievances of these groups, and led most noticeably to the 
increased importance of the Calcutta Corporation as a forum 
of Muslim expression in the city. 
Factionalism, intrigue and the conflicting interests 
of various Muslim groups made the development of Muslim 
communal unity in Calcutta a slow process; but external 
factors, which principally involved the Bengali Hindu 
community, spurred the flagging spirit of communalism to 
life. 
The attitude of the dominant Hindu groups in Calcutta 
and Bengal towards the Muslim community was a vital factor 
in feeding the spirit of Muslim communal sentiment. After 
the failure of the communal rapprochement in the mid 1920s 
various attempts had b~en made to heal the breach between 
the two communities 1 but all were in vain. The Muslims 
were not without blame, especially the more fanatical Urdu-
speakers of Calcutta and the mofussil, but overall the 
dominant landowning Hindu elite may perhaps be considered 
more culpable. The Hindu elite feared for its dominant 
economic, political and social position in Bengal, particularly 
with regard to the threats, imaginary or otherwise, posed by 
the numerically superior but impoverished Muslim masses. 
These fears were a decisive factor in moulding Hindu attitudes 
in Bengal and Calcutta, and largely account for the 
intransigent attitude of the Hindus towards the demands and 
grievances of the Muslims of the province. 
The refusal of the Hindu elite to make any major 
concessions to Muslim sentiment negated all attempts by 
nationalist sympathisers amongst the Muslims to achieve a 
modus vivendi between the two communities. This is nowhere 
better illustrated than in the dismal debates and conflicts 
which absorbed the Hindu and Muslim Corporation councillors 
in the decade between 1926 and 1935. 
Muslims in Calcutta felt frustrated in the fields of 
education and employment, to mention but two major sources 
of contention; whilst elsewhere in the province the 
predominantly Muslim peasantry found its attempts to improve 
its economic position were bitterly opposed by the Hindu 
landowning elite who provided the hardcore of support for 
the nationalist movement in Bengal. 
Admittedly for a while Muslim leaders such as Fazl-ul 
Huq managed to lead a supra-communal peasant movement based 
on class rather than communal interests, but this proved to 
be an illusory alliance. The real struggle for domination 
in Bengal was between the urbanised and upper-class Muslims 
and their Hindu counterparts. The peasantry of both 
communities were inarticulate, and the leadership of them 
eventually fell to the wealthier and more articulate members 
of their respective communities. 
In Calcutta the late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed 
a growing realisation amongst the Muslims of the futility 
both of factional politics and attempts at compromise with 
the Hindu-dominated mainstream of the nationalist movement. 
The ministerial controversy of 1927 and the Simon Commission, 
Nehru Report, the Round Table Conferences, the Communal Award 
and the question of municipal reform, all of which occurred 
in subsequent years, had revealed the full divergence of 
Hindu and Muslim interests. In addition such events under-
scored the pressing need for Muslim solidarity if any gains 
for the community were to be achieved in Calcutta and Bengal. 
This growth of Muslim parochialism in Calcutta was 
matched by a11 growth in communal consciousness amongst the 
Muslim masses of the mofussil. Ironically this had been 
initially precipitated by Fazl-ul Huq who had championed 
their class interests in the late 1920s. Alone, however, Huq 
had proved incapable of defeating the opposition of the 
Hindu landowners. Faced by the antipathy of Hindu nationalist 
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politicians in the Bengal Legislative Council he was forced 
to seek the support of other Muslim leaders and the 
representatives of the d.epressed-class Hindus. 
Huq's Muslim allies, though mainly drawn from landowning 
Ashraf families in the mofussil, were more than willing to 
sacrifice their class interests in return for the influence 
they gained by posing as champions of their community. What 
had originally been a class-based movement was rapidly 
trans£ormed into a communal confrontation, with the Muslim 
peasantry ranged against the Hindu community as represented 
by the great landowners and the provincial Congress 
organisation. 
The increasing influence of the more communally oriented 
Muslim leaders in the rural struggle eventually alienated 
most of Huq's Hindu followers. More important still, however, 
the nebulous concept of 'community', which was evoked during 
the struggle, helped bind the Muslims of Calcutta and the 
mofussil closer. The result was that by the early 19J0s the 
political horizons of the Muslims of Calcutta had expanded 
from the sub-communal group to the community in the city and 
thence to the community at large in the province. The 
nascent alliance was compounded of a variety of often 
conflicting interests for what had the Bihari carters of 
Mechua Bazar in common with the Muslim peasants of Mymensingh 
apart from religion? Yet all were united by a. negative 
attitude towards the political, economic and social domination 
of the Hindu elite. 
In Calcutta the process bf 'politicisation' amongst the 
various Muslim groups had not occurred only in the turbulent 
period immediately after the Great War, but. it continued 
steadily in subsequent years. This was particularly evident 
among specific groups such as the Muslim lascars, waterside 
workers, merchants and municipal electors of the city. 
The history of maritime trade unionism amongst the 
Muslims of Calcutta is one of intrigue and factionalism, but 
it is also one of the slow emergence of a number of distinctly 
Muslim trade unions which by 1932 had definitely adopted the 
communal cause in a deliberate attempt to achieve political 
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gains. Thus by the mid 1930s Muslim leaders who preached 
a distinctly communal creed had gained the support of 
such unions by supporting their claims to separate represen-
tation in the reformed constitutional processes which the 
British planned to implement in 1937. 
The same can be said of the growing communal 
consciousness of Muslim commercial interests which, in 1932, 
gave rise to the formation of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce 
in Calcutta. Such an event was evidence of the growing 
importance of economic conflict and rivalry between Muslim 
and Hindu mercantile groups in the city as a factor in the 
growth of communalism. 
In the field of Corporation politics also the impact 
of the Muslim masses in the city continued to grow. The 
municipal reforms of 1923 and 1932 had not extended the 
franchise to any great extent; nevertheless 1 increasing 
numbers of Muslims had focussed their attention upon the 
activities of the Corporation which had been converted by 
Hindu leaders into a bastion of the nationalist movement. 
Muslim members of the Corporation were not slow to realise 
the psychological impact of street demonstrations,rallies and 
petitions upon their fellow councillors and the press. The 
result was a carefully cultivated extension of Corporation 
politics into the streets, homes, mosques and schools of 
Muslim Calcutta. Thus the sppead of Muslim electors 
associatioil'ls, ward associations and mosque associations in 
the early 1930s bound the Muslims of the city more closely 
to the cause of the community. The Corporation had in fact 
gradually lost much of the Olympian aura which had surrounded 
it in 1918, and by 1935 was the focus of interest 9 if not the 
forum of expression, for the greater proportion of the city's 
inhabitants. 
The political and social history of the Muslims in 
Calcutta between 1918 and 1935 is one of an exotic urban 
minority group which underwent a piecemeal, and by no means 
predictable, process of political awakening and growing 
communal self-consciousness. These developments in turn led, 
under the impact of the community's inability to come to 
terms with their Hindu compatriots, to the development of 
a greater sense of communal self-reliance and identity. 
Such sentiments spread beyond the bounds of the city to 
encompass the Muslims of the mofussil with whom their co-
religionists in Calcutta had little in common beyond a 1 
shared religion and a fear of Hindu domination - both of 
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which were later to be major justifications for the establish-
ment of a separate Muslim state in Bengal. 
POSTSCRIPT 
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In the years between 1935 and 1947 communal relations 
in Calcutta and Bengal deteriorated tragically. The communal 
unity exhibited by the Muslims of Calcutta in the municipal 
dispute of 1935 was symptomatic of a new found communal 
consciousness and confidence which, combined with a despair 
of achieving a modus vivendi with the Hindus, was to sweep 
vast numbers of Muslims into a Teady acceptance of the 
concept of Pakistan. 
In Calcutta the majority of Muslims firmly supported 
the walk-out of the councillors, and communal leaders from 
all parts of the province seized the opportunity to further 
the cause of Muslim unity. At a mass meeting on the Maidan 
on January 19, in the presence of .the dissident councillors, 
with the sole exception of Huq, the Nawab of Dacca clearly 
enunciated Musl.im sentiment. He declared that: 
The Mayor and the Muslim councillors deserve to be 
warmly congratulated on their resignation from a 
corporate body in which the rights of the Moslems 
have been deliberately and tyrannically trampled 
under the heel of so-called nationalism which is 
nothing but communa.lism and vested interests of 
the darkest dye. 
The situation with which we are faced today 
has taken a long time to develop. The action of 
the Mayor and the Muslim councillors has been the 
culminating point in a series of futile endeavours 
to convince their Hindu colleagues who are in an 
overwhe.lming majority that such a continued denial 
of justice to the Moslems would be against the best 
interests of the nation, the cause of which the 
Congress Party profess to serve and which the Muslims 
have been no less anxious to uphold. Das, Bose 
[Subhas Chandra] and Sen-Gupta treated us with 
consideration, but not their successors and if in 
a comparatively limited sphere as the administration 
of a city municipality, Congressmen have been 
unable to rise above narrow communalism and 
partisanship, what can we expect, if tomorrow, in 
the larger.political field the Congress comes into 
power? 
I shall not be wrong if I say that the Moslems 
of Bengal as a whole are watching with keen concern 
the outcome of this struygle for Moslem rights in 
the 'Citadel of Swaraj'. 
1calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XXIII, 25.1.1936, p.315. 
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His speech lucidl-y set forward the wider interpreation 
given the municipal dispute by the Muslims of Bengal, and 
indicated that for once the community was not dealing with 
an immediate grievance, but rather was looking into a future 
in which Swaraj now loomed as an attainable goal. 
It would perhaps be naive to interpret the speech as 
the first clumsy gropings towards the concept of Pakistan, 
but it did nevertheless reveal the degree of Muslim alienation 
from the Congress and the Hinqus. In addition Dacca's 
speech was not directed at an audience comprised solely of 
Urdu-speakers, social conservatives and religion fanatics, 
but rather at the representatLves of a wide variety of 
groups from within the community. He was warmly supported 
by the leading Muslims of Calcutta such as Nooruddin, Momin, 
Ispahani and Huseyn Suhrawardy, as well as members of 
prominent Ashraf families from the mofussil, trade unionists, 
disillusioned nationalist sympathisers and respected divines. 
Such men represented a wide spectrum of political and 
social views, but all were united in their suspicion of 
Congress and an increased awareness of the need for the 
Muslims to function as a distinct communal bloc in the 
politics of Bengal and India. 
Just as in the period 1927 to 1935, in the Bengal Legis-
lative Assembly, the question of tenant interests had 
enabled both communal and secular Muslims to work together, 
the larger issues stirred by the municipal dispute confirmed 
this liaison and extended it to include further groups such 
as the trade unionists and the former Nationalist Muslims. 
The main significance of the dispute, as far as Calcutta was 
concerned, was that it sealed the bonds between the leaders 
of the city and the mofussil, and bound the future of the 
Urdu-speaking urban community to that of their Bengali-
speaking co-religion1sts in the rural areas. 
The Hindus of Calcutta were slow to realise the extent 
of Muslim alienation, and until the eve of the municipal 
elections, late in February 1936, they refused to accept the 
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resignation of the Muslim councillors. 1 Admittedly at 
first they had some cause for optimism, as on February 9 
A.K.M. Zakariah withdrew his resignation, and Huq entered 
into negotiations with the Hindus for a settlement. 
But the optimism w~s misplaced. Zakariah was denounced 
at a mass meeting on the Maidan, and when he entered the 
Corporation on February 12 he was assaulted by a gang of 
Muslim students. 2 In addition the negotiations with Huq 
were undermined by his own alienation from his community. 
At first he had beeiLhailed as a hero but when, on February 6, 
he opposed a resolution, sponsored by the Nawab of Dacca, 
Ispahani and Suhrawardy, that the Muslims should boycott 
the forthcoming muncipal elections his image was severely 
tarnished.3 A public statement in which Huq condemned the 
resolution as 'impolitic and ill-advised' did little to 
improve his relations with other Muslim leaders. 
went on to dec.l are that : 
The statement 
The resolution has been passed at the instance of 
the Khilafat Committee and the New Muslim Majlis. 
With due deference to these two institutions I 
cannot but say that even the two put together do 
not represent even a minute fraction of the Muslim 
ratepayers of Calcutta ••.• For them to seek to 
impose a mandate on those who are willing to 
undertake civic duties is, in my opinion, a worse 
tyranny than what is imputed to the Hindus in the 
Corporation •••• I have nothing but praise for the 
public spirit and energy shown by the Khilafat 
Committee and the Majlis. But let them spare the 
poor ratepayer in Calcutta and direct their guns 
against the Port Trust, the Government, and the 
non-official Europeans, who are worse culprits 
than the Corporation ltindus. 
I appeal to the Nawab Bahadur [of Dacca] to 
intervene and suspend the resolution till at least 
the wishes of the ratepayers have been consulted.4 
1Ibid., 11.1.1936, p.235; ibid., 18.1.1936, p.260, ibid., 
25.1.1936, p.313; ibid., 1.2.1936, p.356; ibid., 8.2.1936, 
P·396. 
2 Ibid., 15.2.1936, p.431. 
3Ibid., 1.2.1936, p.356. 
4 Ibid. , 15. 2. 1 9 36, p. 4 31 • 
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In part Huq's appeal gained some response from the 
Muslims who, on February 18, met Hindu representatives at 
the residence of the Nawab of Dacca. The Muslims refused 
to withdraw their boycott resolution, but they did agree 
to further negotiations if the Corporation would immediately 
appoint two Muslims to senior posts in the mu~cipal 
administration and agree to re-open the question of Muslim 
employment. The leaders of the two major factions in 
Congress accepted these conditions, but unfortuhately when 
they raised the resolutions in the council chamber they 
failed for want of a quorum. 1 
The Muslims were furious, 2 and Huq, whose house had 
already been besi~ged by mobs infuriated by his attempts 
at conciliation, 3 abandoned his efforts to seal the breach. 
Under pressure from Dacca, 'who had been appointed titular 
head of the boycott movement' by Nooruddin, Ispahani and 
Suhrawardy, Huq withdrew his candidature as Alderman and 
denounced the municipal elections. 4 
II 
The elections proved to be a fiasco. The New Muslim 
Majlis and the Cal.cutta Khilafat Committee, under Huseyn 
Suhrawardy, canvassed the community to secure a complete 
boycott and were large.ly successful in their effor:ts. 5 Five 
of the nineteen Muslim seats remained vacant after nine 
candidates were persuaded to withdraw; twelve seats were 
1Ibid., 22.2.1936, p.4ft'1. 
2 Ibid., 29.2.1936, p.512a. 
3Ibid., 8.2.1936, P-396. 
4Ibid., 11.4.1936, p.740a; Ispahani, M.A.H., Qaid-e-Azam 
Jinnah As I Knew Him (1966),p.11. 
5Ibid., p.10. 
filled without contest, and only two were filled as the 
result of any contest. 1 
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Ispahani's claim that the Muslim boycott was complete 
1 except for a it Quisling" and a few hackney carriage drivers, 
barbers and butlers who were elected by default and not 
by merit 12 was true as far as the number of Muslim voters 
was concerned, but it was only partially true as a 
description of the men elected. Thirteen of the new counci-
llors were complete nonentities but six of them had been 
elected to previous councils and ranged from the arch-
communalist 'Fruit King' of Calcutta, Mahomed Akbar, to 
the Nationalist Muslim Jalalluddin Hashemy. 3 These men, 
however, committed political suicide by such action and soon 
vanished into the oblivion wished upon them by their co-
religionists. Demonstrations were mounted against them, 
their homes were ransacked and Abdur Raheem, a nominated 
councillor who was later elected as deputy mayor and had 
been involved in municipal and communal politics since 1913, 4 
was attacked in the street by members of the Calcutta 
Khilafat Committee.5 
As a result of the elections the attention of Muslims 
in Calcutta passed from the Corporation to the next centre 
of confrontation with the Hindus: the first elections to 
the reformed Bengal Legislative Assembly, which were held 
in January 1937. In the intervening period, however, vital 
changes in the leadership of the Muslim community throughout 
India were occurring. 
Since the halcyon days of Hindu-Muslim political 
cooperation in the early 1920s the Muslims of India had been 
1
calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XXIII, 29.2.1936 {supplement). 
2 Ispahani, M.A.H., op.cit., p.10. 
3Jalalluddin Hashemy, Mahomed Akbar, A.K.M. Zakariah, Mahomed 
Hashem, Shamsul Huque and M.M. Huq. 
4 See p.10. 
5Calcutta Corporation, Gazette, Vol.XXIII, 25.4. 1936, 
pp.825-30; ibid., 2.5.1936, p.853. 
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leaderless at the national level and divided into a 
multitude of rival factions. By the first years of the 
1930s this lack of unity had waned. Futile attempts at 
conciliation and confrontation with the Hindus had created 
a climate of opinion within the Muslim community which 
favoured a greater degree of intra-communal unity, and which 
fonnd a champion in the person of Mahomed Ali Jinnah, an 
anglicised Muslim from Bombay. 
Without examining the details of Jinnah's rise suffice 
it to say that he was the first Muslim since Mahomed Ali 
who offered his co-religionists a national leadership, and 
the first ever who proposed a national and communalist 
policy for his community. Jinnah revived the moribund All-
India Muslim League, and in 1936 he embarked on a whirlwind 
tour of India to conciliate divergent political factions 
within the community to secure a victory for the League 
at the provincial elections due in January 1937. 
In August 1936 Jinnah visited Calcutta and at the Town 
Hall made a speech which, although it was conciliatory 
towards the Hindus, made it clear that the Muslims considered 
themselved a distinct political entity separate from 
Congress. Jinnah declared that: 
Ours is not a hostile movement. Ours is a movement 
which carries the olive branch to every sister 
community. We are willing to co-operate, we are 
willing to coalesce with any group or groups, 
provided their ideals, their objects are approx-
imately the same as ours. 1 
The combination of 'olive branch' and Muslim political 
assertiveness were vague enough to appeal to Muslims of 
differing political persuasions. The result wa.s that during 
his visit Jinnah secured the support of Ispahani, who led 
the New Muslim Majlis, and of Fazl-ul Huq, who had retreated 
from active politics in Calcutta to the mofussil where he 
1
sen, S,, Xhe Birth of Pakistan (1955), p.107. 
1 
continued to receive the "\farm support of the peasantry. 
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One important group of Muslim leaders in Bengal, ho;r.rever, 
at first remained aloof from Jinnah's All-India Muslim 
League and the Presidency League which Ispahani had revived" 2 
This group consisted of Huseyn Suhrawardy, Khwaja 
Nazimuddin and the Nawab of Dacca, who, shortly before 
Jinnah 1 s visit, had formed the United Muslim Party. 3 
However, once Huq's Praja Party, with its considerable 
following among the Muslim and Hindu peasantry, had agreed 
to support Jinnah, the attitude of the le~ders to the United 
Muslim Party changed. They realised they stood little chance 
of securing more than a handful of rural seats in the forth-
coming provincial elections, and eventually they joined 'the 
Bengal Muslim Parliamentary Board which had been set up by 
Ispahani. 
The Board had nine members: four from the United Muslim 
Party - Nazimuddin, Dacca, Akram Khan and Huseyn Suhrawardy; 
two from the Praja Party - ·Fazl-ul Huq and Shamsuddin Ahmed, 
and three who sat as Jinnah's representatives, namely 
Ispahani, Nooruddin and a prominent merchant Abdur Rahman 
Siddiqui. These last three had been members of the Majlis 
which by now had merged with the Presidency League. 
Eventually the United Muslim Party also liquidated itself 
and only the Praja Party, with its large Hindu peasant 
following, retained its separate identity. 4 
1Ispahani, M.AoH., op.cit., pp.18, 23; Sayeed, K.K., 
Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (1968), .p.94. 
2 Ispahani, M.A.H., op.cit., p.2J. 
3Ibid., p.17. 
4Ibid., p.JO. 
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III 
At the provincial elections in 1937 the Muslim 
Parliamentary Board had considerable success. Between them 
the component parties secured 74 of the 119 seats. The 
Muslim League accounted for 39 and the Praja Party for 35, 
in addition to which at least seven of the 45 independents 
were strongly sympathetic to the coalition. 1 
In Calcutta Huseyn Suhrawardy and Ispahani easily 
captured the two Muslim seats, 2 whilst their supporters 
Nooruddin and Mohamed Solaiman secured two of the contiguous 
Muslim seats and the third went to Suhrawardy who now held 
two seats.3 This double victory proved of great importance, 
for beneath the surface of the coalition conflict had broken 
out between Fazl-ul Huq and the leading Ashraf families in 
the mofussil. Khwaja Naz:i:muddin decided to fight Huq for the 
leadership of the Muslim rural :masses and contested his 
home seat at Barisal. Nazimuddin was soundly defeated, 
however, and he only entered the Assembly by securing the 
seat of North Calcutta when Suhrawardy opted to retain his 
second seat. 4 The opposition which faced the successful Muslim 
candidates in the Calcutta area had been minimal. Six of 
the rival candidates were obscure figures of no prominence, 
whilst the remaining three - Mahomed Raffique, Shamsul Huque 
and Mahomed Saadatullah - were compromised by their membership 
of the Corporation and suffered humiliating defeats. 5 A. 
further member of the Presidency League also secured a 
Calcutta seat: Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, who was elected to 
represent the Muslim Chamber of Commerce. 
1 Govt of India, Reforms Dept, Franchise, 1937, File no. 
20/III/36-F. 
2 . 
Calcutta North; Huseyn Suhrawardy, 3743/6929 votes; Calcutta 
South: M.A"H. Ispahani, 4069/6486 votes. 
324-Parganas Municipal: Hus~yn Suhrawardy, 1884/3082 votes; 
Barrackpore: Mohamed Solaiman, 1885/3078 votes; Hooghly cum 
Howrah: Nooruddin, 1856/2322 votes. 
4 Bengal Gov"t~, A Brief Summary of Political Events in the 
Presidency of Bengal During the Year 1937 (1938), p.4. 
5Govt of India, Reforms Dept, Franchise, 1937, File no. 
20/III/36-F. 
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Following the elections Huq formed a ministry. His 
quota of Muslim seats plus the support of the depressed-
class Hindu representatives gave him the largest following 
in the Assembly. Jinnah remained faithful to their pre-
election agreement, and the representatives of the League 
promised him .their votes for which they gained three 
ministerial appointments. 1 Once the ministry was formed 
Huq began to adopt a more overtly communal stance. The 
failure of Congress elsewhere in India to form provincial 
ministries with the support of representatives of the Muslim 
League infuriated him, and at the Lucknow session of the 
All-India Muslim League in 1937 he 
threatened to retaliate against the Hindus of 
Bengal for the supposed dangers to Muslim 
intErests under the Congress Governments. 2 
Also shortly after this he claimed during a speech in 
Calcutta that Congress was 
determined to crush and subdue the Muslims and 
that the Mahasabha was devoting its energies to 
the frustration of Muslim hopes and the 
suppression of the'~ legitimate rights ••• of ••• 
Muslim India.3 
In part Huq's language may have been a result of 
increasing pressure from his more communalist colleagues; 
but whatever the cause such statements served . only to 
undermine the unity of the Praja Party whose Hindu supporters 
were already dissatisfied with the distribution of 
ministerial portfolios. 4 
1Huq: Education and Chief Minister; Nazimuddin: Home 
Minister; Dacca: Health Minister; Huseyn Suhrawardy: Finance,. 
Commerce and Labour Minister. 
2 ALCC Papers, 1938, File no.6-32. 
3Ibid. 
4 Bengal Govt, A Brief Sununary of Political Events in the 
Presidency of Bengal During the Year 1937 (1938), p.5. 
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The political history of Bengal, and by now Calcutta 
was an integral part of the provincial political arena as 
far as the Muslims were concerned, was marked in succeeding 
years by an increasing divergence of interests between the 
Hindus and Muslims. Huq' s ministry survived until 1941 
when, following a quarrel with Jinnah and the resignation 
of his fellow Muslim ministers at the instance of Jinnah, 
Huq had to resign. His attempt to reconcile sectional 
Hindu and Muslim interests failed because of tensions within 
Bengal, and also because of the interference of Jinnah 
who used Bengal as a pawn in his struggle for Muslim rights 
at the national level. 1 
Although Huq lost the support of the majority of 
Muslim MLAs he still retained sufficient votes .to :form a 
new ministry which survived until 194J. In that year, as 
a result of the gradual alienation of many depressed-class 
Hindus by the rapid growth of a more intransigent spirit 
of Muslim communalism, and quarrels between Huq and Governor 
Herbert, Huq again resigned. 2 This time however he was 
unable to rally sufficient supportg His main rivals Khwaja 
Nazimuddin and Huseyn Suhrawardy formed a Muslim League 
ministry with Nazimuddin as Chief Minister. In 1945 this 
ministry collapsed as a result of conflict between its 
progenitors, and Suhrawardy became the last Chief Minister 
o:f a united Bengal. 
IV 
It is virtually impossible to write of a separate Muslim 
political history in Calcutta during the years after 1935. 
By then the Muslims of the city had entered provincial 
politics in liaison with Huq and the Ashraf :families of the 
1 sayeed~ K.Bo, opocito~ p.21J; Huq, Fazl-ul, Bengal Today (1944), 
p.6o 
2
Ibid., PP·7-35· 
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mofussilo The immediate interest of all the Muslim groups 
was to destroy the economic and political stranglehold of 
the Hindu eliteo The ultimate goals of the Urdu-speaking 
merchants of Mechua Bazar, of peasant leaders such as Huq~ 
of demagogues such as Huseyn Suhrawardy and of the 
disillusioned Nationalist Muslims may have differed~ but 
in their confrontation with the Hindu elite they used the 
common weapon of communalismo 
In Calcutta Congress made belated attempts to conciliate 
Muslim nationalist sympathisers and trade unionists, but 
it was too late~ Mujibur Rahman was won back to the cause, 1 
but the Urdu-speakers firmly rejected all overtures. 2 
Ironically leaders of Congress in the province had finally 
come to realise the need to conciliate the peasant masses, 
and in May 1937 one official of the party reported that: 
I feel that Muslims in Bengal may be mobilised 
only through peasant movements. There is hardly 
any middle class Muslim youth who can be diverted 
to Congress. We should however try to bring in 
a number of Muslims to make the Bengal Congress a 
real mass organisation. It would also help us 
when Subhas [Chandra Bose] returns to Calcutta as 
he also entertains similar ideaso3 
Such belated considerations were of little value. The 
accession of the former Nationalist Muslims and Huq to the 
Muslim League coalition had strengthened the hand of the more 
intransigent communalist Muslims. The Nawab of Dacca again 
took a leading role in the activities of the maritime trade 
unions; 4 while Huq and the Bengali-speaking former Nationalist 
Muslims provided a vital link for the Ashraf families and the 
Urdu-speakers of Calcutta with Muslim peasant organisations 
in the mofussil. 
1ALCC Papers, 1937, File no.26, letter dated 16.4.1937· 
2Ibid., File no.54, letter dated ~.8.1937. 
3Ibid., letter dated 21.5. 1937. 
4 Bengal Govt, Administration Report, 1935-36, p.XXVIII. 
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Eventually Huq's understanding with the Muslim League 
collapsed, but at the same time the Praja Party was undergoing 
a piecemeal disintegration, and finally fell vic tim to the 
upsurge of Hindu and Muslim communalism. The spoils of 
this disaster were gathered by the Muslim League. Firmly 
entrenched in Calcutta, where the spirit of Muslim 
assertiveness appealed to the business instincts of Muslim 
merchants and industrialists, who first espoused a 'Buy 
Muslim' campaign and then the cause of a separate Muslim 
1 state~ the League rapidly extended its influence into the 
mofussil where it championed the cause of the Muslim peasantry 
with an arrogant brand of communalism. 
Huq and the former Nationalist Muslims were caught in 
an unenviable position. Huq retained considerable personal. 
support but his supra-communal party was in ruins. Its 
Hindu supporters had been alienated by his own flirtation 
with the more extreme brand of Muslim communalism and a 
parallel rise in Hindu communalism which overwhelmed their 
class interests. The Muslim peasantry had been seduced by 
the Muslim League who, while espousing the class conflict 
of peasant versus landlord, had the additional weapon of 
communal sentiment. 
The former Nationalist Muslims suffered a similar fate. 
Alienated from Congress they pursued their activities 
amongst the Muslim peasants and werelargely responsible for 
bringing them, and other groups such as the lascars, into 
the orbit of the Muslim League. The Ashraf families of the 
mofussil, and the Urdu-speakers of Calcutta, played a vital 
role in these events. Dacca, Nazimuddin, Suhrawardy and 
Ispahani all adopted the cause of the Muslim peasant, yet 
their aims were radically different from those of the former 
Nationalist Muslims. They had no interest in social reform 
and were only concerned with seizing the dominant economic 
and political roles held by the Hindu e1.i te" For such men 
1 Sayeed, K.B., op.cit. 9 p.95. 
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the defence of communal interests~~> and later the espousal 
of Pakistan, were conceived largely in terms of the economic 
and political gains they would achieve. 
Too late men such as Mujibur Rahman and Abul Hashem, 
son of Abul Kasem 9 brother-in-law of Huseyn Suhrawardy, and 
the 'young socialist General Secretary of the provincial 
Muslim League',~ realised the full meaning of the Muslim 
political revival. Rahman returned to Congress in 1937, 
and was followed by Hashem in 1943 after he had waged 'a 
battle royal inside the Bengal Presidency League against the 
group led by the Nawab of Dacca and Khwaja Nazimuddin', who 
were also supported by the Muslim merchants and industrialists 
of Calcuttau 2 In Hashem's case the dispute was to have 
further consequences for when he was forced to migrate to 
East Pakistan in 1950, after communal riots in Burdwan, he 
was imprisoned for several years by members of the coterie 
he had angered in 1943. 3 
Other former stalwarts of the nationalist movement 
remained with the Muslim League. Akram Khan allied himself 
with Nazimuddin and became a leading newspaper editor in 
East Pakistan; whilst Aftab Ally continued his trade union 
activities in the new state amongst the lascars, most of 
whom originally came from the area. 
Perhaps the ultimate tragedy of these years was that 
whilst the concept of Pakistan gained support first from the 
Urdu-speaking Muslims of Calcutta and the mofussil, the state 
itself was made possible by the mass support of the peasantry 
whose political interest had been aroused by men such as 
Huq and the Nationalist Muslims~ None of these men envisaged 
the final fruit of their work, and certainly once East 
Pakistan had been established it was the 1 Bihari',or Urdu-
1Ibid., p.209; interview with Abul Hashem at his home in 
Dacca, 1.10.1970. 
2Ibid., 2.10.1970; Sayed, K.B., op.cit., p.209. 
3Interview with Abul Hashem at his home in Dacca, 2.10~1970. 
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speaking, Muslims rather than the Bengali-speaking Muslims 
who tasted the fruits of victoryo 
Large nwnbers of Muslims from Calcutta migrated to the 
new state where, along with local members of Ashraf families 1 
they gained political and economic control. The Ispahanis, 
along with Gujerati and Memon families 1 established a 
virtual economic monopoly, whilst M.A.H. Ispahani was later 
the Pakistan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. 
Nazimuddin and Huseyn Suhrawardy quarrelled shortly after 
Partition, when Nazimuddin became Chief Minister of East 
Pakistan, but later Suhrawardy was amply rewarded when he 
became Prime Minister of Pakistan. Huq also achieved 
political power in the new state, first as Advocate-General 
of East Pakistan and later as Governor of the Province and 
Interior Minister for Pakistan. His enmity with Suhrawardy 
and the Dacca coterie, however, did not decline 1 and in his 
final_years his proclaimed sympathy for the peasant masses 
and the general body of the Bengali people alienated him 
from the 1 Bihari 1 elite. 1 
A host of other 1 Bihari' Muslim emigres from West 
Bengal and Calcutta soon replaced the vanquished Hindu 
elite in East Pakistan, and a deteirmined attempt was made to 
undermine the Bengali culture of the region. Eventually, 
however, the growth of a small Bengali-speaking Muslim middle 
class, which filled the lower ranks of the administration and 
professions, combined with discontent at the misgovernment 
of the province by the 1 Bihari 1 elite to breed a revolutionary 
s.i tuation in which the emigre Urdu-speaking Muslim population 
fell victim to the bloody birth of Bangla Desh. 
1Interview with Faizul Huq, son of Fazl-ul Huq at his home in 
Dacca on 2. 10. 1970; also with Syed Azizul Huq, nephew of 
Fazl-ul Huq, at his home in Dacca on 1.10~1970. 
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APPENDIX I 
Occupation or means of livelihood of the Muslims of Calcutta, 
.1.2..Q.!. 
I. 
II~ 
III. 
IV. 
Government Service: 5,44_'3 (figs include dependents). 
Pasture and Agriculture: 5,931 
Personal Service: 45,954 (indoor servants: 28,01 3). 
Prepara.tionand Supply of Material Substances: 118,239. 
1 • Provision of animal food 
2" 
3. 
4. 
!I 
" 
Lighting 
!I vegetables etc. 
11 drinks, spices etc. 
5. Fuel and forage 
6. Building 
5~472 
6,227 
5,351 
329 
2,070 
23,603 
a. masons ) 
b. bricklayers) 
7., Vehicles and vessels 
8. Paper 
9. Books and printing 
10. Watches, clocks, etc. 
11. Carving and engraving 
12.. Toys and curiosities 
13. Music and musical instruments 
14. Glass bangle sellers 
15. Necklaces, beads, threads 
1 6 • Furniture 
17.. Harness 
18. Tools and machinery 
19. Arms and ammunition 
20. Wool and fur 
21. Silk 
22. Cotton 
23. Jute, hemp etc. (operatives) 
24. Dress (incl. tailors) 
25. Gold, silver, precious stones 
26~ Brass, copper, bellmetal 
27. Tin, zinc, etc. 
28 • Iron and s tee 1 
29. Glass and chinaware 
1,435 
2,030 
9,277 
257 
763 
321 
107 
561 
387 
142 
143 
2,061 
310 
456 
309 
2J437 
12,668 
24,465 
2,157 
315 
371 
936 
694 
23., 307 
( 1 o, 6o4) 
30o 
3L 
32., 
33u 
34. 
35• 
36. 
37o 
38. 
Earthen and stoneware 
Wood and bamboo 
Carpenters 
Canework, matting, etc,, 
Gums, wax 9 resins, etc" 
Drugs, dyes, etco 
Shoe, boot~ sandalmakers 
Horn~ hide~ bristle sellers 
Bone 
Vo Commerce, Transport and Storage: 
1 • 
4. 
VI. Professions 
1 • 
2c 
Commerce 
a) general merchandise 9 bankers, 
accountants 
b) shopkeepers, hawkers 
Railway 
Road 
a) cart drivers 
b) cart owners, etc. 
Water 
a) boat and barge 
b) ships officers, crew 
c) dockyards 
Porters 
Religion 
Education 
Literature 
Law 
Medicine (doctors) 
Engineering and surveying 
Music~ acting, dancing 
VII. Unskilled Labour 
224 
596 
3,580 
503 
212 
1 '241 
1, 018 
2' 118 
1?255 
11,755 
(4,6o6) 
(6,291) 
3,354 
20,484 
(13,115) 
(6,853) 
30,796 
(15,962) 
(12,518) 
(1,164) 
4,671 
1 '21 3 
1,186 
926 
608 
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1 '6 98 ( 715) 
761 
843 
VIII. Means of subsistence Independent of Occupation 
1 0 Property and alms 
At State expense 
Occupat~on or means of l~vel~hood of the Musl~ms of Calcutta 9 
1901, by Wardo 
1. Largest s~ngle group ~n the bmld~ng trade where they 
form a major~tyo Compr~se a th~rd of jute m~ll workers 
(c~rca 4oo) and general labourers and a major~ty of 
ta~lors, cart dr~vers and tramway employees. 
2 ,, Form major~ ty of ta~lors and transport workers; also more 
than a quarter of constables, durwans and Publ~c Serv~ce 
IJlen~als. 
J~ Form major~ty of masons, br~cklayers, bookb~nders, ta~lors, 
leather goods dealers 9 tannery operat~ves. Also nearly 
50 per cent of text~le workers and dealers ~n h~des, 
horn, bone and br~stles. 
4, Form major~ty of' butchers 1 slaughters 1 match and candle-
makers, f~rewood and chflrcoal dealers, suppl~ers of 
an~mal fodder, masons, br~cklayers and transport workerso 
Also nearly 50 per cent of text~le and dress workers, 
carpenters and general labourers. 
5. Form major~ty of r~ver transport workers and over 25 per 
cent of transport and storage workers. 
6. Form major~ty of bakers, br~cklayers, masons, booksellers, 
publ~shers, greasers, ta~lors, cart dr~vers, boatmen 
~ a:rrl. porters w~ th over a th~rd of text~le workers, jute 
workers, general transport and storage workers and 
general labourers. 
7. Form major~ty of masons, br~cklayers, pr~nters, book-
b~nders, ta~lors, leatherworkers, general transport 
workers, cart dr~vers, and boatmen w~th over a th~rd 
of general labour~ng populat~on. 
8. Form major~ty ~n ammal fodder trade, food trade, 
l~ght~ng, f~r~ng, for~g~ng, fuel 1 br~cklayers, masons, 
cart transport, general transport, paper manufacture 1 
bookb~nd~ng, pr~nt~ng, text~le work, general labour~ng, 
hawk~ng w~th over a th~rd of those engaged ~n commerce, 
as m~ddlemen and brokers, and ~n the profess~ons. 
9. Much the same as Ward 8 except that the Musl~ms have an 
even greater share ~n the profess~ons and commerce. 
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1 o. Largest number of Muslims employed i.n domestic service 
where they form nearly 45 per cent of those so employed. 
Same percentage in food trade, building and textile 
industries and in transport. 
11. Muslims poorly represented in all occupations. 
12. Much the same as Ward 11 except that they form a majority 
of those engaged in bookbinding, road transport and 
storage. 
13. Form majority of those engaged in textile trade, tailoring, 
transport, storage and as cart drivers. Form nearly 50 
per cent of workers in personal service, the food and 
drink trade and the building trade. 
14. 1 Many respectable Muslims I • Form majority of those 
engaged in Public Service, personal service, building 
trade, tailoring, textile trade, bookbinding, printing, 
general transport and unskilled labour. Also form more 
than 40 per cent of those engaged in the professions and 
commerce. 
15. Much the same as Ward 14 except that Muslims form the 
majority of those engaged in the professions. 
16. Much same as Ward 15 although Muslim majority narrower. 
17. Muslims in less proportion than Ward 16 but still fonn 
majority of those in transport and personal service. 
18. As Ward 17. 
19. Muslims poorly represented in all fields, but survey 
incomplete. 
20. Muslim majority in Public Service, building trade, 
transport, ·,storage, tailoring, personal service and the 
professions especially education, medicine and engineering. 
21. Form majority in tailoring, transport, building trade, 
bookbinding, printing and personal service. 
22. Poorly represented in all occupations except tailoring. 
23. As Ward 22. 
24. Form majority in personal service, tailoring, building 
tr'ade, bookbinding and printing. 
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25. Form majority amongst tailors, stationers and dockyard 
labour .. 
Throughout the city they form: 
67 % of those engaged in building trade 
6o % II II II ti water transport 
53 % II II II II associated industries 
51 % II II !I II tailoring, textile and dress 
49 % II II II II drug and gum trade 
44 % II II II II general road transport 
44 % II II II II animal care and provedoring 
references: Govt of India, Census of India, 1901, vol.VII, 
part 1, pp.160-73, 200-491; ibid., vol.VII, 
part 4, pp.96-97; Bengal Govt, Education Dept, 
April 1919, File no.1E-2, Progs 1-10. 
trade 
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APPENDIX II 
1 Ethnif;_ groups' listed by M.K.A. Siddiqui in his unpublished 
seminor paper 1Caste among the Muslims of Calcutta', pp.4-8, 
presented to the Indian Anthropological Society, Calcutta, 
January 22-30, 1970. 
I. Foreigners: 
A. Afghans 
B. Arabs 
( i) Jalalabadi 
(ii) Qandhari 
(iii) Ghaznavi 
(iv) Mazarsharif 
c. Tibetans, Chinese and others. 
II. Indians: 
A. North Western Region 
(i) Pakhtoon 
(ii) Peshwari 
(iii) Kashmiri 
-
number of 
(iv) Punjabi 
(a) Sayed 
(b) A wan 
(c) Kakazai 
(d) Kalal 
(e) Kashmiri 
divided into 
occupational 
(a) Rajput 
(b) Jat 
-
Priests 
-
Muleteers 
-
Tribals 
-
Potters 
-
Traders 
a large 
backgrounds. 
B. Western Region 
(i) Rajasthan 
1. groups wearing ghagra (shirt) of 
specified colour. 
(a) Shekhawati - Red - Nilgar 
(b) Madi - Black 
-
Nilgar 
(c) Manikar - Banglemakers 
(d) Sonar - Goldsmiths 
(e) Lahar - Blacksmiths 
(f) Dhabi - Washermen 
2. groups not wearing ghaghra 
(g) Besati - Hawkers and 
traders. 
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(ii) Gujerati, economically dominant 
1. sectarian-cum-ethnic groups 
(a) 
(b) 
Dawoodi Bohra - Traders 
Imami Ismaili Shia - Traders, 
very small group. 
2. groups sharing sects with others 
C. Southern Region 
(c) 
(d.) 
(e) 
(f) 
(i) Tamils 
(ii) Malayali 
Halai Memon 
Cutchi Memon 
Sunni Bohra 
- Traders 
- Traders 
- Traders 
Asni Ashari Bohra - Traders 
(a) Marakkayar - Traders 
(b) Rowther II 
(c) Labbai II 
(a) Thanagal - Saiyid.s 
(b) Musalliyar 
(c) Mapilla 
(d) Rowther 
(e) Keyi 
D. Northern Region (Gangetic valley provinces) 
(i) Groups claiming foreign origin -
having no traditional occupation and 
not organised on the basis of caste 
panchayat (council) - represented in 
all sects and most regional groups. 
(a) Saiyid. 
(b) Sheikh 
(c) Moghul 
(d) Pathan. 
(ii) Groups of indigenous origin, recruited 
from superior ruling and fighting 
castes, coming from particular areas 
with some sort of caste organisation 
often taking shape in formalised 
institutions. 
(a) Qaum-e-Panjabian (Delhi), 
economically dominant 
(b) Qaum-e-Panjabian ~ivala), 
economically dominant 
(c) Rajputs 
(d) Jats 
(e) Malik. 
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(iii} Groups with t~aditional occupation~~ 
with traditional caste organisations of 
varying strength. 
1. Groups that do not pursue traditional 
occupations in Calcutta hut continue 
to do it elsewhere 
(a) Momen - Weavers 
(numerically most 
(b) Ranki Kalal 
(Iraqi) 
dominant) 
- Distillers, 
monopolise the 
hide and skin 
trade. 
2. Occupational groups that continue 
to pursue traditional occupations, 
besides adopting other occupations, 
and which generally have strong caste 
organisations 
(c) Darzi 
(d) Kharadi 
(e) Qasab and 
Qureshi 
(f) Chik 
(g) Rai 
(h) Besati 
Mans uri 
- Tailors - Bengali 
and non-Bengali 
- Woodworkers 
- Butchers, third 
strongest 
numerical group 
- Goat and sheep 
butchers 
- Greengrocers, 
second strongest 
numerical group 
- Stationary 
peddlars 
- Cotton carders (i) 
( j) Churihar and 
Shishgar - Glass bangle 
makers and 
dealers 
(k) Nikari Fishmongers, very 
small group 
(l) Dafali -· Drum makers and 
priests of 
certain sects 
(m) Hajjam - Barbers and 
surgeons 
(n) 
( 0) 
Dhabi - Washermen 
Mirshikar and 
Chirimar Bird trappers 
dealertjl, very 
small group 
and 
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(p) Mirasi Musicians, very 
small group 
(q) Qalander ? 
(r) Faqir Beggars and mendi-
cants 
(s) Patwa 
-
Painters 
(t) Sheikhjee Dairy product dealers 
( u) Mea II II II 
also an ethnic and 
regional group 
(v) Ghosi Dairy product dealers 
( w) Lal Begi Sweepers, an 
'unclean' group on 
the borderline of 
Islam and Hinduism. 
JOJ 
APPENDIX III * 
Extract from "Independent" dated Allahabad, the 2nd Oct. 1921. 
Mahatma Gandhi has issued the following appeal to the 
Mussalmans of India:-
To the Mussalmans of Indiac 
Dear countrymen - While the arrest of Maulanas Shaukat 
Ali and Mahomed Ali has touched every Indian heart I know 
w4at it has meant to y6uo The brave brothers are staunch 
lovers of their country, but they are Mussalmans first and 
everything else after, and it must be so with every religiously 
minded man. The Brothers have for years past represented 
all that is best and noblest in Islam. No two Mussalmans 
have done more than they to raise the status of Islam in 
India. They have promoted the cause of the Kh.ilafat as no 
two other Mussalmans of India have. For they have been true 
and they dared to tell what they felt even in their internment 
in Chindwara- Their long interrnnent did. not demoralise or 
weaken them. They came out just as brave as they went in, 
and since their discharge from interrnnent they have shown 
themselves true nationalists and you have taken pride in 
their being so. 
The Brothers have by their simplicity, humility and 
inexhaustible energy fired the imagination of the masses as 
no other Mussalman has~ 
All these qualities have endeared them to you., You 
regard them as your ideal meno You are therefore sorry 
for their separation from youo Many besides you miss their 
genial facesu For me, they have become inseparate. I seem 
to be without my arms~ For anything connected with Mussalmans 
Shaukat Ali was my guide and friend., He never once misled 
me. His judgement was sound and unerring in most caseso 
With the Brothers among us I felt safe about Hindu-Muslim 
unity whose work they understood as few of us have. 
* "Bamford Report'', pp .. 207-212. 
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The Duty of Muslims: 
But whilst we all miss them we must not give way to 
grief or dejection. We must learn, each one of us, to stand 
alone. God only is our infallible and eternal Guide. 
To be dejected is not only not to have known the 
Brothers, but it is if I may venture to say so, not to know 
what religion is. 
For do we not learn in all religions that the spirit of 
the dear ones abides with us even when they physically leave 
us? Not only is the spirit of the Brothers with us but 
they are serving better by their suffering than if they are 
in our midst giving us some of th-eir courage, hope and 
energy. The secret of non-violence and Non-co-operation lies 
in our realising that it is through suffering that we are 
to attain our goal. What is the renunciation of titles, 
councils, law-courts and schools but a measure, very slight 
indeed, of suffering. That preliminary renunciation is a 
prelude to the larger suffering - the hardships of a goal 
life and even the final consumption on the gallows if need 
be. The more we suf'fer and. the more of us suffer, the 
nearer we are to our cherished goal. 
The earlier and the more clearly we recognise that it 
is not big meetings and demonstrations that would give us 
victory but quiet suffering, the earlier and more certain 
~11 be our victory. 
I have made your cause my own because I believe it to 
be just. Khilafat, I have understood from your best men, is 
an ideal. You are not fighting to sustain any wrong or even 
misrule. You are backing the Turks because they represent 
the gentlemen of Europe, and because they are Mussalmans and 
will not assimilate the modern spirit of exploitation of 
weaker people and their lands. In fighting for the Turks 
you are fighting to raise the dignity and the purity of your 
own faith. 
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Non-violence 
You have naturally therefore chosen pure methods to 
attain your end. It cannot be denied that both Mussalmans 
and Hindus have lost much in moral stamina" Both of us 
have become poor representatives of our respective faiths. 
Instead of each one of us becoming a true child of God, we 
expect others to live our religion and even to die for us. 
But we have now chosen a method that compels us to turn 
each one of us our face towards God. Non-co-operation 
presumes that our opponent with whom we non-co-operate 
resorts to methods which are as questionable as the purpose. 
he seeks to fulfil by such methods~ We shall therefore find 
favour in the sight of God only by chasing methods which are 
different in kind from those of our opponents. This is a 
big claim we have made for ourselves and we can attain 
success within the short time appointed by us, only if our 
methods are in reality radically different from those of the 
Government. Hence the foundation of our movement rests on 
complete non-violence whereas violence is the final refuge 
of the government. And as no energy can be created without 
resistance our non-resj_stance to government violence must 
bring the latter to a standstill. But our non-violence to 
be true must be in word, thought and deed,, It makes no 
difference that with you non-violence is an expediency. 
Whilst it lasts, you cannot consistently with your pledge 
harbour designs of violence# On the contrary we must have 
implicit faith in our programme of non-violence which 
presupposes perfect accord between thought, word and deed. I 
would like every Mussalman to realise, whilst the occasion 
for anger is the greatest., that by non-violence alone can 
we gain complete victory even during this year. 
Nor is non-violence a visionary programme. Just imagine 
what the united resolve of seven crores of Mussalmans (not to 
count the Hindus) must mean. Should we not have succeeded 
already if all the titled men had given up titles, all the 
lawyers had suspended their practice and all the schoolboys 
had left their schools and all had boycotted councils? But 
we must recognise that with many of us flesh has proved too 
weako Seven crores are called Mussalmans and twenty-two 
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crores are called Hi.ndus, but only a few are true Mussalmans 
or true Hindus. Therefore if we have not gained our purpose, 
the cause lies within us, and if ours is, as we claim it, is 
a religious struggle we dare not become impatient save with 
ourselves, not even against one another. 
The Brothers, I am satisfied are as innocent as I claim, 
I am of incitement to violence. Theirs therefore is a 
spotless offering. They have done all in their power for 
Islam and their country. Now, if the Khilafat or the Punjab 
wrongs are not redressed and Swaraj is not established during 
this year, the fault will be yours and mine. We must remain 
non-violent but we must not be passive. We must repeat the 
formula of the Brothers regarding the duty of soldiers and 
invite impri.sonment. We need not think that the struggle 
cannot go on without even the best of us. If it cannot we 
are neither fit for Swaraj nor for redressing the Khilafat 
and the Punjab wrongs. We must declare from a thousand 
platforms that it is sinful for any Mussalman or Hindu to 
serve the existing Government whether as soldier or in any 
capacity whatsoever. 
Boycott of cloth 
Above all we must concentrate on complete boycott of 
foreign cl.oth whether British, Japanese, American or French 
or any other, and begin, if we have not already done so, 
to introduce spinning wheels and handlooms in our own homes 
and manufacture all the cloth we need. This will.be at once 
a test of our belief in non-violence for our country's 
freedom and for saving the Khilafat. It will be a test also 
of Hindu-Muslim Unity and it will be a universal test of 
our faith in our own programme. I repeat my conviction that 
we can achieve our full purpose within one month, by a 
complete boycott of foreign cloth. For we are then in a 
position,having confidence in our ability to control forces 
of violence, to offer civil disobedience, if it is at all 
formd necessary. 
I can therefore find no balm for the deep wounds inflicted 
upon you by the Government other than non-vio.lence translated 
into action by boycott of foreign cloth and manufacture of 
cloth in our own homes. 
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APPENDIX IV 
* The Calcutta Riots 
The following extracts from the report of the Commissioner 
of Police, on the Calcutta riots from the 2nd to 15th April 
1926 was published in the Calcutta Gazette for general 
information:-
Communal rioting between Hindus and Muhammadans broke 
out suddenly on the 2nd April and continued for several days, 
on a scale which is unprecedented in the history of Calcutta. 
The immediate cause of the rioting was the failure of 
the band of an Arya Samaj procession to cease playing their 
instruments when passing Dinu Chamrawala 1 s mosque, .in 
Harrison Road, at the time of the 'Azan' or "invitation to 
prayer" 9 preparatory to the four o'clock public worship, 
but it is unreasonable to suppose that this small incident 
could possibly have been the sole cause of such extensive 
riots as those which followed. On the contrary, there can 
be no doubt that this was purely the occasion and that the 
cause must be sought in more remote circumstances. 
To appreciate what followed it needs to be stated at 
the outset that the first collision took place between up-
country Hindus and Muhammadans and that by far the greater 
portion of the rioting and attendant crime has been confined 
to this section of the population of Calcutta. 
Outbreak of Riots 
As has been stated, the immediate cause of the outbreak 
was. the playing of instruments in front of the Dinu 
Chamrawal.a 1 s mosque by the Arya Samaj procession. The passing 
of the mosque at the junction of Harrison Road and Central 
Avenue had been successfully negotiated; music had been stopped 
without difficulty and the procession passed in safety. 
They arrived at Dinu Chamrawala's mosque, however, at the time 
* Indian Annual Register, 1926, January -June, pp.70-84, 
Ibid., July -.December, pp.SJ-85" 
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when the 'muezzin' was about to pronounce the 'Azan' the 
invitation to Mahammadans to join in prayer and silence 
on the part of the band was again invoked. This time, 
however, the direction was not immediately obeyed and the 
musicians continued to play their instruments. Some 
Muhammadans then came out from the mosque and remonstrated 
with the processionists, and ultimately the Police Inspector 
in charge, with the assistance of the leaders of the 
procession, succeeded in stopping the music. One drummer, 
however, continued obstinately to beat his drum and, by so 
doing~ supplied the spark to set off the powder train which 
the events of the past few years had combined to prepare. 
Narrative of Important Events 
April 2nd, -From this stage onwards, it is difficult 
to speak with certainty as to the exact sequence of events, 
but the following narrative of the more important events, 
has been carefully compiled from the statements of two 
European eye-witnesses of the outbreak and from a series of 
reports from unconnected sources and it may, therefore, be 
accepted~ as a record which approximates as closely to the 
actual sequence of events as any human record of events 
happening in such quick succession could possibly do. 
It seems clear, t~en, that the first militant act was 
committed by some Muhammadans in front of the mosque, who 
threw some clods of earth which they took from the road and 
they were followed almost immediately by another Muhammadan 
who threw an empty packing case at the procession. At this 
the processionists broke loose, the neighbouring shops and 
buildings were looted and brickbats and soda-water bottles 
were hurled at the mosque, smashing some of the window-panes 
and glass ornaments. They attacked the Muhammedans standing 
near the mosque and freely belaboured them with lathis and 
stones. The Muhammadans were then joined by a large number 
of their co-religionists living in the locality, who poured 
into Harrison Road from the by-lanes. In the initial stages 
of the rioting, two cart-loads of new bricks arriv~d on the 
scene - apparently destined for some building under 
construction - and the combatants on both sides helped 
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themselves freely to the contents. There appear, however, 
to have. been other stores of ammunition in the vicinity, and 
it is alleged that bricks were thrown from the roof of the 
house adjoining that occupied by Babu Madan Mohan Barman a 
prominent figure in the Hindu Mahasabha - by men who 
subsequently ran on to the roof of the latter's house. 
Finding the situation entirely beyond his control, the 
Inspector in charge of the procession hastened at once to 
Jorasanko police-station, from where he telephoned to the 
police headquarters Lall Bazar and mobilised the police-
station staff, numbering about twenty-five constables, with 
whom he returned to the scene of the riot. 
The battle raged furiously for some minutes, but the 
Muhammadans, who were now numerically superior to their 
opponents, put the processionists to headlong flight and 
thereafter remained in control of the street. Trams and 
buses were stopped and the Hindu occupants were freely 
belaboured. Hindu pedestrians were also seized and beaten 
and the situation became so grave that in a very short time 
the shops were closed and all the vehicular traffic was 
suspended. 
Dy. Commissioner Assaulted 
A strong contingent of police consisting of sergeants 
and constables of the traffic police then arrived in charge 
of Mr. F.D. Bartley, Deputy Commissioner, Head-quarters, and 
all rioting in the immediate vicinity was quickly put down. 
In the process, however, Mr. Bartley was struck on the eye 
by a brickbat and a sergeant who was near him was also 
injured~ while a Gurkha constable who endeavoured to protect 
Mr. Bartley was stabbed from behind and seriously wounded. 
Piquets were posted on all important crossings and other 
strategic points and the situation was brought under control. 
Sporadic rioting continued,however, in the side streets 
and by-lanes until mid-night, and individual Mahommedans and 
Hindus were waylaid and assaulted by members of the opposite 
communities. 
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Shortly after the arrival of Mr. Bartley, it -was noticed 
by the Inspector of the Jorasanko police-station that tbe 
Hindu temple in Mandir Street~ and the idol of Siva contained 
therein, had been damaged. This outrage appears to have been 
committed by local Mahomedans, who raided the temple, 
assaulted the Oriya servant who was present there, broke the 
image of Siva with stones and iron weights and took away all 
the movable articles inside the temple, as a measure of 
revenge for the damage inflicted on the Dinu Chamrawala's 
mosque. 
In the meantime, the news of the riot had spread to 
other parts of Calcutta and sympathetic rioting arose. At 
about 7 a.m. a disturbance took place behind Madan's Theatre 
in Corporation Street and there was considerable excitement 
in the New Market. At about 8 p.m. the dead body of an 
unknown man was forcibly push_ed into a tram-car on Lower 
Chitpur Road near Tara Chand Dutta Street and a sweet-meat 
shop looted in Phear's Lane. At 10.30 p.m. a large mob 
armed with "la this 11 , including a number of Khilafa t 
volunteers, passed along Central Avenue towards Zakaria 
Street and subsequent.ly proceeded along Harrison Road 
towards Chitpur Road, but, although their attitude was 
menacing, no actual collision took place and at a suitable 
opportunity they were intercepted and disarmed. At 1 1 • 30 p • m • , 
a Hindu boarding-house at No. 36, Central Avenue, was attacked 
by a mob armed with brickbats, and a "bania 1 s 11 shop was 
looted. During the course of the day, a constable of the 
Howrah Armed Police, in plain~clothing 9 was stabbed by a 
Mahomedan near Howrah BridgeM 
Renewal of Hostilities 
( 
April 3rd - After a comparatively quiet night, rioting 
again broke out at 8 a~m.,, on the 3rd April , at the junction 
of Harrison Road and College Street, at Rajabazar and near 
Sealdah Railway Station - the reason for the renewal of 
hostilities being that a party of Hindus, including a few 
Sikhs, on hearing a rumour to the effect that the Sikh 
Gurdwara in Mechua Bazar had been set on fire, attacked and 
damaged the Jumma Pir Dargah in Clive Street. This thoroughly 
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enraged the Mahomedan population 1 who proceeded immediately 
to take revenge for this outrage. They threatened the 
Pareshneth Temple in Badri Das Temple Street and set fire 
to the Siva Temple in Mandir Street which they had damaged 
on the preceding day. Thereafter, they set fire to a number 
of Marwaris' and Hindus' houses. On Circular Road, a crowd 
of Mahomedans 9 who had collected near the Tram Depot, 
stopped a motor bus and assaulted the up-country conductor. 
A Bengali passenger, who came to the latter's assistance, 
fired a revolver which slightly wounded another passenger, 
but, nevertheless, had the desired effect of scaring away 
the mob. A Sikh driver of an Improvement Trust lorry was 
also dragged from his conveyance and beaten with 11 lathis" 
and stabbed. At about 9.30 a.m. 9 a posse of police from 
Jorasanko police station were heavily stoned by a crowd of 
Mahomedans, who refused to disperse when ordered to do so, 
and a constable was somewhat seriously wounded. Shortly 
after this, a Hindu constable was stabbed at the junction 
of Harrison Road and Chitpur Road and an unknown Mahomedan 
was attacked and stabbed by a Hindu mob at the junction of 
Mullick Street and Cotton Street. Both these men died 
shortly after their admission into hospital. Two determined 
attacks were made by the Mahomedans on the Kali Temple at 
Kalitola, but they were repulsed by a large band of 
Bengalis, (most of whom were students), who had armed themselves 
with sticks and 11 lathis 11 in order to repulse attacks of this 
nature. At about 11 a.m. a crowd of Mahomedans broke into 
the Sikh Temple in Mechuabazar Street and the Sikh Gu:rdwara 
in Syed Sally Lane looted the gold and silver idols and 
other movable property inside the temples, destroyed the 
religious books, including a copy of the 11 Granth Saheb", and 
set fire to the buildings. They also looted and set fire to 
the Sikh cloth-shops on the ground floor of the Gurdwara 
in Syed Sally Lane. Information of this incident was conveyed 
by the Sikhs to a Police piquet stationed in Harrison Road, 
who immediately rushed to the spot and dispersed the mob. 
The fire was quickly extinguished by the Fire Brigade, but the 
temple in Mechuabazar Street was again set on fire by the 
Mahomedans and ultimately had to be guarded by Police. The 
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news of these outrages roused the Sikh community, who live 
chiefly in Bhowanipur, and it was only with the greatest 
difficulty that they were restrained by the Police from 
participating in the rioti~g. A large party of Sikhs, 
numbering about 400, succeeded in reaching the scene of the 
first outrage, but their participation in the hostilities 
was avoided by placing some of them inside the Temple and 
sending the remainder back to their homes" 
From 10 a.m. onwards, the situation became increasingly 
grave and, as all the reserves of Police had, by this time, 
been exhausted, it was decided at about noon to requisition 
the aid of the Military authorities. A detachment of 
infantry and two armoured cars were posted on the streets 
and another detachment was held in reserve for use in 
emergencies. 
Sikh Gurdwara Desecrated 
At about mid-day, a mob of Mahomedans entered the 
Sikh Gurdwara at No. 9, Bagmari Road, and damaged and 
desecrated the Temple. At about 1 porno a large number of 
Mahomedans invaded the Presidency College grounds and 
assaulted the Hindu 11 durwans 11 • Three of them were seriously 
WOUJlded and one of them, the head 11 durwan 11 , was so badly 
wounded that he died in hospital the next day. Shortly after 
this, a large crowd of about 500 Mahomedans attacked the 
11 Sukumar Bhaban'·' 1 a Sanskrit School in Bai takbana Road, and 
drove out the inmates, who escaped over the compound wall. 
The mob then proceeded to loot and damage the property. 
At about ?v30 p.m. two Marwaris were stabbed at the junction 
of Circular Road and Mechuabazar Street, and both subsequently 
died. Immediately after this incident, a postal mail van 
was attacked in Mechuabazar Street by a mob of about 200 
Mahomedans who stopped the van by placing a dust-bin in front 
of it and stabbed the Sikh driver so seriously that he died 
the next day. The Police piquets posted near the spot 
attempted to intervene, but they were powerless to control 
the mob, who then proceeded to break open the van with the 
object of looting the contents. Fortunately a section of the 
Fire Brigade arrived at this juncture and were able to rescue 
the mails. 
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At about 3 p.m. a curious incident occurred; between 
two and three thousand Mahomedans had collected in front 
of the Nakhoda Masjid and a lorry containing a number of 
Mahomedans 9 who had been rescued from a Hindu quarter by 
a party of Police and were being escorted for safety, 
arrived there. Immediately after the rescued persons had 
descended from the lorry, three shots were suddenly fired 
at the Police from the Musafirkhana at No. 110, Lower 
Chitpur Road and a Hindu constable was mortally wounded 
and died that evening. No clue regarding the identity of 
the perpetrator of the outrage has yet been obtained and 
none is expected, and this incident will remain an act of 
gross treachery which is entirely inexplicable. 
At about 4.30 p.m., a Mahomedan was attacked by a Hindu 
mob on Harrison Road and his left hand was chopped off. 
Throughout the day, looting, incendiarism and murder 
occurred freely, whenever the rioters were out of sight 
of the Police or Military piquets, and no less than nine 
other persons were killed during the course of the day, 
in addition to those mentioned in the foregoing narrative. 
By 4 p.m. the situation was more under control and, 
although the atmosphere was very electric, outbreaks of 
rioting became fewer in number. A general and continuous 
panic prevailed in the disturbed area, however; wild 
rumours abounded, frequent alarms occurred and these combined 
to produce a situation, in which anything might happen 
without the slightest warning and which taxed all the 
efforts of the Police to keep_ it under control. 
During the evening, about 150 up-country Hindus attacked 
the Sona Pir Dargah at Durga Charan Mitter Street, but, 
before they could effect any appreciable damage, the police 
arrived on the scene and dispersed the rioters. The only 
other important event during the evening was the murder of 
a Hindu in front of the Y.M.C.A. building in College Street. 
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A day of Alarm 
April 4th- At 1.30 p.m. on the 4th, an alarm was 
raised that the mosque in Wellington Square was being attacked, 
and a number of Mahomedans immediately hastened towards 
the spot. Mr. B.N, Banerji, Assistant Commissioner, South 
District, relying on his influence with the Mahomedans 
of the locality, by whom he is generally respected, attempted 
to induce these persons to return to their homes, but the 
latter paid no heed to him, assaulted him and knocked him 
down~ Fortunately, a party of Police arrived on the scene 
and rescued the Assistant Commissioner. 
Some of the rioters were chased into neighbouring 
shops and allegations of looting on the part of these 
constables were subsequently made to the Commissioner" A 
search was immediately instituted by the Deputy Commissioner, 
South District, and it is a regrettable fact that certain 
articles belonging to the shops were found in and immediately 
outside the building occupied by the constables attached to 
the Taltolla police station. The property was not found in 
the exclusive possession of any one of the constables and 
the latter's version is that the articles had been left there 
until the officer-in-charge should find time to take charge 
of them. There is no doubt that the charge of looting is 
true, and four constables have been dismissed~ 
At about 8 a,,m .. rioting broke out at Jagannath Ghat 
between Mahomedan and Hindu carters, until the latter were 
dispersed by the Police. The boatmen in that locality also 
took part in the disturbance and a Hindu was stabbed while 
he was bathing at the Ghat. At about 11 a.mo the Jain Temple 
at Belgachia was attacked by the Mahomedans, but the Police 
were quickly on the scene and dispersed the rioters. Shortly 
afterwards, a Mahomedan was mortally wounded by a Hindu md:J 
in Shibtella Street, who also stole a double-barrelled gun 
belonging to another Mahomedan resident of that locality" 
During the course of the morning, the mosque in Nimtolla 
Street was attacked by a Hindu mob, who damaged the building 
and set it on fire, and, shortly afterwards, a mosque at 
Posta in Strand Road was attacked by Hindus and damaged. A 
posse of Police were quickly despatched and they quelled 
the disturbance but, doing so, two Hindu constables were 
315 
injured. At about 1~30 p.m. a riot broke out_ in Rajabazar 
and, in the process of dispersing the mob, three other 
constables were wounded. At about the same time, a serious 
riot broke out in Eden Hospital Road between Hindus and 
Mahomedans and brickbats were freely exchanged. The Shiva 
Temple in that neighbourhood and the Shitalamoni Temple in 
Prem Chand Boral Street were threatened and the mosque in 
the compound of the Medical College was attacked by a Hindu 
mob, but no harm was done in any case. A strong Police 
force quickly arrived on the scene and dispersed the crowd. 
At 6 p.m. the Nimtolla mosque was again attacked and set 
on fire, but the fire was extinguished and the rioters 
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dispersed before much damage could be done. At about 8 ]!).m. 
a large crowd of Mahomedans were again going to attack the 
Jain Temple at Belgachia, but the Police received previous 
intimation of their intention and a large force was despatched 
in time to baffle their attempt. At about the same time, a 
crowd of 300 or 4oo low class Hindus demonstrated in front 
of a house in Maniktolla Street which was partly occupied 
by Mahomedan tenants and in which some Mahomedan refugees 
from shops looted in the vicinity had taken sanctuary. The 
Hindu proprietor of the house directed the mob to disperse 
and threatened them with a rifleo As they paid no heed to 
his commands, he fired three blank shots, but this only 
served to infuriate the mcb, who made a determined attack 
on the houseu The proprietor then fired eight ball cartridges 
from his rifle with the result that four persons were 
injured, one of whom was seriously wounded. 
During the course of the day 10 two Mahomedans and three 
Hindus were killed or received mortal injuries,and a large 
number of shops were looted. A 1 majhar 1 at the junction of 
Upper Chitpur Road and Baranashi Ghosh Street was entirely 
razed to the ground and a Hindu Shiva was placed on the site, 
but this was subsequently removed at the instance of certain 
influential Hindus of the locality. 
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State of Panic 
A state of panic prevailed throughout the disturbed 
area to an even greater degree than on the previous day. 
Wild rwnours flew from mouth to mouth, frequent alarms 
occurred and business was entirely suspended" Very few 
people were seen on the streets and all attempts by leaders 
of communities to restrain their followers still failed to 
have the slightest effect. 
On this date, the Chief Presidency Magistrate issued an 
order under section 144, Cr. P"C. prohibiting the assembly 
of more than five persons in any part of the disturbed area, 
and this order was enforced with effect from 5 p.m. This 
had a very beneficial effect and removed from the streets 
the large crowds which had previously collected there and 
had been productive of so much trouble, but individual cases 
of assault and disturbances in by-lanes still continued. 
During the following night, a small temple of Radha 
Kissen in Watgunge Street was secretly desecrated by 
Mahomedan 1 Goondas' and this was responsible for a good deal 
oi feeling in the Kidderpore neighbourhood on the following 
day. 
April 5th - On the 5th Aprilt the rioting extended to 
the river-side. At about 7,30 a.m. some Hindu carters 
assaulted a number of Mahomedan boatmen at Nimtollah Ghat 
and at about 10 a.m. some Hindu Durwabs of Messrs. Marshall 
and Sons assaulted some Mahomedan crane drivers employed in 
the Port Commissioner's Jetty. At about 11 a.m. on this date 
about 2,000 Mahomedans, armed with lathis and brickbats, 
assembled at the junction of Manicktolla and Narkeldanga Main 
Road and declared that the Police should be attacked, as 
they were guarding Hindu temples and generally assisting the 
Hindu combatants. Brickbats were thrown at Inspector JoN, Roy 
and some constables, four of whom were injured, but a force 
of soldiers arrived almost immediately under the command 
of the Assistant Commissioner, North Suburbs, and the crowds 
dispersedo At about 5 p.m. some five hundred Mahomedan 
boatmen from boats moored near Babu Ghat attacked the police 
outpost in the Eden Gardens with lathis and brickbats and~ 
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having driven the staff from the building, proceeded to 
loot the contents. Information was immediately sent to 
Lall Bazar and a small contingent of Auxiliaries and Police 
Sergeants soon arrived on the scene in charge of Mr. F.D. 
Bartley, Deputy Commissioner, Headquarters. The rioters 
put up a determined opposition to the efforts of the newly 
arrived patrol to disperse them and the patrol was heavily 
stoned, but they ultimately succeeded in driving the crowd 
down the gangway on to the pontoon. On this the ~ioters 
took up their stand and continued to shout defiance and to 
hurl stones at the patrol, whom they repeatedly tried to 
rush. The patrol thereupon fired and succeeded in 
dispersing the rioters by this means. 
In the disturbed area, the full effect of the Chief 
Presidency Magistrate's order under section 144, Cr. P.C. 
began to be appreciated on this date and the day was 
comparatively uneventful. Some brickbats were thrown into 
the Taltola police station and some Mahomedans with a herd 
of cattle were attacked by Hindu tioters on the Strand Roadu 
Sporadic looting and assaults continued, however, and the 
panic remained undiminished. As a consequence of this, the 
day was fu.ll of false alarms and this fact was not conducive 
to a speedy return to normality. 
Incident Averted 
April 6th - On the 6th April, a number of incidents 
occurred, which might easily have developed into very 
serious situations, but fortunately the Police were, in most 
instances, on hand in time to prevent serious rioting~ Thus 
considerable tension arose in Kidderpore, where some 
Mahomedans threw stones at the Hindu temple in Watgunge 
Street, whicn had been desecrated on the previous day, and 
a number of members of both communities prepared to fight, 
but the Police arrived before hostilities commenced and 
dispersed the crowds. Shortly afterwards, a large number 
of Mahomedans, armed with lathis,collected near the mosque 
from Hem Chandra Street, but they were quickly dispersed by 
the Police. Thereafter, a horn or conch-shell was blown 
from the Panchanantola temple and Hindus of the locality 
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immediately collected there, out of fear that the temple 
was about to be desecrated. Mahomedans also arrived in 
large numbers and both parties were armed with lathis! but 
the Police were able to disperse the crowd after a brief 
exchange of brickbatso Again, at about 9 p.m.~ some 200 
Mahomedans attacked the Shiva temple at the junction of 
Amberst Street and Sitaram Ghosh Street with brickbats 
and soda water bottles, but a contingent of soldiers and 
Police were immediately despatched to the spot and the mob 
was dispersed" 
At 11.15 p.m., there was a disturbance in Nikasipara 
in North Calcutta, because the local Mahomedans feared that 
a body of Hindus were about to attack the Nikasipara mosque, 
while the Hindus had collected on receipt of a false rumour 
that the Mahomedans were about to loot their shops. The 
Police were immediately on the scene and the mobs were 
reassured and dispersed. 
In two cases, more serious offences were committed. A 
party of Hindus attacked the mosque in Armenian Street with 
brickbats, but the disturbance ceased immediately on the 
arrival of the Police~ and a Peshwari beggar was stabbed and 
killed in Harrison Road by some unknown Hindus. 
April 7 - On the 7th April, there was a further decrease 
in open rioting" Some stones were again thrown at the 
desecrated temple in Watgunge Street, but further trouble 
was averted by the Po.lice. A Mahomedan was found dead on 
Baranashi Ghosh Street, and another Mahomedan was stabbed 
at Posta by a party of Hindus and died in hospital the same 
day. 
April 8th - On the 8th April, the situation had still 
further improved and the only event of importance was the 
murder of a Mahomedan in Upper Chitpur Road by a party of 
Hindus. 
April 9th to 11th- On the 9th, one Mahomedan was wounded; 
on the 10th one Hindu and one Mahomedan; the 11th passed 
without any reported casualty; on the 12th two Hindus and one 
Mahomedan were wounded. 
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Thus ended the sporadic rioting ~vhich attended the later 
stages of the communal strife which began on Good Friday, 
the 2nd April. The Id-ul-Fitr on the 14th passed off 
peacefully and most of the troops were withdrawn that evening. 
The 15th was also without incident and the complete withdrawal 
of the troops from the streets late that afternoon may be 
said to mark the conclusion of the first phase of the riots. 
It is to be observed that the foregoing narrative is 
by no means an exhaustive account of the innumerable 
incidents which occurred during the course of the riots in 
the various parts of Calcutta~ It would be impossible to 
give a full list of such incidents in the sequence in which 
they occurred, and the narrative has therefore been confined 
to a recital of events which serve to convey some appreciation 
of the course and the character of the riots. 
Measures Taken to Quell the Riots 
Information regarding the outbreak of the riots was 
received by telephone at Lall Bazar at 3.50 p.mo on the 2nd 
April (Good Friday), and the Armed Police were immediately 
ordered to stand by. A patrol consisting of 20 Sergeants 
and 20 Constables from the Reserve Traffic under the command 
of Mro F.D. Bartley 9 Deputy Commissioner of Police, Head-
quarters, was despatched at once to the scene of the outbreak 
and they were followed very shortly afterwards by another 
patrol consisting of 1 Inspector and 10 Constables of the 
Traffic Police. These patrols proceeded at once to quell 
the original riot and they were reinforced at about 4.30 p.m. 
by 2 non-Commissioned Officers and 20 Sepoys of the Armed 
Police~ with whose assistance they were enabled to bring 
the situation under control. By these means all open rioting 
was stopped for the time being, but sporadic disturbances 
then broke out in the side streets and by-lanes, and a force 
consisting of 4 Sergeants and 30 Constables of the Mounted 
Police was therefore despatched at 5.30 p.m. for patrol duty. 
At about 7 p.m. the rioting began to extend beyond the scene 
of the first outbreak to other quarters of the town, and all 
Traffic Police were therefore withdrawn from posts in the 
city were held in reserve at Lall Bazar. As the disturbances 
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still continued, at 9 p.m. a force of 40 Constables of 
the Traffic Police and 10 Sepoys of the Armed Police were 
despatched to the disturbed area, and at 9o30 p~m" another 
force" consisting of 24 Sergeants, 7 Head Constables and 
70 Constables of the Traffic Police, went out under the 
command of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, HeadquartersD 
In addition to the above, a nwnber of small patrols were 
from time to time despatched to various parts of the 
disturbed area, on receipt of telephone messages to the 
effect that disturbances were taking or about to take place. 
At about 10o30 p~m. the situation was comparatively 
quiet and the majority of the Police were therefore withdrawn, 
leaving a force of 10 Sergeants and 20 Sepoys of the Armed 
Police and 2 Sergeants and 15 Constables of the Mounted 
Police to assist the district police in the disturbed area 
throughout the night. 
At about 8 a~m., on the following day, the Jrd April 1 
rioting again broke out~ and during the course of the next 
two hours a total force of about 150 Police was despatched 
to reinforce the piquets in the disturbed area .. By.10 a.mo~ 
general rioting was taking place over a large area and~ as 
the police piquets were insufficiently mobiles five motor 
lorries were hired for the purposes of conveying patrols 
quickly to the place where they were required, and each of 
these were equipped with a force of 4 Sergeants 9 5 Sepoys 
of the Armed Police and 10 Constables of the Traffic Policeo 
Two of these motor patrols and four motor cycle patrols 
each consisting of 8 Sergeants in a motor-cyble and a 
side-car, patrolled continuously throughout the disturbed 
area, while these motor patrols and two motor-cycle patrols 
were held in reserve at Lall Bazar for despatch to danger 
spots on receipt of requisitions by telephone. All possible 
reserves at the disposal of the Police, including a force of 
100 recruits and constables undergoing refresher course at 
the Police Training College were pressed into service in 
connection with the riots. By this time~ some five to six 
hundred police were concentrated in the main disturbed area of 
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the North Town and this arrangement continued till the 
rioting had subsided. The district police in other quarters 
of the town and suburbs were standing by to deal with 
sympathetic outbreaks in their jurisdiction and were 
reinforced from Headquarters where necessary, while all 
reserves were held in readiness at Lall Bazar. 
It soon became manifest, however, that these forces 
were insufficient and, at about nonn, it was found necessary 
to requisition military assistance. This was readily given 
and a force of 350 officers and men of the North Staffordshire 
Regiment and four armoured cars, manned by crews provided 
by the Calcutta Presidency Battalion were placed at the 
disposal of the Police. In addition a light Motor Patrol, 
consisting of about twenty men with two Lewis guns was 
provided by the Calcutta Presidency Battalion and a Lewis 
gun patrol was obtained from the Calcutta Scottish. 
On the 4th April, a contingent of one hundred men of the 
Eastern Frontier Rifles, under the command of Captain L.Y. 
Bazett, was received from Chinsurah, and twenty Armed Police 
were lent by the Superintendent of Police, 24-Parganas. 
This force continued to be employed throughout the period of 
the riots and, on the 6th April, a further reinforcement of 
200 men was obtained from the Eastern Frontier Rifles at 
Dacca. 
A Network of Patrols 
With these reinforcements, it was possible to establish 
a network of patrols throughout the affected area. Mi.li tary 
piquets were stationed at all strategic points throughout 
the day and night and these were maintained at sufficient 
strength to furnish constant patrols radiating from the fixed 
posts and linking up with the neighbouring piquets. 
Unarmed parties were sent out regularly from Lal Bazar 
and from police stations to patrol both the main streets and 
every side street where trouble had occurred and a number of 
reconnoitring parties patrolled all the threatening areas 
throughout the day and night. 
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The remaining military forces were held in readiness 
at Lall Bazar; where information of almost all alarms was 
received by telephone. As necessity arose, they were sent 
out in flying patrols, under officers from police Headquarters, 
to the places from where the alarms were reported~ In these 
cases, they dealt with the situation as they found it on 
arrival and, when peace had been restored, they returned to 
Lall Bazar after making local arrangements to prevent any 
fresh alarms or outbreak of rioting. 
From the morning of the Jrd April, there were few 
collisions between large bodies of the two contending parties 
and the great majority of the disturbances were entirely 
sporadic in character; they subsided as suddenly a,s they 
arose, and the difficulties with the belligerents were 
greatly enhanced owing to the excellent cover afforded them 
by the labyrinth of small lanes and alleys which characterise 
that portion of the cityo The particular feature of this 
warfare which was most difficult to control was the stabbing 
of individuals by small roving bands of the opposite community:: 
who pounced on their victims without the slightest warning 
and vanished in a moment. As the assailants in each case 
immediately sought she 1 ter amongst their co·-religionists 9 
it was impossible for a patrol arriving even within a few 
moments of the occurrence to ascertain whether they had gone 
or to obtain the slightest clue to their identity. It has 
been freely suggested that firing should have been resorted 
to more frequently by the Police~ but the foregoing 
description will serve to show that this suggestion utterly 
ignores the realities of the situation" The most that could 
possibly be done was to keep flying patrols continuously 
operating in the affected area and to search for bad 
characters and lethal weapons in the gulleys down which the 
assailants had disappeareda 
Throughout the riots" members of the public have 
frequently complained that fixed piquets did not rush to 
their assistance when they raised an alarm, but this criticism 
too is equally uninformed arid.ignoresthe ma;ny other 
considerations that determined the conduct of these piquets. 
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As has been stated elsewhere the first phase of the 
riots may be said to have closed with celebrations of the 
Id festival on the 14th April on which day the greater portion 
of the troops were withdrawn; on the following day and on 
the 16th April the detachments of the Eastern Frontier Rifles 
were permitted to return to their respective stations. 
Effect of Military Forces 
The reinforcement of the Police by Military Units had 
a very beneficial effect on the situation. The ~ppearance 
of British troops on the streets, and particularly on the 
armoured cars provided a grim and effective warning to the 
rioters, which went far from being unheeded, and on 
inumerable occasions their presence alone was sufficient 
to disperse menacing crowds 9 
In addition, however, to their moral effect and to 
their undoubteded effectiveness in quelling actual riots, 
the mobility of the armoured cars made them of special value 
to outlying unarmed piquets, with whom they were constantly 
in touch, and they also formed a valuable reconnoitring 
unite 
Throughout the first phase of the riots, the armoured 
cars did excellent work and their utility in dealing with 
street riots in a town like Calcutta cannot be over-estimated. 
The type of car at present used is possibly a little 
cumbersome and not adapted for narrow streets, but it. is of 
immense use in the broader thoroughfares. 
The greatest effect of the military forces was~ however, 
achieved during the process of re-establishing normal 
conditions in the affected area~ and there can be little 
doubt that the return to comparative normality would not 
have been achieved within so short a period without the 
feeling of security which was induced by their presence on 
the streets. 
324 
Communities Participating in the Riots 
In the first instance, the rioting was confined to 
the two communities who first came into conflict$ namely, 
the Mohamedans and the Arya Samajists, but the conflict 
became almost immediately a struggle between Mohamedans and 
up-country Hindus. This state of affairs continued until 
10 a.m. on the 3rd April, when the Kali Temple at Kalitola 
was attacked by Mohamedans. This outrage thoroughly roused 
the Bengali Hindus, who had hitherto taken no part in the 
struggle and against whom the Mohamedans had displayed no 
animosity whatsoever, and they took up the cause of their 
up-country co-religionists~ Their part in the struggle was, 
however~ confined almost entirely to the defence of their 
religious institutions and in only a few instances did they 
participate in any retaliatory measures. 
Casualties among the Public 
So far as can be ascertained, the total number of 
casualties from the rioting which took place between the 
2nd and 12th April was 44 deaths and ,584 injuries sufficiently 
serious to warrant admittance into hospital. Of the dead 
persons twelve were killed outright~ while the remainder 
died in hospital, and they include 24 Hindus, 19 Mahomedans 
and 1 person of doubtful nationality. 
The persons admitted to hospital consisted of 327 Hindus, 
238 Mahomedans, 1 Anglo-Indian, 2 Jews and 16 persons 
nationality is not known. 
Appended is a statement of the casualties giving the 
dates on which they occurred:-
Date 
2-4-26 
3-4-26 
4-4-26 
5-4-26 
6-4-26 
7-4-26 
8-4-26 
9-4-26 
10-4-26 
12-4-26 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
... 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
8 •• . . . 
. . . 
. . . . .. 
. . . 
... 
... 
• • 0 
. . . 
0 ••• 0 0 • 
Total 
325 
Injured Death 
1 71 ... 
195 
28 
134 . . . 
41 . . . 
1 7 5 
15 4 
9 3 
1 ... 
2 . . . 
3 
588 4o 
4-died 
subsequently 4 
584 44 
It would be unsafe, however, to assume that these figures 
represent the total casualties resulting from the riots, 
since a number of dead bodies may have been thrown into the 
Ganges, a considerable number of injured persons were 
undoubtedly treated at their homes, instead of being sent to 
hospital, and a large number of persons were dressed and 
discharged at the hospitals without any record being kept of 
their cases. 
Police CasuaJties 
The total number of Police Casualties amounted to 2 
deaths and 91 injuries. The injured persons included Mr. F.D. 
Bartley, Deputy Commissioner, Headquarters, Mr. B.N. Banerjee, 
Assistant Commissioner, South District, 1 Inspector, 21 
Sergeants, 4 Head Constables, 60 Constables and 3 Sowars. 
Arrests 
The total number of perons arrested in connection with 
the first phase of the riots is 500, of whom 327 are 
Mohomedans and 173 Hindus. This figure bears no relation to 
the number of persons engaged in the riots nor tothe number 
of offences committed, but the difficulties in the way of 
securing evidence against the rioters are obvious and require 
no comment. Of the persons arrested, 153 were released on 
personal recognizance to appear on the 30th April for 
discharge. 347 persons have been sent up for trial and details 
of the sections of law rmder which they will be prosecuted 
are given below~-
Sent up for trial rmder sections 302, I,P.C"' (9 accused 
in one case and 1 accused in another) - 10o 
Sent up for trial under sections 147 and 148, I.P.C. 
-
203 
Sent up for trial under sections 457-380, I.PoC. 
-
8 
Sent up for trial under sections ?+54, I.P.C. 
- 9 
Sent up for trial for minor offences, i.eo sections 29, 
54 A and 68 of the Calcutta Police Act - 117 0 
Looting 
Throughout the period of the riotss looting of shops 
was freely resorted to by members of both Commrmitieso In 
many cases~ the object was purely to cause damage to a member 
of the opposing commtrnity~ but, in many other cases, the 
motive was pltrnder by the unruly element of the population, 
who took prompt advantage of the rmsettled conditions in 
that quarter. The total number of shops looted amounted to 
197, of which 106 belonged to Mahomedans and the remaining 
91 to Hindus. It has not been possible to arrive at even 
an approximately accurate estimate of the total loss sustained 
and enquiries in this connection are still being made. While 
many persons have omitted to give information to the Police 
regarding the looting of their shOps, others have greatly 
exaggerated their losses and, in these circumstances, it 
would be unsafe and mis-leading to offer any estimate without 
further investigation. 
Goondas 
An important feature of the riots was the vigorous 
participation therein by the "goonda 11 element of the population, 
who speedily realised the opportunities for looting and 
violent crime which were offered by the conditions then 
prevailing and proceeded to take full advantage of these 
opportunities. 
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Attack on Religious Institutions 
The most remarkable feature of the riots was the number 
of religios institutions attacked by members of the opposing 
communities, and this may be taken as symptomatic of the 
great animosity existing between the followers of the rival 
religions. Attacks on Hindu temples have always been a 
feature of Indian history, although their frequency has 
decreased very considerably since the British occupation, 
but they have never occurred in Calcutta, and it would be 
difficult to findli" within recent times, in the whole of India 
a parallel to the events that have taken place in Calcutta 
during the outbreak of communal frenzy, since, during the 
course of seven days, no less than three temples and three 
gurdwaras were attacked or desecrated and five others were 
threatened. 
Attacks on mosques, however, have not oopurred since 
the beginning of the 18th century (1712 A.D.) when the Sikhs 
under the leadership of Banda, a 1 bairagi', destroyed a 
number of 'masjids', in revenge for the destruction by 
Aurangzeb of Hindu temples. From the date until the present 
time, destructive attacks on mosques have been practically 
unknown, but in the present instance five mosques were 
attacked and attempts were made to attack two others, while 
attacks were made on three 11 daryabs 11 9 one of which was entirely 
razed to the ground. These acts of vandalism have 
unquestionably intensified to an unprecedented degree the 
bitterness and hatred existing between the two communities 
of which they are themselves the symptoms 9 and it is impossible 
to say how long this acute antagonism will continue. 
A full list of the temples and mosques destroyed or 
desecrated is given below:-
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
~;~ 
Temples 
Shiva Temple at crossing of Zakaria Street and 
Mandir Street - Twice desecrated. 
Radha Kissen Temple in Watgunge Street- Once 
desecrated; twice threatened. 
Kali Temple in Cornwallis Street - Once attacked; 
twice threatened. 
Jain Temple in Belgachis Road - Twice threatened. 
Shiva Temple in Amherst Street - ThreatBned. 
( 6) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(J) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(J) 
~~ ~· 
~~~ 
(J) 
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Pareslmeth Templ.e in Badri Das Temple Street 
Threatened. 
Shiva Temple in College Street - Threatened" 
Si talamani Templ.e in Prem Chand Boral Street 
Threatened. 
Gurdwaras 
Tara Singh Sangar in Mechusbasar Street -
Desecrated. 
Hari Narain Singh Sangat in Syed Sally Lane 
Twice set on fire and three times attacked. 
Gurdwara in Belgachia Road - Desecrated. 
Mosques 
Dinu Chamrawala 1 s Mosque in Harrison Road -
Desecratede 
Massaripatti Mosque in Upper Chitpore Road - Attacked. 
Nimtollah Mosque - Twice desecrated. 
.Amposta Mosque·at Posta- Attackedo 
Medical College Mosque - Attacked. 
Canning Street Mosque - Attacked. 
Armenian Street Mosque - Attacked. 
Dargahs 
Jumma Pir Dargah in Clive Street - Desecrated. 
Sona Pir Dargah in Durga Charam Mitra Street -
Desecrateda 
Majhar at crossing of Baransashi Ghosh Street 
and Upper Chitpore Road - Destroyed. 
Incendiarism 
Another remarkable feature of the riots was the extra-
ordinary degree to which incendiarism was resorted to by the 
rioters and 0 there is no doubt that, but for the splendid 
efforts of the Fire Brigade, an enormous conflagration 
causing incalculable losses in human life and property would 
have resulted. Incendiarism has been employed by the 
conflicting parties in previous disturbances, but the extent 
to which this means of revenge was employed in the present 
instance is entirely unprecedented. During the four days 
ending the 6th April no less than 151 fires were caused by 
the rioters and~ although the resources of the Fire Brigade 
were strained by this unparalleled call on their services 
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and despite the difficult conditions under which they were 
frequently called upon to work 1 the Fire Brigade succeeded 
in all cases in confining the fires to the premises of 
origino The first fire caused by rioters occurred on the 
Jrd instant and, between 10 a.mp and 1 p.m. on this date 1 
the Fire Brigade extinguished no less than 51 fires 1 which 
probably constitutes a world's record. The control of 
this extraordinary wave of incendiarism would have been 
impossible~ however, but for the very commendable foresight 
of the Chief Officer~ who 1 at the first sign of dange:t:" 1 
arranged for the maintenance of the maximum pressure of water 
in all the water mains in the disturbed area and allotted 
additional machines and staff to the Fire Brigade which 
received most of the calls. 
The method chiefly employed by the indenciaries was 
to break open a window or a door and to throw into the 
premises a piece of cloth which had been saturated with 
kerosene. oil and then igni ted 1 but in many instances petrol 
was poured into the premises and set on fire. 
It is interesting to record that· although the crowds 
frequently behaved in a threatening manner when fires 1 which 
they had ignited, were being extinguished 1 they did not 
interfere except on one occasion when the Fire Brigade were 
extinguishing a fire in the Jumma Pir Dargah near the junction 
of Harrison Road and Clive Street. On this occasion 1 the 
Fire Brigade were severely stoned 1 but fortunately only two 
members of the staff were wounded and their injuries were 
comparatively slight. In many cases 1 the Fire Brigade 
found 1. on arrival, that people in the premises had been cut 
off by the flames, but in all cases they arrived in time to 
rescue these people from danger. On at least three of these 
cases~ the inmates had been actually locked in by the 
incendiaries a It is difficult to estimate how many lives 
they were therby enabled to save, but the number must have 
been considerable. 
Valuable services were also rendered by the Ambulance 
Department of the Fire Brigade throgghout the riots, in 
conveying wounded persons to hospitals. All the members of 
the staff were mobilised for duty in connection with the 
330 
riots and, although they were frequently in positions of 
considerable danger, they performed their duty with unremitting 
zeal and were responsible for the safe conveyance of about 
400 wounded persons to hospital. 
The great effie iency displayed by these two departments 
and their ability to prove equal to the demands of an 
unprecedented situation reflect the greatest possible credit 
on Captain B.A. Westbrook and afford eloquent testimony of 
his powers of organisation. 
A material factor in the successful manipulation of the 
Fire Brigade and the Ambulance Department was the efficient 
working of the Fire Alarm System, which is maintained in 
conjunction with the Telephone Company. Several thousand 
messages were transmitted to the Fire Brigade Headquarters, 
but in no case was there any material delay, and, since any 
such delay might have resulted in a serious conflagration 
in cases where fires broke out in congested areas, the 
thanks of the public are due to the telephone operators for 
their arduous and efficient work in this connection. 
Conduct of Sikhs 
Another feature of the riots, which is worthy of 
comment is the conduct of the Sikhs, who throughout the riots 
conducted themselves with most commendable restraint in 
spite of considerable and repeated provocation. 
The whole Sikh community in Calcutta are to be 
congratulated on the restraint which they exhibited in the 
face of such severe provocation, and great credit is due to 
the leaders for their powers of control and for the very 
commendable public-spiritedness displayed by them. 
On the 13th April 9 the procession of the Sikhs was 
forbidden by the Commissioner of Police, in view of the danger 
of the situation at that time. The Sikhs were far from 
willing to acquiesce in what they considered to be a further 
concession to outrageous Mahomedan demands and there was some 
talk of defying the order 9 but ultimately saner counsels 
prevai.led and the procession was postponed. 
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Indian Press 
Possibly the most disappointing feature of the riots, 
in view of the desire of Government to promote the growth of 
self~goverrunent in India, was the irresponsibility displayed 
by the Press. So far 9 indeed from assisting the authorities 
in controlling the situation 9 the whole of the vernacular 
press, in a greater or less degree, devoted their energies 
to inciting the followers of their respective religions, 
and to fomenting the existing attitude of disobedience 
towards the authorities engaged in restoring law and order. 
Some of the newspapers were admittedly worse than others, 
but all took full advantage of the absence of any legis-
lation to control their productions and, on the 9th of April, 
the Honourable Member convened a conference of journalists, 
for the purpose of impressing on them their duties in regard 
to the riots. This Conference had a salutary effect but 
almost all the vernacular press continued their former 
propaganda~ though in a subdued degree. Their chief offences 
were the publication of inflammatory leaflets issued by the 
opposite community. It is impossible to over-emphasise the 
danger of this form of· propaganda, since the majority of 
the persons engaged in the rioting are almost wholly 
illiterate and derive their information from the newspapers 
which a few of their number are able to read aloud to them, 
and the natural result is that they are spoon-fed with 
highly sensational and extremely biased reports which they 
are only too ready to believe. 
Leaflets 
Towards the conclusion of the first phase of riots 
both the contending factions began to indulge in a highly 
mischievous and dangerous form of propaganda by means of 
anonymous leaflets which advocated the commission of murder 
and other acts of violence, in retaliation for the excesses 
committed by the opposing party. These leaflets have been 
very numerous and have taken a variety of forms such as 
notices 9 1 fatwas 1 and communiques regarding incidents or 
defining the general situation. They have been published 
in almost all the languages employed in Calcutta, and even 
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the less dangerous types 9 such as the pamphlets issued by 
the various Relief Committee's explaining the functions of 
these Committees, in connection with the riots, have played 
an important part in exacerbating the existing tension 
between the two communities~ 
Defence Parties 
Immediately after the outbreak of attacks on religious 
institutions on the 3rd April, proposals were made to 
organise defence parties for the protection of Hindu temples. 
Some defence parties were actually formed, notably the 
'Bray Club' in the jurisdiction of the Bartola police-station, 
the South Calcutta Defence Force under the presidency of 
Mr. SoN. Haldar, and another band of Bengali youths, who, 
under the leadership of Pulin Das, Nanda Ghash and Nea 
Ghosh~ defended the Kali temple in Kalitola. 
Early in the riots, the Commissioner of Police was 
approached by Mr J.M" Sen Gupta, Mayor of Calcutta, with a 
proposal that the latter should organise volunteer defence 
parties for the protection of mosques and temples and to 
assist in the work of restoring order. In discussing this 
proposal~ the Commissioner explained to Mr Sen Gupta the 
necessity, firstly, for recruiting these volunteers equally 
from both communities and, secondly, for their enrolmert as 
11 special constables" under the control of the Police 
authorities. Mro Sen Gupta expressed considerable doubt 
regarding his ability to provide the necessary Mahomedan 
contingent and, in subsequent correspondence with the 
_commissioner, made it clear that in no case could he sanction 
the subordination to official control of any volunteer 
recruited by him .. In the special circumstances existing at 
present 9 the empl.oyment of such independent bodies would be 
fraught with many obvious and serious dangers and Mr Sen 
Gupta's attitude made it impossible to pursue the matter any 
further. Attempts are still being made by the Police, in 
co-operation with prominent Hindu and Mahomedan gentlemen, 
to organise mixed defence parties of properly enrolled 
volunteers. Apart, however, from the difficulties of 
recruitment, it is impossible to say, without experience, how 
far such volunteers could be usefully employed in a 
communal disturbance~ 
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It has been alleged that the refusal of the Commissioner 
of Police to recognise unenrolled volunteers deprived the 
public of a certain measure of protectiono This contention~ 
however 1 entirely ignores the obvious dangers inherent in 
the employment of bodies of men liable to be swayed by 
communal feeling and entirely divorced from effective control. 
These dangers so greatly outweigh the advantage of such 
protection as might have been afforded by these volunteers 
that the allegation carries its own refutation. 
Exodus of Members of the Public from Calcutta. 
Even in the early days of the riots, the panic in the 
disturbed area was so great that a number of people left 
their residence for other localities and~ from the 3rd 
instant until after the conclusion of the riots, there was 
a daily exodus of people of all classes from the portion 
of Calcuttac Generally speaking, the Marwaris and the Hindus 
intended that their departure should be purely temporary 
and proceeded to their garden houses or to the houses of 
their friends outside the disturbed area, until such time as 
it should be possible for them to returno Many Mahomedans, 
however~ have left the city with the intention of remaining 
absent for some considerable time and have returned to their 
original homes. It is impossible to compute~ even 
approximately, the number of persons who have thus left 
their homes in Calcutta, either temporarily or permanently, 
but it is safe to say that their numbers have run into 
many thousands. 
This report would be incomplete without some reference 
to the adverse criticism which has been freely levelled 
against the Police by all sections of the community$ 
Criticism of this character is not lacking, even in normal 
times~ and from the very nature of the riots, it was only to 
be expected that there would be outbursts of unbridled 
criticism, since the Police were required to hold the balance 
between two violently opposed factions 1 whose members were 
blinded to all reason by religious prejudice and were 
impatient of any sort of control. 
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It must, nevertheless, be admitted that, in the nature 
of things the great preponderance of Hindus in the force, 
whether officers or constables 9 does afford some ground for 
the apprehensions of the Mahomedans that~ in a communal crisis 
of this nature 9 Police measures may be conducted in a partisan 
spirit~ It would, however be grossly untrue to assert that 
this spirit influenced? to any appreciable extent, the general 
conduct of the Police in the present riots. It would be too 
much to expect that individual members of the force should 
not entertain sympathies for their co-religionists engaged 
in the struggle cir that, in a force numbering some 5,000 
officers and men, these sympathies should.not influence their 
actions in some isolated cases, but, generally speaking, it 
can be fairly maintained that the members of the force have 
subordinated their personal feelings to their sense of duty 
and have conducted themselves with most commendable 
impartiality in extremely trying circumstances. 
The general body of criticism has been so vague and 
general in character that it has been impossible to undertake 
any investigation into the great majority of the allegations 
levelled against the Police, either individually or 
collectively~ Such of the allegations 1 however, as have 
been supported by evidence are being carefully examined by 
responsible officers, but, in almost all instances, these 
allegations are found to be entirely baseless. The delay 
in examining these charges is due, firstly, to their vagueness, 
and, secondly, to the fact that practically the whole Police 
force have been continuously and fully engaged in quelling 
the riots. 
Mention has already been made of the one outstanding 
case, in which it has been found that constables were guilty 
of removing articles from shops which had been looted. These 
constables have been dismissed, in default of sufficient 
evidence to warrant criminal prosecution .. 
As against this instance of a true allegation, the 
following may be quoted in illustration of the baseless 
charges whi.ch have been so freely levelled against the 
force, even by persons of public prominence and high 
position:-
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On the 4th April Mr H.Sa Suhrawardy, Deputy Mayo'r of 
Calcutta~ personally complained to the Commissioner that 
the Police and the Military had that day looted a shop at 
No 37, Kengrapatti.~ Burra Bazar, The Assistant Commissioner 
of the Detective Department (Mr Hartley) and Inspectors 
Robertson, Mahns~ and P.Na Mukherjee~ all of the Detective 
Department were immediately deputed to accompany Mr 
Suhrawardy to the scene of the alleged occurrence. A full 
enquiry was held without delay and it was found that the 
charge was entirely baseless. The shop in question was 
intact and a large number of the local residents testified 
that no looting whatever had taken place in that particular 
locality that dayo The Assistant Commissioner found, 
however that two cl.oth-shops, at No 47, Kengrapatti, had 
been looted on the previous day, but an eye-witness of 
the occurrence 9 who was produced by Mr Suhrawardy, declared 
that· no Police or Military were in the locality when the 
looting took placeo 
The Second Phase of the Riots, 22nd April - 9th May 
Shortly before 1 p.m., on the 22nd April!ii rioting again 
broke out throughout the disturbed area. The immediate 
occasion was a brawl between some Hindus and Muhamadans 
near the junction of Mechua Bazar Street, Cotton Street and 
Upper Chitpur Road. Considerable uproar and excitement 
followed on the heels of this incident and all important 
shops in Chitpur Road and Cotton Street were immediately 
closed.. The Deputy Commissioner; North District, the local 
police and a force consisting of 1 Inspector, 6 Sergeants, 
10 sepoys of the Armed Police and 10 constables were quickly 
on the scene and the rioting was immediately put down. Two 
of the drunken Mohammadans who participated in the brawl 
were arrested and the crowds were dispersed, 
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The atmosphere in the disturbed area continued to be 
very uncertain even after the conclusion of the first phase 
of the riots and a force had accordingly been kept 
permanently posted on all important crossings to patrol that 
area both day and night~ When the second phase of the riots'. 
broke out on the 22nd April, therefore, the district police 
under the command of Mro H.Co Hunt, Deputy Commissioner, 
North District, who was immediately on the scene, were 
enabled to cope with the initial outbreak. Reinforcements 
w·ere, however, immediately rushed out from Lall Bazar, on 
receipt of a telephonic message from one of the armed 
piquets. Strong piquets were posted at all imp~rtant 
junctions and a reserve force was stationed at Batra Bazar 
thanao When the rioting began to spread beyond the scene 
of the original disturbance, further measures were adopted 
and by 2 p.m. all available reserves had been mobilised 
and every possible precaution takeno In addition to the 
piquets stationed on all important crossingss fifty men 
from the North Division, Port Police 9 had been drafted into 
Harrison Road~ motor lorries had been hired, and motor 
patrols put into operation, and the whole of the Traffic 
Police,. Armed Police and Mounted Police had been recalled 
from their normal duties and made to stand by at Lall Bazaro 
In view~ however$ of the number of by-lanes and gulleys 
with which that part of Calcutta is honeycombed this force 
was unable to prevent the commission of isolated assaults 
which then began to occur. Other contingents of force were 
added later from Dacca and other places. 
Moreover, the large number of individual assaults, 
which particularly charact"erised the second phase of the 
riots, required the establishment of an even closer network 
of patrols than previously and it was essential that as many 
as possible of these should be in charge of persons capable 
of exercising initiative. The decision to retain their 
services for a period of three months has been arrived at 
in consideration,. firstly~ of their moral effect and secondly, 
of the grave possibility of further outbreaks of rioting 
within this period, and particularly on the occasion of the 
11 Bakr-ld 11 and 11 Muharram 11 • 
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Communities Participating in the Riots 
As in the case of the first phase the rioting was 
confined almost entirely to the Mohammadans and up-country 
Hindusc The Bengali Hindus participated to a greater degree 
than in the first phase, but generally speaking 9 they 
remained on the defensive~ the Sikh community remained 
completely aloof from the struggle and in only one isolated 
incident did a member of this community participate" 
Casualties among the Public 
No less than 66 persons were killed 5 or died as a 
result of injuries received, during the second phase of the 
riots and 391 persons were so seriously wounded as to 
warrant their adm:iffiion into hospitals. The dead persons 
included 30 Hindus~ 31 Mohammadans and .5 persons of doubtful 
nationality, while the persons admitted into hospital 
consisted of 172 Hindus, 213 Mohammadans and 6 persons whose 
nationality is not known. 
It is unlikely that these figures represent the total 
casualties resulting from the rioting which occurred between 
the 22nd April and 3rd Mayo 
Police Casualties 
The casualties amongst the Calcutta Police force were 
comparatively slight and consisted of one death and four 
serious injuries., A number of other officers received minor 
injuries, but they were not admitted into hospitals and 
their cases have not been included. 
Arrests 
The total nwnber of persons arrested during the second 
phase of the riots was .567s of whom 398 were Mohammadans 
and 169 Hindus. A large nwnber of these had to be discharged 
for lack of evidence~ but 360 persons, including 272 
Mohammadans and 88 Hindus, were sent up for trial. 
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Individual Assaults 
The chief characterisic of the second phase of the 
riots was the very large number of attacks on individuals 
by small roving bands of the opposite factiong These 
assaults were, almost without exception, committed in 
apparently deserted streets~ out of sight of the police, and 
frequently just after a police patrol had passed and, in 
view of this fact and of the difficulties attaching to 
the control of the form of crime which have been indicated 
in the report on the first phase of the riots, many of the 
assailants succeeded in escaping the legal liabilities of 
their action,. Such methods as were possible, however, were 
adopted. 11 Goondas 11 and other persons known to be addicted 
to this form of crime were rounded up and prosecuted when-
ever evidence subsequently proved available 1 and the 
localities in which the assaults were committed were raided 
irrunediately afterwards for suspicious persons and for 
illegal weapons~ As is apparent from the narrative, these 
measures ultimately achieved their desired effect and the 
numbers of assaults decreased in proportion to the increase 
in the number of arrests. 
Looting 
Instances of looting, however, were considerably less 
frequent than in the first phase of the riots, and 
throughout the whole period of the second phase, only 21 
cases of looting occurred.. In some of these cases, the 
premises were deserted at the time when they were looted and 
the extent of the damage caused, therefore, is difficult to 
compute; whereas in other cases, the value of the property 
looted was almost certainly exaggera~d. The difficulty of 
obtaining even an approximately accurate estimate of the 
total damage still remains, therefore. But it is improbabl~ 
that the figure was less than Rs. 10,000. 
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11 Goondas 11 
As in the first phase, the 11 goonda 11 element of the 
population participated freely in the rioting, and the fact 
that all the available police were fully occupied in the 
suppression of open rioting and other acts of violence made 
it difficult to deal with them effectively~ Such of the 
11 goondas 11 as came actively to notice during the riots were, 
of course, arrested and where evidence was sufficient, were 
placed on trial but the leaders and the main body of the 
11 goondas 11 still remained. 
Despite great difficulties, however, forty-eight bad 
characters including several of the most notorious "goonda 11 
leaders in Calcutta, were arrested, of whom twenty-five 
were proceeded against under the Goondas Act or were 
prosecuted under the ordinary law while forty-three others 
were elected to leave Calcutta. 
Attacks on Religious Institutions 
It is gratifying to record that the series of attacks 
on religious institutions, which formed the most remarkable 
feature of the first phase of the riots, was not repeated 
during the second period. 
Incendiarism 
Instances of incendiarism were also strikingly less 
frequent than in the first phase of the rio~s, and the total 
number of fires duri.ng the second period which can be 
definitely attributed to the rioters was fifteen only. In 
no case did the fires assume serious proportions and they 
were quickly extinguished by the Fire Brigade. The Ambulance 
Department also had considerably less to do than in the first 
phase and the total number of calls made on them was 172. 
Allegations Against Police 
Four separate complaints were lodged in court on the 17th 
May by Mohammadan residents of Mechua Bazar, accusing 
inspector R.D. Khosia of Sukea Street police ... station of the 
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commission of murder~ trespass and assault on the morning 
of the 27th April, shortly after the murder of Head Constable 
Bharat Roy. Three of these complaints were lodged before 
Mr. A.Z. Khan, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, who 
after a preliminary enquiry summoned the Inspector for 
trial, and all three cases are still pending. The fourth 
complaint, which accused the Inspector of murder and trespass~ 
was lodged before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, who 
after examining the complainant's witnesses, dismissed the 
charge as being palpably false and a deliberate attempt to 
implicate the Inspector. 
Charges under sections L~48 and 824f Indian Penal Code, 
were also preferred against Sub-Inspector M.S.A. Ahmed~ of 
Burra Bazar police station by a Marwari 11 bania"s and this 
case is at present being tried by Chief Presidency 
Magistrate. 
Scavenging by Bengali Boys 
One of the worse features of the second phase of the 
riots was the almost entire suspensionr, for a number of days~ 
of the conservancy arrangements in the disturbed area, in 
consequence of the fear of the Hindu sweepers and scavengers 
that they would be attacked by Mahomedans during the 
performance of their duties. The interruption of these 
arrangements threatened a serious general epidemic and 
remedial measures speedily became imperative. As soon as 
they asked for them, the Corporation authorities were 
furnished with police guards to protect such of their 
scavenging staff as could be persuaded to go out and the menace 
was succ~ssfully averted~ In certain instances, Bengali 
youths displayed commendable public spirit by voluntarily 
assisting in removing refuse. 
THE 3RD PHASE OF THE CALCUTTA RIOT 
The following are extracts from the report of the Calcutta 
Police Commissioner on the communal riots in Calcutta from 
the 11th to the 25th July 1926.., The main disturbances during 
the period related to the Rath Jatra procession at Paikpara, 
Rajrajeswari procession at Burrabazar and the Maharram 
processiong After describing the incident of the disturbances? 
the Commissioner described the measures taken toquell the 
riots and the help rendered by the military authorities. 
Casualties showed 28 deaths, (20 Hindus~ 8 Mahomedans) and 
226 wounded 9 ( 94 Hindus and 1 32 Mahomedans) ~ There were 
numerous cases of assault on the Police officers and men, 
but fortunately the injuries were in no case very serious. 
From the fact_ that a large prop6rtion of the 
disturbances took place during the holding of religious 
processions~ it is sefl-evident that numerous conflicts 
between large bodies of opposing communities occurred and 
that the police were frequently faced with the necessity of 
immediately dispersing large crowds of persons who were 
keyed up to the highest pitch of religious and communal 
frenzyo In these circumstances~ the only effective means of 
dispersing the mobs and avoiding more serious conflicts 
was to resort to the use of firearmsQ The first instance of 
firing by the Police was on the 15th July during the 
Rajrajeswari processionQ The Police were forced to open 
fire four times in one dayp the result being one man killed 
and several wounded.. During the Rath procession~ ten 
rounds of ammunition were fired with the result that four 
Mahomedans and two Hindus were wounded., On three other 
occasions, the Police had to fire to disperse the crowd. On 
the 21st July~ during the Muharram procession the Police had 
to fire eight times with the result that three men were 
killed and 13 woundedo The Commissioner states there can 
be no question that firing was necessary in all the above 
instances and in each case, it was both sufficient to secure 
the object in view and at the same time strictly limited to 
the necessities of the situationo There were four instances 
of shooting by members of the public, in which two men were 
killed and five wonnded. 
With reference to the attitude of the Indian Press, 
the Police Commissioner says:- 11After the April riots it 
was hoped that a better spirit and a greater sense of 
responsibility would develop among the editors of the Indian 
Press; but this hope was not realised and journals of both 
communities continued to display a regrettably hostile 
spirit. The inflammatory articles which were published 
by both communities were greatly to be deplored. and. there 
can be little doubt that they contributed. materially to the 
maintenance of the tension which led. to the July riots. 
The disturbances in the Pabna District furnished. ample 
material for bi.tter communal criticism and. the Government 
were compelled. to nnd.ertake a number of prosecutions for 
the articles. In thi's connection, 13 prosecutions were 
sanctioned.. In ten of these cases, the offending journals 
were Hindu and. three were Mahomed.ano There is at present 
an improvement in the general tone of the vernacular press; 
but it is difficult to say-whether this is due to the above 
prosecutions or to the absence of rioting or other materials 
for communal criticism. Experience of the July riots has 
shown, however, that any commnnal disturbancES in Calcutta 
are almost certain to be accompanied. by a flood. of 
inflammatory articles in newspapers of both the contending 
factions and. during the riots a number of new journals were 
started. which are definitely communal in tone. Ordinary 
law clearly provides no adequate check for the suppression 
of publications of this character and its limitations in 
this respect are manifestly fully appreciated. by the 
offending journals 11 • 
As to the dislocation of busin~ss caused. by the riots, 
the Commissioner states the effect on wholesale business 
was more material and. the present riots have still further 
postponed. readjustment of the dislocation caused by the 
previous riots. The small dealers are not prepared. to carry 
large stocks of goods and. bigger merchants are, therefore, 
saddled. with such heavy stocks that they do not feel 
justified. in ordering further supplies. This fact was clearly 
brought out at a meeting of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce 
on the 28th July when it was decided that no Marwari 
merchant should order supplies of piece-goods for a period 
of four months under pain of serious penalties. 
Govt. Communique on 'No Music Before Mosque'. 
The following resolution was issued by the Government of 
Bengal on the 6th June 1926 .-
It is only in recent years that the controversy about 
music before mosques has become important in Calcutta. This 
subject is now attracting a great deal of attention, and, 
in fact, it was the immediate occasion of the disturba.nces 
in April, 1926. On the 17th May His Excellency the Governor 
convened a conference unsuccessfully to arrive at a 
conclusion which would be acceptable to both the Hindu and 
Mahomedan communities.. In dissolving the conference His 
Excellency expressed a hope that the two communities would, 
after mutual discussion, be able to agree and inform him 
of their agreement. This hope has not been fulfilled. 
In matters of religion the Government maintain an 
attitude of strict neutrality, and only intervene when the 
claims of one community clash with those of another, and 
when the persistance in mutually incompatible claims 
threatens to endanger public peaceQ Such a situation now 
exists, and it is necessary, therefore, for the Government 
of Bengal to announce, with as much detail as the circum-
stances of the case permit, the nature of the orders which 
will hereafter be enforced in Calcutta in this respect. 
After referring to the law giving authority to the 
Commissioner of Police for regulating music at processions 
in Calcutta, the Resolution S8o/S:-
It was arranged at the conference on the 17th May that 
written statements regarding the personal experience of 
those who are acquainted with this subject should be received 
and considered by the Government. A large number of 
statements have been received, and they have been carefully 
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considered. The Hindu community claim that music is an 
essential part of their religious observances, and is, 
therefore, a necessary feature at all their religious 
processions. They have claimed the right and asserted the 
practice of playing music before mosques without hindrance 
at all hours of the dayo The Mahomedan community consider 
that music disturbs the devotions of those who are at 
prayer in mosques, and they claim the right and assert the 
practice of the stoppage of music before mosques at all 
hours of the day~ and not only on the occasions of public 
worship. 
There is, there'fore, a definite conflict of statements 
as to the actual practice in the past, and it is clear to the 
Government that this conflict is largely due to the fact 
that very recently the subject has not attracted much 
attention in Calcutta, and the two communities have generally 
been prepared to accommodate one another. These conditions 
no longer prevail, and circumstances have arisen which make 
it necessary for the Government, in the fulfilment of their 
responsibility for the preservation of the peace to arrange 
for a clearer definition of the instructions which will in 
future be observed by those conducting processions in 
Calcutta. 
The terms of the licence will remain unaltered; but, 
in order to prevent uncertainty~ it will be necessary in all 
doubtful cases for the Commissioner of Police to ascerta~n 
and lay down for the guidance of those conducting the 
proc.ession what are the hours of public worship. 
The Government interpret the word, "public worship" as 
meaning recognised congregational worship, and are not 
prepared to admit a claim which has been put forward that the 
time of public worship extends throughout the day. In the 
case of mosques the hours of the five recognised Mahomedan 
prayers will be specified. In other respects the Commissioner 
will, according to the law, be guided by the requirements of 
the public peace and convenience with due regard to 
established practice, In all cases it has not been established 
to the satisfaction of the Government that the general 
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practice has gone beyond the terms of the licence. At the 
same time the Commissioner of Police will retain the fullest 
discretion to secure compliance with such orders as .he may 
give in accordance with the law. If, however , a particular 
procession exercises its privileges in a manner which is 
calculated to give offence that procession and others will 
incur the risk of having its privileges curtailed in future. 
On the other hand, the Government do not intend that such 
restrictions as may be imposed on those conducting Hindu 
processions shall be extended on account of the demand made 
by Mahommedans for the imposition of further restrictions. 
The Government have given special consideration to the case 
of the Nakhoda Mosque in Chitpore Road, and have decided 
that, in consequence of its size, importance and situation, 
an exception to the general rule ;will be made in the case of 
the mosque, and that all processions passing it at any time 
of the day will, when doing so, be required to stop their 
mus::j_c. 
These orders relate only to Calcutta. In other places 
different conditions have resulted in the establishment of 
different practices, and such practices will not be modified 
as a result of these orders. 
The existence of this dissension is a matter of serious 
concern to the Government of Bengal. It is, in their 
opinion, damaging to the reputation of the people of Calcutta 
for good citizenship, and it is the earnest wish of His 
Excellency in Council that at an early date the two 
communities will show greater readiness to meet one another's 
wishes and will thereby restore the amicable relations which 
until quite recent~y have subsisted between them. 
Feeling in the Mofussi.l 
The Government of Bengal, in a communique on the state 
of communal feeling in the mofussil, state:- It is true that 
during the past two months an intense state of anxiety has 
prevailed in many districts, especially in Eastern Bengal; 
that both Hindu and Mahomedan communities have been upset 
by rumours which they have heard, and that there are 
resultant feelings of irritation and distrust which constitute 
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a danger to public peace" But it is also true that during 
this period there have been very rare occasions in the 
whole of the wide area affected in which a breach of the 
peace has occurred. 
While the Government do not minimise the insult to 
religious feeling which is implied by the destruct:lon of 
images, the public should be careful not to over-estimate 
the significance of many of those incidents. In numerous 
cases they have attracted far less attention in the places 
where they have occurred than they have done in the Press. 
There is abundant evidence of the success of the joint 
efforts of Hindus and Mahomedans in preserving peace and 
restoring confidence. 
Instructions have been given to District Magistrates 
to reply promptly to requests to verify stories which are 
referred to them for verification by editors of newspapers. 
If hereafter false rumours are published in the Press without 
enquiry the Government will act on the assumption that those 
wl;1.0 publish them had not reasonable grounds for believing 
in their truth. 
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I Unpublished 
Government of India Files: 
Home Department Political files for the years 1918 to 
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Home Department Public files for the years 1918 to 1936. 
Home Department Judicial files for the years 1918 to 1936o 
Home Department Establishments files for the years 1918 
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preserved have been distributed between the Bengal 
State Archives in Calcutta, the former State Archives 
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Police and Political Department files, the C.I.D. 
office in Calcutta. This latter depository does 
not permit scrutiny of the files they holdg 
Indian Statutory Commission~ 1 Oral Evidence: Bengal' o 
Two undated typewritten volumes of oral evidence 
have been deposited by the State Government at the 
National Library of India, Calcutta. 
Reports on Native Newspapers: 
Bengal 1 Nati've Newspapers and Native Owned English 
Newspapers' , for the period 1918 to 1935o Original 
copies held at the Bengal State Archives in Calcutta. 
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12Ql, Vol.VII, parts I-IV (Bengal Secretariat Press,1902). 
l2!1, Vol.VI, parts I-III (Bengal Secretariat Bookshop, 
1913). 
~' Vol.V, part I; Vol.VI,part I (Bengal Secretariat 
Bookshop, 1923). 
1211, Vol.VI, parts I-II (Bengal Secretariat Bookshop, 
1932). 
Cotton, C.W.E., Handbook of Commercial Information for 
India (Calcutta, Government of India~ 1924). 
Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, 
Statistical Abstracts for India from 1 11-12 to 
1920-21 Calcutta, Government Press~ 1923 ; ibid.~ 
1912-13 to 1921-22 (Calcutta, Government Press, 1924); 
ibido, 1929-30 to 1938-39 (Calcutta, Manager of 
Publications, 1941)o 
Indian Delimitations Committee, Evidence, Vol. III 
(Simla, Government of India, 1936). 
Indian Franchise Committee, Evidence, Vol.IV (Calcutta, 
Government of India, 1932)o 
Indian Franchise Committee, 1918-19, Report (Calcutta, 
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1919). 
Indian Industrial Commission~ 1916-18, Report (Calcutta, 
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1918). 
Royal Commission of Labour in India, Report of the 
Ro al Commission on Labour in India, 1929 (calcutta, 
Government of India, 1931 ; ibid., Evidence, Vols V, 
parts 1-2 1 Vol.XI. 
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Great Britain: 
Indian Statutory Commission, Vol.XVII, part II, 
Selections from Memoranda and Oral Evidence by 
Non-Official§.; Vol.VIII, Memorandum Submitted by 
the Government of Bengal to the Indian Statutory 
Commis.&£g (London, H.M.s.o., 1930). 
Parliamentary Papers: 
.1..2..!.§, Vol.XVIII, Cd 9178~ 'Addresses Presented to his 
Excellency the Viceroy and the Right Honourable, the 
Secretary of State for India~' 
..1.21.2., Vol.IV, Crud 203. 'Joi!lt" Select Committee on 
the Government of India Bill,' Vol.II, 'Minutes of 
Evidence' • 
1919, Vo •• VIII, Cd 9109. 'Report on Indian Consti-
tutional Reforms, 1919.' 
..!..2,gl, Vol.XXVI, Cmd 1261. 'Return Showing the Results 
of Elections in India, 1921. 1 
..1.224, Vol.XVIII, Cmd 2154. 'Return Showing the Results 
of Elections in India, 1923.' 
.l.2£2., Vol.XVIII~ Cmd 2923. 'Return Showing the Results 
ofElections inindia, 1923 and 1926. 1 
.1930-31' Vol oXXIV' Cmd 3922. I Return Showing the 
Results of Elections in India, 1929 and 1930. 1 
193Q'-38, Vol. XXI s Cmd 5589. 'Return Showing the 
Results of Elections in India, 1937•' 
Government of Bengal: 
A Brief Summar of Political Events in the Presidenc 
of Bengal During the Year 19J.Z Calcutta, Government 
Press , 1 9 3 8) • 
Bengal District Gazetteers: published by Bengal 
Secretariat Book Depot~ O'Malley, L.s.s., 
Hooghly District Gazetteer 
(Calcutta, 1912). 
Howrah District Gazetteer 
(Calcutta, 1909). 
24-Pargknas District 
Gazetteer (Calcutta, 1914). 
Bengal Legislative Council, Debates, 1912-1935 
(Calcutta, various Government printing agencies and 
dates). 
Calcutta, Statistical Information, 1901-02 (Calcutta, 
Government Press, 1905). 
Memorandum to the Statutory Commission: Communal 
Re resentation in Le islative and Local Bodies 
Calcutta, Government Press,. n. d. • 
Re art of the Ben al Franchise Committee (Calcutta, 
Bengal Secretariat Press, 1932 • 
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Re12...ort of the Bengal Provincial Committee appoin-ted 
b to assist the 
Statutory Commission Darjeeling, Bengal Government 
Press, 1929). 
Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government 
of Ben al to consider uestions connected with 
Muhammedan Education Calcutta, Government Press, 
1915). 
Re ort of the Committee on Industrial Unrest in 
Bengal. 1221 Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press, 1921) 
Re orts of the Local Governments on the Workin 
the Reformed Constitution% 1223 
Re orts of the Local Governments on the Workin 
the Reformed Constitution, 1924 
Re ort of the Reforms Office 
Calcutta, Government of Bengal Home Department, 
1938). Compiled by R.N. Gilchristo 
Re ort on an En uir into the Standard of LivinK...£[ 
Jute Mill Workers in Bengal Calcutta, Bengal 
Secretariat Book Depot, 1930). Compiled by Dr A.C. 
Choudhury. 
Februar Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press, 
1891 • Compiled by H.F.J.T. Maguire. 
Re ort on the Administration of Ben al 
Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press, 
every annual issue until 1935-36. 
Re ort on the General Elections to the Legislative 
Assembly in Bengal, 1234 Calcutta, Bengal Goverment 
Press, 1935). 
Sinha, N. ( ed.). Freedom Movement in Ben a.l 04. 
Who's Who (Calcutta, Education Department, 
Terrorism Civil Disobedience and the Calcutta 
Corporation Calcutta, Bengal Government Press, 
19 33-34). 
B. PAPERS OF ORGANISATIONS 
I Unpublished 
All India Congress Committee [AICC], 1918-37• Held at 
the Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhio 
Calcutta Corporation, Minutes,1913-36o Held at the 
Calcutta Corporation. 
N.M. Joshi Papers~ 1926-35. Held at the Nehru Memorial 
Library, New Delhi. 
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II Published 
Bengal Anti-Communal Award Committee, Report (Calcutta; 
The Secretaries, 1939). 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, A Centenary 
Survey, 1853-1953 (Calcutta, The Chamber, 1953). 
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